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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores French colonial perceptions of 
Vietnamese- cultural identity derived from the fusion of 
collective projections of European Self and Asian Other 
with the French fallacy of Vietnam as "little China". Colo-
nialism mythologised these perceptions to meet the personal 
needs of French officials (and others) to feel securely in 
control of their alien Asian environment. Myths of Self and 
Other appeared early in colonial Cochinchina, and persisted 
in their initial form until the twentieth century when pol-
itical disturbances like the 1908 anti-tax movement in the 
Protectorate of Annam (Central Vietnam) exposed certain 
shortcomings. In Annam, the subsequent need to neutralise 
anxieties about the arcane power of "Annamite tradition" 
prompted members of the Hue-based ~mis du Vieux Hue to up-
data- existing colonial myths during the later 1910s. 
Their revision resulted in the definitive versions of 
two politically significant colonial myths that defined 
Vietnamese (and French colonial) identity _for the rest of 
the colonial period. They are called in this thesis the 
myths of "old, traditional Annam", and of the union of 
French genius and Annamite soul. So successful were they 
that their arguments continued to shape French (and west-
ern) understanding of Vietnam and the Vietnamese long into 
the post-colonial era. These myths, and the legitimating 
"little China" model they rested on, seemed to most obser-
vers to be objectively verifiable by recourse to colonial 
studies of Vietnamese history, society and customs. But, as 
this thesis argues, that influential body of understanding 
owed far less to Vietnam than to the needs and assumptions 
of an imported European discourse, in which unconscious 
collective projections of French Self and Vietnamese Other 
played the dominant role. 
The thesis examines that discourse, and the myths and 
projections at its heart. It begins by sketching in outline 
the main political trends in the century before French in-
vasion as a framework for assessing the accuracy of Chinese 
model interpretations of Vietnam at the time. It then moves 
to colonial Annam, where it considers the concrete circum-
stances in which the compensatory development of political 
myths of Self and Other occurred. It then concludes with 
historical examples of collective projection and political 
myth, first analysing the colonial model of a Sinic mon-
archy, and then French images of their colonial selves, and 
of the Vietnamese Other. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
POLITICAL MYTH AND COLLECTIVE PROJECTION: SOME PRELIMINARY 
REMARKS 
Introduction 
1 
This thesis considers two related colonial political 
myths, and the collective projections of Self and Other at 
their heart, that together played a significant role in 
constructing the French colonial model of Vietnamese cultur-
al identity. By extension, they have influenced much western 
understanding of Vietnamese history, culture, and society 
as well. They are called here the myths of old, traditional 
Annam, and of the union of French genius and Annamite soul. 
Though rooted most deeply in the soil of colonial Annam, or 
Central Vietnam (Trung-ky), both myths spread far beyond it. 
By the end of World War One, aspects of their narratives and 
arguments circulated as common currency throughout the rest 
of the colony, automatically tendered in explanation of 
almost anything about the Vietnamese, and much about the 
French in Vietnam also. 
This widespread and unquestioned acceptance reflected 
the vital function these myths performed in colonial 
society. Although apparently focused on the Vietnamese past 
and futur~, like all living political myths their real con-
cern lay with the present circumstances of their adherents, 
members of the French colonial community. For them, the 
myths met two important needs. First, they acted to neutral-
ise and demystify the alien environment by defining Vietnam-
ese identity in terms of acceptable, preconceived French 
2 
perceptions. Arising from this, they defined and delimited 
the political relations possible between colonial French and 
Vietnamese in ways designed to sustain the necessary illu-
sion of colonial supremacy and superiority over their Viet-
namese subjects. In other words, the myths acted to mediate 
and naturalise the unequal relationship between European 
Self and Asian Other in colonial Vietnam. 
Considered at the general level, there was nothing uni-
que to the French in Vietnam about this. Nineteenth century 
colonial imperialists used political myths of Self and Other 
universally to explain and justify their attempt at European 
(or western) dominance o~ the world at large. Along with 
similar economic and political structures of exploitation in 
conquered and colonised areas, expanding metropolitan powers 
also imposed shared cultural convictions of European supe-
riority and non-European inferiority. As a result, all such 
colonial myths bore strong family resemblances, growing as 
they did from the great nineteenth century European imperial 
myth sanctioning the White Man's duty to civilise the world 
in his own image. This parent myth drew on two rich sources 
of argument and verification. First came the treasure house 
of stereotypes, preconceptions, and unconscious prejudices 
horded up over centuries to distinguish Europe from "the 
East'',~ or civilised Europeans from savages. The second, and 
probably even more powerfully persuasive at the time, was 
the intellectual and moral support lent to colonial domina-
tion by the "objective" findings of new nineteenth century 
~ As analysed by Edward W. Said in Orientalism (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). The model best fits the 
Muslim countries, however. 
human sciences. The racist dictates of biological deter-
minism found their way into all later nineteenth century 
European_ imperial myths, whether primarily metropolitan or 
colonial in focus. 
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But although these generic resemblances existed, life 
in the colonies caused the metropolitan imperial myth to 
fragment over time in response to the needs of Europeans 
confronted by quite different local societies. It set off a 
process of naturalisation which increasingly camouflaged the 
metropolitan provenance of the myths of Self and Other with 
assumed local colours. With their foreign roots buried by 
the accretions of time and experience, these imported per-
ceptions came to appear completely locally-derived and, as 
such, an accurate reflection of the nature of the colonised 
people. These assumed truths about the colonised Other often 
then went on to play a leading role in the colonial politic-
al arena. 
This thesis considers that general process in relation 
to certain related political myths enshrining collective 
projections of French Self and Vietnamese Other in nineteen~ 
th and early twentieth century Vietnam. It traces their 
intellectual roots, and follows their evolution from initial 
establishment in early colonial Cochinchina to their growing 
localisation in response to events and circumstances in the 
politically anomalous Protectorate of Annam. Tracking these 
increasingly well-disguised versions of imported political 
myths and projections through their new Asian environment 
allows us to uncover hidden examples of their influence on 
people and events, and thus to suggest something of their 
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effect on colonial Vietnamese history. But the method yields 
more than this: it exposes the fundamental flaw in most 
colonial era French interpretations of Vietnamese history 
and culture. By uncovering the gulf between the influential 
colonial image of Vietnam as little China and the historical 
realities of pre-colonial Vietnam, the approach reveals the 
extent to which the colonial model derived from preconceived 
conclusions, and myths and projections of Self and Other. It 
locates the image of Vietnamese identity, as constructed by 
the colonial French and subsequently accepted in western-
scholarship, within its proper context as a colonial dis-
course. That is, to borrow Michel Foucault's definition, it 
is revealed as part of a set of 'practices that systemati-
cally form the objects of which they speak' by using signs 
'to do more than ••• designate things'. 2 
But before moving to these issues, some basic remarks 
about certain central and interrelated concepts that recur 
throughout the study might be useful. They are political 
m~th, the projection of European Self and Colonial Other, 
and the French fallacy of Vietnam as little China. The newt 
sections introduce each in turn. 
Political Myth 
Numerous theories of myth abound that define it from 
religious, psychological, semiological, or sociological 
2 Michel Foucault (trans A.M. Sheridan Smith), The 
Archeology of Knowledge (London and New York: Routledge, 
1991), p.49. 
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perspectives. Detailed evaluations of the various theories 
can be found elsewhere~ and need not be replicated here. For 
our purposes a working definition suffices. Broadly, when we 
speak of myth in this thesis we refer to a narrative form of 
practical thinking that explains a situation or an event and 
argues for, or prescribes, a course of action in the world 
as a consequence of that explanation. 4 Every myth, there-
fore, has a protagonist and a plot, usually a highly drama-
tic one. Believers tend to accept its account as true be-
cause it fits or helps make sense of their own experiences, 
while at the same time proposing uncomplicated but apparent-
ly appropriate solutions to life's problems. Political myth 
varies from this in two main ways. First, because it tells 
the story of a political society, its protagonist is always 
collective, a group rather than an individual. Second, its 
narrative interprets the group's current circumstances and 
validates its contemporary political choices by reference to 
history, by depicting group members as heroic actors engaged 
in a vast historical drama within which they form the vital 
link between (imagined) future and (imagined) past. 
Political myths always focus on the present. No matter 
how far back in time their tales may range, or what other 
peoples may feature in them, political mythologists are in-
variably most concerned with contemporary issues. They 
3 Short analyses can be found in G.S. Kirk, Myth. Its 
Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures (Cam-
bridge University Press, 1971); Henry Tudor, Political Myth 
(London: Pall Mall, 1972), Chapters 1-2; or Pierre Maranda 
(ed), Mythology (Penguin Books, 1972). 
4 The definition that follows paraphrases Tudor, Political 
Myth, pp.121-39. 
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appeal to history without being historians: for them, the 
present sums up the whole purpose and meaning of the past. 
They ignore objectivity and balance in their historical 
references, deny the existence of historical contingency and 
accident, and even ~ispense with the concept of unilinear 
time. To political myth-makers the past mainly represents as 
a valuable source of raw materials, to be quarried for em-
blematic incidents or individuals that, stripped of context, 
can be brandished as proof of their basic premises. By using • 
methods that identify a part with the whole, that ionfuse 
form with function and theory with practice, or that ignore 
discontinuities between historical eras, political mytholog-
ists smooth out the contradictions and awkward exceptions 
thrown up by the complexities of human life. When history is ~ 
misused in this way, as Levi-Strauss remarked, in endows 
myth with patterns that appear 'timeless'.~ They are achiev- • 
ed by the myth's distiling the past into a tiny number of 
essences, whose perennial nature is demonstrated by personal 
experience, or by appealing to a grab-bag of carefully 
chosen, but otherwise unconnected, examples. 
Mythological thinking displays an omnivorous appetite. 
It can digest any non-mythic mode of explanation, from his-
torical analysis to scientific hypotheses or analytical 
models. 0 The process naturalises them into a self-evident, 
~ Claude Levi-Strauss (trans and ed Claire Jacobson and 
Brooke Grundfest Schoepf), 'The Structural Study of Myth', 
in Structural Anthropology (Penguin University Books, 1972), 
p.209. 
• For example, Mary Midgley has analysed the way socio-
biology has mythologised Darwinian evolutionary theory in 
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unarguable "common sense" which illuminates past, present, 
and future with 'a clarity which is not that of an explana-
tion but ~hat of a statement of fact' • 7 We should therefore 
be prepared to find political myth-makers embellishing their 
narratives with references to history, science, economics, 
social theory, philosophy, psychology, religion, or whatever 
else serves; but to do so in a way that betrays their real 
purpose. That is, they treat these elements as if they were 
facts in themselves, weighty authorities whose pronounce-
ments independently verified the prescriptions of the myth. 
These methodological flaws usually make exposing mytho-
logical narratives disguised as history relatively easy. 
Coming to grips with the actual myth itself poses greater, 
and ultimately frustrating, problems for a historian, 
however. To begin with, political myths are evasive in form. 
Although collective by nature, their existence depends on 
individual human adherents, who routinely vary the story or 
argument according to their own c:irc:umstanc:es, or the c:hang-
ing needs of their times. Thus no powerful living political 
myth ever exists in a single "authorised version". Rather, 
their plastic: and polymorphic: forms defy a simple or 
rigourous categorisation. A myth can be stretched, twisted, , 
doubled back on itself, overlapped with other myths, and 
even rendered self-contradictory in parts without ever call-
ing its essential truth into question for believers. Con- • 
sequently, as Raoul Girardet recognised, political myths can 
Evolution as a Religion. Strange Hopes and Stranger Fears 
(London and New York: Methuen, 1985). 
7 Roland Barthes (trans Annette Lavers), Mythologies 
(Granada Books, 1973), p.143. 
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never be expected to display anything like the intellectual 
or analytical consistency associated with systems of politi-
cal thought.a 
More frustrating than dealing with the potentially rio-
taus inconsistencies of myth, however, is the strong sense 
that, past a certain point, an outside observer can never 
truly apprehend the spirit of the phenomenon. Powerful myths 
are not only delicate and elusive by nature; they are also 
charged with unconscious elements. They belong to the realm 
that Girardet has called the 'imaginaire politique', 9 where 
they feed on collective emotions and personal passions, on 
the hopes, dreams, and memories, on the loyalties, and be-
trayals that so often motivate individuals but so rarely 
receive their due in historical accounts - and for good rea-
son. They exist, therefore, in a dimension that always re-
mains in part barred to non-communicants. While historians 
might dissect a particular political myth to reveal its 
content and arguments, or analyse its development in a given 
time and place by reference to its ability to satisfy exi-
gent psychological needs or material interests, they can 
never proceed to lay bare its inner vitality as experienced 
by true believers. About this crucial factor the historian 
can only ever speculate, not elucidate. To a genuinely out-
side observer, all political myths, no matter how generous 
or noble, are distorted by fanciful or fantastic elements 
that caricature, rather than comprehend, the complexities of 
Q Raoul Girardet, Mythes et mythologiques politiques 
(Paris: Editions du Seuil,,1986), pp.15-18. 
Ibid, p.9. 
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human life. And if a particular myth stirs no sympathy in 
such an observer, it becomes easier in turn to doubt the 
sincerit~ of those who professed to believe it. Its presence 
may be glossed over or ignored in historical accounts, and 
believers' actions put down to expediency or self interest. 
Since it cannot be rationally explained, myth risks being 
explained away as something else, as, for example, false 
consciousness, or a device to endow narrow sectional inte-
rests with a broader social legitimacy and respect. 
Clearly, as our definition recognised, political myths 
do defend and advance the interests of particular groups. It 
is equally true that myths may be appropriated and exploited 
by individuals, who do not themselves truly believe in them, 
to manipulate the lives of those who do. But this can never 
be the whole story: powerful living myths defy such simple 
reductionism. They contain an extra dimension that these 
formulas cannot accommodate. Political and other myths can, 
and do, inspire believers to sacrifice whatever is required, 
up to and including their own lives, in their drive to rea-
lise the myth in the material world. As Jung explained, when 
such a myth invades peoples' minds, it compells them 'to 
live the irrational in their own lives, even devoting their 
loftiest. ideals and their best wits to expressing its mad-
ness in the most perfect form'. 10 This numinous power has 
exploded catastrophically onto the historical stage too 
often in recent centuries for historians to deny or under-
1 ° C.G. Jung (trans R.F.C. Hull), 'On the Psychology of 
the Unconscious', in Two Essays on Analytical Psychology 
(Bollingen Series XX, Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 
94. 
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rate its effects, even though its motive force ultimately 
defies our rational tools of analysis. Even the individuals 
transform.ed by profound mythic experiences cannot adequately 
convey its meaning to others, even when consciously trying 
to do so: 'how impossible', as Owen Chadwick has perceptive-
ly commented, does 'the autobiographer find it to describe, 
intelligibly to others, what moved his mind at the deepest 
well'.~~ How much harder for historians, usually at several 
removes from their subjects, to elucidate the experience of 
a group when a myth transmutes beliefs of its members about 
themselves, the world, and their rightful place in it. 
Faced with the dilemma of trying to explain the inex-
plicable, Girardet resorted to paradox. 'Myth', he wrote, 
'can only be understood if it is intimately lived, but to 
live it forbids rendering an objective account of it.·~2 As 
historians we must accept that in the analysis of political 
myth there would always be doors that could never be forced. 
Nothing in this thesis seeks to dispute that conclusion. As 
Chapter Six shows, we can relate what people said they be-
lieved, and describe some of the apparent links between be-
lief and action; but beyond that we necessarily leave large 
blank areas. Evidence for the existence of the myths as out-
lined litters contemporary sources; but when we come to 
individual adherents, we can only guess to what extent, or 
indeed whether, any particular man truly believed its 
prescriptions. In my judgement, active and politically sig-
~~ Owen Chadwick, The Secularisation of the European Mind 
in the 19th Century (Cambridge: Canto, 1990), p.13. 
Girardet, Mythes, p.23. 
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nificant members of the Friends of Old Hue (Amis du Vieux 
Hue) like Pierre Pasquier or Leon Sogny were convinced that 
the Frencn colonial myths conveyed truths about themselves, 
and about the Vietnamese. We find them repeatedly advancing 
basic elements of the myths, in public and private, to ex-
plain contemporary events and circumstances. They present 
themselves as sincere believers, and I have accepted them as 
such. I cannot prove, however, that at heart they were not 
cynical manipulators of convenient colonial dogmas or, as 
their contemporary, Albert Sarraut, so often seems from the 
sources, simply full of humbug. 
This caveat concludes our comments on political myth. 
• We turn now to unconscious collective projection. 
European Self and Colonial Other: 13 Some Remarks 
The pitfalls of exploring political myth pale beside 
those in the enormous subject of collective projections of 
Self and Other, even when restricted to the Other in the age 
of colonial imperialism. The daunting size and scope of the 
field, and its relative newness in Asian studies, means few 
specialist monographs exist exploring its features. 14 This 
13 Self and Other in this thesis refer only to unconscious 
collective projections that function within particular human 
groups as a means of defining and dividing off their own es-
sential nature by comparison with another, different group. 
"Self" here, therefore, should not be confused with the 
Jungian archetype of the Self, the psychic prime mover of 
individuation according to analytical psychology. 
14 Two early studies on the psychology of colonialism 
touch on some of the issues: O. Mannoni (trans Pamela Powes-
land), Prospero and Caliban. The Psychology of Colonisation 
(London: Methuen, 1956) in reference to Madagascar; and Al-
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section therefore seeks to provide a modest introduction to 
the subject by sketching in broad strokes the evolution of 
the domin_ant nineteenth century image of European Self and 
non-European Other 1 e to serve as background to the discuss-
ion in Chapter Six of the colonial political myths based on 
projections of French Self and Vietnamese Other. We will 
begin at the most basic level. 
In individual psychology, awareness of the "not-I" as 
separate and autonomous requires the development of con-
sciousness to the point where a person recognises and fully 
accepts that others have a sense of self, of being "I", 
which is not merely an extension of one's own. But, as Esth-
er Harding has noted, even 'this state of consciousness is 
by no means always achieved' • 1 • Where individuals fail to 
develop, or lose sight of, an active awareness of the auto-
bert Memmi (trans Howard Greenfeld), The Coloniser and the 
Colonised (New York: Orion Press, 1965) for North Africa. 
Raymond Dawson, The Chinese Chameleon (Oxford University 
Press, 1967) is excellent for China, while Syed Hussein Ala-
tas has considered island South-east Asia in The Myth of the 
Lazy Native (London: Frank Cass, 1977). V.G. Kiernan survey-
ed the field rather generally in Lords of Human Kind. Black 
Man, Yellow Man and White Man in an Age of Empire (London, 
1969). John W. Dower in War Without Mercy. Race and Power in 
the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986) raised many 
of the issues, but mainly in regard to America and Japan, 
both metropolitan powers in colonial terms. Two outstanding 
studies that deal with earlier colonial societies must also 
be mentioned: Tzvetan Todorov (trans Richard Howard), The 
Conquest of America. The Question of the Other (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1984); and Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over 
Black. American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 1968). 
1 e For a general history, especially in terms of its 
racial component, see Thomas F. Gossett, Race: The History 
of an Idea in America (New York: Schocken Books, 1973); or 
Jordan, White Over Black, passim. 
1 • M. Esther Harding, The ·r· and the 'Not-I'. A Study in 
the Development of Consciousness (Bollingen Series LXXIX, 
Princeton University Press, 1965), p.15. 
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nomy of the "not-I", they inevitably risk stumbling uncon-
sciously into situations in which their views of, and reac-
tions to,. other people are distorted by unconscious self-
projections by their own psyches. In these circumstances, 
'we fail to differentiate between the "I" and the objective 
"non-I", and, in addition, we fail to differentiate between 
the ''I", the conscious ego, and the rest of the psyche, 
which, because it is unconscious to us, is seen only in 
projection to the outer world' • .:1. 7 
These subjettive elements and unconscious projections 
also obtrude themselves between an individual's perception 
of the outer world and its material objects~ so that often 
'the object is not seen as it is in itself, but only in a 
more or less distorted form• • .:1.e Where strongly held convic-
tions are concerned, Harding identified a similar process 
occurring in the inner realm: 'just as we are convinced that 
what we see as the external object is as we see it and not 
otherwise, so is our conviction regarding the validity of 
our inner vision unshakeable'. In this connection she re-
marked: 
We do not fight a man to uphold a certainty, but 
only to force him to accept our belief, our con-
viction, of the truth ••• Fanaticism rests not on 
fact but on psychological projection. It is the 
correlate of doubt, not certainty ••• 
If we move from the individual to the social level, we 
find unconscious projections show themselves in collective 
forms. At its simplest, this means that they appear as the 
.:1.7 Ibid, .p.30 • 
.:1.8 All quotes, Ibid, p.37 • 
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received ideas and unquestioned prejudices, the "common 
sense" and conventional wisdom of a particular time and 
culture. But they can also attach themselves to specific 
groups or categories of people, as Jung pointed out. 'Col-
lective contents, such as religious, philosophical, politi-
cal and social conflicts, select projection-carriers of a 
corresponding kind - Freemasons, Jesuits, Jews, Capitalists, 
Bolsheviks, Imperialists, etc' .i• We could also add race, 
ethnicity, and gender to Jung's examples of projection-
carriers listed here. And as this list suggests, collective 
projections need not be benign in their influence. In their 
more extreme manifestations, the collective eruption of un-
conscious contents can induce a sort of shared delusion in 
which people act on their convictions with great enthusiasm 
and resolution, for good or ill alike. 20 The religious war-
fare and persecutions of the Reformation and Counter-Refer-
mation in sixteenth and seventeenth century western Europe 
illustrate the point. We will consider one special instance 
of it, the witch plague. 
The witch persecution started as an attempt to enforce 
conformity on poorly assimilated and heterodox mountain 
communities whose way of life distinguished them from the 
lowland majority. But it quickly changed. Dominican inquis-
itors transmogrified the backwoods heretics into the demonic 
Other as they, the inquisitors, elaborated a vast, system-
i• C.G. Jung (trans R.F.C. Hull), Flying Saucers. A Modern 
Myth of Things Seen in the Sky (Bollingen Series, Princeton 
University Press, 1978), p.14. 
20 Jung, 'Psychology of the Unconscious', pp.64-79, and 
90-113. 
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atic demonology of Satan's kingdom, the mirror-image of 
their own beliefs, from fragments of confessions. Having un-
covered the perversion in one place, it soon appeared else-
where as people learnt to apply the new witch mythology to 
other idiosyncratic or non-conformist behaviour. So compel!-
ing was the unconscious suggestion at its core that sponta-
neous confessions of self-proclaimed witches often conformed 
to its least details. Although not uncommon in such situa-
tions, reasonable men at the time took the phenomenon as 
proof positive that the new mythology accurately reflected 
social reality. 2 i 
In their more everyday guise as social facts, clearly 
pre-existing and external to individuals, collective projec-
tions play a major role in socialisation. They help to re-
gularise cultural categories and to define a person's place 
in society. But however objective, certain, or self-evident 
such projections appear to those under their influence, they 
can only ever be derived from unprovable convictions rather 
than demonstrable facts •.. Their unconscious roots show in the 
.. •.. .. . ·. . 
emotional, irrational, and even fanatical reactions inspired 
by serious dissent from their assumed truths. Yet such 
challenges become inevitable over time, as social and other 
changes erode the projection's ability to summarise success-
fully the world, or some aspect of it. 22 
2 i H.R. Trevor-Roper, The European Witch-Craze of the 16th 
and 17th Centuries (Penguin Books, 1969), pp.30-54. 
22 C.G. Jung (trans R.F.C. Hull), Aion. Researches into 
the Phenomenology of the Self (Bollingen Series XX, Prince-
ton University Press, 1959), pp.3-35. 
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Where conflicts arise among overlapping but antithetic-
al projections as, for instance, between competing political 
ideologies, the tensions inherent in defending unprovable 
beliefs as absolute truths rise to the surface. Here their 
own shortcoming and contradictions are liable to provoke 
change in the beliefs themselves, as the political history 
of the last two centuries suggests. But where tensions are 
buried deep beneath the unconscious acceptance of the major-
ity, the world-view projected might endure for a very long 
time through a slow adaptation of non-essential elements to 
changing circumstances. Unconscious projections that touch 
the instinctive lives of everyone, or which structure and 
organise social power, seem to be among the most persistent 
and adaptable, as witnessed by the re-emergence of the col-
lective projection of sacred kingship in the twentieth cent-
ury onto projection-carriers like Hitler and Stalin. 23 Simi-
larly, the great paired archetypal opposites of Male and 
Female and of Self and Other, intertwined at the foundation 
of western European power structures from th~ twelfth cen-
tury at least, were also able to sustain the same hierarch-
ical forms for seven centuries, despite the enormous changes 
that occurred in European consciousness and in the social 
and material world. Only with the appearance of modern cons-
23 Edmond Rochedieu, 'Le caractere sacre de la souverain-
ete a la lumiere de la psychologie collective', in The 
Sacred Kingship (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1956), pp.48-53. For a 
discussion of archetypes in modern history see Ira Progoff, 
Jung's Psychology and Its Social Meaning (New York: Double-
day Anchor, 1973), pp.259-80. 
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ciousness in the mid-nineteenth century24 has their tradi-
tional expression in terms of superiority (Male/ Self) and 
inferiority (Female/Other) even been seriously challenged, 
although by no means replaced. 
Two other general points should also be raised here. 
First, when we speak of the Other, or of Otherness, we never 
refer simply to strangers, to people unlike one's own who 
may become familiar with time and experience. Nor do we ref-
er to the ordinary subjective sense of the incidental supe-
riority of one's own group or people. North American Indian 
tribes, for example, regarded early white missionaries and 
settlers as manifestly inferior beings; but if the strangers 
conformed to tribal customs during their stay they were en-
tirely accepted, and could even attain high status. 2~ But 
even highly acculturated Indians never won similar accept-
ance in white society, because social conformity alone could 
not dissolve their projected Otherness. 2 • Their ethnic dif-
ference from the majority had been infused with a meaning 
over which they exercised no control, because it depended on 
the definitions of the (European) Self. 
As this example indicates, the definition of Otherness 
is inextricably bound to that of the Self. Projected Other-
24 The characterisation of modern consciousness used below 
derives from Michel Foucault, The Order of Things. An 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 
1973). My brief references do no justice to his evidence. 
2 e James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cul-
tures in Colonial North America (Oxford University Press, 
1985), Chapter 5 for Canada and Chapter 13 for white Indians 
further south. 
2 • Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr, Salvation and the Savage (Uni-
versity of Kentucky Press, 1965), pp.87-88 and 123-24. 
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ness arises when the Self refuses to accord an autonomous 
identity and equality of human worth to people who hold (or 
are assumed to hold) values and beliefs significantly diffe-
rent from, or at odds with, those of its own (culture, gen-
der, class, or ethnic group). Instead, the Self defines 
these Others in its own terms, as either the (imperfect) an-
alogues of, or inferior opposites, quality by quality, to 
its own idealised self-image. As Tzvetan Todorov recognised, , 
the basis of this denial lies in egocentrism, 'in the iden-
tifica~ion of our own values with values in general, of our 
I with the universe' . 27 
The sixteenth century Spanish conquest of America pro-
vides a classic example of this dual denial. 29 It began with 
Columbus. On the occasions when the Admiral saw the native 
Americans as human beings like himself he automatically pro-
jected his own values onto them, discovering in them a pre-
dilection for Christian conversion that matched his own 
proselytising purpose. 29 Early sympathisers like Las Casas, 
too, defended the Indians for their alleged Christian vir-
tues (humility, truthfulness, obedience, chastity, disinte-
rest in wealth), virtues so conspicuously lacking in the 
conquistadors themselves.~0 At other times, however, Colum-
bus treated the Indians as living objects to be disbursed to 
27 Todorov, Conquest, p.43. 
2~ As did contemporaneous English reactions to their init-
ial encounters with African Negroes. See Jordan's perceptive 
account in White Over Black, pp.3-43. 
Todorov, Conquest, pp.41-46. 
Ibid, pp.168-82 for Las Casas. 
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his followers as rewards or added as specimens to his 
collection of exotic flora and fauna for shipment back to 
Spain. 3 ~ Later conquistadors perfected this form of dehum-
anising inferiority. In their eyes, the colonised Others 
became an expendable natural resource to be ruthlessly ex-
plaited in the quest for quick wealth, or a source of amuse-
ment for men who discovered that in the New World, far from 
the effective control of Spanish law and morality, they were 
free to kill or torture the local people on impulse, or for 
entertainment~ 3~ At·no time, even by their champions, were 
native Americans perceived as having the least right to 
their own identity and autonomy. 
But like political myth, with which it is so intimately 
involved, the projection of Self and Other is never uniform 
and totalitarian. Context matters. This brings us to our ~ 
second point: distance (geographical, social, cultural) 
affects the nature of the projection. The further removed 
from the physical presence of Others, the neater and more 
self-contained the image appears. At the greatest remove, 
Otherness may dissolve into symbolic, romantic, or imagina-
Ibid, pp.48-9. 
3 = Ibid, pp.139-43. As Todorov noted, they pioneered the 
great contextual gulf between metropole and colonies that 
made massacre 'intimately linked to colonial wars waged far 
from the metropolitan countries' [p.144] where the projected 
inferiority of the local people ensured Europeans felt few 
social or ethical restraints in their regard. In the 1885-86 
conquest war in Central Vietnam, for example, French army 
units routinely killed almost all Vietnamese surrendering 
under arms, behaviour utterly unacceptable in Europe. [For 
examples, see Charles Gosselin, L'Empire d'Annam (Paris: 
Perrin, 1904), pp.280-84 and 289.] It was only when inferior 
Otherness became projected on European groups like Slavs and 
Jews in World War II that comparable scenes recurred in mod-
ern Europe itself. 
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tive representations which, though sparked by the idea of 
the Other, only ever reflect the interests and needs of the 
Self. Ed~ard Said's analysis of Orientalism provides a fine 
example of the way Europeans at home used other civilised 
peoples as a social mirror in which they could glimpse asp-
ects of themselves (or their Biblical heritage) from unusual 
angles. 33 From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, 
almost all Europe's lovingly fashioned dreams and images of 
"the East" grew out of European needs, desires, and enthusi-
asms34 that bore little, or often no, connection to the 
living reality of these areas - and even less to the rest of 
Asia. 3~ 
Colonial administrators, however, found themselves in a 
very different world, in particular those who arrived during 
the decades in which the colony was being established. 
Although mentally garbed in the same Orientalist preconcep-
tions as their metropolitan colleagues, many found their 
experiences unravelled the neat borders, and sometimes even 
33 For examples of this among nineteenth century French 
writers on Vietnam, see Peter Baugher, "The Contradictions 
of Colonialism: The French Experience in Indochina, 1860-
1940", PhD, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1980, pp.20-
122. 
34 By over-generalising Said missed the change that began 
with sixteenth century overseas expansion. In specific cases 
it can be striking. Cleopatra, who thereafter came to symbo-
lise the East of desire had, ironically, been for the previ-
ous two centuries touted as 'a paradigm of female goodness 
••• who proved her virtue by committing the one act capable 
of absolving a woman from the baseness inherent in her gen-
der', suiciding for the love of a man~ Lucy Hughes-Hallett. 
Cleopatra. Histories, Dreams and Distortions (New York: Har-
per and Row, 1990), p.113. 
3~ European fascination with China was equally a matter of 
'Europe's impressions ••• reflect[ing] Europe's own needs', 
according to Dawson, Chameleon, p.115. 
; 
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tore holes in the fabric itself. Far from Europe, without 
the structures, institutions, and routines of European 
civilisatjon and living among an alien people, the 
complexities of their situation could erode metropolitan 
certainties. 36 Unstable extremes could develop. Men might 
become caricatures of their official personas; or unbalanced 
eccentrics. Others conceived a romantic desire to win the 
respect and affection of the native peoples. 37 As a local 
colonial society developed and put down roots, parochial 
attachments might also grow to the point that colonial 
priorities could outweigh metropolitan interests: a French 
Governor-General of Indochina might declare himself in 1928 
to a Parisian audience as the 'representative and defender 
of the interests of the colony vis-a-vis the metropole' • 3 e 
And more to the point in this context, the simplistic impor-
ted images of Self and Other might fracture under pressure 
~· Although not referring to a colony, Robert A. Rosen-
stone' s Mirror in the Shrine. American Encounters with Meiji 
Japan (Harvard University Press, 1988) contains fascinating 
glimpses of the impact that living in a traditional Asian 
civilisation during early western contact could have on in-
dividual westerners. 
~7 The difference between first and later generations is 
especially explored in Mannoni, Prospero, Part Three. In 
early colonial Cochinchina, for example, several young mili-
tary officers turned officials felt such solicitude for the 
local people, in the wondering account of a mid-1930s colo-
nial commentator, that they dearly wanted 'to appear [to 
them] better than their mandarins had been'. J. Perin, 'La 
vie et l'oeuvre de Lura', BSEI (ns), XV, 1-2 (1940), p.23. 
ze Though under French sovereignty. Pierre Pasquier, 'La 
Politique indigene en Indochine', NP, 136, Jan-Feb, 1929, 
p.2. Said rejects the possibility of these differing pers-
pectives, even where his own evidence insists on them. See, 
for example, his failure to explain Cramer's complaint that 
colonial administrators may 'treat subjects of local inte-
rest in a manner calculated to damage, or even jeopardise, 
Imperial interests'. Orientalism, pp.44-45 (my emphasis). 
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to reveal perplexing human strangers beneath. When that 
happened, even the big stick of colonial power might prove 
insufficient to calm the anxieties generated in the colonial 
psyche, as we will see in later chapters. 
Let us now turn to the historical development of the 
common nineteenth century projection of white European Self 
and coloured colonial Other. 
Before the discovery of America, the awareness of Self 
and Other had been framed in religious terms that created an 
absolute gulf between Christian believer and non-believing 
Other, whether heretics within or Muslims without. But from 
the sixteenth century, contact with peoples utterly unsus-
pected in Europe, neither mentioned in the Bible nor in 
ancient legend and fable, initiated the slow evolution of a 
secular projection of European superiority that, by the 
nineteenth century, had become as absolute in its claims as 
the medieval formulation. We will briefly chart its 
evolution. 
Arguments over the nature of the indigenous Americans 
provoked the first steps in the secularisation of the Euro-
pean self-image. Although by 1537 crown and Church had re-
cognised the Indians as 'true men ••• capable of receiving 
the Christian faith', who should not therefore be enslav-
ed, 39 neither colonists in South America nor certain think-
ers in Europe agreed. The dispute culminated with the famous 
1550 debate between Las Casas and the Spanish scholar, 
39 Todorov, Conquest, p.161. The projection of identity 
worked in the Indians favour, for the Pope had been con-
vinced partly because, 'as we have been informed', they 
'eagerly hurr[ied] to convert'. 
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Sepulveda. Both argued from within the contemporary epistem-
ological configuration that relied on establishing resembl-
ances betwe~p one thing and another. 40 To Las Casas the 
radical egalitarianism of the faith spiritually united all 
believers, placing Indians and Spaniards at the same end of 
the Christian/infidel dichotomy. (No-one at the time felt 
the same about black Africans, who were seen as candidates 
for slavery, not conversion. 41 ) To Sepulveda, however, the 
appropriate resemblances were cultural and moral. As the 
leading Aristotelian of his day, he posited that human soc-
iety was by nature hierarchical, and that all men varied ac-
cording to their superior or inferior qualities. On this 
basis, the Indians' cultural defects (absence of money, wri-
ting, clothing) and moral failings branded them as natural 
slaves. 
Sepulveda lost the debate, but in a later defence of 
his position set down a series of linked resemblances and 
oppositions that formed one of the earliest secular state-
ments of the superior European Self and inferior Colonial 
Other. 42 
In wisdom, skill, virtue, and humanity, these 
people are as inferior to the Spaniards as child~ 
ren are to adults and women to men; there is as 
great a difference between them as there is bet-
4 ° Foucault, Order, pp.17-44. Jordan, White Over Black, 
p.7 discusses the multiple (and antithetical) meanings of 
"black" and "white" for the pre-sixteenth century English. 
4 ~ For Las Casas' own ambivalence, see Todorov, Conquest, 
pp.170-71. For the unthinking English enslavement of blacks, 
see Jordan, White Over Black, pp.44-98. In the American 
colonies, Negro conversions only began around the late sev-
enteenth century. 
Todorov, Conquest, p.153. 
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ween savagery and forbearance, between violence 
and moderation, almost - I am inclined to say - as 
between monkeys and men. 
Here in outline is one of the fundamental planks which would 
later support the patriarchal and paternal idealisation of a 
European Self whose superiority rested on intellectual, 
technical, and cultural pre-dominance. But equally interes-
ting is the philosophical shift forced by the Church's prior 
acceptance of the Indians as men. Sepulveda's formulation 
lacks any unconditional ground of difference comparable to 
the medieval believer/non-believer dichotomy to sustain the 
vast disparities asserted between Spanish Self and Indian 
Other. Instead, it has moved the issue from the absolute to 
the relative by shifting the emphasis from the either/or 
imperatives of religion to the social, cultural, and natural 
world (fathers/sons, males/females, monkeys/men) where fine 
gradations and differentiation of ranking could occur (not 
that anyone at the time perceived it in these terms). This 
relocation formed one essential prerequisite for the 
evolution of the nineteenth century projection of Self and 
Other. 
The second came not long after. In the seventeenth 
century a subterranean epistemological change began slowly 
to transform the way European thinkers approached the busi-
ness of knowing and understanding. Instead of seeking resem-
blances, the budding Classical age turned to close mea-
surement and analysis of continuity and differences as the 
means of discovering general categories and tabulating the 
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order of nature. 4~ Natural history came into being, with the 
aim of classifying the structures of the visible world. For 
over a ce-ntury, Biblical authority and the belief that God 
had individually created all living things as he wished them 
to be, delayed its application to mankind. By the mid-
eighteenth century, however, its methods were being used to 
study mankind as part of the animal kingdom, and to order 
racial varieties. 44 
A bold ~inority went much further. Self-consciously 
radical philqsophes like Voltaire repudiated scriptural au-
thority for the common descent of mankind as irrelevant for 
failing to accommodate the New World. 4~ Instead, he and 
others like David Hume toyed with the idea that races actu-
ally represented species of men, not simply varieties. 4 c 
Significantly, in its support they tended to present cultu-
ral achievements as if they were a function of natural (or 
racial) differences. For instance, in 1766, when China still 
equalled Europe in many areas and, in the eyes of many 
43 Foucault, Order, pp.50-58. For natural history, see 
pp.125-62. 
44 So Linnaeus, for instance, treated mankind like any 
other species and divided it into four varieties (European, 
Asian, African, and American). Gossett, Race, pp.32-53. 
Ibid, pp.44-45, though others had questioned it earli-
er. 
4 • This gave rise to the theory of polygeny, which held 
that races were separately created species of men. It was 
especially strong in nineteenth century America where the 
existence of other races posed the issue more urgently than 
in Europe. See Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man 
(Pelican Books, 1984), pp.30-71; or John S. Haller, Jr, Out-
casts from Evolution (University of Illinois Press, 1971), 
pp.69-79. 
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philosophers, excelled her in rational administrative 
organisation, Hume mused: 47 
- I a~ apt to suspect the negroes and in general all 
the other species of men (for there are four or 
five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to 
the whites. There never was a civilised nation of 
any other complexion than white ••• no ingenious 
manufacturers amongst them, no arts, no sciences 
••• Such a uniform and constant difference could 
not happen in so many countries and ages, if 
nature had not made an original distinction 
betwixt these breeds of men. 
In the mid-nineteenth century speculative history and 
the new sciences of man took the final necessary step that 
fused nature and culture as the basis of European superio-
rity. The notion that civilisations could be characterised 
and ranked according to a single main criterion already 
existed in the works of Hegel and Marx when, in 1853-54, the 
French orientalist, Arthur de Gobineau, made race the key. 
Gobineau's work built on the late eighteenth century dis-
covery of an ancient Inda-European (Aryan) linguistic group 
in India~ and the invention of an ancient Aryan speaking 
race to match it. In his universal hi~tory; the Aryans 
emerged as the sole culture-bearers of the human species, 
and thus the founders of every known civilisation. 49 Even 
China, he maintained, owed its civilisation to early Aryan 
colonisation; and its long stagnation to the dilution of 
Aryan blood through centuries of intermarriage. 4 • Ranked im-
mediately below the Aryans came the diligent, industrious 
47 Quoted in Gould, Mismeasure, pp.40-41 (my emphasis). 
48 For the later political myth of the Aryan race, see 
Tudor, Political Myth, pp.105-10. 
4
• Arthur de Gobineau, Essai sur l'in~gal~t~ des races 
humaines, I (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1940), pp.491-95. 
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but unimaginative and uninventive folk of the yellow race, 
the human middle class compared to the Aryan aristocrats. 
The black. race, which in Gobineau's view could only ever be 
brought to civilisation by interbreeding with the higher 
races, crouched far below at the base.e0 
The development of biological determinism confirmed the 
racial ladder. In the first place, linear social evolution-
ary theory held that all cultures had to pass through the 
same stages of development. It made the social organisation 
of lower races seem like a set of 'living fossils·,ei worth 
investigating principally because they illuminated the 
beginnings of Aryan progress.e2 Later nineteenth century 
social anthropologists like Frazer, Morgan, or Tylor, for 
whom 'cultural evolution was but a chapter of biology' ,e3 
toiled to formulate general theories of human history and 
institutions that further refined (and in the process re-
inforced) the racial-cultural nexus.e4 Next came the bio-
logical discovery of evolutionary recapitulation in the 
human embryo. It immediately vindicated the analogy Spencer 
ea For the essence of his racial classification, see 
Michael D. Biddiss, who has translated and edited his dense 
prose in Gobineau. Selected Political Writings (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1970), pp. 134-44. 
ei To generalise Karl Marx's 1862 description of China in 
Shlomo Avineri (ed), Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernisa-
tion (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1969), p.442. 
e 2 Spencer's was the harshest expression of this view but 
a more modified version circulated widely. Gossett, Race, 
pp.148-51; and Haller, Outcasts, pp.97-129. 
e 3 Because it employed the same ascending sequence from 
simple to complex. Haller, Outcasts, p.97. 
e 4 E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Social Anthropology (London: Co-
hen & West, 1964), pp.27-42. 
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had drawn between human societies and the lives of indivi-
dual organisms. A social recapitulationist theory framed in 
racial-cultural terms resulted, which held, in Spencer's 
1895 summation, that •the intellectual traits of the uncivi-
lized ••• are traits recurring in the children of the civ~ 
ilised•.ss Those interested in racial (and other) ranking 3 
found in recapitulationism a general theory of biological 
determinism which, as mainstream science, avoided the short-
comings of earlier (but still widely popular) approaches 
like craniology. 0 • Arguing from anatomy to psychology, in-
telligence, and culture in general, recapitulationists held 
that European males equated with civilised adulthood, while 
yellow races ranked with white (male) adolescence and black 
with white infancy, or at best childhood. (White women plac-
ed at the same level as children or adult male savages. 97 ) 
In the dictates of biological determinism the European 
Self could find a basis of superiority as unconditional as 
that afforded centuries before by the medieval dichotomy 
between Christian and non-Christian - and for much the same 
reason. It rested upon absolute convictions so entrenched as 
to appear simple facts. In the later nineteenth century, 
established religions slowly ceded much of their legitimat-
so Spencer's 1895 summary, quoted in Gould, Mismeasure, p. 
117. For recapitulationism in general, see pp.113-22. 
0 • The technical problems of standardising measurements so 
that results could be accurately reproduced made craniology 
scientifically suspect by the end of the century. Ibid, 
pp.83-108. 
57 It was also applied to classes and ethnic groups. Ibid, 
pp.103-06 and 115-19 for examples; or Dower, War Without 
Mercy, pp.153-56. 
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ing power and vitalising force in European society to two 
new and numinous symbols that enthralled men's minds: Man 
and Matter. Man became 'a finite creature ruling the created 
world as the measure and arbiter of all meaning and value', 
with Matter 'as the primary reality of the world'.ee Under 
their influence, science ran the real risk of being elevated 
(and distorted) into a secular faith whose revealed truths 
must be accepted, no matter how unpalatable to any indivi-
dual. The cult of statistical analysis and scientific objec-
tivity projected Truth onto published materials which had 
been •gathered selectively and then manipulated unconscious-
ly in the service of prior conclusions~.e9 Conscious aware-
ness that the cult of science was as value-laden as any 
other rarely surfaced at the time (and still remains contra-
versial in some scientific circles today00 ), so that western 
man 'burn[ed] incense to himself, and his own countenance 
[was] veiled from him in the smoke'. 0 i 
But around the mid-nineteenth century, at the same time 
that racist doctrines were sweeping European science and 
scholarship, another subterranean discontinuity occurred at 
what Foucault has called the archeological level of the 
episteme. It inaugurated the modern age. Where the Classical 
Both quotes, Progoff, Jung's Psychology, p.271. 
e~ Gould, Mismeasure, p.85. Chapters 2 to 4 provide innu-
merable examples, including some derived from Gould's re-
working of published data. 
As Midgley's study shows. Evolution, pp.1-49. 
oi C.G. Jung, 'The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man', in 
Modern Man in Search of a Soul (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1978), p.246. 
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age had investigated mankind as part of the natural world, 
the modern study of man as 'a primary reality with his own 
density, the difficult object and sovereign subject of all 
possible knowledge', 02 began slowly to take its place. The 
new human sciences made man a field of study in his own 
right. But although not apparent to those obsessed with de-
tailing and quantifying the most minute differences between 
races, classes, and genders, the logical corollary of making 
man the field of study was, by definition, finitude. If fun-
damental existential similarities united all within the 
field, as the new human sciences began to confirm in the 
twentieth century, 03 then the divisions between what lay 
within the field must be relative or epiphenomena! in compa-
risen to the absolute difference with what was outside it. 
The analytic of finitude moves inexorably to sameness, ir-
respective of apparent diversity. As Foucault put it: 04 
.From one end of experience to. the other, finitude 
answers itself; it is the identity and the diffe-
rence of the positivities, and of their foundat-
ion, within the figure of the Same ••• (M]odern 
reflection, as soon as the first shoot of this 
analytic appears ••. moves towards a certain thou-
ght of the Same - in which Difference is the same 
thing as Identity ••• 
The analytic of finitude ••• is always con-
cerned with showing how the Other, the Distant, is 
also the Near and the Same. Thus we have moved 
from a reflection upon the order of Differences 
[in the Classical era] ••• to a thought of the 
Foucault, Order, p.310. 
• 3 Gossett thought cultural anthropology exposed the fall-
acies in the racial-cultural nexus [Race, pp.416-30] but, as 
Gould showed, the impulse towards ranking still persisted, 
in intelligence testing especially. Mismeasure, Chapters 5 
and 6. 
Foucault, Order, p.315 and p.339. 
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Same, still to be conquered in its contradictions 
The gradual rise to consciousness of this analytic pro-
voked no sudtien transformations, however. It never caused 
those nineteenth century social theorists who intuitively 
sensed it to revise their beliefs. Rather, they incorporated 
and adapted the analytic to their existing assumptions. 
Thus, for example, the American cultural evolutionist Lewis 
Morgan acknowledged the psychic unity of human races made 
mankind 'one in source, one in experience, and one in 
progress' .•e Sadly for the savages, however, whatever advan-
ces they managed would never allow them to overhaul superior 
Aryan peoples. Even contact with higher races could only 
lead to calamity for lower ones, who lost their own auth-
enticity and with it the chance to progress through 'unass-
isted self-development'.•• They became the doomed casualties 
of evolution. It was a popular view. W.J. McGee, for instan-
ce, who believed that human activities 'all diverge in form, 
yet converge in essential quality and in their effects on 
mankind', 67 balanced it with the conviction that evolution 
would ensure the extinction of lower races, either physical-
ly or through increasing intermixture with others. The cul-
tural evolutionists imported a teleology into their theories 
which convinced them that scientific laws guaranteed the 
future they envisaged. When mankind converged into one race 
•e Quoted in Haller's discussion of his principal work, 
Ancient Society (1877). Outcasts, p.110. 
Ibid, p.112. 
Ibid, p.104. 
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and one culture, it would be our race and our culture: 
Difference would merge into Identity but, since we were the 
norm, the-Other must become Self, or perish. 
Many rejected even this distant prospect. They preferr-
ed to put their faith in numbers, especially those that ap-
plied the hard data of measurement and quantification to 
exposing irreducible differences between human groups. But 
in fact even worst problems lurked here, and it was only by 
projecting meaning onto the materials that many could be 
made to serve the intended purpose. We will take as typical 
an example from French Indochina. 
In the early 1880s, two tertiary educated French colon-
ial advocates published a compendium of current information 
about Indochina. The section detailing the physical features 
of the Vietnamese opened with the confident assertion that 
'the Annamites belong to the yellow race, the Indochinese 
branch, and the Annamite family'. Four pages devoted to 
physical characteristics listed their tell-tale small brain 
weight ('accordihg to B~oca, the weight of the Annamite 
brain is 1,233 grams, that of the European brain being 1,375 
grams'), and a host of other carefully measured differences 
including speed of respiration (at 20 breaths per minute 
'almost the same as among Europeans') and heart rate ('82 
beats for an Annamite man, 96 for a woman, 80 for an 
Englishman, and 72 for a Frenchman' ).•a 
•a All quotes, A. Bouinais and A. Paulus, L'Indo-Chine 
fran~aise contemporaine, I (Paris: Challamel, 1885, 2nd ed), 
pp.227-28. 
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What most strikes a modern reader about this odd cata-
logue, apart from its absurdity, is its essential meaning-
lessness.- Heart rate and respiration vary so enormously in 
individuals in response to environmental factors that the 
notion of a single average rate, varying constantly accord-
ing to nationality, gender, and race appears utter nonsense. 
However, so convinced were Bouinais and Paulus that the data 
signified something meaningful that they never even noted 
the figures could only be statistical averages. We are left 
today with the strong impression that the authors believed 
the numbers denoted absolute physical differences - that, 
for instance, 'Annamite' respiration at twenty breaths per 
minute was a "fact", and one that differed in a measurable 
(and hence significant) way from 'European' respiration at 
eighteen breaths per minute. But no such meaning arises from 
the data, whose disparities are so slight as to suggest 
similarity rather than difference in a detached observer. 
The g 1 i ttering, prom.ise of uncohdi tional European super-
. iority held out by the racial-cultural fusion of biological 
determinism was ultimately a chimera: the new human sciences 
could not be forced into contradicting their own inner logic 
indefinitely. (This, of course, does not imply that indivi-
dual practitioners of these sciences, and others, might not 
be more influenced by unconscious preconceptions and projec-
ted values than by logic. 0~) Subterranean conflicts became 
inevitable; and perceived racial divisions hardened as men 
• 9 As the wilder claims of human sociobiologists suggest. 
For their scientific shortcomings, see Gould, Mismeasure, 
pp. 324-33; and their philosophical ones, see Midgley, 
Evolution, passim. 
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struggled to defend unprovable convictions as scientific 
facts. Only one means exists by which such magic can be 
wrought: _the transformative power of myth. Social Darwinism, 
cultural evolutionism, and biological determinism gripped 
European imaginations so tenaciously not (as men of the time 
might have argued) because they were good science, nor sim-
ply_ because they served vested interests so well, but be-
cause they became mythologised. And once transformed, they 
spawned new myths of their own. 
Myth also disposes of the power to reconstruct the im-
mediate past, and to turn previous beliefs on their heads 
without appearing to do so. When the most widely-accepted 
projection of French Self and Vietnamese Other fractured in 
early twentieth century Annam, exactly that happened. The 
demands of the changed situation pushed colonial officials 
(and others) in Central Vietnam to re-formulate the existing 
colonial myths to explain away the new uncertainties. The 
process tapped into this subterranean source, whose con-
flicts it imaginatively resolved in its revised myth of the 
union of French genius and Annamite soul. Instead of seeking 
to turn the Vietnamese into Asian Frenchmen, this myth now 
looked forward to the day when French Self and Vietnamese 
Other, engaging equally 'with all their heart in a common 
work, [would] bring to fruition a new civilisation formed by 
[their] amalgamation', as one of the chief mythologists of 
the time enthused in 1922. 70 Problem solved: Identity and 
70 RS Pasquier, inaugurating the Ecole des Hautes Etudes 
of the Annamite Government at Hue, 24 Nov 1922. AEP GGIC 
51080 
Difference would merge into Same in the process of creating 
something new. 
We now turn to the fallacy of Vietnam as little China, 
the central paradigm that organised French colonial under-
standing of Vietnamese identity, and of the society, cul-
ture, and history of pre-colonial Vietnam. 
The Little China Fallacy 
The French who invaded southern Vietnam in 1859 enter-
ed a country about which they and their compatriots at home 
knew very little indeed. From missionary accounts and other 
reports they knew to expect a system of government that ex-
hibited similar characteristics to that of China - all of 
which they duly discovered. The self-styled empire was 
ruled by a sacred monarch, the Son of Heaven, whose rigidly 
formal court and sinicised administration were staffed by 
learned mandarins recruited via public examinations after 
long years _of studyinQ. the Chinese: classical canon. The 
people venerated their ancestors and worshipped Confucius. 
Chinese was the official written language and, as Gabriel 
Aubaret's hasty translation of the legal code in 1865 
showed, the laws were those of China as well. 71 In the next 
fifteen years nothing they saw from distant Sai-gon, or ex-
perienced on their few embassies to the Chinese-style capi-
71 His translation lacked the Vietnamese commentaries on 
its local application which only appeared with Philastre's 
1876 translation. Jean Marquet and Jean Norel, 'L'occupat-
ion du Tonkin par la France (1873-1874), d'apr~s des docu-
ments in~dits', BSEI (ns), XI, 1 (1936), p.94, fn 1. 
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tal, 72 challenged their first impressions. A Legation final-
ly opened in Hue in 1875, but the closer perspective merely 
served to-reconfirm the current perception of a government 
and people ruled by Confucian orthodoxy, and of a court 
over which 'Chinese etiquette •.. reign[ed] as sovereign 
mistress.' 73 
That French pre-conceptions of a sinicised Vietnam 
were so richly confirmed must rank as one of the outstand-
ing political successes of the Tu-Bue reign, which spanned 
almost the entire period of piecemeal French penetration. 74 
For internal political reasons, the king consciously strove 
to present his rule in the unblemished garb of Chinese 
orthodoxy; but while he never convinced all his subjects, 7 e 
the French believed it absolutely. In the synchronicity of 
contact, ignorant French ewpectations and combined with 
Vietnamese internal policies to ensure that the Europeans 
failed to sort form from substance in Vietnamese political 
life. That mid-nineteenth century Vietnam seemed the image 
of China to foreigners is therefore understandable. How-
ever, this is not the little China fallacy. 
Clearly, a millenium of Chinese rule and a thousand 
years of interaction afterwards left a strong imprint on 
72 There were only six: in 1863, 1864, 1866, 1867, 1868, 
and 1875. A. Auvray (ed H. Cosserat), 'Dix-huit mois a 
Hue'' BAVH, xx, 3-4 (1933), p.210, fn 1. 
Ib~d, p.249. 
74 Enthroned in 1847, he died in 1883, nearly. a year after 
the French invaded the North, and only a month before they 
imposed a protectorate convention on the royal government 
itself. 
We return to these matters in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Vietnamese life, in particular on the culture of its liter-
ate elite and on the forms of its institutional life. To 
pretend otherwise would be foolish. Like most peoples 
bordering great and powerful civilisations, the Vietnamese 
admired, borrowed, and adapted aspects of Chinese material 
and intellectual culture as they developed their own. But 
this is not the colonial fallacy, either. The little China 
fallacy did not refer to the interesting (but hardly un-
usual) transactions of cultural borrowing but to something 
quite different. It held as a fact that pre-colonial Viet-
nam was in all essentials "nothing but" China: its people, 
culture, and institutions had remained unchanged from when 
China had ruled a thousand years before, and were thus ful-
ly understandable in Sinic terms. Here, for example, is 
Alfred Schreiner's 1900 distillation of the little China 
fallacy. During a millenium of Chinese rule, he wrote, 
Vietnam had taken from China 'everything she was able to 
give: administration, justice, religion, literature, and 
science, all came from the Middle Kingdom ••• [and] 
throughout the centuries [of independence that followed], 
the Annamites [had] not made any progress on Chinese 
civilisation'. 70 
On the face of it, it is, to say the least, a giant 
leap in logic to conclude that the existence of a sinicised 
kingdom in the nineteenth century proved that the country 
had been suspended in time for a thousand years, transfixed 
7 * Alfred Schreiner, Les Institutions annamites en Basse-
Cochinchine avant la congu~te fran;aise, I (Saigon: Claude 
etc~-, 1900), pp.53-54. 
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by its unchanged and unchangeable ancient Chinese heritage. 
Nor, it should be noted, did local history support such a 
deduction which, the next two chapters will show, fell far 
short of the mark. For the previous two centuries Vietnam 
had been caught up in considerable political change and 
upheaval that had resulted in its emergence in the early 
nineteenth century united into a dynamic and expansionist 
South-east Asian state. Despite the Confucian pretensions 
of the Tu-9uc reign, in 1860 the kingdom's evolution to-
wards the rigidities of a Confucian state was only about as 
old as Louis Napoleon's Third Empire in France. In fact, 
late Nguyen Vietnam, which the colonial paradigm advanced 
as typical of ten centuries of cultural and political in-
stitutions, was so unusual as to be virtually unique in 
Vietnamese history. 
Yet little or none of this eroded the certainties of 
the little China fallacy, even after later research had un-
covered the basic outlines of pre-colonial history, 77 be-
cause the· fallacy rested less on French ignorance of Viet-
namese history per se than on the racial-cultural formulat-
ions of European superiority discussed in the previo~s sec-
tion. Here, for instance, is Schreiner's detailed explana-
tion of why Vietnam never progressed beyond its Chinese 
heritage. Quite typical of its time in all but length, it 
is worth hearing more or less in full. 7 e 
77 Thus, for example, Schreiner's long outline of pre-col-
onial history [Ibid, pp.10-217] never challenged his little 
China beliefs [pp.53-55]. 
7e Ibid, pp.54-55. 
We hold it much against the Annamites that across 
the centuries they have never made any progress 
on Chinese civilisation. Their arts and sciences 
have always remained very much below those in 
-China. True; •••• but the reason lies solely in 
their habitat. By itself, Annam ••• could little 
modify the sociological conditions imposed by 
nature. It unconsciously obeys the immutable laws 
of racial evolution. 
Peoples, like individuals, only progress in 
the presence of necessary stimulants ••• Without 
needs, no efforts; without efforts, no progress 
A law seems to regulate contact [between 
peoples]. When one of the two races is so far be-
hind the other in its evolution, it greatly risks 
disappearing for, if it rapidly assimilates the 
vices_ of the otherJ it generally acquires none of 
the [gdod] qualities. When this happens it is 
necessary that the people of the advanced culture 
act with a patience and tact whose usage the hard 
struggle for existence almost always precludes. 
This being so, we see that the Annamite race 
was placed in such a situation that, fatally, its 
own progress must be slight. To the East was the 
sea, to the West and the South savages or at 
least peoples less civilised than itself. All 
culture came to them from a single point: from 
the North. But as its relations with China were 
neither extensive nor perfectly constant, it 
necessarily came about that the people of Annam 
always found themselves behind their powerful 
neighbour, and all the more so because their 
torrid climate, their frugal life, and their 
great rusticity created in them a sum of needs 
quite inferior to the means of satisfying them. 
If we compare Schreiner's exposition with the racial-
cultural assumptions discussed in the previous section, its 
close affinity with the common European perceptions and 
convictions of the time becomes apparent. We will save this 
matter for a more detailed discussion in Part Three •. A more 
general survey, taking soundings from the colonial period 
and beyond, is more appropriate here. Let us begin, then, 
with Eliacin Lura whose influential 1877 publication, Le 
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Pays d'Annam, 7~ helped endow the little China fallacy with 
intellectual respectability for generations. 
Lura's study rested on his own observations of 1860s 
and early 1870s Cochinchina, and what missionary-scholars 
and local informants told him. It all convinced him that 
the Vietnamese were a 'Chinese people' with a 'Chinese civ-
ilisation·,ao despite the fact that nineteenth century Nam-
ky represented the least sinicised and probably the most 
culturally diverse region of Bai-Nam. The little China 
fallacy guided his vision of the past as well. Although 
allowing that Vietnamese had kept enough 'feeling of their 
own nationality' to reconquer their independence in the 
tenth century, Lura nevertheless still believed they had 
fully accepted 'the laws of the conqueror, [been] fashioned 
to his customs, and adopt[ed Chinese] literature.· As a 
result 'emancipation had ••• only produced ••• the effects 
of a fortunate decentralisation·.Q 1 In his view, the import-
ed Sinic political institutions of monarchy, mandarinate, 
and examinations had then persisted virtually unchanged 
until the nineteenth century. Thus for Lura and every other 
J.B.E. Lura, Le Pays d'Annam (Paris: Leroux, 1897, 2nd 
ed). 
so Report of 26 February 1871, quoted in G. Taboulet (ed), 
'Jean-Baptiste-Eliacin Lura. Inspecteur des Affaires 
indigenes en Cochinchine', BSEI (ns), XV, 1&2 (1940), p.64. 
91 Lura, Pays, pp.76-77. A recurrent theme in later French 
writing, it appeared as late as 1962 in the work of one 
South Vietnamese historian, product of a French-designed 
education system, who likened independence from China to a 
fruit ripening and dropping from the tree, to begin an 
identical but separate life. Cited in Alexander Woodside, 
Vietnam and the Chinese Model (Harvard University Press, 
1971), p.8 and fn.2, p.297. 
French author after him, the Vietnamese monarchy replicated 
its Chinese original in every respect, so that the nine-
teenth century institution could be perfectly adequately 
explained by comparison to the origina1.e2 
In the tenth century, the Annamite people had 
completely adopted Chinese civilisation: the in-
digenous absolute monarchy was definitively esta-
blished; the king [took] the same titles as the 
emperor of China, he [had] the same powers. 
We must read the canonical books (the Kinh) 
to get an idea of what a Chinese or Annamite sov-
ereign is, or at least of the education and in-
fluence of the mandarins, selected from literate 
graduates of the public examinations, who sur-
round him. 
In this system of pure monarchy, the monarch 
is imprisoned in the formulas of a poorly defined 
traditional cult, which goes back more than thir-
ty centuries before our era, and which has no 
other limits than those of the doctrine of Confu-
cius, followed by all the literati of the nation. 
Aware that differences existed between nineteenth century 
China and Vietnam, Luro accounted for them (as others would 
also do) from within the little China fallacy. Instead of 
finding traces of a distinctively Vietnamese identity in 
these dissimilarities, Lure explained them as an accident 
of history. By enabling Vietnam to avoid Mongol and Man-
churian rule, independence had preserved a purer (or more 
archaic) Chinese civilisation here, he asserted.e3 Without 
outside forces to set change in motion, Vietnamese civilis-
ation had persisted in stasis. 
These widely accepted ideas encouraged a cherchez la 
Chine methodology among many colonial French writers. Ex-
41 
a~ luro, Pays, pp.89-90. For a compendium of French colon-
ial views of the Vietnamese monarchy, see Robert Petit, La 
Monarchie annamite (Paris: F. Louiton, 1931). A longer dis-
cussion can be found in Chapter Five below. 
Lura, Pays, pp.76-77. 
planations of Vietnamese institutions routinely began by 
uncovering their Chinese roots, or by tracing their growth 
by reference to China. We will take Camille Briffaut as an 
example. So convinced was this author by the little China 
fallacy that his major study, La Cite annamite, repeatedly 
tagged the Vietnamese ·la race sino-annamite' . 64 For Brif-
faut, even the quintessential Vietnamese institution, the 
village, owed its origins directly to China. The first 
volume of La Cite annamite thus opened with a hypothetical 
history of the birth and evolution of the Vietnamese vil-
lage which showed that, 'properly speaking, [it] date[d] 
from the Chinese conquest and owe[d] its existence to the 
efforts of the [Chinese] victors'. But 'when China lost 
sovereignty in Annam' its evolution 'stopped short', leav-
ing 'certain forms of its law archaic •.. ' 64 With 'the 
Annamite nation reduced to its own resources'Q~ after in-
dependence, the mainspring of development wound down. In 
time, static Vietnamese society even lost the ability to 
copy and assimilate evolving Chinese institutions. When the 
first Nguyen king promulgated the Qing Code in 1812 it 
failed: 'Annam was [now] too far behind her educator and 
could no longer follow without disruption'.e• 
Few academically trained Orientalists who lived and 
worked within the French community in Vietnam betrayed much 
94 Camille Briffaut, La Cite annamite, I (Paris: Larose, 
1909), for example, p.22. 
Ibid, pp.16-17. 
Ibid, p.17. 
Ibid. 
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more scepticism about the little China fallacy. Many re-
searchers at the renowned Ha-noi Ecole fran~aise d'Extr~me-
Orient [EFEOJ, for example, apparently shared the dominant 
perception of a fundamentally sinicised Vietnam, at least 
according to a 1951 retrospective assessment of their work 
by Georges Coed~s.ee 
The EFEO had been a late addition to colonial Inda-
china. Only in the 1890s did Vietnam and Cambodia, pre-
viously dismissed as 'simple annexes to sinology or Indian 
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studies,·e9 win sufficient scholarly interest to warrant in-
vestigation in their own right; and then most activity cen-
tred on deciphering Ankor and the secrets of defunct Cham 
and Cambodian societies. When it came to the Vietnamese 
past, however, the little China fallacy intruded. As Coedes 
pleaded in mitigation for the small body of work devoted to 
Vietnam, the EFEO had not needed to concentrate on recon-
stituting Vietnamese history for the process was relatively 
simple, 'thanks to its annals and to the references of Chi-
nese historians.· In these happy circumstances, the modern 
researcher's task 'essentially consist[ed] of submitting 
this continuous recitation to a severe critique, of comple-
ting it, and of correcting it as need be in the light of 
other trustworthy documents' • 90 That such a naive method-
ology could be seriously advanced as late as 1951 eloquent-
ly testifies to the tenacity of the little China fallacy. 
es Georges Coedes, 'Etudes indochinoises', BSEI (ns), 
XXVI, 4 (1951), pp.437-62. 
Ibid. p.437. 
90 Ibid, p.452. 
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Scientific speculation was not immune, either. When 
the EFEO began to study 90ng-son Bronze Age culture in the 
1920s, no-one dreamt its metal technology could have origi-
nated anywhere but China. In the initial report on this 
culture, whose bronze casting techniques are now accepted 
as South-east Asian in origin,•L Victor Goloubew described 
it as 'a still rather primitive civilisation where metal-
lurgy, introduced by a foreign people, had been able to 
develop a little, in the way of a graft.'•2 Those clever 
foreign innovators, of course, had been the Chinese. 
As we might expect, not everyone agreed with every 
aspect of the little China fallacy. Lure described a far 
less patriarchal family than many later writers.•3 Pasquier 
vehemently rejected the common French assertion that Viet-
namese literati had simply 'contented themselves with the 
Chinese classics ••. and [had] not known how to produce 
anything' of their own.•4 But despite the occasional demurer 
over details, most people accepted most of it without 
question, since it performed so well the valuable role of 
explaining observable Vietnamese reality. In the early 
twentieth century, some scholarly experts began to question 
exactly how much the French did understand about Vietnamese 
•L Keith Weller Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam (University 
of Californ~a Press, 1983), Chapter 1 and Appendix D for 
the society and culture. 
•
2 Coed~s, ·~tudes·, p.454, quoting from 'L'Age du bronze 
au Tonkin et dans le Nord-Annam', published 1929. 
Luro, Pays, pp.205-25. 
• 4 Pierre Pasquier, L'Annam d'autrefois (Paris: Chall~mel, 
1907), p.317. 
life, past and present. 9 e The professionals realised, as 
Marcel Ner put it in 1930, that: 96 
-despite the value of pioneering [works], the his-
teirical and ethnographical study of Annam is all 
fairly sketchy ••• We are especially disadvantag-
ed concerning the history of institutions, and it 
is quite difficult for us to discover not only 
the successive stages belonging to each epoch or 
each influence but also the present state of 
legislation and customs. 
But such caution rarely escaped from scholarly circles. 
Certainly, it never dented the armour of received ideas and 
conventional wisdom that encircled the little China fallacy 
in wider colonial society. As war loomed in the late 1930s, 
for instance, the English traveller Alan Broderick reported 
his French hosts had cheerfully assured him that Annam 
still remained, in their phrase, 'une ancienne Chine~ 
domici 1 e' . 97 
The August Revolution of 1945 pierced some of the com-
placency, though without really discrediting the little 
China fallacy. It jolted Roger Pinto, for one, into the 
troubling real :i,sation that, .d~spi te eighty years of occupa-
. . - .. 
ti6n and thousands of learned book~ and articles, French 
knowledge ot 'the native milieux, of its past and its con-
temporary evolution ••• remain[ed] empirical and fragment-
9~ For example, Pierre Lusteguy (trans Charles A. Mess-
ner), The Role of Women in Tonkinese Religion and Property, 
(Human Relations Area File, New Haven, 1954) [orig. 1935], 
on colonial convolutions regarding the legal status of 
Vietnamese women. 
9
• M. Ner, 'Caract~res generaux de l'oeuvre de Fustel', 
BSEI (ns), V, 3 (1930), p.210. 
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97 Quoted in Little China. The Annamese Lands (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1942), p.x. 
ary' • 96 Pinto advocated a more scientific and orderly study 
of the Vietnamese to plug the gaps in French knowledge; but 
while such research continued to employ a fundamentally 
flawed model of Vietnamese life and culture, it could never 
hope to provide more than limited insights into Vietnamese 
life. 
The August Revolution caused Paul Mus even less in-
tellectual self-questioning. The communist-led Viet Minh 
revolution did not lead him to question or reject the exis-
ting paradigm. Rather, Mus tried to fit the revolution into 
its axioms. Thus, when he outlined the fundamental princi-
ples sustaining Vietnamese political culture in an attempt 
to change French policy in 1952, his exposition derived 
directly from the little China fallacy. His discussion of 
the mandate of Heaven, for example, emphasized how the ap-
pearance of a swift and complete transfer of power between 
former and present dynasties traditionally legitimated a 
new regime as Heaven's choice in the eyes of the people. 99 
Mus' sketch adequately outlined the classical Chinese poli-
tical concept. However, had he been able to consider Viet-
namese history more objectively, rather than theorize about 
it in Sinic terms, Mus might have noticed an awkward prob-
lem with his interpretation: the only documented transfer 
9 s Roger Pinto, Aspects de l'~volution gouvernementale de 
l'Indochine fran;aise (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1946), p.64. 
46 
99 Paul Mus, Viet-Nam. Sociologie d'une guerre (Paris: Ed-
itions de Seuil), 1952, pp.26-33. Twenty years later the 
same arguments surfaced in an English-language adaptation. 
J.T. McAlister, Jr and Paul Mus, The Vietnamese and Their 
Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), esp. pp.59-69. 
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of power that conformed to these supposedly traditional 
criteria for legitimacy was the August Revolution itself. 
The little China fallacy even survived the demise of 
colonialism entirely. In 1962, ten years after Mus, sixty 
after Schreiner, and nearly a century after Eliacin Lura 
had arrived in Cochinchina, the respected Bulletin de la 
Societe des Etudes Indochinoises in Sai-gon chose to pub-
lish~00 an unadulterated re-iteration of the French colonial 
fallacy masquerading as history. The introduction to an 
article on the nineteenth century mandarinate by the second 
generation colonial, Muriel Texier, neatly refined the es-
sence of the little China fallacy - that Vietnam owed 
everything to China and had made no advances on her Chinese 
heritage in a millenium of independence - into a single 
page. 
'Even after the establishment of national dynasties', 
Texier asserted, 'Viet-Nam continued to live an entirely 
Chinese life as much from the viewpoint of civilisation as 
of institutions'. This occurred because the Chinese had 
'found practically nothing when they arrived', and had so 
impressed their own culture on the Vietnamese that 'in the 
tenth century, Vietnam was a country without memories'. In-• 
dependence therefore had 'inevitably only changed the mast-
er, not the political or social structure.' The inevitabil-
~ 00 Although a foreword noted that only 'a certain number 
of pages from the exposition submitted' had been published, 
they included the introduction, which could have been 
excised without affecting the substance of the article. 
Muriel Texier, 'Le mandarinat au Viet-Nam au XIX• siecle', 
BSEI (ns), XXXVII, 3 (1962), p.328. 
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ity arose because, when left to their own devices,i01 the 
Vietnamese were incapable of cultural originality or polit-
-
ical creati~ity: 'how even to conceive of another political • 
form of government when they had only ever known and seen 
one in operation'. From this followed the remarkable fact 
that the Chinese political institutions of monarchy and 
mandarinate with which the new kingdom had begun its indep-
endence in the tenth century 'subsisted in their entirety' 
to the end. 
The clue to the little China fallacy's longevity lies 
here in Texier's thought. She presented her breathtaking 
assertions and sweeping generalisations as if they required 
no proof beyond their own self-evidence. Confusing form 
with function and theory with practice the author skipped 
lightly across whole historical eras, selecting appropriate 
examples from each with which to construct the story of 
Vietnamese political institutions. All these factors betray 
her. Whatever Texier's conscious intent, she was not engag-
ed in writing history but in retelling myth, specifically 
her version of the myth of old, traditional Annam. 102 
Essentially, the little China fallacy survived as long 
as it did because it defied close scrutiny; and it defied 
such scrutiny for decade after decade because it became 
101 Like Schreiner, Texier insisted on Vietnam's isolat-
ion. 'Until the XIXth century, [Vietnam] remained practic-
ally isolated from the rest of the world: by the configur-
ation of the country, it could only be turned towards Chi-
na'. As for Champa to the south, she considered it 'hardly 
probable that its civilisation could have exerted an influ-
ence'. Ibid. Neither assertion is historically accurate. 
As, in my view, was Paul Mus in Sociologie d'une 
guerre. 
mythologised. Derived as much of it was from unconscious 
European preconceptions and projections of Otherness, it 
was a prime candidate for the transition from misunder-
standing to myth that occurred in the later nineteenth 
century. As myth, it fleshed out the Vietnamese Other. Its 
assumptions defined the grandeur and limitations of the 
"Annamite soul", at the same time that they intellectually 
suppo~ted the central image of the myth of old, traditional 
Annam, the picture of pre-colonial Vietnamese history as 
one long, blood stained catalogue of failure. As Part Three 
will show, key elements of the nineteenth century colonial 
model of traditional Vietnamese political institutions103 
had already been translated into myth by the start of the 
twentieth century. The emotional power of the myth charged 
the little China fallacy with the strength and commitment 
to sustain its paradigmatic status for another fifty years 
- and, as a result, to ensure that few twentieth century 
French (or western) studies of the traditional kingdom, 
and especially ot Nguyen po!itical ~life and institutions, 
ever advanced beyond the boundaries of the nineteenth 
century discourse. 
With that point we conclude this brief introduction to 
political myths, the projection of Otherness, and the 
little China fallacy. They re-appear in Part Three. In the 
103 Chapter 5 only considers some aspects of the French 
model. More general descriptions are available in Baugher, 
"Contradictions", Chapter 2; and Nguyen Van Phong, La Soc-
iete vietnamienne de 1882 a 1902, d'apr~s les ecrits des 
auteurs fran;ais (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 
1971). Unfortunately, neither tries to assess the extent to 
which the model adequately reflected Vietnamese life and 
identity rather than French beliefs and expectations. 
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meantime we will re-focus our perspectives to concentrate 
on something the little China fallacy largely misconstrued 
or ignored - the historical complexities of pre-colonial 
Nguyen Vietnam, and of its successor, the Protectorate of 
Annam. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY KINGDOM: FROM VIET-NAM TO BAI-NAM 
In the preface to his classic study of Nguyen govern-
ment in the first half of the n~neteenth century, Alexander 
Woodside noted the importance of setting the 1802 founda-
tion of the dynasty against its proper historical backdrop 
of disunity and civil war. 1 Yet paradoxically, when it came 
to analysing the institutional history of the first Nguyen 
reign, the Gia-Long era (1802-1819), Woodside largely fail-
ed to carry out his own injunction. When considered in the 
context of the previous two centuries, it can be argued 
that the internal political history of the Gia-Long period 
owed much less to the Chinese model than it did to the 
continuity of Nguyen government and administration from 
their southern kingdom (Bang-trong). Applying this differ-
ent perspective focuses other disagreements with some of 
the assumptions and conclus~ons about nineteenth century 
pre-colonial ~political h.istory that .ap.pear in Vietnam and 
the Chinese Model. The next two chapters raise some of 
these matters, less to criticise Professor Woodside's semi-
nal study than to argue that, to understand the nineteenth 
century kingdom, we need to pay as much attention to its 
inheritance from former 9ang-trong as we do to its rela-
tionship to the Chinese model. 
1 Vietnam and the Chinese Model. A Comparative Study of 
Nguyen and Ching Civil Government in the First Half of the 
Nineteenth Century (Harvard University Press, 1971), pp.2-
4. [Hereafter Model] 
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Gia-Long's Viet-Nam: 2 Burdens From the Past 
In 1802, a single Vietnamese kingdom emerged from the 
ruins of nearly three centuries of internecine division and 
devastating civil wars. When the victorious Nguyen king in-
augurated the Gia-Long era, by which his reign is known, it 
signalled several historic changes in the country. The four 
hundred year old Le dynasty had finally disappeared. In its 
stead came rulers with no personal connections to the 
ancient Northern Red River heartland, men for whom its high 
dikes and bamboo hedges conjured up learned poetic conven-
tions rather than the landscape of the Vietnamese soul. The 
new rulers, too, shunned the time-hallowed soil of Thang-
long (modern Ha-noi) to raise the Dragon Throne in their 
upstart capital at Phu-xuan (Hue), geographically more 
central in the new kingdom but emotionally and culturally 
peripheral to most of its subjects. 
Also for the first time, Vietnam assumed its modern 
contours, as the historic southern advance (the nam tien) 
slowed to an ~d~y in the swampy Mekong delta. The new Sou-
thern dynasty found itself in charge of a vastly expanded 
and variform territory, whose administration would pose 
problems unprecedented in 9ang-trong. Added to this, up to 
70/.3 of its population inhabited the comparatively compact, 
~ Gia-Long wanted Nam-Viet but the Chinese, for their own 
reasons, switched the characters to make Viet-Nam. In 1839 
Minh-Mang renamed the country 9ai-Nam (the Great South) 
without apparently informing China. Ibid, pp.120-21. 
3 Population is hard to assess: anything between 2/3rds 
and 3/4ths may have lived north of Quang-binh in 1802, gi-
ven Le Thanh Khoi's estimate of 1.5 million for 9ang-trong 
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and sullenly watchful, northern provinces of former Bang-
ngoai (the Trinh lands from Nghe-an north). Here decades of 
war, famine, and administrative disarray before Gia-Long's 
victory had left agriculture devastated and village society 
uprooted, condemning many Northern peasants to wander the 
countryside destitute and desperate, their former lands 
either uncultivated or stolen by local strongmen. It was 
vital that the new dynasty correct this situation, and 
defuse the distrust of former enemies by integrat~ng them 
into a united kingdom, lest gnawing political instability 
destabilize the state and bring the Nguyen down. 
The quest for integration and unity forms a constaMt 
undercurrent in the history of nineteenth century Vietnam. 
At certain times, like the Minh-Mang era, it emerges as a 
driving force. The institutional reforms and new ideologi-
cal emphases of this reign (1820-41) arose directly from 
its predecessor's inability adequately to address, let 
alone solve, these two basic political needs. In 1820 the 
newly enthroned king must have been all too aware of the 
dangers he faced. A keen student of Chinese history, when 
Minh-Mang surveyed his disunited inheritance, with its 
loose, decentralised political and administrative system, 
the spectre of the seventh century Suy dynasty must breath-
ed coldly at his shoulder. Like the Nguyen, the Suy had 
united warring principalities into a single empire after 
centuries of disunity. But they had lost it all to the Tang 
in the mid-eighteenth century. Histoire du Vietnam des ori-
qines a 1858 (Paris: Sudestasie, 1981), pp.267-68. Later 
effects of war and famine on the Northern population are 
impossible to quantify. 
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in two generations. Eighteen years on, in 1820, nothing in 
the view from Hue could have encouraged complacency in 
Minh-Mang_about the Nguyen's chances of survival, either. 
But why had Gia-Long failed at this crucial task? The 
simplest answer to this complex question is because neither 
the king nor his administration ever really transcended 
their Bang-trong origins. No cleansing fire of Chinese oc-
cupation had cauterised social wounds and renewed national 
unity of purpose through an independence struggle before 
Gia~Long ascended the throne (as had happened for the Le in 
the fifteenth century). Instead of beginning as a national 
hero, and with a clean political slate, Nguyen Anh had 
hacked his way to power over thirty years as the most suc-
cessful of the late eighteenth century warlords. He brought 
their methods to the governance of his kingdom. Beneath its 
shiny impe~ial trappings, the Gia-Long regime smelt of its 
past. Its failure to respond innovatively to the complex 
new problems of victory handicapped Hue's ability to deal 
adequately with them. By the 1820s, Gia-Long's failure to 
advance the political integration and administrative unity 
of the kingdom meant dynastic survival still hung in the 
balance. It made a new approach imperative. 
We will consider Minh-Mang's responses to the challen-
ge later, after surveying the most intractable of the poli-
tical problems he inherited. Foremost among these was the 
nature of the administration itself. To understand it, we 
need to glance at its previous history. 
In the early sixteenth century, an attempted usurpa-
tion of the waning Le throne had led to decades of civil 
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war in which the existence of the Le kings came increasing-
ly to depend on powerful protectors. Chief among them were 
Nguyen Kim and, after his 1545 death, his son-in-law Trinh 
Kiem. 4 The two families later fell out, however. Nguyen 
Kim's son, Hoang, in fear of his life, arranged to be offe-
red the post of military commander in distant Thuan-hoa 
province, the southern-most edge of the empire. In his 
train went a large number of retainers from his family's 
Thanh-hoa home district. When Trinh Tung forced the puppet 
Le king to legitimate his waxing power with the title of 
chuae in 1599, the Nguyen held a strategic redoubt from 
which to challenge Trinh power. Another bloody round of 
internecine conflict duly ensued between 1627 and 1672. 
Outnumbered, but not out-gunned or out-fought, the 
Nguyen s~rvived the civil war as rulers of an increasingly 
distinctive polity, Nam-ha in the official records or Sang-
trong (the inner way) to its people. The push south distan-
ced Vietnamese of this area socially and culturally, not 
merely geographically, from their longer-settled Northern 
compatriots. Loosely organised and locally-adapted, the 
Nguyen state pulsated with energy and movement.° Foreign 
traders from all areas found welcome. Vietnamese, singly or 
in family groups, followed their fortune from one area to 
Ibid, pp.247-320 for a fuller account. 
An untranslatable title meaning a sort of military die-
tater under the crown. 
• All details from Li Ta Na. "Central Vietnam in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Some Social and Eco-
nomic Aspects", seminar delivered 20 September, 1990 at the 
Australian National University, Canberra. 
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another along the shifting frontiers where they alterna-
tively fought, or integrated and intermarried, with the 
Chams, Cambodians and other peoples they found there. In 
the process, they learned to eat Cham foods, to use and 
adapt the Cham plough, to modify their marriage customs, 
and even in some places to adopt Cham style graves. In sum, 
the most intimate aspects of their lives evolved to meet 
local conditions very different from those in the North. 
At the head of this state stood the Nguyen chua, ener-
getic rulers unafraid of innovation or compromise, in the 
seventeenth century especially. In this connection, an 
anecdote from the Chinese Buddhist traveller, Da Shan, who 
visited Bang-trong in 1694, is illustrative. While conver-
sing with Da Shan one day, a servant's message had sent the 
chua dashing away instantly, without a word to his guest. 
The prince later apologised, explaining that he had rushed 
off urgently to help fight a fire. Such undignified royal 
conduct and exuberant involvement in life were quite anti-
thetical to the stylised formality cherished by Confucian 
images of monarchy - and also, no doubt, to the actual 
behaviour in the courts of both Le king and Trinh chua in 
contemporary Ha-noi. ~t would be another fifty years, in 
the early 1740s, before the formal outlines of a court were 
even elaborated in Bang-trong~ Also typical of this pragma-
tism, the Nguyen rulers welcomed any means of accelerating 
the development of their southern borderlands. When several 
thousand Ming loyalist (Ming-huong) Chinese arrived in the 
late seventeenth century, they found themselves redirected 
to the far South, where they carved Gia-dinh out of the 
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Cambodian frontier and turned it into an important trading 
centre and magnet for further Chinese settlers. The Nguyen 
also allowed large estates to be developed, not merely pea-
sant family farms, and permitted the enslavement of minor-
ity peoples who provided agricultural labourers for the 
underpopulated far South. Until the 1740s, it was all run 
by a decentralised administration, divided according to 
military districts, whose officials, like their Cham pre-
decessors, paid themselves from the taxes they collected. 
Again until the 1740s reform, the central government in 
Phu-xuan comprised only about two hundred officials in 
three departments and three subsidiary bureaux. 7 
In the eighteenth century an emerging sense of region-
al identity found political expression. In 1702, Nguyen 
Phuc Chu' (Minh-vuong) sought to establish a direct tribut-
ary relationship with China, that is, to be recognised as 
an independent king. Rebuffed by Beijing, Nguyen Chu assum-
ed a royal title anyway (quoc chua).a Forty years on, his 
son Nguyen Phuc Khoat (Vo-vuong) formalised the claim to 
kingship by restructuring the existing administration into 
7 All set up under Sai-vuong (1614-1635). Bang Phuong-
Nghi, Les Institutions publigues du Viet-Nam au XVIII• 
Siecle (Paris: Ecole fr. d'Extr~me-orient, 1969), pp.73-75. 
a Philippe Langlet, La Tradition vietnamienne: Un etat 
national au sein de la civilisation chinoise (Saigon, 
1970), p.225 fn3 for Minh-vuong. This annotated translation 
of chapters 33 and 34 of the Kham dinh viet su thong qiam 
cuonq muc [Complete Mirror of Viet History, Established by 
Imperial Order] is extracted from BSEI (ns), XLV, 2&3 
(1970). Another failed attempt occurred in 1756. Charles B. 
Mayben, Histoire moderne du pays d'Annam (Paris: Plan, 
1920), p.113. 
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the traditional six Boards, and by elaborating a proper 
court over which he ruled as king (vuong). 9 
However, the administrative reorganisation modified 
the structure rather than transformed the basis of the 
regime. Government still rested on a combination of milit-
ary force, geographical ties, and kinship links. Soldiers 
still usually outweighed civilians and, although some new 
educated families tugged at the fringes of power, members 
of the chua's own extensive clan or important old retainer 
lineages still shared most top posts. Like the Nguyen, most 
politically important Bang-trong families originally issued 
from Tong-son district in Thanh-hoa. Over the generations, 
their families had been woven into a compact elite bound by 
marriage with the Nguyen, and each other. Their lineage 
names - Nguyen Huu, Nguyen Cuu, Truong Phuc, Tong Phuc, 
Nguyen Khoa and so on - pepper the biographies of eminent 
persons of the pre-dynastic era in the Bai-Nam Nhat Thong 
Chi (Gazetteer of Bai-nam]. 10 
Close kin relations never precluded intense intra-
elite rivalry, however, and it was thanks to such a politi-
9 Appointments, Rites, Penalties, Finances, War, and Pub-
lic Works, with the secretariat (Van chuc) transformed into 
the Academy (Han lam vien). The 1638 ranking of the chua's 
top advisers into 'the four pillars of the throne' (the 
dien rank of dai hoc si) stayed and continued right through 
the dynastic era. 
10 A collection of provincial gazetteers compiled by the 
Annals Office between 1865 and 1882 (with Central provinces 
up-dated between 1889 and 1909), -BNNTC was published in 
Chinese in 1909 by Cao Xuan Due. In quoc-ngu translations, 
it was later published by the Sai-gon Ministry of Education 
in the early 1960s and separately by the Ha~noi Historical 
Studies Institute (1969-71). I have used both sets, but not 
all volumes were available to me. 
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cal contest that one of their number, Truong Phuc Loan, 
helped bring the regime down. As Regent in 1765 Loan pl~ced 
a child on the throne instead of an older candidate11 and 
triggered a political crisis that divided the elite. His 
unpopularity in the next few years opened the way for a 
"legitimist" revolt - the Tay-son rebellion - that almost 
destroyed them all. 
Gia-Long grew to manhood during the Tay-son rebellion, 
and the long struggle that later Nguyen sources called the 
Restoration ( Trung-hung). 12 And when we consider the Gia-
Long era against this background, "restoration" seems no 
misnomer. Certainly where his administrative system is 
concerned, Gia-Long emerges less as the first Nguyen emper-
or than as the last Nguyen chua. 
Like its 9ang-trong predecessor, Gia-Long's regime was 
decentralised and military based. Restoration era retainers 
or officials shared almost all senior positions of power. 
No fixed rules of tenure13 or uniform mode of recruitment 
operated throughout the country. In the North, most new of-
ficials surfaced via irregular regional examinations, but 
were largely limited to careers in the civil ranks of the 
decentralised Northern administration. 14 In the Centre and 
came 
13 
Gia-Long's father. 
From 1778, when he became chua at 16, to 1802. He be-
vuong in 1780. Mayben. Histoire moderne, pp.194-5. 
Model, p.108. In 1820, Minh-Mang set a 6 year limit. 
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14 Re-established in 1806, the three regional examinations 
under Gia-Long may have produced fewer than 250 for the 
reign. Ibid, p.170-71, 180-81 and 220. For a longer discus-
sion, see Chapter 2 below. 
South, new recruits came from various sources. In 1802, 
many families on the fringes of the Bang-trong elite took 
advantage~f the Restoration death toll to slip literate 
but unqualified members into lower echelon administrative 
vacancies that would otherwise have gone to older families 
or their clients.i~ Later in the reign, a handful of gradu-
ates appeared; but for over twenty years most men from here 
gained office by right of birth, through the patronage of a 
high official, or in response to government appeals for 
literate men to present themselves for appointment to minor 
clerical posts.i 0 (In this humble way Nguyen Tri Phuong, 
later one of the most powerful officials under Thieu-Tri 
and Tu-Bue, began his career in 1820.)i7 After decades 
without examinations most non-graduates, and some recent 
laureates, felt more comfortable with demotic Vietnamese 
script (chu nom) than with Chinese characters, causing 
official business to be transacted in either language. 
(Minh-Mang quickly extirpated this particular heresy.)ie 
i~ At least two important nineteenth century political 
lineages began this way, the Quang-binh lineages of Nguyen 
Bang Tuan (son Nguyen Bang Giai) and of Hoang Kim Xan (son 
general Hoang Ke Viem). BNNTC [SGJ(9), pp.184, 186, and 
189; and VNDNTB, pp. 236-37 for the first. BNNTC [SGJ(9), 
p.185; and VNDNTB, pp. 91-93 for the second. 
Mayben, Histoire moderne, pp.356-59. 
i 7 From a lowly district office clerk, he soon moved to 
the Hue Finance Board where he became a protege of its Pre-
sident, Nguyen Bang Tuan. Bao Bang Vy, Nguyen-Tri-Phuong 
(Sai-gon: Nha Van-hoa, 1974), pp.56-58. 
ie Model, pp.54-55. Li Tana's research confirms numerous 
nom items in archival holdings for the Gia-Long era. Some 
nom poetry also appeared in examinations until the 1830s. 
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Court behaviour matched the general situation. Though 
hardly informal, it would have astonished mid-century Fren-
ch observers for whom 'etiquette [was] a sacred thing at 
the Court of Hue'. 19 The absence of Confucian indoctrinated 
degree holders from the political elite at court accounted 
for much of the relatively relaxed atmosphere. Not even the 
brilliant and influential Trinh Hoai Bue boasted a presti-
gious academic title. 2 ° Few of Gia-Long's old comrades-in-
arms, now high mandarins, fussed overly with the intrica-
cies of court etiquette; and nor did the king himself. Al-
though using the title of emperor (hoang-de), Gia-Long was 
liable to treat any incautious scholar who saluted him as 
Son of Heaven (thien tu) to a ribald 'dissertation on the 
reproduction of humankind', accompanied by 'such explicit 
words and gestures' as to leave no doubt that his concep-
tion and parentage had been anything but celestial. 21 Regu-
lations governing imperial audiences finally appeared in 
1816. Even so, behaviour at court still struck supercilious 
Chinese as decidedly lax. 22 
19 A. Bouinais and A. Paulus, L'Indo-Chine fran~aise con-
temporaine, II (Paris: Challamel, 1885, 2nd ed), p.653. 
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20 ~NNTC [HNJ(V), p.230. VNDNT~, p.354 says he passed some 
exams in Gia-dinh in 1788. Of Chinese descent, he variously 
headed the Boards of Finance, Rites, and Appointments under 
Gia-Long as well as leading the embassy to China that won 
recognition for the Nguyen. 
21 Michel Bue Chaigneau, recounting a conversation with 
the king. Naturally this did not happen on solemn ritual 
occasions. Souvenirs de Hue (Cochinchine) (Paris: Challam-
el, 1867), pp.111-12. 
Model, p.10. 
A glance at some of the most far-reaching reforms of 
the Gia-Long era, and ironically the very ones that made it 
appear mo~~-~inicised, suggests they had more in common 
with the ad hoc compromises of the chua period than with 
the carefully sifted institutional borrowings of the Minh-
Mang reign. The military and Restoration backgrounds of 
most of Gia-Long's highest officials apparently failed to 
equip them with the patience or insight necessary to wrest-
le at length with the subtleties of education, law, or fis-
cal reform. Pragmatism and expediency led to the wholesale 
adoption of the Ging law code, for example, despite the 
fact that the men charged with reforming the laws had been 
ordered to base their recommendations on 'the ordinances 
and statutes of former dynasties, [and] to examine the laws 
of Hong Due [the Le] and the Chinese Ching dynasty ' 23 
Another major initiative, the establishment of a sys-
tem of land registers for taxation purposes, seems just as 
cavalier. Le Quang Binh, 24 President of the Board of War, 
may have got the job because of his 1790s experience in 
opening new lands in the far South. Certainly because of 
this he would have known how landholding varied in former 
9ang-trong, not to mention between 9ang-trong and the for-
mer Trinh lands. Perhaps this awareness prompted the ad hoc 
solution of importing the Chinese system, but not applying 
it to the South. It was 1818 before the Hue Finance Board 
bothered to send sample registers to Gia-dinh to begin 
Mayben, Histoire moderne, p.364. 
VNDNT-EJ, pp.139-40 and -EJNNTC [HN](I), p.208. 
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teaching Southerners how to use them; and 1836 before cent-
ral officials first surveyed the region and brought its 
people into the Chinese register system. 2 e The centrist in-
trusion inflamed local feeling. A few years later most of 
the minority peoples upon whom land registers had also been 
foisted were in open revolt against Hue. 
In 1802, Gia-Long re-established the six Boards and 
Hanlin Academy (Han lam vien) of Vo-vuong's 1740s administ-
rative reforms but, as in the chua era, they co-existed 
with a military government that ran the country at large. 2 • 
Senior officers called Protectors (tran thu) administered 
the provinces, with little more than the oversight of edu-
cation ieft to their civilian deputies (hiep tran). Outside 
the central area (Quang-binh to Binh-thuan) 27 which depended 
on the capital, two overlords (tong tran) ruled North and 
South on Hue's behalf. The posts were filled in rotation, 
usually for three years, by a tiny number of high ranking 
generals, trusted lieutenants from the Restoration like 
Nguyen Van Thanh, Le Van Duyet, Nguyen Van Nhan, and Truong 
Tien Buu. 28 The tong tran commanded regional armies and hea-
ded distinct administrations whose bureaux replicated the 
Model, pp.164-68 
2 • Ibid, pp.67 and 96 mistakes the 1802 creation of the 
six Boards and the Han lam vien for a Gia-Long initiative 
rather than a re-establishment of pre-existing structures. 
For the military government, see pp.102-03. 
27 In 1820, Minh-Mang added Thanh-hoa (and its neighbour 
Nghe-an) to the area ruled from Hue in recognition of the 
dynasty's roots there. H. Le Breton, 'La province de Thanh-
Hoa ' , fil.. ( n s ) , XX IX , 6 ( 1918) , p. 610. 
26 But Minh-Mang kept Le Van Duyet as tong tran of Gia-
dinh from 1820 until his death in 1832. VNDNTB, pp.119-20. 
Hue Boards and performed all government functions in North 
and South. In addition, the overlords, not Hue, held all 
regional seals of office and could issue any legal orders 
---:'-
on their own authority. As time passed, the Bac-thanh and 
Gia-dinh-thanh administrations began to evolve their own 
characters, becoming less directly responsive to Hue and 
more inclined to use their own methods and procedures. A 
slow erosion of existing central control followed. Given 
this, it is hardly surprising that Gia-Long should have set 
at nought a lifetime of loyal service when, in 1816, cir-
cumstantial evidence hinted that Nguyen Van Thanh, at the 
time Bac-thanh overlord, could be ~nourishing the intention 
of treason•. 2 • The marshal's suicide to order followed not 
long after. For Gia-Long, an overlord had to be absolutely 
trustworthy, or dead. 30 
Applying the lesson of his chua ancestors, Gia-Long 
had prohibited four positions of overweening importance 
whose prestige and power might one day come to threaten the 
throne. 3 L Yet in practice his own administrative system 
2 • Gia-Long's words, quoted in Le Van Phuc, 'La vie et la 
mart du Marechal Nguyen-Van-Thieng, vice-roi du Tonkin sous 
Gia-long', BSEI(ns), XVI, 1 (1941), p.39. Thanh's stature 
made it a cause cel~bre. ~NNTC [HN](I), p.212 notes his 
death as a result of a judgement against his son, which 
Woodside accepted [Model, p.102]. But Le Van Phuc details 
incidents in 1812 (at the burial of Gia-Long's mother) and 
1816 (over the nomination of the heir apparent) that had 
caused the king.already to doubt Thanh [pp.36-39]. 
30 There was continuity here, too. Thirty-five years be-
fore, Nguyen Anh had murdered a top general, Bo Thanh Nhon, 
apparently for similar reasons. Mayben, Histoire moderne, 
pp.195-6. 
ZL They were no prime minister, no trang nguyen (first 
doctoral graduate), no position of empress, and no granting 
the chua-era title vuong. Indeed, Gia-Long preferred to 
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created two such potential competitors upon whose loyalty 
the dynasty had no choice but to rely. While he lived, Gia-
Long· s owh _Q_reat prestige (and ruthlessness) bound the 
structure together. But once he died, how long could such a 
ramshackle system expect to remain intact? 
One other serious problem confronting the new dynasty 
needs to be mentioned briefly - the rural crisis in former 
Bang-ngoai. 
It is hard to generalise about the agrarian situation 
in Vietnam by the nineteenth century, as recent studies 
confirm. 32 But one thing seems clear: while both principali-
ties suffered agrarian crises in the eighteenth century, in 
1802 the residual problems in former Bang-ngoai still loom-
ed as politically serious. 33 Its two most ominous symptoms 
landless peasant vagabonds and private holdings swollen 
with stolen communal land (cong dien) - were reported by 
concerned mandarins in the Bac-thanh administration early 
in Gia-Long's reign. 34 Furthermore, the return of peace was 
not automatically righting the situation. Between 1802 and 
1806, the excessive labour demands of fortress building 
award noble titles to illustrious men only after death. His 
successors, however, proved more forthcoming. Phan Huy Le 
et al, Lich su che do phonq kien Viet Nam, III (Hanoi, 
1961), p.430. [Henceforth CBPK] 
32 Some of the most valuable are gathered in Ngo Kim Chung 
and Nguyen Sue Nghinh (trans Georges Boudarel et al), 
Propriete privee et propriete collective dans l'ancien 
Vietnam (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987). 
zz For a discussion of this neglect, see Le Thanh Khoi, 
Histoire du Vietnam, pp.257-60 and 271-72. 
34 For the court's awareness of the transfer of communal 
land, see the documents cited by Vu Huy Phuc in •chinh sach 
cong dien, cong tho cua nha Nguyen nua dau the ky XIX', 
NCLS, 62 (1964), p.41. 
Nguyen military governors helped drive peasants away from 
another 370 villages in eight delta provinces. 3~ Their 
desertion-only further worsened a situation whose true 
dimensions finally emerged in an 1807 Bac-thanh report 
which officially estimated almost twenty percent of North-
ern farm land was no longer being cultivated. 3 • 
At that point Gia-Long might have solved the Northern 
rural crisis for generations and won the acceptance of its 
hard-pressed peasantry into the bargain. Like the first Le 
kings centuries before, he could have resumed uncultivated 
or excessive private lands and turned them over to communal 
ownership. 37 Indeed, Bac-thanh mandarins had urged exactly 
that course early in the reign, but the court refused. 3 e It 
had settled instead for the communal redistribution of sal-
ary lands previously awarded to Le, Trinh, and Tay-son of-
ficials and generals, and the promulgation of new communal 
land statutes forbidding its sale or long-term lease. The 
regulations even stooped to encouraging disrespect for 
hierarchy by promising to reward ordinary villagers who de-
nounced infractions by their superiors. 3~ But it was hardly 
C-BPK, p.439. 
3 • Truong Huu Quynh, 'Hot so net Jon ve tinh hinh ruong 
dat va nong nghiep thoi Tay-son', NCLS, 183 (1978), p.84. 
37 Though in the fifteenth century, there had been Tran 
clan latifundia to divide, unlike the myriad smaller priva-
te holdings of the Nguyen era. Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du 
Vietnam, pp.138-225. 
3~ Nguyen Phan Quang, · Trao doi y kien ve van de yeu sach 
ruong dat trong phong trao nong dan o Viet-nam thoi phong 
kien', NCLS, 92 (1966), p.37. 
Vu Huy Phuc, 'Chinh sach cong dien', pp.41-42 and 44. 
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enough. Without at least returning communal lands stolen 
within living memory, Gia-Long's measures remained marginal 
to the lives of struggling smallholders or landless peas-
ants. In times of hardship, especially once peace stimulat-
ed population growth, 40 the old cycle was liable to begin 
anew, with the same dangerously predictable consequences 
for public order. 
Just why Gia-Long failed at this historic juncture is 
unclear, but pragmatic politics and personal preferences 
might account for some of it. The king was no peasant rebel 
turned emperor, bringing rural grudges with him to the 
throne. 4 ~ Nor did he or his top officials feel ideologically 
committed to returning excessive private holdings, even 
those illegally obtained, to communal ownership. On the 
contrary, his family had encouraged landlords for genera-
tions in the far South and they had repaid him with finan-
cial backing during the Restoration. Gia-Long was hardly 
about to dispossess his allies. Further, he thought any 
land reform would be politically risky, threatening to 
alienate the people whose support the dynasty needed to 
40 As had happened by 1830, when land registers in 9 prov-
inces from Nghe-an north had to be revised. Nguyen Khac 
Bam, 'Gop may y kien ve van de ruong tu trong lich su Viet-
Nam', NCLS, 65 (1964), p.33. CBPK says taxed land expanded 
by almost 40% between 1820 and 1847 [p.440); but it never 
matched a possible doubling of population from 1802 to 
1847, as estimated by Nguyen The Anh in 'Quelques aspects 
economiques et sociaux du probleme du riz au Vietnam dans 
la premiere moitie du XIXe siecle', BSEI (ns), XLII, 1&2 
(1967), pp.15-17. 
4 ~ Perhaps more to the point, the Tay-son emperor, Quang-
Trung, also failed to return land to communal ownership, 
preferring other means to encourage vagabond peasants back 
to their homes. Truong Huu Quynh. 'Tinh hinh ruong dat', 
pp.86-90. 
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survive. 42 Thus, despite real benefits to the state from 
increasing the area of communal land, 43 it was 1839 before 
Gia-Long's ?Pn, Minh-Mang, approved the transfer of private 
fields in Binh-dinh to communal title. Even then military 
conscripts enjoyed priority in its shares. 44 Although some 
Gia-dinh landlords offered several thousand mau of private 
land for the same purpose in 1840, nothing similar ever oc-
curred in the North. 4 e And the basic reason for that - the 
problem of integrating former 9ang-ngoai - brings us to the 
major new issue that faced the victorious Nguyen in 1802, 
how to forge a single kingdom from two formerly hostile 
principalities. 
Gia-Long's Failure to Integrate the North 
Winning over, not merely pacifying, the North was a 
perennial problem for Gia-Long, made so in no small measure 
by Hue's own contradictory behaviour. While the court re-
cognised the region's economic and strategic importance, 
and tried to conciliate its parochial feelings by a variety 
4~ Thus in 1816 he rejected a land reform request from the 
eminent mandarin, Pham 9ang Hung, on these grounds. Nguyen 
Thieu Lau, 'La Reforme agraire de 1839 dans le Binh-dinh', 
BEFED, XLV (1951), p.120. It is unclear where Hung's re-
quest referred to. 
4~ It attracted higher taxes and helped fund socially ap-
proved local institutions, as well as contributing to offi-
cial salaries (until 1839). To Lan, 'On Communal Land in 
the Traditional Viet Village', VS, No. 61 (1980), pp.131-
46. 
44 Nguyen Thieu Lau, 'Le R•forme agraire', pp.124-25. 
4 e Vu Huy Phuc, 'Chinh sach cong dien', pp.44-45. 
of symbolic gestures, little in the Gia-Long reign signall-
ed that the Hue court had genuinely made room for Northern-
ers in the new ruling elite. Instead, its policy appeared 
politically ambivalent, swinging from conciliation and in-
ducement to gratuitous insult, and back again. The pattern 
began during the Restoration. 
In the early 1790s, Nguyen Anh sent emissaries north 
to solicit support in the struggle against the Tay-son. Al-
though their success was limited, a determined handful of 
fighters did venture south to join his armies (and, as it 
turned out, to make their fortunes since restoration milit-
ary service opened sure access to public office in the Gia-
Long era). 4 = Then a decade later, Nguyen Anh himself rode 
north. But this time he cynically chose to manipulate local 
feeling by posing as a champion of Le restoration in order 
to win Hanoi in a bloodless victory in 1802. Immediately 
exposed as a lie, the tactic rebounded politically against 
the new dynasty, breeding disillusion and distrust where 
the Nguye~ could least afford it. 47 So. in 1803, when ·the 
desperately understaffed government ordered former Le man-
darins to report for duty, the response was hardly over-
whelming, as the astonishing reception of the prize catch, 
4 • ~NNTC [HNJ(III) records 6, 3 from Ha-noi and 3 from 
Nam-dinh (pp.214-15 and 345-46 respectively). Of the 3 sur-
vivors, one became a high ranking soldier, one a provincial 
military governor and one a President of the Board of War, 
the only delta Northerner of the era to head a Hue Board. 
47 His banners carried the hallowed anti-Trinh slogan phu 
Le (restore the Le). Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du Vietnam, 
p.339. For Northern reaction, see Langlois' 1802 report 
quoted in Leopold Cadiere (ed), 'Documents relatifs a 
l'epoque de Gia-Long', BEFEO, 1912, pp.55-56. 
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Nguyen Van, attests. Only a top regional graduate (giai 
nguyen), not even a tien si, 46 Van found himself catapulted 
to the stellar heights of 'the four pillars of the throne' 
when a grateful Gia-Long rewarded him with the supreme tit-
le in the Nguyen mandarinate (Can-chanh-dien Bai-hoc-si). 49 
Other conciliatory gestures to Northern parochialism 
followed. Despite the shrunken communal land base, the sur-
viving scions of the Le and Trinh families received lavish 
grants of cult land.ea Ha-noi was refurbished as the auxili-
ary capital: at one stage Gia-Long apparently even conside-
red making Vinh, in the former Bang-ngoai province of Nghe-
an, his capita1.ei In 1806 some ultra-loyal Le officials, 
returning from self-imposed exile in China, crowned the ef-
forts at symbolic reconciliation when they agreed to ornam-
ent the Hue court with their presence. This new trophy of 
legitimacy, coming hard on the heels of Gia-Long's investi-
ture in Hanoi as tributary monarch by Beijing (that is, of 
Chinese acceptance of the dynasty), re-emphasized the fact 
that the Nguy~n truly held H~aven's Mandate.e2 
46 For academic titles and the examination system in gen-
eral see Model, pp.170-223. 
4~ ~NNTC [SG](V), pp.133-34. As an honorific rank, with a 
lower level office. From a respected Thanh-hoa scholarly 
family, Van mainly drafted official documents. VNDNTB, p. 
345 says he died in 1804. 
eo Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du Vietnam, pp.347-49. 
Model, p.127. 
e 2 So valued were they that each rated an entry in ~NNTC, 
including one who never joined the mandarinate. BNNTC [HN] 
(Ill), pp.216-19 for the three from Ha-noi, who represent 
3/Sths of its Nguyen dynasty entries. 
Certain material benefits accompanied the symbolic 
gestures. Northern officials ran the lower levels of the 
decentralis~9 Bac-thanh administration.e3 Under the 1803 
regulations they enjoyed higher shares and preferential ac-
cess to communal land, both as mandarins and as examination 
graduates. Then in 1807, when regional examinations were 
re-introduced, the North received four sites compared to 
two in former Bang-trong, plus comparatively large graduate 
quotas. In 1813, its sites accounted for eighty percent of 
all regional graduates (cu nhan).e4 But the way the system 
operated typified the Gia-Long era practice of symbolic 
concessions empty of political substance. The generous num-
bers of sites and graduates could not disguise the politic-
al irrelevance of examination titles at the time. Gia-Long 
held only three regional examinations, rather than the six 
the Le would have held; and he never bothered to bring back 
the metropolitan examinations that awarded the coveted tien 
si title.ee Thus, in reality, far from satisfying Northern 
expectations, t~he !i~mi-revived system worked to frustrate 
·-·· 
th~m, be they scholarly aspirations or mandarinal ambit-
ions. 
Model, p.136. 
54 Ibid, pp.195 and 220 (Table 5). Discussed further in 
Chapter Two below. 
ee Examinations were held in 1807, 1813 and 1819. Model, 
p.170 says the six year gap began accidentally; but Hue 
might have accepted it easily, given the nine-year cycle 
under the Nguyen chua, who also never held metropolitan 
examinations either. Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du Vietnam, 
p.264. 
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Gia-Long's ambivalence and empty inducements failed to 
win either the ungrudging allegiance of Northern literati 
or the lo~~lty of the villagers. For the peasantry, as pre-
viously mentioned, Nguyen policies at best only partly re-
paired the social dislocation of the continuing Northern 
rural crisis. Even the benefits of relative peace were off-
set by the heavy demands of the new governors, backed at 
every turn by an occupying army recruited from the distant 
provinces around Hue. The presence of Northerners among the 
civil mandarins never disguised the reality of power: while 
naked force might compel acquiescence in Northern villages, 
it could not coerce loyalty or gratitude.e0 
Far more important politically was the attitude of 
literati families (van than) towards the new dynasty. In 
the North, these families historically provided the natural 
leaders of peasant communities whose status derived from 
attested literacy rather than wealth or land ownership. In 
the villages, certified literacy equalled local elite stat-
us. It won exemption from military and corvee duties, as 
well as eligibility for co-option to village councils. It 
also qualified men for admission to the village Confucian 
association (phe tu van),e7 whose discussions of local and 
national issues made its members the opinion formers in 
e• Later French missionary accounts, as quoted in Bui-
Quang-Tung, captured the feeling. 'La succession de Thieu-
Tri', BSEI (ns), XLII, 1&2 (1967), pp.66-7. 
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e 7 This highly prestigious voluntary society, custodian of 
the cult of Confucius, attracted all literate men who could 
afford its fees. Nguyen Tu Chi, 'The Traditional Viet Vil-
lage in Bae Bo: Its Organisational Structure and Problems', 
VS, No. 61 (1980), pp.82-83. 
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village society. Literate men also usually shared useful 
links of kinship and friendship with serving mandarins, as 
-
well as a c9~mon commitment to elite cultural values that 
made them, as a group, important local brokers of central 
authority within their villages. But men in these circles 
remained part of village society. If the behaviour of cen-
tral officials alienated them from the dynasty, or pushed 
some into actively championing parochial popular grievan-
ces, then local disturbances ranging right up to rebellion 
were all too liable to follow.ea 
Winning their support was therefore crucial to the 
survival of the dynasty. But the disparities Northerners 
perceived between symbolic gesture and political substance 
worked to deny Gia-Long acceptance in these circles. The 
weight of history, and of Northern suspicion, told against 
him. In this unprecedented situation, the king could not 
even honour his own ancestors without offending Northern 
elite sensibilities, as the building of the Thai-mieu 
showed. In 1806, as Gia-Long welcomed the returning Le 
loyalist exiles to his court, he also began to raise a com-
memorative temple within the imperial city at Hue to vener-
ate the 'emperors and empresses [hoang-de va hoang-hau] of 
the chua period'.e• Projecting the imperium back to Nguyen 
Hoang not only glorified Gia-Long's ancestors but also in-
eQ For its organisational forms, Ibid, pp.35-44 and 60-75. 
For a discussion based on mainly French sources, see Yoshi-
haru Tsuboi, L'Empire vietnamien face a la France et a la 
Chine, 1847-1885 (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987), pp.191-95. 
e• ~NNTC [HNJ(I), p.23. It also venerated their top offi-
cials. See L. Sogny, 'Les Associes de gauche et de droite 
au culte de Thai-mieu', ~' I, 3 (1914), pp.293-314. 
itiated the standard Nguyen version of recent Vietnamese 
history - that the 1802 foundation of the dynasty had been 
the restoration of a kingdom already in existence for two 
hundred years.•0 But this retrospective elevation of the 
Nguyen chua, by plain implication to Confucian eyes in the 
North, automatically denigrated several generations of Le 
emperors - and their officials - as unsanctif ied impostors. 
Imperial theory might stretch to the simultaneous existence 
of two kings (vuong) in one country, but never two emperors 
( hoang-de). •.:i. 
Orthodox Northern literati might have accepted the 
Nguyen on the basis that the Tay-son empercir Quang-Trung, 
not Gia-Long, had overthrown the Le. Other Northern scho-
lars might have followed the anti-Tay-son line of Nguyen 
Van (the 1803 Can-chanh). In the 1790s, Van had apparently 
tried to join Nguyen Anh in Gia-dinh. Later, in 1803, he 
tried to resign from his high appointment on discovering he 
was expected to work alongside former Tay-son officials in 
the scratch administration in post-war Phu-xuan.•2 But very 
few had read the changes and acquired pro-Nguyen credent-
ials in time. And from now on, as the new Thai-mieu announ-
ced to all, any accommodation would not be on their terms. 
•° For example, Tu-Bue noted on his father's funeral ste-
le: 'Since the foundation of the kingdom to our times, two 
hundred years have elapsed ••• · A. Laborde and Nguyen ~on, 
'La St~le de Thi@u-Tri', BAVH, V, 1 (1918), p.1. 
•.:i. Just as there cannot be two suns in the sky, neither , 
could there be two emperors, 'two beings of equal dignity 
who are above all others', according to the Book of Rites. 
Quoted in Langlet. Tradition vietnamienne, p.166, fn2. 
ONNTC (SGJ(15), p.134. Gia-Long refused. 
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Henceforth, their ancestors' high renown and honourable 
service would count for little at court. And nor did liter-
ary skill_or a life of learning necessarily smooth the 
path, 63 as Le dynasty scholars ordered to adorn the court 
soon discovered. Roughneck Southerners showed scant regard 
for cherished literary traditions. The wretched fate of 
their greatest living exponent, the Northern poet Nguyen 
Du, epitomised their lot under Gia-Long. Forced by his fame 
into an unwanted mandarinal career and loaded with honours 
he despised, Du's inner torment only earned him the disdain 
of Southern officials at court.•4 
Everywhere they looked in the Gia-Long reign, the Nor-
thern elite saw just how catastrophically changed was their 
place in the state. For many long established scholarly 
Northern families, the world had turned upside down. Nos-
talgia, anxiety, and pessimism about the future poisoned 
their poetry and corroded their confidence.•~ The feelings 
• 3 Though it appears to have done so for Phan Huy Thuc, 
son of the famous Nghe-an scholar and Tay-son official Phan 
Huy Ich. According to VNDNTB, p. 384, Gia-Long promoted him 
to thuong tho (2-1), making him only the second official 
from former Bang-ngoai that I am aware of who reached that 
level before the 1840s. 
• 4 From a noble Nghe-an family, Du was recruited in 1802 
and in 1804 ennobled and given the elevated title of Bong-
cac-dien dai-hoc-si (and, in 1812, the supreme title, Can-
chanh). In 1814 he reached his highest post, Vice-President 
of the Board of Appointments (tham-tri 2-2). [VNDNTB, pp. 
230-1] Court records derided him as a 'frightened man who, 
each time he presented himself ~t an imperial audience, was 
terrified and anxious and could not reply'. Alexander Wood-
side, 'The Historical Background', in Nguyen Du (ed and 
trans Huynh Sanh Thong), The Tale of Kieu (New York: Vint-
age Books, 1973), pp.xiv-xvi (quote p. xv) for Du and other 
examples. 
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For examples, see Model, pp.74 and 136. Woodside's nar-
focus led him to misconstrue Northern elite anxiety. He 
died hard. Even in 1835, when most had reconciled themsel-
ves to the dynasty under Minh-Mang, a censor still reported 
that the brash behaviour of Southerners made Northerners at 
court feel 'ashamed within themselves'. 66 
Had rural distress and elite anxiety remained unstruc-
tured, without a common focus to organise shared feelings 
into joint action, the danger period may have passed in 
time. Unfortunately for the Nguyen, Northern particularist 
emotions early. ranged themselves under the banner of con-
- . . . 
tinued loy~lty to ~n idealised Le king. In 1808, trouble 
erupt~d in four provinces around Ha-noi when rebels demand-
ed the restoration of the former dynasty. As one weapon in 
his armoury, Bac-thanh overlord Nguyen Van Thanh commiss-
ioned a poet to use his skills to pacify the people. Not to 
be outdone, however, the unruly populace riposted with a 
scathing new ballad denouncing mandarinal exactions. 67 The 
quixotic moment was pregnant with the future. Henceforth, 
in every decade but the 1840s, the free-floating disaffec-
tion of Northern peasants (usually expressed in songs sat-
believed it arose from a difference between court optimism 
and the doubts of 'intelligent Vietnamese outside the court 
but still within the educated oligarchy' over 'Vietnamese 
institutional borrowing from China in the 1800's'. [p.75]. 
Yet all his examples are northern. That some were also man-
darins indicates how generalised such feelings were. See 
Chapter Two for the nineteenth century elite in more 
detai 1. 
Ibid, p.135. 
• 7 According to Kieu Danh Mau, Ban Trieu ban nqhich liet 
truyen (Sai-gon: Bo Quoc-gia Giao-duc, 1963), pp.10-12. 
[Hereafter BNLTJ Thanh may have recalled the propaganda 
value of 1790s pro-Nguyen songs in the south. DNNTC 
[HNJ(I), p. 199 (for Hoang Quang); or Duong-dinh-Khue, La 
litterature populaire vietnamienne (Saigon: np, 1967), 
p.111. 
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irising the dynasty or moving laments on their own suffer-
ings) 6 e was galvanised into rebellion. Le associations leg-
itimised almost all of them, while specifically Le restora-
tionist revolts disrupted every former Bang-ngoai province 
at least once between 1808 and 1883. 69 The absence of real 
Le leaders after 1833 proved no handicap. 70 It may even have 
been an advantage, since it allowed otherwise unlikely can-
didates like Vietnamese Christians71 to invoke the magic Le 
name. So potent was its appeal in Bac-ky that only one of 
the major Vietnamese revolts in the region, that of Phan Ba 
Vanh in 1826-27, failed to counterfeit Le credentials. 72 
Pro-Le rebellions were not the only armed disturbances 
in former 9ang-ngoai under Gia-Long. Chinese bandits, moun-
tain tribesmen, and wandering outlaw bands of dispossessed 
•a For some examples from the 1840s and 1850s from former 
9ang-ngoai, see Model, p.134; Bui-Quang-Tung, 'Thi~u-Tri', 
pp. 53-56; or Nguyen Khac Vien and Huu Ngoc (eds), Antholo-
gie de la litt~rature vietnamienne, II (Hanoi: Editions en 
langues etrangeres, 1973), p.12. 
• 9 In 1816, 1833-36, 1854, 1861-64, 1871-74 and 1882-83. 
For details, BNLT, pp.10-13, 24, 58-59, 108-119, 120-47, 
188-95, and 216-21 respectively. Also see Tsuboi, L'Empire 
vietnamienne, pp.214-18. 
70 The only two were Le Duy Hoan, executed in 1816, and 
his son Luong, raised by Highlanders who later rose in his 
cause in 1833. Phan Quang, 'Khoi nghia Le Duy Luong', NCLS, 
224 (1985), pp.64-70. Minh-Mang deported surviving Le line-
age members to Quang-nam, Quang-ngai and Binh-dinh, and re-
fused them contact with each other. VNDNTB, p.123. 
71 Ta Van Phung in 1861-64 and Le Duy Ba in 1883. BNLT, 
pp. 120-27 and 216-19 respectively. 
72 At least of those listed in BNLT. Even so, the rebels' 
banners carried an inscription (phu hoang) that anxious Hue 
observers feared might mean 'restore the imperial [Le];. 
Sang Huy Van, Nguyen Phan Quang, and Chu Thien, 'Mot dien 
hinh cua phong trao nong dan duoi trieu Nguyen: Cuoc khoi 
nghia Phan-Ba-Vanh', NCLS, 86 (1966), p.23; or BNLT, pp.40-
47. 
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peasants joined with Le legitimists to make the area a per-
manent theatre of operations. Indeed, it is no exaggeration 
to say that the Nguyen reversed the more expected sequence 
by conquering their kingdom after founding the dynasty, not 
before. One Ha-noi source has counted over fifty armed re-
bellions or disturbances in Gia-Long's eighteen year rule, 
involving on average more than five of the thirteen North-
ern provinces every year from 1807 to 1819. 73 The protracted 
campaigning in the North contrasted starkly with the 
tranquillity in the old Nguyen lands from Quang-binh south. 
The Le caste no shadow here. Apart from the recurring an-
nual problem of tribal raids on lowland villages in Quang-
ngai, in only five years were armed disturbances recorded 
in these fifteen provinces. None posed any threat to the 
state. Three typified the sort of rumbustious eructations 
of normal village life that always attracted administrative 
sanctions when they erupted onto a wider stag~. They hardly 
deserve counting. In Quang-nam, for example, the activities 
of a celebrated geomancer stirred up the people, while at 
another time a boil-over of village factionalism brought 
official intervention on behalf of one side. Only two seem-
ed at all serious, an 1806 disturbance in the former Tay-
7 z My calculations, from the chart in Nguyen Phan Quang 
and Bang Huy Van, · Tinh hinh dau tranh giai cap o thoi Gia-
Long', NCLS, No. 78 (196.5), pp.9-23 (chart between pp.12 
and 13). I interpret their evidence differently from them, 
and from Woodside [Model, pp.135 and 311 fn 65], who has 
twice misreported the total number of armed disturbances 
they counted as 105, rather than 'over 50'. For the second 
instance, see Woodside's chapter 'Vietnam, 1802-1867• in 
David Joel Steinberg (ed), In Search of Southeast Asia 
(Sydney and Wellington: Allen and Unwin, revised ed, 1987), 
p.129. Annex One argues in issue in more detail. 
son stronghold of Binh-dinh and an 1805 agitation near Hue, 
where forced labour requisitions to build the new capital 
rivalled those of the North. 74 
In 1816-17,. a happy concurrence of events removed two 
potential leaders of any major Northern separatist rebel-
lion at a stroke. In 1816, a son of the serving Northern 
overlord, Nguyen Van Thanh, was arrested and, under tort-
ure, confessed to treason. Almost simultaneously, Le Duy 
Haan was caught plotting revolt. Haan obligingly implicated 
Thanh's son in his conspiracy, proof enough for an already 
suspicious king to order the Grand Marshal's exemplary 
suicide. 7 e At that point, the kingdom must have seemed safe 
from Northern separatism for at least a generation. But the 
executions never stopped the armed outbreaks, nor reconcil-
ed the Northern peasantry to Nguyen military rule. In 1819, 
shortly before the king's own death, famine stirred thous-
ands of Thanh-Nghe peasants and mountain tribesmen to 
rebel. After summoning Le Van Duyet's army, Gia-Long invok-
ed the same tired policy by ordering Le dynastic temples in 
Thanh-hoa repaired as a show of royal generosity. 76 But by 
then the failure of empty symbolism to conciliate Northern 
sentiments was undeniable. Only real measures of integra-
tion, not rhetorical flourishes, could hope to heal the 
dangerous rift that still divided the country at the old 
Trinh-Nguyen border. 
74 Ibid, p.17 for the examples in the text, and pp.18-19 
for the troublesome Thuong of 9a-vach 
Ibid, p.17. Le Van Phuc, 'Le-Van-Thieng' p.39 
BNLT, pp.25-31. 
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When Minh-Mang ascended the throne in 1820, eighteen 
years of Nguyen rule had failed to reconcile the North, or 
even to create mechanisms and incentives to win the willing 
support of its literati elite families. And far from weak-
ening the hold of politically dangerous regionalism, Gia-
Long had entrenched it in the structure of government. 
Dynastic survival required a break with the past, as Minh-
Mang recognised. For the next fifteen years he worked 
patiently with handpicked officials in Hue to change 
direction. In the process, they transformed the political 
and administrative face of the regime and laid the foundat-
ions for the mid-century kingdom of French experience. 
Minh-Mang's Creation of 9ai-Nam 
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Readers of Alexander Woodside's provocative study of 
early Nguyen government and administration, Vietnam and the 
Chinese Model, could be forgiven for coming away with the 
belief that sinicisation was a foregone conclusion. Or, in 
Woodside's words, that 'the heavy if controversial depend-
ence of the Vietnamese imperial tradition upon the Chinese 
classics and their ideas [was] the preponderant theme of 
early nineteenth-century Vietnamese politics' , 77 and that, 
even if some uncertainties existed •about which Chinese in-
stitutions would be renewed or introduced in Vietnam after 
1802 and which would not•, 7 a the process itself was never in 
77 
7S 
Model, p.16. Also see p.18. 
Ibid, p.76. 
doubt. And that, as a corollary, the court could not adopt 
Chinese institutions, or the king call himself Son of 
Heaven, without also internalising all the other parapher-
nalia of the Chinese world view. Otherwise, "shorn of such 
classical ideological apparatus, [the king] would not have 
been believable in the eyes of Vietnamese bureaucrats and 
the "pale-faced students" (bach dien thu sinh) who were be-
ing educated in Vietnam, generation after generation, in 
the Chinese classics'. 79 
Yet, how true is this of Vietnam and how much is it a 
result of Woodside's own rigourously nineteenth century 
frame of reference? A glance at the monarchy during the 
chua period, for example, certainly disputes the last of 
the above statements. 
The Le emperors, pathetic shadow kings in Hanoi for 
over two hundred years, remained hoang-de and thien-tu the 
whole time, although no-one had any illusions about their 
actual power. No Le emperor from the seventeenth century on 
could have publicly maintained, according to Woodside's 
formulation, 'that his own political virtue in the world 
was unchallengeable, that he had no true competitors for 
the "mandate of heaven", and that he attracted the respect 
of foreigners•.ao On the contrary, it was evident that he 
could not even command the respect of the chua, in whose 
Ibid, p.234. 
Ibid. 
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separate court real power dwelt.Qi But this 'unheard-of rev-
ersal of history~ 82 never provoked a wholesale elite refus-
al, in th~~stronghold of Chinese scholarly traditions in 
Vietnam, to serve the usurping Trinh. Many scholars un-
doubtedly hated it, and some were driven to revolt, but 
most managed to accommodate themselves to the demands of 
real politik. The Son of Heaven may not have seemed believ-
able in their eyes, but it never stopped them from serving 
in his administration. In this example, as in many others, 
the awkward exceptions of the chua era form the rocks on 
which many generalisations about pre-colonial Vietnamese 
history founder. 
As the earlier discussion has shown, a frame of refe-
rence that includes the chua centuries radically alters the 
picture of early nineteenth century politics from that in 
Vietnam and the Chinese Model. From the wider perspective, 
the 'preponderant theme' of the Gia-Long reign hardly seems 
'the dependence of the Vietnamese imperial tradition upon 
the Chinese classics and their ideas'. Rather, it appears 
as a theme of continuity with the past, overl~id by a 
shrugging acceptance of the sinicised titles and trappings 
that traditionally accompanied the imperium. The spirit of 
the Gia-Long reign is best judged by the king's own 
behaviour. How committed to the Confucian role model of the 
Qi Langlet, Tradition vietnamienne, pp.107-08, 166-67, 
197, 201 and 208-09 for examples of public usurpation of 
royal prerogatives and powers by the Trinh. 
82 From the description of the Northern political situat-
ion given the Tay-son leader Nguyen Hue by the turn-coat 
Trinh general, Nguyen Huu Chinh. Quoted in Le Thanh Khoi, 
Histoire du Vietnam, p.320. 
'sage-king' was a 'first scholar of the kingdom' who only 
sanctioned irregular regional examinations and never both-
ered to re~establish the whole system? How serious was a 
Son of Heaven who, when he finally got around to proclaim-
ing a list of the "vassals" that bowed to his political 
virtue in 1815, let it be padded out with the names of 
France and England, something he knew from the French at 
court to be laughable?e3 Framed that way, such questions 
answer themselves.e4 
From the Mac usurpation of the sixteen century until 
the 1820s, the generations of scholars to whom Woodside re-
fers had lacked the power to coerce the political system 
into more than a passing resemblance to the "ideal world" 
preferences of their classical training. Indeed, it is arg-
uable how successful they had ever been in this task, even 
at the height of the sinicising reforms under Le Thanh-tong 
(1460-1497). Vietnam never had an entrenched landowning 
political class similar to the Chinese scholar-gentry, able 
to transcend dynastic change and defend .its members' shared 
s 3 Burma also appeared, though there was no contact be-
tween the two countries until the 1820s. Model, pp.234-39. 
Given Woodside's interpretive framework, he accords the ex-
ercise more seriousness than I think Gia-Long would have. 
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e 4 That Gia-Long did not take the ideological apparatus of 
empire too seriously may help explain an odd error in 
Chaigneau's memoirs. Chaigneau claimed Gia-Long 'did not 
want to recognise, as had his predecessors, the suzerainty 
of the Celestial Empire, despite the demands and threats of 
••• Peking. [But] Minh-Mang lacked the courage to follow 
the example of his father ••• [and] requested investiture. 
From the start [he] abandoned the policy of Gia-Long to 
adopt that of China ••• ' [Souvenirs, p.242] But Gia-Long 
had received Chinese investiture in 1806; so perhaps it is 
Gia-Long's attitude, which the author's father would have 
known, that he is reporting here. 
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interests through monopolising a self-perpetuating imperial 
bureaucracy.ee Unlike China, in Vietnam the civil mandarin-
ate had spent nearly all its institutional history in cen-
turies of competition with other groups for influence near 
the throne, with Buddhists under the Ly and Tran and then 
with the army under the Le. All their successes had depend-
ed on active royal backing. Without such support, civil 
bureaucrats as a group lacked the institutional power to 
dominate the political system. Thus under the Trinh and 
Nguyen chua, for example, civil mandarins in both realms 
had been forced to adjust to centuries of military domin-
ance and a steady erosion of the role and function of Con-
fucian ideology in government, neither of which they could 
adequately resist. 96 
The forces at play in the sinicisation of the nine-
teenth century kingdom, therefore, represented no simple 
continuity with the past. Against the backdrop of the pre-
vious three centuries, who in 1802 (or indeed 1819) would 
have confidently predicted the dynas~i's radical departure 
towards intensive ?inicisation? It was no foregone conclus-
ion in the Gia-Long reign, nor was the later burgeoning 
power of classically-educated examination graduates within 
the political and power elites of the kingdom. Both had to 
se For an analysis of the Chinese structures Vietnam lack-
ed, see 'China as a Permanently Bureaucratic Society' in 
Etienne Balazs (ed Arthur F. Wright), Chinese Civilisation 
and Bureaucracy (Yale University Press, 1964), pp.13-21. 
s• For an overview of the cultural changes in this period 
when Buddhism flourished (even among the Le kings) and Ch-
ristianity took root, see Nguyen Khac Vien, 'Traditional 
Vietnam. Some Historical Stages', VS No 21 (1969), pp.131-
48. 
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be schemed and fought for, and neither could have persisted 
for long without royal backing, or at least acquiescence. 
The Minh-Mang reforms were integral to these later 
developments. They formed the institutional environment 
within which classically-trained scholar-bureaucrats in the 
1850s and 1860s learnt to manipulate royal support to their 
own ends. For that reason they need to be cons~dered brief-
ly here. 
Political realities in the 1820s dictated Minh-Mang 
move cautiously towards the centralisation of power: some 
of Gia-Long's old retainers sniffed suspiciously at his 
more scholarly son. 87 So the king began by consolidating his 
own base with a number of reforms designed to create a 
single, centralised imperial bureaucracy, indoctrinated in 
the Chinese classics and unswervingly devoted to the royal 
will. Historically, this was an ambitious, even radical, 
aim. Only once before, in the Hong Bue period of the late 
fifteenth century, had a Vietnamese king set out to conjure 
into existence a civil bureaucracy Chines'e in both form and 
style. 88 That is, not simply to set up an administrative 
structure along Chinese lines, which was a commonplace in 
Vietnamese history, but also to require its members to en-
act in their lives the high Confucian drama of government 
87 Georges Taboulet, La geste fran~aise en Indochine, I 
(Paris: Maisonneuve, 1955), pp.294-95. 
ss The Trinh made a half-hearted attempt in the 1660s. See 
K.W. Taylor, 'The Literati Revival in Seventeenth Century 
Vietnam', Jnl SE Asian Studies, XVIII, 1 (1987), pp.1-23. 
For the Hong Bue period in detail, see J.K. Whitmore, "The 
Development of Le Government in Fifteenth Century Vietnam'', 
Ph.D., Cornell University, 1968. 
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by "worthy men". Minh-Mang's mandarins were to be moral ex-
emplars, classical role models for the whole of society, 
rather than simply loyal administrative servants of the 
crown. The imperial bureaucracy would became the institut-
ional focus of elite aspirations and, as such, the mechan-
ism that integrated regional literati elites into a nation-
wide network attuned ta the life of the capital and commit-
ted to the ruling dynasty. 
It was a bold strategy, and by the 1820s perhaps the 
only one likely to reconcile the Northern elite to the new 
dynasty and integrate its members into the king's service 
at the highest levels. Minh-Mang began implementing it 
immediately. He set regional examinations on a regular tri-
ennial cycle and, in 1822, restored the metropolitan level 
whose tien si title traditionally crowned the academic 
hierarchy. Both moves initially favoured the North, the 
home of scholarly traditions and Chinese classical studies. 
By renewing these long-established and familiar academic 
institutions, Hue signalled for the first time that the 
dynasty would offer Northerners more than token participa-
tion in public life. They responded enthusiastically. 99 As 
the Guoc Trieu Bang Khoa Luc [Register of Graduates of the 
Current Dynasty] shows, from 1822 ta 1832 all but one of 
99 Woodside reported a 'sudden flood' of scholars to these 
examinations in the 1840s; but his. figures give the 1820s 
total as almost identical to the 1840s (179 to 182), with a 
drop in the 1830s to 144. 1826 had the second highest num-
ber in his sample, while the ratio of the 6 sessions from 
1822 to 1838 and the five from 1841 to 1847 is 1:1 (969 to 
910). The unexplained 1830s' decline may have 
reflected difficulties in reaching Hue due to revolts. 
[Model, p.179] 
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the thirty-five tien si of four examinations came from old 
Bang-ngoai.•0 
In 1~29 Minh-Mang further finetuned the system by add-
ing a palace examination to grade the tien si, and creating 
a consolation 'subordinate list' (pho bang) status for men 
whose metropolitan examination score seemed too low to gua-
rantee success in the palace. Woodside speculated that this 
secondary list might have been intended to salvage poorer 
scholars for bureaucratic employment. This seems unlikely: 
as regional graduates, pho bang already had access to the 
. , 
. . 
·~anda~inate. M6re probably, Minh-Mang wanted to stimulate 
scholarship in general, and in the Nguyen heartland provin-
ces around Hue in particular. By 1829, they had yet to pro-
duce a single tien si.• 1 The pho bang title would help swell 
their numbers, as well as the total number of high academic 
laureates, men whose classical indoctrination ought to make 
them paragons of the new imperial bureaucracy; and whos~ 
gratitude, too, should make them dynastic stalwarts. (Thts 
may explain why no fixed ratio of tien si to pho bang was 
set, as happened in China at the regional level.) If quant-
.ity was the goal, the device proved resoundingly success-
90 The source lists these graduates from 1822 to 1919. 
Compiled by Cao Xuan Due and translated into Vietnamese by 
Le Manh Lieu, it was published in Sai-gon by Bo Van-hoa 
Giao-duc va Thanh-nien in 1962. The one exception was Phan 
Thanh Gian from Nam-ky. 
91 One pho bang passed in 1829, and the first tien si in 
1835. The only tien si from south of Nghe-an until then was 
Phan Thanh Gian in 1826, and then only because Minh-Mang 
refused to accept that none but Northerners had passed for 
the second time in a row. For his reasons, see Truong Buu 
Lam, New Lamps for Old.The Transformation of the Vietnamese 
Administrative Elite (!SEAS Occasional Paper No. 66, Singa-
pore: Mazuren Asia, 1982), p.13. 
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ful. Pho bang averaged 40/. of all metropolitan laureates in 
the next twenty years. Their career success, however, never 
rivalled that of the tien si. 92 
That the first generation of tien si (1822-1835) en-
joyed brilliant careers was largely due to the king's per-
sonal involvement. For laureates who lived and avoided 
serious errors, 93 the tien si degree from these examinations 
afforded the inner running for middle- to upper-level court 
positions. 94 Of the thirty-four noted above, twenty-nine (or 
85/.) reached posts as lang trung (4-1), thi lang (3-1) or 
tham tri (2-2) in the six Boards. 9 = A comparison with tien 
si from the same provinces who graduated in the following 
decade (six examinations between 1835 and 1844) highlights 
how special these early careers actually were: of the later 
thirty-five, fewer than half won comparable positions under 
Tu-Buc. 96 
92 Or 62 pho bang from 160 laureates in 11 examinations 
between 1829 and 1848. Of 22 laureates of these examinatio-
ns who rose to Board president or provincial Governor-Gen-
eral, only 4 (or 18/.) were pho bang. My calculations from 
GT~KL. See Annex Two for statistical tables analys~ng ca-
reer success, provincial and regional backgrounds and fam-
ily educational attainments of graduates. 
9 z One had his name chiselled from the tien si stele and 
several were demoted less spectacularly after reaching high 
positions. 
94 Defined as between 4-1, bureaux directors in the six 
Boards (lang trung) and 2-2, vice presidents of the Boards 
(tham tri). For an outline of the administrative hierarchy, 
see Sao Sang Vy, Nquyen Tri Phuong, pp.80-83; or Alfred 
Schreiner, Les Institutions annamites en Basse-Cochinchine 
avant la congu~te fran~aise, I (Sai-gon: Claude et C£•, 
1900), pp.272-80. 
9 = Sample includes Thanh-Nghe-Tinh. My calculations from 
GTBKL, pp.26-50. 
9~ Only 16 or 451.. My calculations. Ibid, pp.51-93. Chap-
ter Two discusses the political elite in detail. 
The compensatory Northern bias under Minh-Mang also 
fuelled the meteoric careers of outstanding regional gra-
duates (cu nhan), as two examples illustrate. The first, 
Nguyen Cong Tru, 97 rocketed through the administration in 
the 1820s, reaching the rank of vice-president (2-2) at-
tached to the Board of Justice in 1828, a mere eight years 
after joining. Then in 1835 for a short, heady period Tru 
became one of the first Northerners99 to break through to 
thuong tho rank, although as a Governor-General outside 
Hue. But his first error sent him crashing four grades. 
After five patient years he regained 2-1 ranking, only to 
lose it once more the next year after a military disaster 
in Cambodia. 99 The second example, Doan Uan, proved more 
fortunate.ioo A Nam-dinh cu nhan of 1828, he also burned up 
the hierarchy, reaching counsellor (3-1) in eight years and 
vice-president (2-2) in eleven when, in 1839, he became a 
special commissioner charged with the Binh-dinh land reform 
of that year. From here, he cleared the last and highest 
career hurdle when Thieu-Tri appointed him to thuong tho 
rank, with the position of Grand Military Counsellor (tham 
97 VNDNTB, pp.165-68. 
99 The only others I found before him were: the Restorat-
ion fighter Sang Tran Thuong from Ha-noi (Board of War); 
and Phan Huy Thuc, from the famous Ha-tinh Phan Huy family. 
VNDNTB, p.384 says Gia-Long made Thuc thuong tho, but his 
later disapproval of Minh-Mang's policies caused his career 
to languish. 
99 Though he remained on the fringes, ranging between 4-1 
to 2-2 until his retirement in 1848. 
ioo Ca-Van-Thinh, 'Le Mandarin Doan Uan, "pacificateur de 
l'Ouest"', BSEI (ns), XVI, 1 (1941), pp. 42-3. He also won 
a glowing entry in BNNTC [HNJ (III), pp.346-47. 
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tan dai than) in 1845. Of the forty-six tien si from former 
Bang-ngoai provinces who passed under Ming-Mang, only Nguy 
Khac. Tuan.and Truong Quoc Dung 101 matched the success of 
these two men. 
Both the career achievements of high-flying Northern-
ers, and the existence of a final barrier at the 2-1 level, 
betray a royal hand at work. The same king who lavished 
executive positions on his mandarin-scholars from the North 
equally grudged them the appointments of greatest prestige 
and power at court. The apparent paradox was rooted in con-
temporary political realities. Minh-Mang lived in a period 
of engineered change. The affiliations of the past, not 
Confucian indoctrination, still largely defined the politi-
cal elite, and provided the surest guarantees of loyalty to 
the throne. It would still be some time before Minh-Mang's 
sinicising reforms could hope to subsume old loyalties 
based on kinship, history, and geography to produce a new 
elite organised around the orthodox principle of trung-
nghia, a sort of grand amalgam of sincerity, unselfishness, 
upright moral behaviour and faithfulness, all placed (it 
was assumed) in the service of the dynasty. 102 Until that 
time, however, a judicious mix between the existing elite 
and its anticipated successor remained politically vital. 
Thus, in the 1830s and early 1840s, men from chua era re-
tainer families and, to a lesser extent, their neighbours 
101 That they were both from Ha-tinh was probably also 
significant. BNNTC, pp.37-9 for Tuan and p.43 for Dung, who 
also receives a short entry in VNDNT~, pp.515-16. 
102 For the difficulties of translating trung-nghia into 
concrete English terms, see Model, p.110. 
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in the Nguyen heartland provinces from Quang-binh to Quang-
ngai, or the far South, continued to enjoy a quasi-monopoly 
of top arffly and administrative appointments. 103 But equally 
it was no accident that the first t.ien s.i appointed provin-
cial governor under Minh-Mang was Phan Thanh Gian, 104 the 
sole Southerner.among them and a perfect compromise between 
old and new. 1015 
His father's old elite did not escape Minh-Mang's re-
forming zeal entirely, however. In 1821, the king overhaul-
ed Gia-Long's makeshift National College (Guoc Tu G.iam) in 
Hue, established generous scholarships and set its sixty 
royal family (ton s.inh) and upper elite students (am s.inh) 
on a special course of study in preparation for mandarinal 
careers. 10• Initially many proved less than grateful, pre-
ferring the pleasures of Hue to the studious grind Minh-
Mang envisaged for them. In 1825, a special test found only 
three from more than thirty who qualified for bureaucratic 
ioz For example, Vo Xuan Can and Nguyen Bang Tuan from 
Quang-binh [BNNTC [SGJ(IX), p.184] and Ton That Luong and 
Nguyen Khoa Minh from Thua-thien [£JNNTC [HN] (I), pp.192 and 
206-07]. All became Board presidents during the 1830s and 
1840s, and won dai hoc si titles in the top grade of the 
mandarinate. None held academic titles. 
104 One of the best known Nguyen mandarins because of his 
1860s dealings with the French, Gian became tien si in 1826 
and Governor of Nghe-an briefly in 1829. But a military de-
feat against Quang-nam bandits in 1831 lost him 4 grades. 
It was 1835, after routing a pirate band, before he regain-
ed a Governorship. Pierre Daudin and Le Van Phuc, 'Phan 
Thanh Gian (1796-1867) et sa famille, d'apres quelques doc-
uments annamites·, BSEI (ns) XVI, 2 (1941), pp.3-4. 
ioe As it was only an acting appointment, Minh-Mang may 
have used it to signal the career benefit of high academic 
titles in his reign, compared to that of his father. 
Princes were disbarred from the mandarinate, but not 
their sons. 
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selection. Nonetheless, from 1827 the college regularly 
channelled its ton sinh and am sinh into the mandarinate 
via relatively superficial triennial examinations. 107 
All these upper elite students already enjoyed direct 
access to the bureaucracy on account of their fathers' high 
status. 108 What ~as the point of this new formality? It has 
been interpreted as a response to the mandarinal supply and 
demand crisis created by applying the Chinese model to 
Vietnam. 109 Certainly a shortage of officials existed, at 
least in the first reigns. But as am thu110 most of these 
men were already entitled to direct entry. Rather, what 
Minh-Mang may have been aiming at was to effect a sort of 
•confucianisation by stealth~ of the younger generation of 
his father's loyalist elite. By lavishing royal attention 
on the National College and making its attendance attract-
ive compared to direct appointment as minor clerks, he en-
sured that the sons of the existing elite were exposed to a 
greater depth of study - and to the gifted students who had 
won their Quoc Tu Giam places on merit - before starting 
their careers. But even more important, he also made a pub-
lie statement few could have missed at the time. By encour-
107 It tested the Chinese classics and commentaries and 
Vietnamese legal texts. Model, pp.181-83. 
108 Generous special statutes favouring mandarins' sons 
were drawn up in 1819, 1841, and 1844 to regulate their 
rights of entry either into the Quoc Tu Giam or as junior 
clerks of the Academy. Ibid, p.219. 
109 As also occurred with new Chinese dynastie~. Ibid, 
pp.180-81. 
110 The status which allowed mandarins' son ·shader pri-
vileges on account of the father's high position. 
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aging the upper elite to submit to an examination process 
before entering the administration, Minh-Mang reinforced 
the institutional and attitudinal changes he desired among 
his officials by applying them symbolically to his own 
young kinsmen and their relatives. 
Reforming the existing political elite from within was 
a slow process, however. Early friction between those who 
owed their mandarinal positions to examination success and 
those who did not was unavoidable, as the stern 1835 report 
by a censor, Nguyen Ba Nghi, suggests. Nghi depicted South-
erners (that is, men from old 9ang-trong) as 'flatterers 
and braggarts' whose 'good fortune' meant that 'everything 
they say and do occupies the position of advantage'. As a 
result, Northerners felt 'ashamed within themselves' .iii 
What is particularly interesting about this is that Nguyen 
Ba Nghi was himself a 'southerner', from Quang-ngai provin-
ce; but unlike almost all of his fellows, Nghi was academi-
cally distinguished. In 1832 he had become only the third 
man from south of Nghe-an to pass the metropolitan examina-
tions, albeit as pho bang.ii 2 He clearly sympathised with 
the 'northerners' at court who, by definition in 1835, were 
all high examination graduates like himself. 
It is fascinating to speculate about what this out-
burst indicates. Nghi was not yet thirty, and bureaucratic-
ally inexperienced. His sympathy may have tempted disgrunt-
Cited in Model, p.135. 
~~ 2 At the young age of 26, the only recorded graduate for 
his family. He later rose to tong doc. GTBKL, p.50 and 
VNDNTB, p.454. 
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led Northern intellectuals at court to use him as a stalk-
ing-horse for their own grievances. But, it is also poss-
ible, as Nguyen Ba Nghi's ~eclaration hints, that the Con-
fucianisation strategy was already producing results. We 
catch in his words an austere rejection of 'southerners' as 
personally unworthy of their good fortune compared to 'nor-
therners·, trained Confucians like himself, who knew how to 
endure undeserved shame stoically. We may detect, too, a 
glimmer of how new cultural and intellectual bonds between 
scholar-officials could cut across older regionally based 
loyalties. Thus, rather than simply referring to factions 
inspired by geographical associations within the bureau-
cracy, as has been suggested, 113 in this context and at this 
time 'southern' and 'northern' may well have been metaphors 
for the rivalry between arriviste examination graduates 
(mainly from the North and with whom Nghi identified) and 
their academically unqualified superiors from old retainer 
elite families. In 1835, after all, two brothers from one 
such family ~ Nguyen Kho~.Minh and Nguyen Khoa Hao114 - had 
already monopolised two of the six Board presidencies for 
years. 
Finally, it is also worth mentioning the paradox that 
Nguyen Ba Nghi's complaint itself suggests the extent to 
which Northerners were being integrated into Minh-Mang's 
Model, p.135. 
114 G. Riviere, 'Une lignee de loyaux serviteurs: les 
Nguyen Khoa', BAVH, 11, 3 (1915), pp.298-300. Unusually for 
such a family, they originated in Hai-duong, not Thanh-hoa, 
though the original ancestor had followed Nguyen Hoang sou-
th in 1558 as a child. Also see ~NNTC [HNJI, pp. 206-07. 
imperial bureaucracy by the mid-1830s. That a man from 
Quang-ngai would have raised such a matter, and in such a 
manner, in the previous reign is frankly unimaginable. 
Woodside does not relate how Minh-Mang received Nguyen 
Ba Nghi's report, but it may be that such court rivalries 
did not entirely dismay him. Like Le Thanh-tong, the other 
great reforming emperor before him, Minh-Mang may well have 
come to appreciate and exploit the political advantages to 
the throne of tensions between various factions at court 
which only he could harmonise.iie As the chua experience 
showed, the real danger to the monarchy arose not from fac-
tionalism per se, but rather when a single faction dominat-
ed all others and effectively (or actually) captured the 
throne. Well-managed diversity, factional disagreements, 
and competition between officials all worked in the king's 
institutional favour. 
Along with policies designed to imprint the style of 
orthodox 'Confucian gentlemen· onto the new imperial bur-
eaucracy, three other major reforms to the machinery of 
government also prepared the ground for the later emergence 
of a more Confucianised kingdom. Woodside has dealt with 
the Noi Cac secretariat, the Co Mat council, and the pro-
vincial re-organisation of 1831-32 at some length. We need 
not duplicate his findings here, but only note some signif-
icant points. 
iie Whitmore, "Le Government". Also see the poem, 'The 
Morality of Kings·, attributed to Le Thanh-tong in Nguyen 
Khac Vien and Huu Ngoc (eds), Vi~tnamese Literature, Ha-
noi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 198?, pp.252-53. 
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The Grand Secretariat (Noi Cac)iio that appeared in 
1829-30 acted as the principal information clearing-house 
in Hue. As part of their work, Noi Cac officials summarised 
- --
the contents of in-coming memorials and drafted suggested 
replies before passing them to the throne. In neither case 
did they function simply as the 'eyes and ears' of the 
king. Noi Cac officials shared the ideological commitments 
(and bureaucratic agenda) of the waxing group of scholar-
officials in Hue. As time passed, too, the organisation 
fell prey to the shortcomings common to all in-bred, air-
less central bureaucratic agencies. Before the decade was 
out, examples appeared of its officials massaging awkward 
information into acceptable forms, of giving internal pro-
cedures priority over real world imperatives, and of treat-
ing presentation and style as ends in themselves. The re-
fining process jeopardised the throne's access to necessary 
information, and by the late 1830s Minh-Mang often had to 
bully his Noi Cac officials into providing the details he 
wanted. But the real danger was long-term. The Secretariat 
exercised a cumulative subversive influence by its subtle 
and continuous shaping of information from the world out-
side Hue along ideologically acceptable lines. If, as hap-
pened under Tu-Sue, the king became immured in Hue or lost 
access to non-bureaucratic opinion and advice, he could 
easily drift out of touch with political realities outside 
the capital. It was a predictable outcome in all the cir-
Model, pp.86-92. 
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cumstances, but nonetheless potentially disastrous in high 
policy matters. 
Next.in sequence came the provincial re-organisation 
of 1831-32 that finally toppled the Gia-Long regime by re-
placing the former regional governments with thirty-one 
provinces ruled from Hue, grouped into three administrative 
units (ky).ii 7 Although Special Commissioners (kinh luoc su) 
were still occasionally dispatched in emergencies to govern 
all Bac-ky or Nam-ky, from 1832 onwards their appointments 
were always temporary and for specific purposes. 
Gia-Long's military Protectors (tran thu) gave way to 
Governors-General (tang doc), ranking 2-1 in the civil man-
darinate, for larger or more difficult areas, and Governors 
(tuan phu), ranking 2-2, for smaller ones. Hue politics, 
and the hope of promotion to the inner court circle, bulked 
large in their eyes. As befitting high court officials, 
most assumed the more remote style commensurate with their 
rank when possible, preferring to oversee their subordinate 
financial (bo chanh) and judicial commis~ioners (an sat) 
rathe_r·than run their provinces themselves.ii& But no civil 
tong doc delegated one particular function. For the first 
time in centuries, the 1831-32 reforms had vested civil 
authorities in the provinces with control of the army by 
making the tang doc responsible for military matters within 
ii 7 Ibid, pp.146-50. At this time southern Nghe-an became 
Ha-tinh province. After 1832 the sub-region is properly 
called Thanh-Nghe-Tinh, and Thanh-Nghe before. 
ii& For a summary of the powers of the tong doc, tuan phu, 
bo chanh and an sat see Schreiner, Institutions, I, pp.292-
305. 
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his jurisdiction.ii• Although they commanded senior military 
officers (lanh binh 3-1), tong doc usually planned and led 
operation~ themselves. 
Given Minh-Mang's sinicising goals, and Ming and Ging 
practice, it seems odd at first glance that superior civil 
officials personally took the field in military campaigns. 
A far more orthodox recognition of civil superiority would 
have been to consign all operational matters to military 
subordinates for execution.i~o But civilian tong doc cam-
paigned i~ perion because they were expected to. Despite 
Minh-Mang's conscious reversal of chua-style .. military demi-
nance, the king still gave military affairs a very high 
priority and expected the same of his senior officials. In-
deed, both Minh-Mang and his successor, Thieu-Tri, ignored 
the civil classification of provincial governorships and 
appointed the best men available to the posts. As internal 
rebellion and warfare in Cambodia battered the country in 
the 1830s and 1840s, successful military officers with no 
examination titles often found themselves appointed tong 
doc solely on their merits.i 2 i Even an untutored soldier ri-
sen from the ranks, like Nguyen Xuan from Thanh-hoa, might 
be appointed Governor-General in royal recognitio~ of his 
ii• Pay, recruitment, supply, etc were the responsibility 
of various Hue Boards. 
i 20 Truong Buu Lam misunderstood how late this situation 
actually appeared in his discussion of the civil command of 
military force in 'the traditional government of Vietnam'. 
New Lamps, pp.16-17. 
i 2 i I have found biographical data for 12 of them from the 
BNNTC volumes available to me~ 
99 
ability. 122 That Minh-Mang valued flexibility above dogmatic 
orthodoxy was shown in 1839 when, doubtless to the horror 
of some, he cheerfully announced to the assembled court 
that ideally "all civil officials should be forced to learn 
the military arts' and all military officials civilian bus-
iness. It was for this reason, he explained, that tong doc 
in the provinces 'alternate[d] between civil and milita-
For the 1830s and much of the 1840s, the hierarchical 
supremacy of civilian bureaucrats never translated into an 
automatic monopoly of top provincial appointments. Instead, 
they had to compete for them with military officers. What-
ever their ideological disdain for the army, 124 ambitious 
civil mandarins knew nothing won royal favour and fast pro-
motion like a successful military campaign, 12 ~ as biograph-
ies of numerous high-flying civil officials confirm. Even 
the quintessential courtier, Truong Bang Que, who later en-
gineered Tu-Buc's accession, was packed off to serve his 
turn in an- 1~37 rebel suppression campaign in Thanh-hoa 
shortly after becdming president of the Board of War. 120 
BNNTC [SG](V), p.138. 
Model, pp.147-49. 
124 As early as 1825, Hue bureaucrats had placed military 
achievement last of three factors mitigating official pun-
ishments. Ibid, p.64. 
12 ~ They were also a wild-card gamble since failure meant 
speedy disgrace. Given this, it seems unlikely many schol-
ars would have wanted to exercise these powers personally, 
if allowed the choice. 
i 2 • With Doan Uan and another top 1840s civil official, 
Nguyen Bang Giai. Ca-Van-Thinh, 'Doan Uan', p.43. For a 
short biography see R.B. Smith, 'Politics and Society in 
Viet-Nam During the Early Nguyen Period (1802-62), Jnl of 
The last noteworthy reform occurred in 1834 when the 
Co Mat Vien, 127 the Secret Plans and Strategy Council, was 
created Ln a time of escalating regional rebellions. 12e The 
Council included the king and four 'great ministers· (dai 
than) who, from the 1840s, were usually Board presidents. 
Although it later evolved into the central policy making 
organ in Hue, during its first decade the Co Mat was kept 
busy dealing with regional revolts (and war in Cambodia), 
many of which represented local rejection of the centralis-
ing reforms of 1831-32, and their aftermath. This blossom-
ing of revolt formed an ironic commentary on Minh-Mang's 
success in sinicising the bureaucracy. As Hue purists pres-
sed for greater conformity to Chinese models, refractory 
peasants, Christians, and minority peoples responded with 
violence. The upshot was that, according to the figures of 
one researcher, nearly three times as many rebellions broke 
out under Minh-Mang as Gia-Long, many of them now in the 
south. 129 
the Raval Asiatic Society, 1974, pp.157-58; VNDNTB, p.508-
09; or Tsuboi, L ·Empire vietnamienne, pp.1_56-58, who_ places 
him as president of the Board of War from 1832 (instead of 
late 1835) which is during Nguyen Khoa Minh's tenure of the 
post (1832-35), according to Riviere, 'Les Nguyen Khoa·, 
p.299. 
Model, pp.99-102. 
128 Mainly Le Duy Luong and Nang Van Van in the North. 
[BNLT pp.58-61] In the South, the Le Van Khoi rebellion 
(1833-36), led by defecting local army officers, controlled 
all Nam-ky at one stage [BNLT, pp.61-69]. 
129 Though open to criticism (see Annex One), Chu Thien's 
figures for peasant rebellions provide an interesting com-
parison of the incidence of revolt under different Nguyen 
kings. The centralising and sinicising Minh-Mang reign ex-
perienced 11 revolts per year, compared to the Gia-Long 
average of 4, the Thieu-Tri average of 8 and the Tu-Bue 
average of 3, mostly in the North. My calculations from 
figures cited in Nguyen Phan Quang, ·~anh gia phong trao 
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In 1839, Minh-Mang celebrated his achievements by re-
naming the kingdom Bai-Nam, the Great South. He could be 
forgiven a self-congratulatory flourish: nothing comparable 
had happened in the country since the fabled Hong Bue re-
forms of the late fifteenth century. In two decades, his 
intelligent support for local adaptations of tried and tes-
ted Chinese institutions of government had renewed the im-
_perial bureaucracy, and begun to knit the country together 
by drawing the literati elite of all three regions into the 
administration, and thus t6wards the dynasty. And while the 
deeper problems of Northern regibnal particularism persist-
ed, the nightmare scenario of a well-armed overlord plung-
ing the country into another round of civil war did not• 
However, a fundamental flaw threatened the new regime, 
one which, for all his historical erudition, apparently 
eluded Minh-Mang. It needed an active king like himself at 
the centre, able to play the decisive royal role as master, 
not just arbiter, of the system. The throne needed to man-
oeuvre between contending interests and conflicting view-
points, and to manipulate them from above without falling 
captive to any. Also, the ruling dynast could never afford 
to forget that he was king of small Bai-Nam, not emperor of 
China. He had to be able to set the basic premises of Chin-
ese imperial theory and practice in Vietnam against a deg-
ree of outsider's scepticism foreign to the growing band of 
true believers in the Hue bureaucracy. It was all a matter 
of balance. Too much royal scepticism might prove counter-
nong dan khoi nghia trong nua dau the ky XIX', NCLS, 61 
(1964), p.44. 
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.... 
productive, if not actually disastrous. The debilitating 
experience of the Wan-li reign in late Ming China, for ex-
ample, shpws how paralysing it could be for such an admini-
strative organisation if the king questioned, then reject-
ed, his role as Son of Heaven, and basically withdrew from 
government. 130 In Vietnam, however, a greater danger lay at 
the opposite extreme. If the emperor embraced the true 
believers, if he strove too hard to emulate the classical 
'sage-kings', if he understood local political realities in 
terms of Confucian philosophical concepts or Chinese histo-
rical examples, the result might prove just as disastrous 
for the good governance of his Southeast Asian realm. 131 
Minh-Mang's successor, Thieu-Tri, followed his father 
and maintained the balance; but the hidden trap snared his 
unwary son, Tu-9uc. We will conclude with a glance at the 
first twenty years of this reign, the period in which acci-
dents of history guided 9ai-Nam's evolution towards the 
Confucian kingdom of French experience and expectation, and 
of the little China fallacy. 
13° For the Wan-li emperor and his times see Ray Huang, 
1587. A Year of No Significance. The Ming Dynasty in De-
cline (Yale University Press, 1981), esp. pp.1-41, 46-53, 
and 75-86. Wan-li stopped reading state papers, holding 
court audiences and filling high bureaucratic posts. As he 
refused to leave the Forbidden City, officials had to bribe 
eunuchs to take him messages. 
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Tsuboi, L'Empire vietnamienne, pp.152-56 for examples. 
A Confucian State In Embryo, 1847-1865 
In 1847, Thieu-Tri's second son ascended the throne in 
a palace coup against his older brother, Hong-baa, led by 
Truong Bang Que and with the acquiescence (at least) of 
General Nguyen Tri Phuong. Hong-bao never accepted it, nor 
did a minority of the royal family and mandarinate for the 
next two decades. The new king also felt morbidly insecure 
and, fearful of a counter-coup, never left Hue again, not 
even for the Chinese ritual confirming his accession. 132 In 
1854, with his latest schemes betrayed, Hong-bao was im-
prisoned where he soon died. Against the advice of Truong 
9ang Que, the Confucian monarch baulked at executing his 
brother's sons. Instead, stripped of their royal status, 
they lived closely confined for ten years. Months after 
their release in 1864; the discovery of a royal family con-
spiracy against Tu-9uc sent them back into preventative 
custody. But they were a magnet for discontent in the tur-
bulent early 1860s. Finally, in 1866 another group of elite 
plotters, aiming to replace Tu-Bue with Hong-bao's oldest 
son, managed to invade the palace with a large armed band. 
As a result, almost twenty years after his disputed access-
132 Staged in Ha-noi under the three previous kings. The 
titular vassalage was China's way of codifying internation-
al relations with border states. 
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ion, a badly shaken king terminated the whole painful epis-
ode by executing his nephews. 1 ~3 
It i~ impossible to discuss the first half of the Tu-
9uc reign without taking into account the succession crisis 
and the shock waves it sent racing through the country. Bui 
Quang Tung's scholarly monograph explores many of its con-
sequences, including the body blow it struck to the budding 
acceptance of Nguyen dynastic legitimacy in the North (as 
suggested by the renewal of Le restorationism after nearly 
twenty years of quiescence). From 1854 onwards, Heaven's 
anger at the royal fratricide became the standing explanat-
ion in the North for every disaster besetting the kingdom. 
The perceived loss of royal virtue provided both an invita-
tion and a pretext to revolt by cloaking simmering region-
al resentments in a priceless aura of legitimacy. The feel-
ing permeates a pro-Le declaration of 1871: 134 
Within the borders of our Southern kingdom 
good fortune has descended through the noble ge-
nerations of the Nguyen dynasty. But Tu-Bue is 
unworthy to be king, [having] secretly coveted 
the throne of heaven [and] brought harm to his 
nearest kin .. ~Mountains collapse in Binh-dinh, 
floods inundate Phu-xuan, droughts and deluges 
follow one another ••. In truth, Heaven and Earth 
cannot tolerate it; spirits and men cry out angr-
ily at the injustice ••• · 
By the 1850s, the Northern countryside was already a 
prey to long-term inflation and increasingly bitter sectar-
133 Bui-Quang-Tung, 'Thi~u-Tri', pp.31-50; and Tsuboi, 
L'Empire vietnamienne, pp.127-47. This echoes the fate of 
My-Duong, the son of prince Canh, Gia-Long's oldest son and 
heir who had died in 1801. Plots surrounding My-Duong en-
abled Minh-Mang to reduce him to a commoner. Rebels from 
within the elite also championed his rights, for instance 
Le Van Khoi in 1833. VNDNTD, pp.158 and 280. 
Proclamation of Le Duy Minh. BNL T, p .189. 
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ian conflicts with Catholics. To these difficulties were 
added, from the 1850s on, uncontrolled coastal piracy and 
the free-~ooting depredations of Chinese bandit armies, 
spilling across the open border. One or the other threaten-
ed life and property in virtually every province. In this 
situation, the debasement of royal authority and legitimacy 
that followed Tu-Sue's accession and Hong-bao's death not 
only undermined attempts to uphold order but, by licensing 
revolt, actively pushed the region further into the anarchy 
that would engulf it over the next thirty years. 
The succession crisis and its aftermath also played a 
crucial role in the later evolution of Minh-Mang's Bai-Nam 
towards the forms of a Confucian state.i3~ Before consider-
ing this, we need to outline what we mean by a Confucian 
state. Ideally, such a state was centralised, very hierar-
chical, and bureaucratically ruled. Scholars trained in the 
Confucian classics and overwhelmingly recruited by public 
examination monopolised state off ices. The governing ideol-
ogy prized harmony and encouraged people to behave with 
propriety by conforming to a small number of social models 
drawn from family relationships. The elite expressed power 
and hierarchical status through well-defined rituals which 
derived much of their authority and legitimacy from being 
13~ Ralph Smith outlined a similar analysis to that which 
follows, but believed the Minh-Mang reforms and the public 
expressions of Confucian ideology by the throne made Viet-
nam a Confucian state before the end of the Thieu-Tri era. 
But government practices before Tu-Bue strongly suggest any 
such change was after 1847. 'The Cycle of Confucianisation 
in Vietnam~, in Walter Vella (ed), Aspects of Vietnamese 
History (Asian Studies at Hawaii No 8, University of 
Hawaii, 1973), pp.2-21. 
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perceived as handed down from an ideal~sed past, itself the 
custodian of all worthy cultural values and ideas. 
It was also a state in which the dominant bureaucracy 
constantly impressed upon the otherwise autocratic ruler 
his need to conform to its ideal of monarchical behaviour. 
By the nineteenth century, what that meant was two-fold. 
The king had to body forth in public (that is, to his court 
and officials) the ritual and symbolic qualities of the 
imperial Son of Heaven, the incarnation of hierarchy and 
power on earth and of man's connection with the cosmos. In 
addition, he had to behave as a sage-king, as a being supe-
rior to the business of everyday politics, whose virtue at-
tracted to his service men of talent and morality, upon 
whose advice he depended for the proper administration of 
the kingdom. 
As Joseph Levenson has noted, all this represented an 
attempt to control and channel an otherwise authoritarian 
power which was inherently non-Confucian. Unrestrained mon-
archs all too willingly used their power to ends which Con-
fucian educated officials found unacceptable, like waging 
war, murdering rivals (including family members), or 
favouring eunuchs. Kings generally preferred \wielding 
power to change the world, not for emanating perpetuation 
of a changeless pattern'~3• as the interests of the king's 
officials, and the powerful scholar-gentry class from which 
~ 3• Joseph R. Levenson, 'The Suggestiveness of Vestiges: 
Confucianism and Monarchy at the Last', in David S. Nivison 
and Arthur F. Wright (eds), Confucianism in Action (Stanfo-
rd University Press, 1959), pp.252-60, quote p.257. These 
ideas were expanded in Modern China and Its Confucian Past, 
II (New York: Doubleday, 1964). 
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they sprang, dictated. In China, the institutional contest 
between throne and bureaucrats gave rise to a pattern in 
which, put most simply, the impersonal organisational con-
tinuity of the bureaucracy gradually wore down the monarch-
ical dominance that marked the start of each dynasty. As 
the institutional self-interest of the mandarinate frust-
rated effective personal rule, kings turned to allies like 
eunuchs to circumvent the administrative machine.i~7 From 
there, with the monarchical institution on the defensive, 
it only needed the accession of a weak incumbent to send 
the dynasty spiralling into decline, and members of the 
scholar-gentry class onto the look-out for its replacement. 
This sort of pattern never developed in Vietnam, part-
1 y because the kingdom lacked the permanent landed class 
whose interests it protected. Nor had a Confucian state 
ever evolved there, despite the various Chinese elements 
routinely incorporated into different dynastic administrat-
ive systems since independence. Vietnamese kings (or chua) 
had always insisted on their right to exercise personal 
power whereas, politically and institutionally, a Confucian 
state disadvantaged the king. The Confucian role stripped 
the monarch of his political flexibility at the same time 
that it endangered dynastic survival by making him, more or 
less, a tool of the ruling bureaucracy. It was a situation 
that only an immature, imperiled, or indoctrinated king 
would freely accept. In 1847, by chance, an individual came 
Huang, 1587, passim for this transition under the 
Ming. 
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to the throne in Hue who met all these qualifications and 
who, for nearly twenty years, seemed willing to try. 138 
For all that Minh-Mang's reforms laid the foundations 
for a Confucian state, he himself would never have allowed 
it to develop. As Woodside has shown, Minh-Mang valued his 
flexibility highly and insisted on it despite the arguments 
of his most orthodox officials. 13• Tu-Sue's situation, how-
ever, was quite different. A teenage litterateur with no 
interest in public administration before ascending the 
throne, 140 Tu-Bue shared his officials' Confucian ideology 
from the start. But even if he had not, his disputed acces-
sion>and his touchy defensiveness concerning its legitima-
cy,.:1. 4 .:1. left him scant room to manoeuvre. Conforming to the 
scholarly ideal of kingship strengthened his credentials 
and shored up the loyalty of the increasingly Confucianised 
van than circles in the country at large • 
.:1. 3 a Tu-Bue may have tried to impose a more personal rule 
in the 1870s, after the coup leaders had died. In 1875, for 
example, he appointed the first Northern thuong tho since 
1845, and allowed imperial clan members to become politic-
ally significant. Both may indicate the throne's attempts 
to find new allies outside the existing political elite. 
Tsuboi, too, stated that after Phuong's death in 1873 the 
Co Mat became a 'simple consultative organ with no real 
authority' because Tu-9uc took personal charge, in foreign 
policy especially. [L'Empire vietnamienne, p.232] All this 
happened after the period under discussion, and in any case 
does not counter its argument • 
.:1. 3 • An excellent example is his debate over contact with 
the west, though the text contains several others. Model, 
pp.289-93. 
.:L4c::> 
marre, 
p.30 • 
.:1.4.:L 
According to his own admission, quoted in. E. Dela-
'La Stele du tombeau de Tu-Due·, BAVH, V, 1 (1918), 
Ibid, pp.28-31. 
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There was to be a price for this, however. The traumas 
of the Tu-Bue reign slowly transformed the provincial lite-
rati elite (and the lower mandarinal levels) from a distant 
audience of the court into a sort of constituency whose in-
terests Hue could not afford to alienate too far. And by 
mid-century, one of the main demands of this constituency 
had become preserving the sinicised structures of govern-
ment that allowed civil mandarins to grasp political pre-
dominance in the state for the first time in centuries. 
High court officials, examination candidates, and local 
literati could all find common cause in defending the 
status quo that sustained their own positions. When the 
national interest demanded effective reforms to counter the 
French threat from the 1860s on, the only ones acceptable 
all derived from the Confucian canon, and basically advo-
cated little more than the better application of existing 
principles and procedures. 142 
The few maverick mandarinal voices calling for modern-
ising reform, like the Nghe-an Catholjc Nguyen Truong To143 
or the Nam-dinh tien si and royal favourite, Tran Bich 
142 Like reforms to mandarinal selection processes, as 
suggested in 1863 by the retired Truong Sang Que. Nguyen 
The Anh, 'Traditionalisme et reformisme a la cour de Hue 
dans la seconde moitie du XIX• siecle', in Pierre Brocheux 
Ced), Histoire de l'Asie du Sud-Est. Revoltes, Reformes, 
Revolutions (Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1981), 
pp.112-20. 
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143 There is much western literature on To. See, for exam-
ple, Thai Van Kiem, 'Nguyen Truong To. Patriote reformist, 
poete et homme d'action', BSEI (ns), XLVII, 3 (1972), pp. 
489-502; or Georges Boudarel, 'Un lettre catholique vietna-
mien du XIX• siecle qui fait probleme: Nguyen Truong To', 
in Alain Forest and Yoshiharu Tsuboi (eds), Catholicisme et 
societes asiatigues (Tokyo: L'Harmattan/Sophia University, 
1988), pp.159-204. 
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San,i44 were rejected in Hue, if not always by Tu-9uc per-
sonally. After two tu tai graduates led a widespread anti-
Catholic and anti-court revolt in 1874 in Nghe-Tinh, fol-
lowing the latest treaty with the French, the prospect of 
non-Confucian reform dimmed even further.i4 ~ In this climate 
of opinion, it is perhaps no surprise that as late as 1878 
Tu-Bue awarded first place in the palace examinations to a 
pious recitation arguing that the exercise of royal virtue 
alone would suffice to dissolve misunderstandings with the 
French and ensure peace, without the need to reject true 
civilisation as the Japanese had done.i40 The Son of Heaven 
in later nineteenth century Bai-Nam could be no social in-
novator.i 47 
Personal considerations as well as political factors 
in 1847 had helped push Tu-9uc towards the Confucian ideal 
of kingship. The role suited his character and interests. 
Physically weak, often ill and depressed, the retiring 
i 44 Or Tran Hy-Tang, a name bestowed by Tu-Bue personally 
after he topped the 1865 tien si. In 1868, he memorialised 
the king seeking, among others, reforms to the Six Boards 
and the cciurt. Senior officials impeach him for treason, 
but Tu-Bue saved his life. Plainly destined for great 
things, he died young and suddenly in 1877, on the eve of 
1 ead ing an embassy to France. t1TfJKL, pp .148-51; and VNDNTfJ, 
pp.444-45. 
i 4 e Tran Tan and Bang Nhu Mai. Court records say thousands 
of Catholics were killed. Tsuboi, L'Empire vietnamienne, 
pp.205-211. Tsuboi also asserts that the van than deserted 
Tu-Bue after the revolt, but gives no supporting evidence. 
i 40 The author, Phan Binh Phung, later led the anti-French 
resistance in Nghe-Tinh (1885-96). For excerpts see Binh 
Xuan Lam, 'Confronting the French Aggression', VS, No 56 
(1979), pp.157-58. 
i 47 Although Tu-Bue in 1847 had praised his father for ad-
opting 'new ideas, advantageous to administration'. A. La-
borde and Nguyen Son, 'Tu-Due', p.8. 
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scholar was also a deeply filial son. To Truong 9ang Que, 
the prince must have appeared pleasingly malleable. He sha-
red neither Hong-bao's administrative predilections nor his 
outgoing character. And also unlike Hong-baa, his brother 
was not close to Truong Bang Que's great rival, Nguyen Bang 
Tuan, and, after Tuan's 1845 death, his son Giai. 149 Placing 
Tu-9uc on the throne, therefore, would foil the schemes of 
Que's factional rivals at the same time that it elevated a 
politically untutored eighteen year old whose nature promi-
sed he could be manipulated into entrusting the substance 
of power to his father's old tutor and close confidant. 149 
Tu-Bue would embody the Confucian sage-king and first scho-
lar of the empire admirably, while Que and his henchmen got 
on with the business of government. 1 eo And though it is im-
possible to say definitely without much more research, for 
some years that is largely what seems to have happened. 
With hindsight, the accession of Tu-Bue looms as one 
of those cross-road events when history takes a deep breath 
and plunges blindfold ~long an uncharted path. Its politi-
cal consequences,· almost all unfortunate, resonated down 
the years encouraging disunity and unrest at the worst 
possible time for the kingdom's security. Even at the last 
~ 4~ Thieu-Tri had left Hong-baa (assisted by Tuan, Presid-
ent of the Board of Rites) as regent in Hue in 1842 when he 
went to Ha-noi for his Chinese investiture. Tsuboi, L'Em-
pire vietnamienne, pp.134-35. 
~49 Ibid, pp.157-60. It was 1850 before Que relinquished 
the title of Regent. 
~eo From Tsuboi's excellent account it appears circumstan-
tially possible that Que may even have had a hand in Thieu-
Tri 's death. Ibid, pp.129-36. 
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its baleful legacy continued: by enthroning a sterile king, 
the coup stored up a succession crisis for 1883 as well. 
Its effec~s in the North have been noted. Its political and 
administrative consequences are less well known, largely 
because of the dearth of research on the Tu-9uc reign. It 
is likely, however, as some evidence suggests, that the 
coup caused a realignment of political forces in the court 
and bureaucracy which would contribute significantly to-
wards the later evolution of Bai-Nam in the direction of a 
Confucian state. We will conclude with a glance at some 
salient points. 
Although sharing the same narrow regional base as the 
older loyalist elite, the main coup leaders, Truong Sang 
Que and Nguyen Tri Phuong, and their later factional allies 
like Phan Thanh Gian and Tran Tien Thanh 1 e 1 were all compar-
atively new men. 1 e 2 After 1847, the names of many of the old 
political lineages like the Nguyen Khoa, the Nguyen Huu, or 
the Tran 9inh1~z disappear from the highest off ices for a 
g~nerat±on,.al~hough the new men themselves were soon 
integrated into the Hue elite by marriage alliances with 
1 e 1 ·Thua-thien tien si from a minor mandarinal family, he 
reached Van minh dien and thuong tho, but was murdered by 
his fellow Regents not long after Tu-Buc's death. VNDNTE, 
pp.475-77; and QTBKL, p.60. 
1 e 2 Tsuboi says Que's family had served as minor officials 
for generations under the chua. However, as they did not 
follow Nguyen Anh south, and his father served the Tay-son 
as a district magistrate, they were obviously not members 
of the elite. L'Empire vietnamienne, p.156. 
iez Except for occasional individuals like the 1838 tien 
si Nguyen Cuu Truong, a descendant of Nguyen Cuu Kieu but 
apparently from a less powerful branch of the lineage. He 
was a favourite of the king. BNNTC [86](9), pp.188-89; and 
QTBKL, pp.56-58. 
the royal clan.i 34 And though products of the examination 
system themselves,iee they begrudged sharing the spoils of 
power equally with Northerners. Minh-Mang's hope for inte-
grating the North via the high off ices of the imperial 
bureaucracy suffered a swingeing blow after 1847. Without 
an active royal champion, men from Bac-ky disappeared from 
the ranks of the thuong tho for a generation as factional 
preference favoured men from central Trung-ky.i 3 ° Finally, 
we should note that Phuong, Que, and Gian shared an import-
ant formative experience: all three had worked closely with 
Minh-Mang to implement major centralising reforms in the 
later 1820s and early 1830s. Phuong had joined, and later 
headed, the infant Noi Cac secretariat until receiving his 
first military command in 1835, while Que and Gian had been 
among the earliest Co Mat dignitaries. In every way that 
mattered, these men and their followers were products of 
the Minh-Mang era. 
The new dominant clique owed their offices to ability, 
not birth, and their success to mastery of .. the administrat-
ive apparatus they had helped Minh-Mang set up. Their power 
base lay in the bureaucracy, and further selected sinicisa-
tion of government clearly promoted their interests. In 
ie4 In particular, Que's oldest son married a princess, 
while Phuong's second son married Tu-Sue's own younger 
sister. Bao Bang Vy, Nquyen Tri Phuong, p.249. 
i 33 Phuong had no title, but Que had been the first cu 
nhan from Quang-ngai, in 1819 [VNDNT~, p.508], while Gian 
and Thanh were tien si. 
ie• At least, I have found none between Doan Uan in 1845 
and the brief appointment of tien si and royal favourite 
Nguyen Van Phu (or Tu Gian) in 1875. VNDNT~, pp.295-97; and 
GTBKL, pp.85-88. For elaboration, see Chapter Two below. 
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1848, that is exactly what happened. That year saw Minh-
Mang's 1827 special mandarinal entry scheme for ton sinh 
and am sinh through the National College scrapped. Hence-
forth, sons of the elite who sought mandarinal entry by 
this means had to be over thirty and able to pass a tough 
examination before gaining a low level appointment. And if 
their literary talents proved inadequate in practice, they 
were to be sacked. 1 ~7 Am sinh still enjoyed all the advant-
ages of more books, better teachers, and a government stip-
end at the Quoc Tu Giam; but the principle had now been 
established that they had to prove real scholastic achieve-
ment before beginning an official career. 
In 1848 this move may well have shored up Truong 9ang 
Que's bureaucratic power base. But as a corollary, it nec-
essarily raised the numbers and heightened the influence of 
classically-trained scholars in the mandarinate. Twenty 
years later, it brought an unexpected sequel. Que had set a 
precedent which other scholar-bureaucrats used in 1865, the 
year of his death, to flex their own political muscle and 
win a real degree of control over the source of mandarinal 
recruitment. This took the kingdom a giant stride towards a 
Confucian state. Since 1844, all sons of civil officials 
from the first to fourth grades in Hue, and one son of a 
fifth grade mandarin, had been classified as am thu and 
eligible for 'shade' or inherited entry to the mandarinate. 
In 1865 their rights shr~velled. Only one son per civil of-
ficial from the third grade up, or military mandarin from 
Model, p.181. 
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the second grade and higher, could henceforth become am thu 
with the right of direct entry. All other sons enjoyed am 
sinh benefits~ but had to take their chances in the normal 
examination system.iee Nothing signifies more the way the 
power of orthodox scholar-officials had grown in the bur-
eaucracy since 1847 than this unprecedented reform which 
placed their ideological goals ahead of the family inter-
ests of the most senior officials. 
Tu-Sue approved this ·change, and a second reform of 
the same year which equally underlines the growing institu-
tional preponderance of the mid-century bureaucracy. This 
other reform operated to protect the majority of mandarins 
from the random, intrusive power of the king and of their 
own superiors, as well as from the advantages previously 
enjoyed by their more talented colleagues. Nguyen kings had 
consciously exercised the royal prerogative to reward and 
punish as one of their main levers of bureaucratic control. 
And although direct evidence is scanty, biographies hint 
that superior mandarins and promising lower officials also 
developed links of friendship or patronage. In 1865, how-
ever, bureaucratic reformers effectively depoliticized man-
darinal ranks below the fourth grade by promulgating a sta-
tute that fixed standard probation and promotion periods 
for regional graduates up to the fifth grade. No matter how 
brilliant a new cu nhan, or how strongly recommended by a 
superior, none could even aspire to a district magistrature 
in less than four or five years. Any mediocrity who stuck 
~~Q Nguyen The Anh, Kinh te va Xa hoi Viet-Nam duoi cac 
vua trieu Nquyen (Sai-gon: NXB Lua Thieng, 1971), p.61. 
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to his post and avoided serious error could expect to reach 
the same level automatically after twelve.ie 9 
Taken together, these two statutes represented a major 
institutional victory in the cause of bureaucratic self-
regulation. They minimised the effect on the organisation 
of disruptive actions from outside or heterodox elements 
from within by walling them behind a barrier of uniform, 
impersonal rules and strictly applied written regulations. 
The sinicising goal consensus and organisational priorities 
of the classically-trained scholar-officials within the 
mandarinate had finally triumphed over the throne's need 
for flexibility and diversity, a trend whose roots Woodside 
had already uncove~ed in the 1840s.i•o If allowed to flour-
ish unchecked, it guaranteed that in time only men social-
ised into the organisational culture of the mandarinate 
after long years of apprenticeship would ever become elig-
ible for promotion to the highest posts in the land - and, 
of course, to other politically sensitive positions like 
those iM the Noi Cac.i•i The result, whether intended or 
ie• Muriel Texier, 'Le mandarinat au Viet-nam au XIX• 
siecle', BSEI (ns), XXXVII, 3 (1962), pp.359-60. A diffe-
rent statute applied to tien si, as the exceptional career 
of Tran Bich San showed. Tien si in 1865, he leapt from 
district magistrate (5-2) to provincial judicial commis-
sioner (4-1) in two years and, after three years mourning 
for his father, became tuan phu (2-2) of Ha-noi province in 
1874. VNDNTB, pp. 444-45. 
For examples, see Model, pp.90-1. 
i•i Tsuboi thought mandarinal power vis-a-vis the king 
·fragile and unstable' because their •authoritarian organi-
sation• and mutual surveillance ~reinforced the absolute 
position of the sovereign'. While correct at the individual 
level, it ignores the comparative increase in institutional 
power of the mandarinate due to the growing complexity and 
sinicisation of the system. L'Empire vietnamienne, p.157. 
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not, enormously strengthened the mandarinate as an entity. 
For the first time in Vietnamese history the possibility 
existed, in institutional terms, of the throne's being cap-
tured by the bureaucracy as happened in China. (For what it 
is worth, this is how French observers in the 1880s under-
stood the relationship.i•2 ) 
It might be argued from the Chinese example that the 
1865 reforms merely represented the normal point of trans-
ition from a time of personnel shortages and institutional 
irregularities early in a new dynasty, as the examinations 
and mandarinate were being set up, to their routine later 
operation.i•3 This is may well be true for China. In Viet-
nam, however, the mid-nineteenth century development was 
unique. The bureaucracy had never previously been able to 
win unchallenged institutional preponderance because compe-
titian within the political system, with the military in 
particular, had always denied it. Although shallow rooted 
in economic and social terms, from the late 1860s the pre-
dominance of classically-trained scholar-bureaucrats in the 
state was nonetheless real, however ultimately transitory, 
as their contemporary victory over the military confirms. 
i•z Thus Dutreuil de Rhins in 1876 wrote that Tu-Bue only 
'appeared to be king but in reality was as powerless as a 
slave', an opinion echoed by the Legation doctor, Auvray, 
in 1880. Vicomte de Bizemont in an 1884 book also described 
the king as ·a fetish in the hands of his ministers'. The 
first is quoted in Chu Thien, 'Hay nhan xet nho ve nhung 
cuoc nong dan khoi nghia trieu Nguyen', NCLS, 19 (1960), 
p.14. The second is from 'Dix-huit mois a Hue. Souvenirs et 
impressions', BAVH, XX, 3-4 (1933), p.255. The third is 
cited in Nguyen Van Phong, La Societe vietnamienne de 1882 
a 1902, d'apres les ecrits des auteurs fran;ais (Paris: 
Presses universitaires de France, 1971), p.113. 
i•3 As Woodside does in regard to the first example. 
Model, pp.180-81. 
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In the perspective of the previous three centuries, 
perhaps the clearest measure of bureaucratic success in the 
first half of the Tu-Sue reign was the disappearance of 
military mandarins from provincial governorships. As noted 
earlier, Minh-Mang and Thieu-Tri had deliberately presided 
over a competitive system in which civil and military mand-
arins vied for these posts on merit. But the last example 
of this practice recorded in the ~ai-Nam Nhat Thong Chi ap-
peared in 1854, when Nguyen Trang Thao became tuan phu of 
Hung-yen for a few years. 164 And this may well have been a 
special case, for Thao had been Colonel of the Palace Guard 
and then Military Governor of Hue during the early insecure 
years of Tu-Sue's reign and may have won the king's person-
al favour. Certainly the soldier whose troops crushed the 
1866 attempted coup in Hue, Le Si, never received promotion 
outside the military stream as part of his lavish rewards, 
despite being a graduate of Minh-Mang's military school and 
the son of a Gia-Long officer. 10 ~ Yet while soldiers lost 
access to civil positions, 166 high military commands stayed 
open to civilians. Some of the main commanders of the later 
~NNTC [SGJ(15), p.140-41. 
16 ~ He was promoted to general (thong che), ennobled as 
the Kien-dung nam, and awarded a gold plaque and kim tien 
medallion. In 1883, Si reached marshal (1-1) and died de-
fending Thuan-an in 1884. BNNTC [SG](9), p.189. 
166 The great exception was Ton That Thuyet. A military 
mandarin without academic title, son of a general, he beca-
me thuong tho of War in 1881 and a regent late in Tu-Buc's 
reign. He is the only such example I have found. Tsuboi, 
L'Empire vietnamienne, pp.237-39; or VNDNT~, pp.422-23. 
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Tu-Bue era, men like Hoang Ke Viemie 7 and Vo Trang Binhiee 
were graduates who had uncovered hidden martial talents in 
the course-of their civil duties. Although these scholar-
generals valued military success as a source of royal rewar-
ds, few bothered with the details of military affairs. They 
showed little interest in professionalising the army.ie 9 
They allowed an endemic misuse of troops for private pur-
poses. They let modern weaponry fall into disrepair.i 7 o As a 
result, an army already suffering from government neglect 
was run down even further under their stewardship. 
All this is a far cry from a Minh-Mang's enthusiasm for 
western technology, or a Thieu-Tri's insistence that his 
highest court officials learn to use muskets.i 7 i By the 
1860s, however, the political flexibility that had bred the-
se attitudes was; like the attitudes themselves, largely a 
thing of the past. In its place, in Hue in particular, we 
find the burgeoning institutional forms and attitudes of a 
i•7 For a brief biography, see Tsuboi, L'Empire viet-
namienne, pp.239-41; or VNDNTB, pp.91-93. 
i•e From Thua-thien, Binh passed tu tai under Gia-Long. He 
rose to become hiep bien dai hoc si (1-2) and assistant com-
mander of Bac-ky. In 1883, he lost 3 provinces there to the 
French. BNNTC [HNJ(I), pp. 185-86. 
i•9 If anything, the few financially-driven army reforms 
from the late 1870s tended to turn it into a local militia. 
Tsuboi, L'Empire vietnamienne, pp.254-56. 
i 70 See Philastre's scathing comments in 1878. Ibid, pp. 
89-90. Also Greg Lockhart, Nation in Arms The Origins of the 
People's Army in Vietnam (ASAA Southeast Asia Publications, 
Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1989), pp.22-25 notes they lacked 
strategic skills and the ability to use modern weapons to 
advantage. 
Model, pp.282-83. 
Confucian state. It was this polity that French officials 
from the 1860s on observed and experienced, much to their 
own frustration. Two years negotiating the Treaty of 1862 
that ceded three Nam-ky provinces to France led Gabriel 
Aubaret, for instance, to describe Vietnam in the classic 
terms of the little China fallacy: 172 
In this country enslaved by custom and much more 
subjugated to the rites than China because of the 
absolute isolation in which it has remained until 
the present day ••• we have been obliged to con-
sider it an immense step that we were admitted 
into the sacred precinct formed by the king's 
palace. Your Excellency knows that king Tu Due 
condescends to be seen.while at such a distance 
and in such1shadow that he does not cease to be 
in the eyes of his suspicious Court the sort of 
mysterious divinity from which above all he draws 
his strength. 
Several key elements of the colonial perception of 
pre-colonial Vietnam appear here in embryo, in particular 
the vision of Vietnam as a land out of time, beyond the 
dynamics of history, and ruled by a monarch who, like the 
Pharaohs of old, was a god to his people. In this change-
less, immobilised kingdom, all eyes focused on the Chinese 
Confucian past, while the most scrupulous obedience to the 
tyranny of "the rites" ruled the lives of everyone from the 
sacred emperor, hidden like an idol in the depths of his 
palace, to the faceless peasant in the field. 
Nineteenth century European attitudes towards China 
predisposed the French to these views, as we will see in 
Chapter Five. But contemporary Bai-Nam provided a perfect 
peg upon which to project them. Every contact with Hue and 
its mandarins, immured in the Chinese architecture of pow-
Quoted in Tsuboi, L'Empire vietnamienne, pp.151-52. 
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er, engaged in Chinese rituals, steeped in Chinese learn-
ing, even cultivating Chinese leisure pursuits, confirmed 
and reconfirmed the little China fallacy until it became a 
truism, a cliche that explained anything and everything 
about the maddening country. Yet, as we have just seen, the 
mid-century kingdom represented no unchanging example of a 
millenial tradition of government. Its form and policies 
had been produced by recent events, shaped by chance and by 
the choices of men from the possibilities available within 
their history and culture. It would be part of Vietnam's 
tragedy that this Confucianised state apparatus, the most 
unsuited and least flexible of all political forms avail-
able to it, should be the very one evolving on the eve of 
colonialism. 
Just as the French at the time, and later, miscons-
trued what mid-century 9ai-Nam actually meant in terms of 
Vietnamese history, so they also misunderstood much about 
the political elite who ran it. This elite, and its passage 
to colonialism, form the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY POLITICAL ELITE 
Current Models of the Pre-Colonial Elite 
No systematic western research has been carried out 
into the political elite of nineteenth century Vietnam. Most 
modern historians have tended either to follow their colon-
ial predecessors,L or to make general assumptions about the 
nature of the elite based on anecdotal evidence. As the 
interpretation advanced in this chapter differs significant-
ly from existing views of the Bai-Nam elite, we shall begin 
by summarising the current models. 
Scholars who basically accept the French colonial 
model, like Truong Buu Lam, generally see the mandarinate 
and the political elite as one and the same. 2 They portray 
it as a non-hereditary group normally recruited by public 
examination from provincial literati circles (van than). The 
van than did not monopolise its recruitment, however. The 
literate son of the lowliest peasant, once armed with a high 
examination title, could equally become a mandarin and as-
1 For a survey of the colonial views, see Nguyen Van 
Phong, La Soci~t~ vietnamienne de 1882 a 1902 (Par~s: Pres-
ses universitaires de France, 1971), pp.115-28. For a dis-
senting view, see Alfred Schreiner, Les Institutions annami-
tes en Basse-Cochinchine avant la congu@te fran;aise, I 
(Saigon: Claude et CL•, 1900), pp.316-17. 
2 Truong Buu Lam, New Lamos for Old: The Transformation of 
the Vietnamese Administrative Elite (ISEAS Occasional Paper 
No 66, Singapore: Mazuren As~a, 1982), pp.7, 17-19 and 23-
24; or Yoshiharu Tsuboi, L'Empire vietnamienne face a la Fr-
ance et a la Chine (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987), pp. 178-91. 
In both cases, almost all references are to French sources. 
123 
pire to (and attain) the highest honours and positions in 
the land. Such success hardly came easily, but the mandarin-
ate attracted all ambitious eyes since it represented 'the 
sole real engine for social advancement' at the time.~ 'No 
other organised elite existed to challenge this literate and 
administrative body because in no other sphere of activity 
could one gain social prominence' • 4 Fortunately, in these 
circumstances, the mandarinate remained an open elite. A 
history of mandarinal service in one's family, Dr Lam con-
ceded, might create 'influential connections [that] could be 
use~ul on several counts',~ like providing access to better 
education or special entry provisions. But although such ad-
vantages meant some families 'remained mandarinal through 
several generations',• their numbers were few as •it was 
definitely not easy to transmit status in traditional Viet-
nam'. 7 The reforms of the Minh-Mang reign underlined his 
point: quoting a survey of biographies in the Dai-Nam Nhat 
Thang Chi and Quac Trieu Bang Khaa Luc Dr Lam claimed that, 
after these reforms, only 'approximately 20% of [later] 
degree-holders issued from mandarinal families•.• 
In Vietnam and the Chinese Model, Alexander Woodside 
sketched quite a different picture from that of Dr Lam. Even 
Tsuboi, L'Empire vietnamienne, p.179. 
4 Truong Buu Lam, New Lamps, p.8. 
Ibid, p.24. 
• Ibid, p.19 
Ibid, p.18. 
• Ibid, p.24. But this misunderstands the sources cited, 
as fn.61 below discusses. 
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so, he paid surprisingly little detailed attention to the 
nineteenth century political elite, despite the central role 
its members played in the institutional reforms at the heart 
of his study. 9 Few recognisable mandarinal figures emerge 
from his pages; and when they do it seems as much - or more 
- for their literary as their political significance. We 
meet the Nghe-an mandarin, Nguyen Cong Tru, for instance, 
with a frequency hardly justified by his likely access to 
continuing power.Lo Although a prbtege of Minh-Mang (as we 
saw previously) and therefore not without influence during 
that reign, Tru nevertheless proved unable to translate 
royal patronage into a permanent position at the top of the 
administrative ladder. Twice promoted 2-1, he quickly fell 
from grace both times,LL so that his career essentially 
passed at 2-2 or well below. The absence of status markers 
betrays his failure to break into inner court circles: never 
ennobled, Tru also failed to win any of the politically-
sensitive honorifics that crowned mandarinal success.L2 
9 As Ralph Smith noted in an early attempt to redress the 
balance. R.B. Smith, 'Politics and Society in Viet-Nam Dur-
ing the Early Nguyen Period (1802-1862)', Jnl of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, 1974, pp.153-54. 
10 Model, pp.29, 35, 61, 136, 175-76, 217, 235 and 277. 
Properly speaking, Tru was from Nghe-an as Ha-tinh was not 
created until he was over forty. 
11 VNDNT£J, pp.166-68. In 1835 he reached thuong tho rank 
briefly, as tong doc of Hai-An. In 1840 he became a head 
Censor, but involvement in a military defeat in Cambodia in 
1841 saw his demotion. 
12 The ·four pi l 1ars · at the dien level of dai hoc si, the 
three ·imperial tutors· ( thieu su, thieu pho and thieu baa) 
all ranked 1-1; and their deputies, three tutors and four 
hiep bien dai hoc si, ranked 1-2. 
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Perhaps equally significant, he also received no posthumous 
promotion or awards, despite his fine literary reputation. 
Thi~ modest career record pales in comparison with 
those of men of genuine power and influence, like the two 
great court rivals of the late Minh-Mang and Thieu-Tri eras, 
Truong Bang Que and Nguyen Bang Tuan.J.:s These natives of 
central Trung-ky each collected prestigious titles from the 
first mandarinal grade and positions at the top of the sec-
end during the course of their careers, as well as accumu-
lating further distinctions after death. In this contest, 
Que took the prize: in 1847 Tu-Bue awarded him the supreme 
mandarinal title of Can-chanh-dien (1-1) as well as the 
otherwise royal title of Quan-cong. This latter honour ele-
vated him to the ~ugust company of Le Van Duyet and a mere 
three other officials who, between 1802 and 1884, achieved 
this singular reward.J. 4 Furthermore, both men left sons who 
also scaled the mandarinal heights. Nguyen Bang Giai became 
hiep bien dai hoc si (1-2) while still a tong doc, but died 
in office.comparatively young in the early 1850s. Posthum-
ously promoted, his tablet was venerated in the national 
.i.:s Quang-ngai born head of the Board of War and Quang-binh 
born President of the Board of Rites respectively. Tsuboi, 
L'Empire vietnamienne, pp. 134-35. For short biographies, 
see VNDNT-B, pp. 508-09 and pp. 236-37 • 
.i. 4 Normally reserved under the dynasty for sons of emper-
ors, only eight officials won the title in the whole nine-
teenth century, three of them under the Protectorate. A. La-
borde, 'Les Titres et grades hereditaires a la cour d'An-
nam', ~'VII, 4 (1920), p.392. It was more common in the 
chua era. For example, eleven members of the Quang-binh Ngu-
yen Cuu political lineage won the title from the time of its 
founder, Nguyen Cuu Kieu, to the Restoration. -BNNTC [SG](9), 
p.178 ~nd [SG](15), pp.128-29. 
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Hien-luong pagoda opened in Hue in 1858. 15 Two of Que's five 
mandarinal sons also excelled, most notably Truong Quang 
San, who became President of the Board of War and a Co Mat 
Minister from 1889 to 1901. Promoted hiep bien dai hoc si in 
1891, San won posthumous recognition as Bong-cac dien dai 
hoc si in 1914. 1 • In addition, at least two of Que's child-
ren married into the imperial clan. 17 
When we see several of these elements titles from the 
first mandarinal grade, positions at the top of the second, 
ennoblement, posthumous promotion, veneration in pagodas de-
voted to the cult of outstanding officials, marriage into 
the imperial clan, and administrative power and political 
influence extending over at least two generations - gracing 
the same career, it invariably indicates a man of power and 
substance at the highest court level. Yet neither Que nor 
Tuan, who exhibited all these hallmarks of nineteenth cen-
tury political importance, appear in the pages of Vietnam 
and the Chinese Model. Their absence may have reflected 
Wood.~de's comparative focus and his essentially cultural 
15 BNNTC [SG](9), p.186. The family's hopes for political 
recovery died with Giai's tien si son, Hanh, killed by Nor-
thern rebels in 1862. BNNTC [SG](9), p.189. 
1 • Truong Bang Be also headed the Board of War. VNDNTB, 
p.509. For Ban, R. Orband, 'Notices necrologiques: Les Morts 
de 1914', ~' II (1), 1915, p.62 (although he actually 
died in 1911). 
17 His oldest son, Tru, became pho ma (husband of a prin-
cess) CVNDNTB, p.509] and a daughter was the principal wife 
of prince Tung-thien. [H. Le Breton, 'La Vie de S.E. Hong 
Khang (L'un des derniers lettres d'Annam)', BAVH, XX, 3 
(1933), p.172] Tsuboi cites two nineteenth century French 
sources that say another daughter married Tu-Bue but I have 
found no corroboration of it. Tsuboi, L'Empire vietnamienne, 
pp.133-34. 
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and institutional concerns. But it also suggests a relative 
low priority on the politics and political history of the 
period, something borne out by the way the author's comments 
on the politics of the period emerge as asides scattered 
throughout the book. When it comes to the political elite, 
most comments are located in a chapter on the examination 
system, itself indicative of Woodside's general views on the 
subject. We outline them below. 
Broadly speaking, Woodside identified an 'educated oli-
garchy' 1s within which a 'civil bureaucratic elite~ 1• or 
'bureaucratic ruling class' existed. 20 A gulf of 'profound 
differential acculturation' separated these groups from the 
population at large, and placed a major cultural barrier in 
the path of peasants' sons aspiring to mandarinal office. 
Already economically handicapped, few could ever hope to 
ride the rising levels of 'professional acculturation [and] 
of social and cultural change' 21 demanded by the increasing-
ly sinicised examinations to emerge finally, after years of 
effort, as new-made officials. Nor did the dynasty expect to 
harvest many mandarins from the people. It preferred instead 
to cultivate families with 'traditions of service to the 
bureaucracy' 22 and high examination passes. To encourage and 
reward their efforts, the court presented status conscious 
1e Model, p.75 
1• Ibid, p.218. 
20 Ibid, p.200. 
21 Ibid, p.199 for both quotes. 
22 Ibid, p.216. 
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elite families with three or more generations of doctoral 
graduates a prized silken banner to flaunt their fame above 
the family ~~reshold. The paucity of books and the lack of 
public libraries outside Hue and Ha-noi also conspired 
against peasants' sons compared to the offspring of these 
"great scholar families" (ho dai l<hoa) 23 and others in the 
educated elite who transmitted a precious horde of accumula-
ted books and knowledge to their descendants. As a result, 
'talent tended to cluster in a select number of families 
whose traditions of success in the examinations were firmly 
established'.24 
The long examination process inexorably refin~d a man-
darinal elite with \semi-alien or alien trappings and attri-
butes'. 2 :s 
The Vietnamese bureaucrat looked Chinese; the 
Vietnamese peasant looked Southeast Asian. The 
bureaucrat had to write Chinese, wear Chinese-
style gowns, live in a Chinese-style house, ride 
in a Chinese-style sedan chair, and even follow 
Chinese-style idiosyncrasies of conspicuous con-
sumption, like keeping a goldfish pond in his Sou-
theast Asian garden. 
But not every part of the kingdom contributed their sons 
equally to this highly sinicised elite. The eight.provinces 
23 In his seminal essay, 'The Traditional Village in Bae 
Bo: Its Organisational Structure and Problems' (VS, No 61 
(1980), p.43], Nguyen Tu Chi defined them as families con-
taining members with high academic honours over several suc-
cessive generations. But only about 100 families produced 
multiple graduates that included metropolitan laureates be-
tween 1822 and 1884, of whom only nine counted three genera-
tions or more. This is fewer than 37. of all metropolitan 
graduates. (My calculations from information in Annex 2, 
Table 68] 
Model, p.205. 
Ibid, p.199 for both quotes. 
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south of Phu-yen 'came within the compass of the examination 
system only barely~ · 2 • Between 1822 and 1862, they managed 
only four metropolitan graduates from a total of 258. 27 Cul-
tural and ethnic diversity, comparatively late settlement by 
Vietnamese, and the greater interest among comfortable fami-
lies in owning land ahead of academic titles, all helped 
account for the shallow Confucian penetration here. Equally 
important was the fact that for Southerners 'the examination 
system was not the sole road to power' 2 e - army service con-
tinued to open doors to high office, while the sons of Gia-
Long's many officials and military officers recruited from 
this region also inherited the right of direct mandarinal 
entry. At the northern geographical extreme, ethnic diversi-
ty and limited Vietnamese numbers also effectively disbarred 
the mountainous provinces of Tuyen-quang, Cao-bang, and 
Lang-son from full participation. Indeed, educational stand-
ards here were so low that in 1844 the National College in 
Hue had to give tribute students from these provinces spe~ 
cial lenient tests to avoid general failure. 29 Between 1822 
Ibid, p.218. 
27 My calculations from GTBKL. [Annex Two, Table 1) All 
calculations and tables from this source are my own and 
henceforth will not be separately documented. 
29 Model, p.219 offers two 1830s examples, though else-
where the period of strong military influence in government 
is attributed to Gia-Long [for example, pp.171 or 222). 
29 Ibid, p.183. Tribute students (cong sinh) were nominat-
ed annually by districts and prefectures. They enjoyed major 
advantages in the examinations, thanks to the better facili-
ties in Hue and to a government stipend that let them study 
full time. 
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and 1919, no scholar from these three provinces ever p~ssed 
tien si or pha bang. 
But,- in Woodside's view, prejudice against men from the 
North imported far worse distortions into the operation of 
the examination system. He found evidence of this discrimi-
nation in two main areas. First, he pointed to the inequit-
able distribution of examination sites. Until 1834 six exis-
ted: at Gia-dinh for Khanh-hoa and points south; at Hue for 
the provinces between Phu-yen and Quang-binh; at Vinh for 
the Nghe-Tinh region; at Thanh-hoa (until 1834) for itself 
and Ninh-binh; at Nam-dinh for Nam-dinh, Hung-yen, Hai-
duong, and Quang-yen; and at Ha-noi for the remaining eight 
northern provinces. 30 What struck Woodside in this was the 
anomaly of 'several convenient sites in underpopulated cen-
tral Vietnam' compared to the 'lack of enough sites in the 
more densely populated north'. Obvious to contemporaries, 
this distribution pattern 'constituted a major source of 
[Northern] grievances against the dynasty', Woodside 
added. 3 .i. 
Second, a growing regional imbalance in graduate num-
bers, between Ha-noi and Hue especially, exacerbated the 
disparities. Under Gia-Long in 1813 and 1819, Ha-noi had 
outstripped Hue (39 to 26 in total). 32 But by the 1840s 
twice as many cu nhan graduated in the capital as Ha-noi 
3 ° Four were mountainous border provinces and hardly pro-
duced any candidates. 
Ibid, p.195 both quotes. 
32 Ibid, p.222. This must include tu tai, as a table on 
p.220 shows 16 cu nhan from Ha-noi and 9 from Hue in 1813. 
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(213 compared to 107). 33 The reversal reflected deliberate 
policy. Scholarship should adorn the capital: there could be 
only one National College (Ouoc Tu Giam), and it was in Hue. 
As a corollary, however, scholarly Northern families who 
refused to migrate to Hue34 could not avoid lessening their 
sons' educational opportunities, he maintained. Simmering 
Northern resentment at the situation finally boiled over in 
public in 1862. No doubt swept away by the sense of betrayal 
that shocked the assembled doctoral candidates at the news 
that the court had ceded three Southern provinces to the 
French, one daring Bac-ky scholar exploited the "current 
events" question to accuse the court point-blank of favour-
ing scholars and officials from the Centre at the expense of 
the North. 3 e Such political dynamite could not be ignored, 
and Tu-Bue hastened to the hapless defence of his govern-
ment's record. It was a futile gesture for, as we will soon 
see, the Northern scholar's charge was irrefutable, although 
not for the reasons Woodside adduced. 3 • 
Anti-Northern discrimination certainly existed in the 
nineteenth century kingdom. But, by and large, it did not 
skew the regional examination system in the way Woodside 
Ibid, p.222. 
z 4 As no such pattern of migration shows up in OT~KL, it 
cannot have been significant. The source does note some 
residential changes, but none from Ha-noi to Hue. 
Model, p.214. 
34 The protest itself may not have failed entirely. As 
Table 1 in Annex Two shows, in 1862 doctoral laureates from 
the North outnumbered those from the Centre for only the 
third time since 1835. It also held for two examinations in 
a row, something not seen since the early 1830s. 
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described, even if contemporary Northern opinion liked to 
believe it did. Woodside's evidence in this regard crumbles 
under c lose_r:-_ examination. To begin with, rather than dis-
advantaging the North, the location of examination sites in 
the first decades of Nguyen rule overwhelmingly favoured 
former Bang-ngoai over former Bang-trong (four to two), as 
we saw in the previous chapter. Even after Minh-Mang carved 
Ninh-binh from northern Thanh-hoa in 1820 (and brought the 
rest of Thanh-Nghe under Hue's administrative wing), Ninh-
binh scholars continued to attend the Thanh-hoa site until 
its abolition in 1834. 37 It was certainly not before then 
that Thanh-Nghe-Tinh's centuries-old identification with the 
North began to weaken. Until the mid-1830s, then, even the 
most astringent Northern critic could not in honesty point 
to \several convenient sites in central Vietnam' when mani-
festly North and Centre housed two sites apiece, with one 
shared between them. 
Further, when regional graduate quotas favoured Hue 
over Ha-noi in the later 1840s, the Centre was hardly the 
thinly populated area Woodside described. Court tax records 
in 1847 showed 251,388 registered (adult male) inhabitants 
in the region feeding the Hue site (Quang-binh to Phu-yen) 
compared to 357,956 in the graduate producing provinces of 
Bac-ky (that is, Ninh-binh, Ha-noi, Hai-duong, Son-tay, Bae-
ninh, Nam-dinh and Hung-yen). 3 a In addition, the Hue site 
Model, p.194. 
~e Or a 40/60 ratio. These were the only Bac-ky provinces 
to produce metropolitan graduates in 100 years. There can be 
no dispute about the Vinh site either, since the registers 
counted 165,901 taxpayers in Nghe-Tinh in 1847. Figures from 
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had to cater for scores of candidates from outside its feed-
er area. The well-prepared scholars at the National College 
attended here~ as could potentially hundreds of Southerners 
who enjoyed an inherited access to its facilities. 39 Given 
this, it seems unduly harsh for a later historian to condemn 
as flagrant bias the small premium the capital enjoyed in cu 
nhan graduate numbers by the late 1840s. 40 
Setting this matter aside for the moment, there remains 
another pr~blem with Woodside's·discussion of anti-Northern 
.. 
discrimination: he never addresses its political consequen-
ces. Did this discrimination mean~ for example, there were 
fewer Northerners in the Nguyen mandarinate, or at least in 
positions of power? And if so, how did that influence the 
political history of the pre-colonial kingdom, or the pro-
cess of sinicisation of government in the first half of the 
nineteenth century? Questions like these bear d~rectly on 
our understanding of the Nguyen kingdom, and on some of the 
underlying assumptions in Vietnam and the Chinese Model, yet 
they receive scant attention there. In a later quick sketch 
of the mandarinal elite, however, Woodside does suggest that 
the anti-Northern bias he had identified earlier never mat-
tered much politically. He wrote: 'Vietnamese officials of 
Nguyen The Anh, 'Quelques aspects economiques et sociaux du 
probleme du riz au Vietnam dans la premiere moitie du XIX• 
siecle', BSEI (ns), XLII, 1&2 (1967), p.16. 
~9 Sons of officials who had helped Gia-Long found the dy-
nasty could opt for any site but most chose Hue. [Model, p. 
223] As few Northerners qualified, I have assumed a Southern 
provenance. As many such officials lived into the Minh-Mang 
reign, there must have been a steady supply of eligible sons 
until around the mid-century. 
40 The Hue total roughly equalled that of Ha-noi and Nam-
dinh combined. Ibid, p.222. 
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the early 1800s came on the whole either from long-estab-
lished scholar families, mostly in the north ••• or from 
loyal officers in Gia-long's army and navy who had come 
mostly from the centre and from the south'. Northerners won 
entry thanks to 'Gia-long's revival of the civil service 
examination system in 1807 [which] permitted many (Northern] 
families to ••• maintain a continuity of influence and 
power'. 41 
We wi.11 return to this descrip.tion of the nineteenth 
century political elite in the next section. For the moment, 
let us sum up the existing models. For the colonial model 
and its modern interpreters, the central characteristics of 
the nineteenth century Vietnamese political elite were its 
openness (both in terms of initial recruitment and later 
advancement) and its relatively large-scale turnover of con-
stituent families within a couple of generations. In Wood-
side's view, almost the opposite pertained. In normal times, 
the mandarinal elite stood on a very narrow cultural base. 
Generations of examination competition had bred certain 
families with carefully nurtured traditions of royal service 
and repeated examination success. The vast cultural gulf be-
tween them and the rest of the population kept social mobil-
ity at a crawl in either direction, and helped retain elite 
status among such families for many generations. And al-
though the new men of the Nguyen dynasty showed anti-North-
ern bias in the first half of the nineteenth century, the 
41 In the chapter, 'Vietnam, 1802-1867' in David Joel 
Steinberg (ed), In Search of Southeast Asia. A Modern Hist-
~ (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, revised ed, 1987), p.128. (My 
emphases) 
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examination system nevertheless worked to ensure that many 
old scholarly Northern families continued to exert power and 
influence-within the mandarinal political elite. 
Both models are untested, and base their claims more on 
assumptions and anecdotal evidence than on quantified data. 
Yet questions about the degree of openness of the Nguyen 
political elite, or the relative influence of Northern fami-
lies within it, are far better addressed by statistical 
methods. Fqrtu~_ate~y source _materials exist that lend them-
selves to quantific~ation~ and an analysis based on them 
follows in the next section. ·aut before turning to it, we 
should outline the working model of the mandarinal political 
elite that it employs. 
Although a vast gap between 'those who are honourable 
and those who are despised' 42 separated officials from the 
common people, once inside the elite of office not all man-
darins enjoyed political influence. In this respect, the 
organisation sub-divided into three groups. The great majo-
rity, toiling in positions graded five and below and usually 
posted outside Hue, played almost no political role within 
the elite. This attribute belonged to their superiors in the 
court-based political elite, and in particular to a small 
number of men at the summit of the military and administra-
tive hierarchies who formed an effective power elite. The 
effective cut-off point for membership of the political 
elite appears to have been the upper level of the fourth 
42 Phan Ke Binh (translated and annotated Nicole Louis-
Henard), Viet-Nam Phong Tue, I (Paris: EFEO, 1975), pp.13-
17, quote p.16. He added 'the people and the mandarin are 
separated by a world' [p.15) 
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grade, as the material analysed and the status of the posts 
classified at 4-1 suggest. 43 Almost all court ranked, they 
included,_ among others, two of the four mandarinal positions 
held by royal family members, 44 as well as certain signifi-
cant (if secondary) offices like the Director of the Nation-
al College, the deputy heads of the Han Lam Academy, provin-
cial judicial commissioners (an sat), and various central 
officers charged with the direction of important court func-
tions like ceremonial (hong lo tu khanh). Though not neces-
sarily influential, men in such positions ware surely seen 
as political actors, that is, as men whose opinions might be 
heard at court. In addition, as noted previously, men at 
this level and higher escaped the 1865 regulations that 
standardised bureaucratic promotion procedures. That men in 
the fourth grade depended on the hazards of politics and the 
~hance of royal favour for promotion implies they appeared 
to their contemporaries as similar to superior officials. 
The personal influence and degree of power enjoyed by 
men in the political elite depended on their personal con-
43 This also differs from earlier accounts, which seem to 
rely on Lura. In Le Pays d'Annam (Paris: Leroux, 1897, 2nd 
ed, p.99), Lura proposed a tri-partite schema in which the 
first three mandarinal grades formed the political elite, as 
the title, ong lon ('your eminence'), indicated. Men in the 
4th to 7th grades comprised an elite of office, as shown by 
their title ong quan ('respected official'). The structure 
may have worked for the Gia-long era, when provincial Pro-
tectors ranked in the third grade; but it seems inadequate 
after the Minh-Mang reforms. Schreiner [Institutions, pp. 
272-79], however, advanced the same model, as did Smith 
['Politics and Society', pp.162-63] who sourced it to an 
undated University of Sai-gon PhD thesis by Nguyen Si Hai 
entitled "To-chuc chinh-quyen trong-uong thoi Nguyen so, 
1802-4?' (which I have not seen). 
44 Two Vice-Presidents of the Royal Family Administration 
(ton nhon phu), whose Presidents were in the first grade. 
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nections, achievements, talents, and perceived luck. Effec-
tive and continuous power, however, lay with members of the 
upper echelon, close to the throne and often responsible for 
more than one function at a time. In declining order of pol-
itical significance, civil members comprised the presidents 
of the six Boards, men ranked at thuong tho or higher but 
usually working outside the capital, the dozen provincial 
tong doc, and probably the two chief censors. Its military 
members included the marshals of the five a~mies, the chief 
admiral, most or all of their six immediate subordinates and 
maybe a few other senior officers in royal favour at the 
time. Immediately beneath them came an intermediate group of 
men, usually ranked 2-2. Not all mattered politically~ des-
pite their position and status, since the group naturally 
divided between men at the upper limit of their careers, and 
high-flying aspirants jostling for the top jobs. Numbering a 
few dozen at most, their ranks included Board vice-presi-
dents (tham tri), the Governors of lesser provinces (tuan 
phu), certain senior court functionaries, and important 
lesser generals or regimental commanders like the head of 
the Imperial Guard. Lower graded men who enjoyed the king's 
personal favour, and thus the possibility of royal patron-
age, should also be figured among them. 4~ 
4~ Such relationships often began through working together 
in a central organ like the Noi Cac as, for example, with 
the Bac-ninh tien si, Nguyen Tu Gian who briefly reached 
thuong tho and the Co Mat in 1875. Tu-euc's admiration for 
Gian's personality and literary talent made him a royal con-
fidant during his years in the Noi Cac. GTBKL, pp.85-88; and 
VNDNTB, pp.295-97. 
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The political elite and the power elite, as defined 
above, form the main focus of the statistical analysis that 
fol lows. _ 
The Nineteenth Century Elite: A Statistical Profile 
This section tests the propositions that the political 
and power elites within the civil mandarinate were fully 
open to talent, and that many long-descended scholarly Nor-
thern families continued to wield power and influence at 
either or both levels. It proceeds by examinin~ two sets of 
evidence, before concludiMg with a new model of the nine-
teenth century political elite derived from the evidence 
presented. 
The first set of evidence comes from a survey of bio-
graphical materials in the Guoc Trieu Banq Khoa Luc, the fiAi.. 
Nam Nhat Thang Chi, and secondary sources.such as biographi-
cal dictionaries and historical journals. These sources have 
yielded a very reasonable sample of 164 men in the power 
elite and its 2-2 fringes, spread across most of the nine-
teenth century. Table One tabulates the data by province, 
region, and educational qualifications in order to test 
Woodside's view that their examination expertise worked to 
assure many old scholarly Northern4 • families a continuity 
of influence and power under the Nguyen. 
46 To maintain uniformity between the tables, 'North' in 
the discussion refers exclusively to Bac-ky (minus Thanh-
Nghe-Tinh), although it was 1820 before they were separated. 
This creates a small distortion for the earlier period which 
is negligible overall. 
TABLE 1: EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF 164 TOP CIVIL 
OFFICIALS [1-1 TO 2-2) FROM 1802 TO THE EARLY 1890s47 
1-1/1-2 2-1 
--ts pb en less ts pb en less 
Ha-noi 
Nam-dinh 
Hai-duong 
Bac-ninh* 
Son-tay* 
Hung-yen 
2 3 3 1 
2 
Thanh-hoa 
Nghe-Tinh* 
Quang-binh 
Quang-tri 
Thua-thien 3 
Nam-Ngai* 
Binh-dinh 
Khanh-hoa 
3 
Gia-dinh 2 
Bien-hoa 
Vinh-long 
Sinh-tuong 
2 
2 
3 
3 1 
1 1 
4 7 
1 
1 
ts - tien si 
pb pho bang 
en - cu nhan 
2 
3 
3 
1 
9 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
10 
1 1 
4 1 1 
2 
6 3 2 
1 1 1 3 
1 2 2 
4 1 1 9 
2 3 2 
4 
1 
13 6 9 23 
1 
1 
5 
1 
6 
2-2 
ts pb 
6 2 
4 2 
2 
en less 
1 1 
1 1 
1 
14 5 1 1 
1 1 
6 1 
1 
3 2 1 
2 2 2 
2 
1 1 
16 5 5 
3 
2 
3 
1 
9 
4 
1 
5 
total 
19 
10 
2 
5 
2 
1 
39 
6 
18 
15 
16 
34 
13 
6 
1 
109 
11 
1 
1 
3 
16 
less tu tailhuong tien, am thu, local provincial pass, or 
no examination title mentioned in biographical data 
* provinci.al volumes from /:JNNTC unavailable 
First, it is evident from the table that examination 
success provided the overwhelming means of mandarinal re-
cruitment for the Bac-ky men in the sample: 95X of them had 
passed cu nhan or higher. Overall, while the North contri-
buted a disproportionately low 23% (or 17 from 73) of the 
139 
47 My calculations from GT/:JKL, /:JNNTC, VNDNT!:J, and from 
BAVH and BSEI. The Vietnamese sources do not always note 
examination ti t.les. /:JNNTC mentions tu tai degrees, so I have 
assumed that no title there means no degree; but GTBKL 
ignores tu tai for graduates' relatives. VNDNTB is erratic. 
These variations have led tu tai, am thu, and unqualified 
men, plus unknowns, to be classed together. 
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men at 2-1 or higher, all but one held tien si or pho bang 
titles. Cross-checking with biographies in GT~KL, however, 
shows the vast majority were new men. Only three came from 
families with high examination passes who supplied officials 
to the political elite for two generations or more. 48 In-
deed, the source suggests that genuine "great scholar famil-
ies", with three or more generations of metropolitan gradu-
ates among their members, were very thin on the ground in 
the nineteenth century. GTBKL data revealed a mere nine such 
families for all Vietnam. 4 Q These included only four from 
Bac-ky delta provinces who boasted ancestors with tien si 
degrees or high mandarinal positions under the Le. On the 
face of it, this suggests that the sons of long-descended 
"great scholar" Northern families either failed to attend, 
or failed to pass, the metropolitan examinations under the 
Nguyen. Whatever the case, however, four such families hard-
ly qualifies as continuity of power and influence.e0 
Indeed, Table One queries the extent to which Norther-
ners, new men or not, actually enjoyed real political power 
in the nineteenth century. On a per capita basis, men from 
48 They were: Bui An Nien, whose tien si father reached 
tuan phu [GTBKL, pp.157, and 158-59); and Nguyen Tu Gian, 
whose grandfather had been a Gia-Long tri huyen and whose 
son reached 4-1 [GTBKL, pp.85-88, and 179]. Though not 2-1, 
Hoang Te Mi's family, where both father and son reached 2-2, 
has also been counted here. [GTBKL, pp.30, and 155) 
See Annex Two, Table 68. 
eo These are recognised scholarly families only, that is, 
with at least one tien si within the previous four or five 
generations (which is as far back as Cao Xuan Due went). 
Average literati families, with several generations of re-
gional passes and middling officials in their ranks, are not 
counted. In any case, it was not to them that Woodside re-
ferred. 
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Bac-ky and Trung-ky should have shared high positions and 
titles more or less equally, especially if Woodside's model 
was correct. Early imbalances should have evened out over 
ninety years. Instead, the table demonstrates that almost 
three times as many in the sample came from Trung-ky pro-
vinces as from Bac-ky (or 66/. compared to 23/.). If we narrow 
the focus to holders of the prestigious mandarinal titles 
that indicated membership of the power elite, we find more 
than ten times the number from Trung-ky as from Bac-ky (23 
to 2). Even the~, both the Bac-ky mandarins in the sample 
. . 
who won these accolades did so under the French Protector-
ate.e 1 In all, over two-thirds of the Trung-ky sample at-
tained positions in the power elite proper (thuong tho or 
tong doc), while over half the Bac-ky sample lingered on its 
fringes at 2-2. 
Having said this, however, we must acknowledge a degree 
of hidden anti-Northern bias in Table One. The tiny number 
of Northerners recorded there partly reflects an inherent 
distortion in one of its main sources, the Gazetteers of the 
~ai-Nam Nhat Thong Chi. It requires some explanation. 
In each ~NNTC volume there appears a section, entitled 
Nhan Vat, devoted to commemorating notable provincial sons 
under various dynasties. Highly selective and variable in 
content, the sections in no way compare to a modern 'Who's 
Who'. For most periods, the aims of the court compilers 
echoed those of Plutarch: to enshrine for posterity the 
ei Bui An Nien, thuong tho and hiep bien dai hoc si in the 
1890s [QTBKL, pp.158-59]; and Nguyen Trang Hop (or Hiep), 
Van-minh-dien dai hoc si, thuong tho, Co Mat minister and 
Regent during the Thanh-Thai minority [QTBKL, pp. 151-55] 
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careers of outstanding individuals (and lineages) in the 
political elite; and to praise the virtues of exemplary 
figures whose lives embodied particular, usually Confucian, 
virtues. 52 --Luu Van Binh (1802-1862) provides a typical 
example of many in the second category. A Quang-binh pho 
bang of 1853, his personal integrity and benevolence won 
universal admiration. His entry recounts how, when the pee-
pl~ of his second district magistrature heard of Binh's im-
pending promotion··to a more prestigious position in Hue, 
they .banded together and, with tears and lamentations, sue-
, .. 
ceeded in detaining the mandarinal paragon a further six 
years before finally relinquishing him to a long-awaited 
promotion in the capital. 53 
When it came to entries for the Nguyen period, however, 
the court compilers apparently added a third criterion, the 
need to acknowledge and repay the dynasty's debt of gratit-
ude to men who had sacrificed their lives in its cause. Such 
reparation formed both a sacred duty and a political neces-
sity. It also helped to insure against future disasters by 
mollifying the spirits of the dead. Despite the Confucian 
s:z Though two were noted in Buddhist terms: Nguyen Van 
Nhi, a Gia-Long/Minh-Mang era tong doc from Quang-binh who 
was revered as 'a living Buddha' (Phat song) [-EJNNTC [SG] 
(9), p. 182]; and Nguyen Huy Dy, a Thanh-hoa tong doc of 
1881 who later retired to Bac-ninh as a Buddhist recluse in 
the early colonial period. [BNNTC [SG](15), p.145] Nguyen 
Van Tuyen of Quang-binh even became as a supernatural genie 
with healing powers after his death. Originally descended 
from a high Le official, Tuyen was a Gia-Long provincial 
Protector whose son was a provincial military commander 
(lanh binh) 3-1. [-EJNNTC [56](9), p.181] 
93 He died soon after. His son and grandson, both cu nhan, 
later became mandarins. The son reached 4-1 at court, and 
the grandson became a district magistrate in the 1890s. 
BNNTC [SG](9), p.190. 
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Chinese trappings of empire, the king and court knew along 
with every other Vietnamese how malevolent the spirits of 
the unsatisfied dead could be, especially those who had died 
violently.!!>4- The court took care to honour the least of 
those faithful officials, not only the most celebrated. 55 
Although the emperor claimed jurisdiction over the spirit 
realm,e• only a fool trifled unnecessarily with the revenge 
of the dead. Even the examinations opened with a ritual ex-
hortation:e7 
(Souls) having to revenge a grievance come in 
first! (Souls) having to show their gratitude come 
in after! Candidate scholars come in last! (Bao 
oan gia tien nhap! Bao an gia thu nhap! Si tu gia 
thu thu nhap!) 
From Gia-Long on, Nguyen dynasts lavished resources on 
discharging their duties to the dead. Along with building 
commemorative temples and pagodas for royal clan members who 
had died prematurely,e• and for the parents of successive 
Queen-Mothers, the kings also raised numerous shrines to 
e 4 Leopold Cadiere (trans anded Ian W. Mabbett). 'Relig-
ious Beliefs and Practices of the Vietnamese', Monash Centre 
of Southeast Asian Studies, Working Paper No 60, 1989, pp. 
19-21; and the valuable essay by Nguyen Ngoc Huy, 'Fate in 
the Vietnamese Spirit', in T.D.R. Thomason (ed). Understand-
ing Vietnam (The DPC Information Service: Bussum, 1983), 
pp.279-87. 
ee Several also received further posthumous promotions 
under Minh-Mang and later kings. 
e• Like other dynastic founders, one of Gia-Long's first 
acts in 1802 was to build a temple in Hue in which village 
tutelary deities from the whole country were gathered for 
secondary worship (and imperial control). BNNTC [HN](l), 
p.63. 
Quoted in Nguyen Ngoc Huy, 'Fate', pp.279-80. 
ee Including one for prince Canh and two to venerate chua 
era princes and princesses. ~NNTC [HN](l), pp.66-67 lists 
them. 
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honour worthy past officials. As one among several, for ex-
ample, Gia-Long constructed a pagoda to venerate the spirits 
of meritorious Restoration era officials (Hieu Trung hung 
Cong than) that housed the tablets of 2,860 men. (A few more 
were added later, in 1823 and 1851.) In 1820, Minh-Mang took 
up the sacred trust and began work on a pair of matching 
pagodas. The first honoured 114 distinguished officials, 
chief among them three members of important retainer fami-
lies (the Nguyen Huu of Thanh-hoa and Thua-thien, the Nguyen 
Cuu of Quang-binh, and the Nguyen Khoa of Thua-thien). The 
second, somewhat less discriminating, solaced the spirits of 
all soldiers and sailors who had died in the line of duty. 
In 1858, Tu-9uc inaugurated a last great in-gathering of 
souls when over five hundred received ritual welcome in two 
new Hue pagodas. The pagoda of Goodness (Hien-luong) venera-
ted Pham Bang Hung and Trinh Hoai Bue, two famous Gia-Long 
mandarins (the first Tu-Buc's own grandfather), and a furth-
er thirty-nine other civil officials; while the complemen-
tary pagoda of Faithfulness ( Trung-nghia) honoured 471 mil-
itary officers killed on active service. (As a rough index 
of unrest over the previous forty years, more than twelve 
times the number of spirits thronged this pagoda compared to 
the Hien-luong.e~) 
The Gazetteer shared this royal preoccupation. For the 
Centre and South, it carefully salvaged the names of offi-
cials notable only because they had died for the Nguyen, and 
e~ The source does not say if the event was connected with 
the Franco-Spanish expedition of that year. BNNTC [HN](l), 
pp. 70-71. 
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listed them at the conclusion of each district's entries. 
When it came to important Northerners, this third goal seem-
ed to predominate as nowhere else. The Nhan vat sections in 
all Bac-ky volumes available to me (Ha-noi, Hung-yen, Ninh-
binh, Nam-dinh and Hai-duong) differed markedly from the 
norm for former Bang-trong provinces. It was not simply, as 
one might expect, that entries for the chua era formed a 
tiny proportion of the total (3 from 33 for the five provin-
ces).•0 We find a different criterion governing the choice 
of provincial worthies. Thus although these five provinces 
produced seventy-seven tien si and pho bang graduates from 
1822 to 1856 (roughly the period the BNNTC surveyed), only 
three rated a mention, with two restricted to a bare recita-
tion of official positions.•~ Instead, the bulk of entries 
(20, or 60%) commemorated the exemplary loyalty of men who 
had sacrificed their lives fighting for the Nguyen in Bae-
ky. Thus, for Nam-dinh, that nursery of scholars, the only 
civil mandarin deemed worthy of note was Doan Uan, the 1940s 
thuong tho. Even then, his entry lavished most attention on 
the military exploits in Cambodia for which Uan was ennobled 
and posthumously promoted to hiep bien. All the other Nam-
dinh entries comprised soldiers, two from the Restoration 
• 0 All joined Gia-Long in the 1790s and died in the Rest-
oration. Thanh-hoa was able to muster a respectable chua era 
tally (12 from 21) by claiming retainer families from Tong-
son district who had followed Nguyen Hoang south, or joined 
the Nguyen later. Many re-appear in one or more of the Binh-
Tri-Thien volumes, indicating their high prestige. 
•L. That Hoang Te Mi, as both son and father of a tien si, 
came from one of nine genuine great scholar families of the 
nineteenth century [see fn 23 above] is not even mentioned. 
Cf. BNNTC [HN](3), p.218 with GTBKL, p.30. 
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and eleven others killed by Northern rebels or bandits in 
the 1830s or early 1850s.•2 
This bias means that provincial gazetteers reveal vir-
tually nothing about Northern participation in the Nguyen 
mandarinate•3 (and thus have distorted Table One to some 
unknown extent). However, they do offer historians something 
far more precious, an insight into the unselfconscious mind 
of the Hue political elite of the late Tu-Bue reign. In par-
ticular, they illustrate the low regard in which these men 
habitually held the North, and Northerners. By inference, 
too, they suggest how little clout men from Bac-ky could 
muster at court, unable as they clearly were to prevent 
family or friends from being casually written out of their 
own provincial histories. It defies belief that, with the 
sole exception of sparsely settled Phu-yen, every province 
south of Quang-binh managed to discover at least one early 
nineteenth century son worthy of commemoration in their 
provincial Gazetteer; yet Hung-yen province in Bac-ky appa-
rently could not find a solitary individual of note in more 
• 2 The eleven, for whom almost no personal details appear, 
were venerated in the pagoda of Faithfulness in 1858. BNNTC 
[HNJ(3), pp.345-48 (pp.346-47 for Doan Uan). 
• 3 It is puzzling, therefore, that Truong Buu Lam claimed 
a survey of biographies in BNNTC and GTBKL showed about 20/. 
of post-Minh-Mang degree holders came from mandarinal famil-
ies [see fn 9 above]. BNNTC does not routinely include fa-
mily details, for Bac-ky especially. While GT~KL records cu 
nhan and above for family members of laureates, it ignores 
tu tai titles, and is mute on whether academically-qualified 
relatives pursued bureaucratic careers. (Not all graduates 
did.) It is thus impossible to determine from either source 
what proportion of degree holders came from mandarinal fami-
lies, even for tien si and pho bang. 
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than fifty years.•4 During the period surveyed, hundreds of 
men from these five Northern provinces would have served the 
dynasty as officials, many reaching senior positions. Yet, 
-
with few exceptions,•e Hue mandarins in the National History 
Office (Quoc su quan) in the 1870s and 1880s only nominated 
those who had died for the Nguyen as provincial nhan vat. We 
need not hammer the point further. In the self-definition of 
the political elite at court, Northerners simply did not 
rate • 
. Fortunately, given the unknown degree of bias in Table 
One, other statistical evidence exists that allows us to 
profile a key element in the nineteenth century mandarinate 
with greater accuracy. This second set df information comes 
from analysing the personal and career data for metropolitan 
graduates (tien si and pho bang) contained in the Quoc Trieu 
Bang Khoa Luc. The source is not perfect: it occasionally 
lacks data; and the amount of career detail per entry can 
vary from several paragraphs to a single line, even for very 
senior officials. But despite its flaws, QT-BKL remains a 
priceless historical tool for analysing the political and 
power elites of the Nguyen kingdom. It opens a statistical 
• 4 Nine are 1 isted for earlier dynasties. -BNNTC [HN] ( 1), 
pp.298-301. There was at least one candidate: Bui Ngoc Qui, 
tien si in 1829, who reached tang doc, took part in an em-
bassy to China and wrote two books. QTBKL, p.42. 
·~ In all, there were twelve. Three were Le loyalist exi-
les who joined Gia-Long in 1806 and three were killed by 
bandits. Only six typical Nguyen scholar-officials appeared. 
Compare this to the 6 Nam-ky provinces: almost 60% (43 from 
75) were pre-1802, but of the remaining thirty-two entries, 
fourteen were high civil officials (1-1 to 2-2), none of 
whom died fighting, while only one of the eighteen soldiers 
had been killed in battle. 
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window onto a group of men who, in Woodside's estimation, 
'formed the nucleus of the Nguyen civil service'.•• And 
given its catalogue format, any biases that emerge from its 
analysis should reflect social and political realities, not 
distortions within the source. 
Let us begin with the regional backgrounds of metropol-
itan laureates who reached the power elite (1-1 to 2-1) be-
fore colonial appointments intruded, that is, of men who 
passed the examinations between 1822 and 1856 (Table Two). 47 
The sample is surprisingly small: a mere twenty-six 
(including five pho bang) from a possible 278 of these cele-
brated graduates managed to reap the fruits of power. Obvi-
ously, with only one in ten attaining the summit of adminis-
trative power, academic distinction of itself conferred no 
automatic passport to ultimate career success. But the right 
regional background certainly helped. While the twenty-six 
men hailed from eleven provinces (six Northern, four Central 
TABLE 2: PROVINCIAL BACKGROUNDS OF TIEN SI/PHO BANG RANKED 
1-1 TO 2-1 BEFORE 1884 jexaminations 1822-1856} 
level* Bac-ky Trung-ky Nam-ky Thua-thien 
1-1 
1-2 
2-!a 
2-1b 
totals 
* 1-1 
1-2 
2-1a 
2-1b 
2 
7 
9 
2 
2 
13 
3 
16 
1 
1 
1 
one of 4 top dai hoc si working at 2-1 
hiep bien dai hoc si working at 2-1 
Board President ( thuong tho) as highest post 
Governor-General (tong doc) as highest post 
Model, p.179. 
The data are in Annex Two, Table 5. 
2 
2 
6 
6 
and one Southern), exactly half were natives of Ha-tinh (7) 
and Thua-thien (6) in Trung-ky. 
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The right regional credentials also made all the diffe-
rence between winning through to the inner sanctum of court 
power, or finishing one's career as a provincial governor. 
Four-fifths of the men from Trung-ky - including all the 
Thua-thien contingent - reached the heart of court and admi-
nistrative power as Board presidents (thuong tho). For Nor-
therners, however, the reverse pertained, with a virtually 
identical proportion (77%) ending their careers as provin-
cial tong doc. The distribution of high mandarinal titles 
among them further underscores the point: of the five in the 
sample who won these glittering prizes, four came from Thua-
thien and none from the North.•& 
In such a small sample statistical correlations must be 
very high to be significant - as they are. The remarkable 
inverse correlation between regional background and ultimate 
career success is particularly striking. It suggests that an 
invisible b~rrier routinely prevented almost all Bac-ky tong 
doc from ever breaking through to the select ranks of power-
holders around the king in Hue, the vast majority of whom 
through the century derived from Trung-ky provinces. 
But what of the political elite formed by the first 
four grades? Can a similar pattern of discrimination be de-
tected here, too? The tables below supply the answer. 
Table Three gives a proportional and numerical analysis 
of the comparative career success of tien si and pho bang 
Among those from Thua-thien were three pho bang. 
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within these grades. For simplicity's sake, four areas have 
been selected that highlight regional, sub-regional, and 
provincial differences. The provinces of Ha-noi and Nam-
dinh, whic~·together accounted for nearly half of all Bac-ky 
metropolitan graduates, represent the North. Nghe-an and Ha-
tinh appear as a control, and as a special sub-region in 
northern Trung-ky. Binh-Tri-Thien stands for central Trung-
ky, with Thua-thien province presented separately for com-
parative purposes.•• The first three areas produced compar-
able graduate cohorts, with Thua-thien responsible for near-
ly half the Binh-Tri-Thien number. 70 
TABLE 3: COMPARISON OF CAREER SUCCESS OF T1£N SI/PHO BANG 
FROM SELECTED AREAS (examinations: 1822 - ~862) 
I 
a. 16'l. (9] 
b. 60'l. (34] 
c. 19.5'l. (11] 
d. 12.S'l. (7] 
'l. cohort (93'l.) 
II 
22'l. [11] 
58'l. [29] 
12'l. [6] 
2'l. [ 1] 
(721..) 
I. 
I I. 
I I I. 
IV. 
Ha-noi/Nam-dinh 
Nghe-Tinh 
Binh-Tri-Thien 
Thua-thien province 
Comparisons between those who: 
III 
32'l. [18] 
68% [38] 
9% (5] 
5'l. (3] 
( 82'l.) 
a. reached the top two grades 
b. reached the top four grades 
IV 
50'l. (13] 
75'l. (19] 
8'l. [2] 
4'l. (1] 
( 88'1.) 
c. never reached higher than district official, or 
d. spent their careers in education 
•• Raw data and numerical totals appear in Annex Two, 
Tables 3 and 4. 
70 This includes a small colonial distortion. The 1862 
examination raises the total to 289, of which the sample 
represents 56%: 56 from Ha-noi/Nam-dinh; 50 from Nghe-Tinh; 
56 from Binh-Tri-Thien; and 25 from Thua-thien. The selected 
areas produced comparable graduate numbers over the whole 
period (1822 to 1884): 81, 77, and 82 respectiveli. 
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While similar proportions from the first three areas 
reached grades one to four, a correlation between regional 
(and provincial) backgrounds of those who won promotion to 
the power ~lite in the second and first grades, and those 
who did not, is manifest. Only one-quarter of Northerners in 
the political elite actually progressed to the second grade, 
compared to a third from Thanh-Nghe-Tinh, half (477.) from 
the central Trung-ky area, and two-thirds of the men from 
Thua-thien province. The correlation at the other extreme is 
almost as striking. While one-third of all Bac-ky metropoli-
tan graduates produced in these forty years ~i~her remained 
in education or languished as district magistrates, only 
one-sixth of the sample from the two Trung-ky areas suffered 
the same fate. But comparing Thua-thien directly with Ha-noi 
and Nam-dinh best underlines the correlation between power 
and provincial background. For the two Northern provinces, 
twice as many metropolitan graduates passed their careers in 
teaching or in district posts as ever reached the top two 
grades of the mandarinate. For Thua-thien, on the other 
hand, the pyramid reversed: four times as many laureates 
attained the top two grades as spent their careers in the 
districts or in education. 7~ 
One last table considers career fluctuation among the 
sample in the top two grades. The chance of dismissal, or 
demotion by several grades, posed a relatively common hazard 
for imperial bureaucrats, even at a high level. It acted as 
71 Binh-Tri-Thien result was in inverse proportion to the 
two Northern provinces, with twice as many in the top grades 
as in teaching or the districts. 
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an important lever of royal power over senior officials, and 
one that no Nguyen sovereign shrank from using. Such dismis-
sal or demotion was only rarely final, however. After a 
period in the administrative wilderness (or sometimes the 
army), many mandarins resuscitated their careers and scram-
bled up the promotion ladder once more. Not everyone could 
hope to regain lost ground, however. Even to return to with-
in two grades of their previous best required not only luck 
and skill but, as Table Four suggests, the right background 
and connections as well. 
TABLE 4: RATE OF SUCCESSFUL REINTEGRATION OF DISMISSED OR 
DEMOTED TIEN SJ/PHO BANG FROM THE POLITICAL ELITE 
grades I II III IV 
a b a b a b a b 
1 2/5 0 2/5 0 
2 4/9 3 5/11 1 3/13 1 2/8 0 
3 5/10 4 1/5 1 2/6 1 1/2 0 
4 4/15 2 2/13 1 1/14 1 014 0 
total 13/34 9 8/29 3 8/38 3 5/19 0 
as 'l. (38/. J [ 69/. J (27/. J [ 37/. J (21/.J (37/. J (26/.J(-] 
I Ha-noi/Nam-dinh 
I I Nghe-Tinh 
III Binh-Tri-Thien 
IV Thua-thien province 
column a shows the numbers dismissed or demoted from the 
total number in the sample 
column b shows numbers who failed to rise within two grades 
(or higher) of their original level 
Table Four charts the rate of successful reintegration 
among men in the Table Three sample who were demoted or dis-
missed from the top four grades. 7~ The sample is necessarily 
72 Only those for whom QT~KL provides sufficient data are 
included. If the text says 'committed an error' without det-
153 
tiny, and by itself could hardly be regarded as persuasive. 
But its confirmation of earlier results lends this table its 
significance: once more we find a strong correlation between 
provincial -background and career success. The table shows 
that Ha-noi and Nam-dinh graduates in the sample suffered a 
major career set-back at nearly twice the rate of their 
peers from the central Trung-ky provinces. Their chance of 
career resuscitation fared even worse. Fewer than one-third 
of the Ha-noi/Nam-dinh sample clawed back to within two 
grades of their former positions, compared to two-thirds 
from the two Trung-ky areas - and every single man from 
Thua-thien. 
In terms of access to the highest grades and supreme 
positions of power, as well as the chance of successful re-
integration after a major career derailment, analysis of the 
OTBKL graduate data repeatedly reveals a pattern at work. 
Positions of political power and influence in the nineteenth 
century mandarinate were not open to equal competition on 
merit. Special advantages accrued to men born in Thua-thien 
province (and, to a lesser extent, in central Trung-ky), 
while men from Bac-ky provinces encountered a level of dis-
crimination that can only be described as systemic. 73 There 
seems no reason to assume this pattern only affected tien si 
ailing its consequences, the man is omitted. The raw data 
are in Annex Two, Table 3. 
73 An alternative explanation, of course, is that men from 
Bac-ky quit the mandarinate early in statistically signifi-
cant numbers. But if so, we would have to ask why; and part 
of the answer might lie in their anticipation of anti-North-
ern discrimination, a feeling which certainly existed. A 
more sensitive barometer than OTBKL would be needed to re-
veal if such a self-sustaining cycle developed. 
and pho bang from the North. But nor, we should add, did it 
automatically exclude every delta Northerner from winning 
through to the power elite, especially those like Doan Uan 
in 1845 or ··Nguyen Tu Gian in 1875 who attracted royal 
patronage. Nineteenth century Vietnamese history teems with 
exceptions to every generalisation. Nevertheless, despite 
this caveat, the statistical analysis overwhelmingly backs 
the conclusions of the more selective data in Table One. 
* * * 
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The nineteenth century mandarinal political and power 
elites that emerge from these tables differ from the pre-
dictions of existing models. Instead, the statistical evi-
dence best fits a regionally-based model of the nineteenth 
century political elite, dominated by men from Hue and its 
surrounds and, until the 1860s, from the far South, inter-
mixed with a quantum of men from the northern Trung-ky pro-
vinces of Thanh-Nghe-Tinh. As the nineteenth century pro-
gressed, the existing elite of the Gia-Long reign prolonged 
its access to power by making room for newcomers from the 
same region, and by effectively changing its own spots. 
Until the 1830s, leading elements of the Nguyen political 
elite sprang from three main sources: from chua era lineages 
of note; from newer Restoration era military retainers; or 
from families at the edge of the former elite who benefited 
from the losses of the previous quarter-century to place 
literate but unqualified members in the lower echelons of 
the administration in 1802, or shortly thereafter. Part way 
through the Minh-Mang era it began to change, however, as 
royal encouragement for the examination system endowed 
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academic title-holders with real career advantages within 
the reformed imperial bureaucracy. As graduates (including 
men from the North) who lacked ties of kinship or patronage 
with older ~lite families began trickling into higher court 
positions in the 1830s, few in the existing elite could have 
missed the threat this implied to their own continued power. 
What elite family could afford to ignore the warning in Phan 
Thanh Gian's meteoric rise from tien si to acting tuan phu 
in three short years? And what unqualified mandarinal aspir-
ant from central Trung-ky could fail to be disturbed by the 
swift successes of exemplary Northern cu nhan like Nguyen 
Cong Tru or Doan Uan at Minh-Mang's encouraging hand? 
As examination titles gained administrative signific-
ance, the ambitious sons of existing officials at all lev-
els positioned themselves to acquire the academic degrees 
that would enable them to ride out the changes - and, as a 
corollary, to contain the influx of outsiders that threaten-
ed the existing distribution of power and influence. Gradu-
ate quotas, which had favoured the North under Gia-Long when 
they were politically irrelevant, now expanded in the exami-
nation sites patronised by the existing elite. Thus despite 
Nam-ky's lack of scholastic depth and paltry history of Con-
fucianisation, Sai-gon's cu nhan numbers rose during the 
Thieu-Tri reign to an extraordinary 87, or 80% of the com-
parable Ha-noi figure. 74 Central Trung-ky families, their 
sights set higher than their Southern cousins, aimed at the 
more prestigious metropolitan examinations. Despite failing 
74 Model, p.222. 
to produce a single tien si before the mid-1830s, by the 
end of the 1840s the seven Nguyen heartland provinces 
(Quang-binh to Binh-dinh) boasted between them almost as 
many tien sI and pho bang for the decade as the whole of 
Bac-ky (48 to 53). This result, like their later career 
success as revealed in our tables, owed much less to chance 
than to deliberate choices. As Woodside explained, 'it was 
at these higher examinations ••. that emperors personally 
were most inclined, and able, to influence the results 17~ 
and, he might have added, that candidates 1 identities were 
virtual!~ impossible to keep secret from the initial 
examiners. 
The 1847 coup that enthroned Tu-Bue brought a new gen-
eration of leaders from the same region muscling into the 
circle of power around the throne. All shared similar back-
grounds as senior civil officials deeply involved in imple-
menting the Minh-Mang administrative reforms. As a result, 
the coup promoted further sinicisation of government at the 
same time that it entrenched the existing regional dominan-
ce of the political elite. A consummate bureaucratic poli-
tician like Truong Bang Que could man the mandarinal ram-
parts far more effectively against Minh-Mang's Northern 
proteges (and their successors) than could the sons of Gia-
Long' s elite, mostly first generation graduates still 
climbing the promotion ladder. For the next thirty years, 
the promising Bac-ky assault on the citadels of court power 
launched in the 1830s and 1840s ran out of momentum. Even 
the most brilliant Northerners found their hopes frustrated 
Ibid, p.220. 
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and falling short of the mark. While their careers routine-
ly ended outside the court as tong doc, their less talented 
confreres.found themselves systematically relegated to the 
lower reaches of the political elite, and of the bureaucr-
acy in general. 
In the nineteenth century kingdom, the right Trung-ky 
regional credentials (and, of course, the network of per-
sonal connections and family relations they implied) began 
and remained the greatest single asset for any ambitious 
mandarin. It was as true for military officers74 as for tien 
si or pho bang graduates. Even men with lowly tu tai titles 
from central Trung-ky provinces beat Bac-ky doctoral laure-
ates into the power elite by two to one when averaged over 
the whole century. 77 
The 1860s loss of the South only exaggerated the trend 
for men from Trung-ky to exercise the substance of military 
and political power. The next section considers them, and 
their differing passages to colonialism. 
74 Of forty-three generals in the first two grades for 
whom biographical data were found, the most northerly came 
from Thanh-hoa (6). Fifteen came from Phu-yen and provinces 
further south, while the remaining twenty-two (51/.) were 
from the Quang-binh to Binh-dinh heartland. 
77 Or 32 to 16. Among their number were Tran 9inh Tue, a 
Quang-binh tu tai who reached hiep bien in 1882 and negoti-
ated the Harmand convention in 1883 [~NNTC [SG](9), pp.74-
75; and VNDNTB, pp.454-55], and the sons of Truong Sang 
Que. [QT~KL, p.75 lists a nephew as tien si in 1842 and 
gives Que as the only other graduate (cu nhan or higher) in 
the family. Orband, 'Les Marts de 1914', p.62 confirms it 
for Ban.] 
Trung-ky Regional Elites and the Colonial Challenge 
Two politically significant regional elites evolved in 
nineteenth century Trung-ky. One revolved around the Hue 
area, the other Thanh-Nghe-Tinh. Each group depended on a 
special (but dissimilar) relationship with the Nguyen rul-
ing house to smooth their access to political and administ-
rative success. Even so, their attachments to the throne 
remained too diverse to bring about a real social integra-
tion between the two elites. However, until the French in-
vasion pared personal and political commitments to the 
bone, the universal Confucian vocabulary of loyalty to the 
throne plastered over the fissures and disguised their 
depth. When colonial invasion shattered the apparent con-
sensus, it thrust into stark relief the divergent bases 
upon which these two elite circles generally founded their 
loyalty to the Nguyen dynasty. In the crisis of the 1870s 
and 1880s, conflicting loyalties would propel many members 
of the Thanh-Nghe-Tinh elite down the road to anti-colonial 
resistance, in opposition to most of the Hue-based elite 
who ultimately sided with the French. 
Myriad personal factors always influence the decisions 
individuals make, or fail to make, at crucial historical 
junctures. Nevertheless, in this instance transpersonal 
matters like the differing well-springs of identity and of 
attachments to the dynasty that separated the two Trung-ky 
elites undoubtedly played a major part in the polarisation. 
Not everyone followed suit, of course; but the evidence 
strongly suggests that many in the central Trung-ky elite 
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found their most profound commitment lay in the living 
bonds of blood and kinship they shared with the Nguyen (and 
each other), forged and reforged over generations. In 
Thanh-Nghe-Tinh, on the other hand, many felt regional 
pride, nourished by a deeply-ingrained sense of patriotic 
duty and bred in the bone by centuries at the heart of 
national power, far more compelling. We will briefly con-
sider each in turn. 
The Tay-son rebellion and subsequent Restoration had 
decimated the Nguyen royal clan. Nguyen Anh himself only 
became chua after the deaths of four men with stronger 
claims, including his uncle Hue-vuong and his cousin Muc-
vuong as well as his own father and older brother. In 1820, 
when the newly enthroned Minh-Mang turned his reforming eye 
upon them, the living descendants of seven generations of 
polygamous rulers numbered a mere two hundred, 7 e including 
Gia-Long's own relatively modest progeny of thirteen sons 
and eighteen daughters, and their children. 79 
In the past, except for the successor, chua's sons had 
all been called ton that. Now Minh-Mang decreed Gia-Long's 
male descendants be differentiated from ton that in the 
seven non-imperial Nguyen chua lineages by special patrony-
mies, laid down for twenty generations by the king himself. 
At the same time, he organised imperial princes and their 
descendants into a formal status hierarchy and endowed them 
Ung Gia, 'Le Ton Nhon Phu', BAVH, V, 2 (1918), p.104. 
79 Modest compared to Minh-Mang's 78 sons and 64 daught-
ers, or Thieu-Tri's 29 sons and 35 daughters. Ton That Con, 
Hoang Toe Luoc Bien (Hue, 1943), pp.19-25. By the 1880s, 
there may have been 1000 descendants of Gia-Long. 
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with generous state stipends and other entitlements. 90 A new 
regulatory body (ton nhon phu) was also established to sup-
ervise th~ affairs of the extended royal family.ei Its dir-
ectors, the ta ton chanh and huu ton chanh, held the two 
highest ranked mandarinal positions. The king no doubt 
never intended these two office holders to become the pol-
itical rivals of the senior mandarins ranked just below 
them in the first grade. By the early 1880s, however, in 
the hands of long-serving princes Tho-xuan and Tuy-ly, 62 the 
two ton chanh would come to exercise a personally-hazardous 
political authority in the court, thanks to the 
insecurities of Tu-Bue. 
If Minh-Mang's formal organisation changed the appear-
ance of the royal family, his reforms never altered one of 
its basic functions. As always, the royal (now imperial) 
clan still served to bond the political and military elite 
to the throne, whether they be existing families or out-
standing newcomers. Gia-Long's children, for example, were 
eo Laborde, 'Les titres', pp.386-406. Huong (or Hong), 
Ung, Buu, and Vinh were current in the colonial period. It 
was also probably in 1820 that royal concubines were org-
anised into nine grades, whose personal allowances ranged 
from 1000 quan and 48 sets of clothes down to 180 quan (all 
plus rice). Under Minh-Mang, imperial princes received 500 
quan and princesses 360 (both plus rice), compared to tong 
doc who got 300 quan plus rice, according to CBPK, pp.433-
35. 
Ung Gia, 'Le Ton Nhon Phu', pp.100-05. 
82 Tho-xuan served continuously as Ta ton chanh from 1840 
to 1885; while Tuy-ly held the off ice from February 1889 to 
November 1897. [Ton That Con, Hoang Toe, p.31.] But Tuy-ly 
had earlier worked in the Ton Nhon Phu at the lower level 
from 1862, and had been promoted Huu ton chanh in 1882, ac-
cording to L. Sogny, 'Les Familles illustres: Son Altesse 
le Prince Tuy Ly', BAVH, XVI, 4 (1929), pp.190-92. 
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mostly disbursed in strategic marriages designed to shore 
up old and new alliances. Thus as the new-made sixteen year 
old chua in the dark days of 1778, Nguyen Anh had sealed 
the allegiance of Vo Tanh (and his large private army) in 
Gia-dinh by offering the general an infant daughter in 
marriage. 83 Later he rewarded another new ally, Nguyen Huynh 
Bue, by wedding two daughters to Sue's son~.•4 Other child-
ren found spouses among long-standing retainer elite famil-
ies like the lineage descendants of Nguyen Huu Dat,•e or 
newer followers of proven worth like Ho Van Boi.•• The use 
of marriages to strengthen existing bonds or to forge new 
ones with promising outsiders was hardly limited to the 
royal clan. Although most marriages in elite circles were 
arranged between social equals, or with the royal clan, 
polygamy provided enough offspring for elite families to 
gamble a child on a talented stranger. In exactly this way 
one of the more celebrated pre-dynastic officials, Bao Duy 
Tu, the son of a lowly wandering comedian, started his 
spectacular rise to power. Tu so impressed the governor of 
a::s -SNNTC (HN](5), p.229; and VNDNT-S, pp.527-29. Both say 
Vo Tanh married Nguyen Anh's daughter when they joined for-
ces in 1778; but the girl must have been far too young. 
• 4 VNDNTB, pp.255-58. 9uc had rallied to Nguyen Anh des-
pite the latter's murder of his leader, Bo Thanh Nhan, in 
1781. After saving the chua's life in 1782, Bue was given 
the Nguyen surname and treated like a family member. 
• 5 L. Sogny, 'Les familles illustres d'Annam: SE Nguyen 
Huu Bo', BAVH, IX, 2 (1924), p.177-78 for Oat's official 
biography. Bo's grandfather, Luan, [p.181] had been close 
to Nguyen Anh and his predecessor, and Gia-long married 
- ·-' a son among his descendants •. 
a• Or Vui. -SNNTC, [HN](5), p.79; and VNDNT-S, pp.103-04. 
His daughter married the future Minh-Mang in 1806, two 
years after her father's death. 
Qui-nhon in a chance conversation that the canny official 
rapidly recruited him as a son-in-law. 87 
The evidence that exists suggests that this dual mar-
riage strategy continued through the nineteenth century, 
though with one significant exception. In terms of politi-
cal significance, it remained closely focussed on central 
Trung-ky and the South. Few Northern families, or even ones 
from Thanh-Nghe-Tinh, secured their children's spouses 
among the imperial clan. The political function of royal 
polygamy, however, has tended to disguise the pattern. 
Like his chua forebears, the emperor routinely took 
numerous concubines from among mandarinal families as a way 
of reinforcing royal influence among them. 88 If as a conse-
quence, as Gia-Long explained to Chaigneau pere, this meant 
the king felt obliged to accept any mandarin's daughter of-
fered to him,e• as the century passed many of these women 
must have been Northerners. Yet their presence has left 
almost no historical trace since, with the exception of Tu-
5uc, their later royal masters had a}l fathered several 
sons while still princes. All Nguyen heirs came from among 
these sons whose mothers, whether legitimate wives or con-
cubines, in turn all came from Bang-trong families.• 0 They 
97 L. Sogny 'Les Associes de gauche et de droite au culte 
du temple dynastique de Thai-Mieu', BAVH, I, 4 (1914), pp. 
305-08. It may be on his account that the Nguyen allowed 
sons of actors to contest the mandarinal examinations. 
ea Michel 9uc Chaigneau, Souvenirs de Hue (Cochinchine) 
(Paris: Imprimerie imperiale, 1867), pp.122-24 (fn 1) and 
129-30. 
Ibid, p.124 (fn 1). 
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automatically outranked later additions in the rigid hier-
archy of royal concubines, unless a newcomer managed to 
attract royal attention long enough to bear a son. (From 
1847 to 1883, under the sterile Tu-Bue, not even this slim 
hope existed.)• 1 In reality, then, royal polygamy masked a 
situation in the nineteenth century in which all the 
matches that mattered in terms of the succession had been 
formed long before any king's accession, between princes 
and daughters of upper elite families from central Trung-ky 
and Nam-ky. 
Where imperial princesses were concerned, circumstan-
ces (if not necessarily intentions) ensured the dual stra-
tegy continued, and that few - if any - ever married out-
side 9ang-trong families. Competition for these high status 
wives was quite fierce; and dynastic regulations laid down 
that only sons or grandsons of men from the top two grades 
of the mandarinate, civil or military, even be considered 
as royal consorts (pho ma).•2 This automatically disposed of 
virtually all families north of Quang-binh during the first 
two reigns. Then later Tu-Buc's sterility caused the supply 
•° Certainly as far as the kings were concerned. Thanks to 
a generation lag many were also Southerners. For example, 
Tu-Buc's mother, the empress Tu Du, and Hong-bao's mother 
both came from Gia-dinh. [Bui-Quang-Tung, 'La succession de 
Thieu-Tri', BSEI (ns), XLII, 1&2 (1967), pp.37-38] At least 
the first was supposedly chosen for her grandson by the 
dowager empress, Gia-Long's principal wife, and hints at a 
preference for her home area. VNDNT~, p.432 
• 1 Conceiving a son was not always easy, even for long 
term partners: Hong-bao's mother had been married for about 
6 years, and Tu-Buc's for 4, before bearing sons. Low stat-
us concubines must have had very poor chances. Bui-Quang-
Tung, 'Thieu-Tri', pp.37-38 
•~ L. Sogny, 'Ceremonial d'autrefois pour le mariage des 
princesses d'Annam', ~' XXI, 3 (1934), pp.146-47. 
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of imperial princesses to dwindle alarmingly: from 1847 to 
the early 1880s, only thirty became available. 93 Such 
precious commodities needed careful distribution. Two at 
least went for old-fashioned strategic political reasons, 
to help weave the families of important new men into upper 
elite circles within a single generation. Thus Truong Quang 
Tru, the oldest son of Truong Bang Que, and Nguyen Lam, se-
cond son of Nguyen Tri Phuong, both became pho ma on their 
fathers' account. Tu-Bue wed Lam to his own younger sister 
in 1864 as a public gesture of affection and appreciation 
for Nguyen Tri Phuong's successes against the Ta Van Phung 
rebels in the North. 94 Later, when Tu-Bue bowed to political 
necessity and adopted heirs, he also married a full sister 
of his third adopted son (the future king Bong-Khanh) into 
the family of his powerful court favourite, Nguyen Van 
Tuong, whose own background had been quite unassuming. The 
marriage sought to raise Tuong's standing, and bind him 
more closely to the future of the dynasty. 99 Although not 
entirely successful in this case, the strategy worked well 
in most others. 94 Over the century it created a dense inter-
Q 3 Ibid, p.147. They were all daughters of Minh-Mang and 
Thieu-Tri. 
Q 4 Lam was killed in 1873 in Hanoi, fighting alongside his 
father. Bao Bang Vy, Nguyen-Tri-Phuong (Sai-gon: Nha Van-
hoa, 1974), pp.248-50. 
99 Tsuboi, L'Empire vietnamienne, p.236. Sogny, 'Princes-
ses', pp.151-52 says Tu-Bue actually adopted the girl, but 
Ton That Con [Hoang Toe, pp.26-28] does not mention it. 
9 • For example, four of Nguyen Huu Bo's children married 
imperial spouses: two became queens (of Bong-Khanh and 
Thanh-Thai) and two became pho ma even though, after 1883, 
short tenures and boy-kings made royal princesses almost as 
vanishingly rare as before. Sogny, 'Nguyen Huu Do', p.204. 
locking network of living relationships that inextricably 
bound the fortunes and emotions of the central Trung-ky 
upper elite to the Nguyen dynasty - though not before a 
severe trial in the 1860s. 
As mentioned previously, some elements among the mand-
arinal elite and royal family never had accepted Tu-Sue's 
irregular accession. After Hong-bao's death their disaffec-
tion simmered below the surface in Hue until the French in-
vasion of the South, and the Treaty of 1862. When Tu-Bue 
made peace in the South in order to free his forces for the 
rebellions sweeping the delta North, he surrendered three 
provinces steeped in Restoration significance, and which 
housed the lineage homes of several important court fami-
lies, including his own mother's. Attempts to negotiate 
their return stalled at the last minute in mid-1864, 97 
stoking upper elite outrage in Hue. In January 1865 an 
imperial half-brother, Hong-tap, the pho ma Truong Van 
Chat, and several mandarins and royal clansmen were captur-
ed plotting to murder Phan Thanh Gian and Tran Tien Thanh, 
the king's closest advisers after Truong Bang Que's retire-
ment and, unlike Que, staunch advocates of the peace poli-
cy. Then in 1866 one of prince Tung-thien's sons-in-law, 
Boan Trung, stormed the palace with an armed band in a bid 
to replace Tu-Bue with Hong-bao's oldest son.•• Tung-thien 
A son of the 1890s mandarinal strongman, Nguyen Than, also 
married the oldest daughter of the short-lived king Duc-
Bu~ • SN , p • 58 • 
Tsuboi, L'Empire vietnamienne, pp.165-68. 
•a Bui-Quang-Tung, 'Thi@u-Tri', pp.23-98; and Bo Bang, 
'Tinh hinh trieu dinh Hue truoc vu bien nam 1885', NCLS, No 
224 (1985), pp.74-6. 
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only averted personal disaster by handing over his daughter 
and grandchildren, bound hand and foot, to Tu-Buc's mercy. 
They survived, unlike possibly nineteen others, among them 
all Hong-bao's male descendants.•• The double failures, and 
the reprisals they unleashed, effectively purged dissent. 
From the mid-1860s Tu-Buc's throne was safe from his tur-
bulent relatives, most of whom now closed ranks politically 
behind him. 
But further north, in Thanh-Nghe-Tinh, matters pro-
gressed quite differently. For centuries history had dealt 
this region a unique role that bred a special sense of 
identity and destiny among its people. Settled since the 
Bronze Age, Thanh-Nghe had experienced the thousand year 
Chinese domination along with the rest of the North. Its 
people had manned the frontline against the Chams before 
independence, and later swelled the centuries-long push 
south that finally dispossessed them. A tough frontier area 
under the Tran, the region had served as the dumping ground 
for exiled bandits and outlaws from the delta provinces. 
All these qualities came to the fore after the Ming inva-
sion of the early fifteenth century when two anti-Chinese 
rebellions broke out from here. The second put Le Loi on 
the throne, surrounded by the Thanh-Nghe warrior clans who 
had helped him to power. 10° From then on, families with 
their roots in Thanh-Nghe villages strode centre stage of 
Bui-Quang-Tung, 'Thieu-Tri', pp.83 and 88. 
100 There had been an earlier anti-Chinese rebellion here, 
against the Tang in 722. People from the area also fought 
the Qing in 1788. Ninh Viet Giao, 'Nghe Tinh. People and 
Traditions', VS, No 59, 197?, pp.31-35. 
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Vietnamese history. For the next three centuries they succ-
essfully contested a long and sometimes bitter struggle 
with men from the Red River delta for power and influence 
under the Le. 101 When two of their number, the Trinh and the 
Nguyen, extended that rivalry geographically, other Thanh-
Nghe families ranged themselves equally behind the new 
contenders. Right through the chua period, ambitious 
adventurers from the area, and from the Nguyen home dist-
rict in particular, filtered down into 9ang-trong to swell 
the ranks of Thanh-Nghe families already riding high in the 
chua's service. 102 
The transformed political fortunes of the region en-
tailed other consequences too. Although Thanh-Nghe remained 
the principal area of military recruitment under the Le, 103 
contact with the court in Ha-noi gradually made its leading 
families more culturally sophisticated. As generations 
passed, they developed a passion for scholarly pursuits 
that spread to the region generally~ 104 By the seventeenth 
century, despite th~continued military orientation of the 
101 For its start, see J.K. Whitmore, ''The Development of 
Le Government in Fifteenth Century Vietnam", PhD thesis, 
Cornell University, 1968. For its later form, see K.W. Tay-
lor, 'The Literati Revival in Seventeenth-century Vietnam', 
Jnl of SE Asian Studies, XVIII, (1987), pp.1-23. 
102 For example, Tong Van Khoi, Nguyen Huu Thuy (who wed a 
chua's daughter in the mid-eighteenth century) and his 
father and brother, and Tran Cong Lai. ~NNTC [SGJ(15), pp. 
131, 132, and 134 respectively. 
103 Elite soldiers, who enjoyed benefits for themselves 
and their children, were recruited on the basis of 1:3 reg-
istered males here, compared to 1:5 in the delta. Le Thanh 
Khoi, Histoire du Vietnam, p.257. 
104 Nguyen Trang Con, Phong trao conq nhan cao trao xo-
viet Nqhe-Tinh (Hanoi, 1980), p.8. 
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old warrior families, they had nevertheless amassed enough 
educated members to take on and beat the delta literati at 
their own_game.ioe Under the Le the two provinces built a 
reputation for scholarship and examination success. Indeed, 
in poorer Nghe-an, the examinations came to form a vital 
element in the survival strategies of literate families. 
While preparing for the examinations, students received 
preferential access to the best communal fields, and after 
graduation they were rewarded with extra shares depending 
on the level of their degree.i 06 Such small local incent~ves 
might not have mattered unduly to the long-descended 
scholarly families Woodside described, with their generat-
ions of contact at court. But for middling literati famil-
ies, struggling to ride out the accelerating disasters of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they represented 
a great opportunity to accumulate assets. As a result, a 
sort of examination industry developed here, as families 
laboured over the generations to produce regional graduates 
to serve on village councils and staff the middle reaches 
of the Trinh and Le bureaucracy.io7 
ioe Taylor. 'Literati Revival', pp.22-23 describes how the 
contest was also waged in terms of Confucian concepts. 
io* Amounts differed. In Tri-le (Anh-son district), for 
example, where roughly two-thirds of rice fields were com-
munal, graduates got from 0.5 to 2 mau (for tien si) extra. 
Ninh Viet Giao, · Vai net ve cong dien cong tho o Nghe-an 
truoc va trong thoi gian 1930-1931' , in Nong Thon Viet Nam 
Tronq Lich Su, I (Ha-noi, 1977), pp.161-63. It may be for 
the same reason that the poor central province of Quang-
binh, where Ngo 9uc Thinh found almost all rice fields were 
communal until the twentieth century, was also a nursery of 
scholars. 'Cac quan he so huu dat dai cua lang xa o Quang 
Binh', Idem, pp.387-400. 
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In 1802, when the dynasty changed, Thanh-Nghe found 
itself uniquely placed to benefit. Although the Le had 
gone, Thaoh-hoa retained its status as the imperial pro-
vince and still housed important dynastic temples, albeit 
of a different family. And the Nguyen were quick to acknow-
ledge their ancestral links. When Gia-Long re-established 
regional examinations in 1807, Thanh-hoa and Nghe-an each 
received a site, while all other Bac~thanh scholars had to 
squeeze into Nam-dinh and Ha-noi. Graduate numbers were 
also high. 10• When Minh-Mang re-introduced metropolitan 
examinations in 1822, Th~nh-Nghe men responded in force: 
from 1822 to 1884, the area accounted for 25/. of all metro-
politan graduates. QTBKL data shows two other interesting 
matters: this area accounted for the smallest number of 
graduates recorded as the sole laureates from their fam-
ilies (47 or 50/.); and of the rest, 90/. of the families 
claimed only two generations of graduates. 109 Taken togeth-
er, this suggests that nineteenth century metropolitan 
laureates from here generally were not descended from Le 
dynasty tien si or high officials so much as from the 
107 Phan Binh Phung's family seems typical. Although desc-
ended from Phan Nhu Tinh, who reached tong doc, no-one in 
the next twelve generations under the Le is mentioned as 
reaching a similarly high appointment, despite there being 
numerous scholars and officials in each generation. Even 
so, the family was very important locally, Bao Trinh Nhat, 
Phan-Binh-Phunq (1847-1895) (Sai-gon: Tan Viet XB, 1957), 
p.6. 
109 Model, p.220. For three examinations (1813, 1821, and 
1825) the Ha-noi site totalled 67 cu nhan and Nam-dinh 89, 
while Thanh-Nghe reached 105. 
109 See Annex Two, Tables 6A for data. In central Trung-
ky, 67% were sole graduates compared to 61% in Bac-ky. The 
second comparison is 67% and 73/. respectively. 
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middling literati families of regional graduates, still 
doggedly pursuing their traditional academic strategy but 
now with spectacularly better results. 110 But while many 
from Thanh-Nghe-Tinh were new to high mandarinal honours, 
few were new to Confucian studies, unlike most of their 
contemporaries from central Trung-ky. 111 This seminal 
distinction would come into its own in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. 
As the century progressed, the ebbing retreat of Le 
restorationism away from the dynasty's home area and to-
wards the Northern delta provinces exemplified the evolu-
tion of Thanh-Nghe-Tinh into a distinctive, intermediary 
zone, no longer fully of the North but not quite integrated 
into the Centre either. This does not mean that families 
here failed to make connections outside the area, for mand-
arinal or scholarly friendships between men from different 
elite circles could and did lead to marriages between fam-
ily members. But such change is naturally slow, and in the 
nineteenth century it remained shallow, lacking the depth 
and breadth of collateral relationships produced by genera-
tions of ~nterconnections. 112 So while van than circles here 
110 The descendants of Phan Nhu Tinh in An-dong village 
(Ha-tinh) are typical. No-one in the previous three genera-
tions under the Le passed tien si, so its members appear in 
QTBKL as without earlier graduates, although other sources 
assert numerous generations with good passes. Between 1822 
and 1919 they then went on to produce seven tien si and pho 
bang among a total of eleven higher graduates. QT~KL, pp. 
45-46, 91, and 171 for the Phan Sinh Phung branch; and 71-
72, 194, and 195 for the other. 
111 Here a mere BY. of metropolitan laureates between 1822 
and 1884 were second generation graduates, compared to 17% 
in Bac-ky and 26% in Thanh-Nghe-Tinh. 
pledged loyalty to the Nguyen, it was conditional Confucian 
trung-nghia they offered, unsupported by ancestral 
guarantee~ or the visceral sureties of blood and kinship. 
At heart the commitment remained fundamentally ambiguous. 
No proper Confucian since the master himself had ever ac-
cepted trung-nghia as absolute and personal, or believed 
that an official owed total loyalty to his prince in all 
circumstances. Confucius had taught in The Analects, 'if [a 
prince's] personal conduct is not correct he may issue ord-
ers, but they will not be followed.' 113 Later Xun Zi devel-
oped the theme: 'submission to what is right#, he wrote, 
•not to what has been commanded by ••• one's prince [is] 
the most righteous action'. 114 Mencius capped it. A king 
whose conduct had forfeited his right to the title might be 
killed with impunity, he implied in response to King Xuan's 
question about the assassination of King Zhou: 11 e 
He who outrages the benevolence proper to his na-
ture is called a robber; he who outrages righte-
ousness is called a ruffian. The robber and ruff-
ian we call a mere fellow. I have heard of the 
cutting off of the head of the fellow Zhou, but I 
1 12 Such marriages could also split families rather than 
unite them. For example, in the late 1880s Tran Tram, from 
a Gia-Long retainer family of Quang-nam, found himself with 
one sister as a high ranking concubine of king Bong-Khanh, 
and another as the fugitive wife of Phan 9inh Phung, leader 
of the anti-French (and anti-court) can vuong rebellion in 
Nghe-Tinh. Bao Trinh Nhat, Phan-£)inh-Phung, p.9; and Nguyen 
Tien Lang, 'Quelques mandarins d'hier', BAVH, XXVI, 2 
(1939), p.158 who discreetly mentions only the first. 
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113 For many examples from the Confucian canon, see Frank-
lin W. Houn's valuable compilation, 'Rejection of Blind 
Obedience as a Traditional Chinese and Maoist Concept•, 
Asian Thought and Society, VII, 19 (1982), pp.18-31 and 20 
(1982), pp.264-279, quote p.24. 
114 Ibid, p.29. 
Ibid, p.28. 
have not heard of the putting of a sovereign to 
death, in his case. 
The time bomb concealed in these deeply ingrained senti-
ments began-~icking in the 1860s, in response to the pro-
tracted French colonial crisis and the contradiction that 
Hue's irresolute responses inexorably produced between 
national independence and dynastic survival. 
The French threat galvanised the patriotic emotions 
and combative traditions of Thanh-Nghe-Tinh and split open 
the fissures between the two Trung-ky elites. In 1858, at 
first word of the Franco-Spanish expedition, the feisty 
octogenarian Nguyen Cong Tru demanded royal permission to 
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lead troops south in person. 11• In 1859, a further ten Nghe-
an scholars echoed his request, with one winning command of 
a military column in the South as a result. 117 But as the 
fighting dragged on, the peace faction at court waxed more 
powerful and their outspoken opponents, like the Nghe-an 
tien si and high official Ho Si Tuan, found themselves 
quietly banished to distant appointments, or their careers 
blocked. 118 Although some mandarins from the area continued 
1 1• Binh Xuan Lam, 'Phong trao dau tranh vu trang chong 
xam luoc phap cuoi the ky XIX o Nghe-Tinh: nhung dac diem 
phat trien, nguyen phan that bai, y nghia lich su' ,1 NCLS, 
No. 218 (1984), p.25. 
117 Ho Tuan Niem and Phan Huu Thinh, · Truyen thong yeu 
nuoc cua nhan dan xa Guynh Boi', NCLS, No 170 (1976), p.69. 
118 Tuan was appointed governor of Quang-yen, where he 
soon died in 1862. Ibid. 
to criticise the peace policy in the 1860s, 11• the initiat-
ive increasingly passed to the local van than. 
In 1865, like-minded Nghe-an literati met in Vo-liet 
village, later to became an important "Red Soviet" during 
the 1930-31 rebellion, and agreed to set up •groups of 
righteous scholars' (nghia si doan). The groups rapidly 
multiplied through Thanh-Nghe-Tinh. In 1873,. they formed 
the organisational sinews of rebellion, the structure that 
sustained the Scholars' Revolt of 1874 in which thousands 
of Vietnamese Catholics died at the hands of van than reb-
els, outraged by the court's latest dealings with the 
French. The rebels~ 1874 proclamation exposed the dangerous 
ambiguity of Confucian doctrine in patriotic hands: 120 
The present crisis involves the salvation of the 
state; there is no place in it for personal in-
terests ••• If you, men of justice and fidelity, 
allow yourselves to live without taking part in 
the worthy struggle for the State, Heaven will 
never forgive you. We are not afraid to die. 
Even if we have not yet received authorisation 
by royal decree and even if we might be punished 
by his majesty the emperor, it makes no differen-
ce: it must still be done. We will ask his per-
mission afterwards. In any case, if we succeed in 
exterminating (the French and the Christians), we 
must at least become national heroes. 
That mere subjects should dare to set their judgement 
above his own was intolerable for an authoritarian like Tu-
11• For example, the junior censor Phan Huan publicly de-
nounced the Treaty of 1862 (9inh Xuan Lam, 'Phong trao dau 
tranh', p. 25], while Vu Pham Khai wrote a book against the 
peace policy. Van Tan, 'Vu Pham Khai. Not van than yeu nuoc 
dung dau phai chu chien duai Trieu Tu-Bue' , NCLS, No 141 
(1971), pp.3-8. Khai was born in 1807 in the part of Thanh-
hoa that later became Ninh-binh province. · 
120 Tsuboi, L'Empire vietnamienne, pp.207-210 for the 
whole proclamation of 19 March 1874. The quotes form the 
peroration. 
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9uc, whose early Confucian views had been so tempered by 
experience that he now professed that teaching ~total and 
devoted obedience' to the king was the principal aim of all 
education. 121 Furious at the slowness of the repression, Tu-
9uc enlisted French assistance. 1But sending Nguyen Van 
Tuong on a French war vessel to engage the rebelS122 could 
only exacerbate the emerging contradiction between national 
salvation and dynastic survival. For many in Thanh-Nghe-
Tinh literati circles, the 1874 revolt finally unravelled 
their ties to the Nguyen. 123 Upper elite families, eyes on 
the mandarinal prize, held out until the 1880s; but ulti-
mately they too had to choose between their own patriotic 
traditions and the Nguyen dynasty. After Tu-9uc's death in 
1883, the mandarinal tien si Nguyen Xuan On 124 and Phan 9inh 
Phung resigned their official posts and returned home to 
prepare for armed struggle. It followed in 1885, 129 with the 
121 Royal marginal comment in the Kham dinh Viet su thong 
aiam cuanq muc, the history of the Le dynasty commissioned 
in ,1865 •. Philippe L~nglet (ed and trans), La tradition 
vietnamienne:. un etat national au sein de la civilisation 
chinoise, extracted from BSEI, XLV, 2&3 (1970), p.97. 
122 Tsuboi, L'Empire vietnamienne, p.250. The revolt is 
outlined at pp.247-51. There was a particularly high death 
toll among its many thousands of victims and participants. 
123 Tsuboi claimed the van than in general deserted Tu-Bue 
after 1874, but gives no evidence for the rest of Trung-ky. 
At this stage I believe it was mainly a Thanh-Nghe-Tinh 
phenomenon. Ibid, p.251. 
124 Binh Xuan Lam, 'Phang traa dau tranh', pp.26-27 Tien 
si in 1871, On had reached 3-2 at court but was demoted to 
educational director in Quang-binh before becoming a resis-
tance leader at age fifty-five. GT~KL, p.179-80. 
12= For the movement, see David G. Marr, Vietnamese Anti-
colonialism 1885-1925 (University of California Press, 
1971), pp.86-91. For the war in Nghe-Tinh, see Charles Gos-
selin, L'Empire d'Annam (Paris: Perrin, 1904), pp.251-313. 
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active participation of more mandarins, scholars, and 
graduates here than in anywhere else in Trung-ky. 12• 
The 1880s resistance war fractured the Thanh-Nghe-Tinh 
elite. Families from the same village and whose clans had 
intermarried, like those of Phan 9inh Phung and Hoang Cao 
Khai (who became the 1890s kinh luoc of Tonkin), were split 
by their conflicting choices. 127 In villages like Quynh-doi, 
and in families like that of Ho Ba On 129 (whose grandson, Ho 
Tung Mau, became a founder of Vietnamese communism with 
Nguyen Ai Quoc in Canton), anti-colonialism meshed with 
emotional commitments to family and ancestors after several 
members died fighting the French in the 1880s, and later. 129 
Indeed, until the early 1930s Thanh-Nghe-Tinh acted as the 
For one province, see Nina Shapiro Adams, "The Meaning of 
Pacification: Thanh hoa under French rule, 1885-1908', Ph 
D, Yale University, 1978. For particular activists, see 
Phan Boi Chau (ed and trans Georges Boudarel), 'Les Memoi-
res de Phan Boi Chau·, France-Asie/ Asia, XXII, 3&4 (1968), 
pp.17-25. 
12• Gosselin, L'Empire d'Annam, p.247 said of north Annam: 
'all business was suspended [and] mandarins, especially of 
higher rank~ abandoned almost all their posts to swell 
Thuyet's following·. GT~KL data also shows that of the 20 
metropolitan graduates between 1865 and 1884 who fought or 
died in the can vuong movement, 11 came from Thanh-Nghe-
Tinh, plus 2 from nearby Quang-binh. Central Trung-ky only 
provided 7, of whom 5 came from Quang-nam. 
127 Khai tried to convince Phan Binh Phung to surrender in 
the mid-1890s. Their exchange of letters over the issue is 
discussed in Marr, Anticolonialism, pp.66-68. Vietnamese 
translations of the complete letters are in Bao Trinh Nhat, 
Phan-Binh-Phunq, pp.202-209. 
12a An-sat (provincial judicial officer) of Nam-dinh, who 
fought on when the French attacked in 1883 after his supe-
riors had deserted their posts. He later died of his wounds 
at home. Ho Tuan Niem and Phan Huu Thinh, 'Xa Guynh Boi', 
p.69. Also see Ho Tung Mau's biography in Trinh Chi (ed), 
Nhung nguoi cong san (Ho Chi Minh City, 1976), pp.81-86. 
Ibid, pp.70-71. 
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vanguard and flag-bearer of militant anti-colonialism in 
Central Vietnam, and arguably in the whole country. 130 
Even~s in Hue triggered the heroic defiance of court 
and colonialism among an important sector of the Thanh-
Nghe-Tinh elite and literati in the later 1880s. We will 
complete the chapter by returning to the capital, and the 
central Trung-ky elite that dominated its politics. 
* * * 
In Hue, two main events shaped the early 1880s. The 
first had its roots in France in 1879, when a change of 
government scrapped the anti-expansionist policy of the 
previous six years and brought to power men willing to heed 
the incessant demands of their compatriots in Indochina for 
further military advances. 131 Three years later, in May 1882 
in the Red River delta, the final French conquest began in 
earnest. Then in July 1883 the death of Tu-Bue triggered 
the second. His political testament unleashed and 
exacerbated the succession crisis stored up since 1847 by 
nominating an heir he did trust, surrounded by an unwork-
able group of antagonistic advisers. To three mandarinal 
Regents - Tran Tien Thanh, a peace advocate, General Ton 
130 Thus Nghe-Tinh supplied two-thirds of the patriotic 
authors of the time anthologised in Hop tuyen tho van yeu 
nuoc va each manq dau the ky XX, according to Nguyen Trang 
Con, 'Xo-viet Nghe-Tinh', p.10. Many leading twentieth cen-
tury anti-colonial militants like Phan Boi Chau, Hoang 
Trang Mau, Ho Chi Minh, Tran Phu, Ha Huy Tap, Le Hong Son, 
Le Hong Phong, and Nguyen Thi Minh Khai also came from 
here. 
Tsuboi, L'Empire vietnamienne, pp.81-88. 
That Thuyet, leader of the war faction, and the opportunist 
Nguyen Van Tuong - Tu-Bue had added his mother and princi-
pal wife ~s counsellors of the new king, and the heads of 
the Ton Nhon Phu, Princes Tho-xuan and Tuy-ly, as special 
advisers to the government. Within days a palace coup demo-
lished the impossible structure and left the deposed Due-
Bue to starve to death. Thuyet and Tuong, now masters of 
the court, enthroned one of Tu-Buc's younger brothers as 
Hiep-Hoa. 132 
Internal and external factors collided with swift, 
terrifying force a mere one month later. Determined to im-
pose a protectorate, the French sent a naval squadron that 
bombarded Thuan-an, and ranged the coast with casual a 
brutality. 133 Then the ranking diplomat, Harmand, issued a 
nightmare ultimatum that triggered the court's two darkest 
fears, the invincibility of French arms and the destruction 
of the dynasty: 134 
We could, for we have the means to do it, destroy 
your dynasty from top to bottom, even to its 
132 The best short account of the internal convolutions 
afterwards is found in Nguyen The Anh, The Withering Days 
of the Nguyen Dynasty (Research Notes and Discussions No. 
7, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1978). 
133 Pierre Loti, an officer with the force, wrote about 
the operations for Le Figaro, including a description of 
sailors massacring hundreds of Vietnamese soldiers unnec-
essarily. It caused a storm in Paris that almost brought 
his recall, and was censored for later publication. Loti 
never understood the fuss: 'I found them [the sailors] sub-
lime and thought people would admire them, not realising I 
was writing for cissies'. Quoted in Alec G. Hargreaves, The 
Colonial Experience in French Fiction (London: Macmillan, 
1981), pp.69-70. 
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1 34 Quoted in full in Georges Taboulet, La Geste fran;aise 
en Indochine, II (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1956), pp.805-06. The 
1883 convention is at pp.807-08. 
roots, and take for ourselves all the kingdom ••• 
as we have done in Lower Cochinchina. You should 
take note of this since [you] ••• cannot seriously 
resist our armies ••• 
If you reject [the ultimatum] you must expect 
the greatest misfortune. Imagine the most awful 
thing and you will still be short of the truth. 
The Empire of Annam, its dynasty, its princes, 
and the court will have signed their own [death] 
warrants. The name of Vietnam will no longer 
exist in history. 
From 1860, an ineradicable fear of modern weaponry, 
and of Vietnamese helplessness to withstand it on the 
battlefield, had driven court relations with the French. 13e 
To Tu-Bue, another war with France could only spell disas-
ter and further loss of territory. He refused to consider 
it, even when, as with the Garnier expedition in the North 
in 1873, royal forces could have prevailed against the iso-
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lated garrison in Hanoi. 136 Now the fate that Tu-9uc's sche-
mes and subterfuges had striven to avoid materialised be-
fore his hapless successor, and before a court still 
stunned by the Regents' coup. 137 The promise of annihilation 
catalysed the doomladen hysteria over French firepower that 
had sapped official policy for two decades. The court 
135 For a outline of the arguments see Bang Huy Van, 'Cuoc 
dau tranh guia phai "chu chi en" va nhung phai "chu hoa 11 
trong cuoc khang chien chong phap o cuoi the ky XIX', NCLS, 
No. 94 (1967), pp.29-40. 
13• Thus he stopped Hoang Ke Viem and Ton That Thuyet from 
attacking Ha-noi: 'Today you ask to fight; tomorrow you 
will repeat the request. But if we fight continuously with-
out success, will we have any country at all left for our 
mothers and children in the future?' Quoted in Bo Bang, 
• Trieu dinh Hue' , p. 75. 
137 For an insider's view of the court at the time, see 
Huynh Con and Jean Jacnal, 'Memoires de son excellence 
Huynh Con· , Bl. (ns), XL, 3&4 ( 1924), pp .188-200. 
crumbled, and an initial protectorate convention was signed 
in August 1883. 
In the following months, Hiep-Hoa tried to inch away 
from the Regents with the support of some close relatives, 
in particular Prince Tuy-ly and his sons. For a short time 
Tuy-ly even became the sole diplomatic intermediary with 
the Hue Legation. But the Regents outflanked the hazardous 
manoeuvre in November, this time by the dethronement and 
open murder of Hiep-Hoa and the assassination of Tran Tien 
Thanh. Tuy-ly, refusing to lend his name and authority to 
men who had carried out 'the worst crime that a subject can 
commit 1 ,i 3 e vainly sought sanctuary with the French. Handed 
over almost immediately, ·he was imprisoned with several 
sons and a nephew. Another of his sons, Huong-sam, was 
executed. The decision to scatter them in exile throughout 
central. Trung-ky may well have saved them from clandestin~ 
murder.i39 
The Regents' open contempt for ritually enthroned 
kings, and the mutilation of the principle of monarchy this 
entailed, defiled the symbolic heart of government. But 
with the exception of Phan 9inh Phung, whose denunciation 
of the first regicide had earned him a spell in prison,i 4 o 
the Regents' power cowed the court into uneasy acquiescence 
for the next two years. In the North, however, the desecra-
Sogny, 'Tuy-ly', p.194. 
i 39 Ibid, pp.194-95. Sogny, 'Nguyen Huu ao·, p.190 says 
two other sons of Minh-Mang, also imprisoned by the Reg-
ents, were freed by Nguyen Huu 9o in 1885. 
i 40 On his release he returned to Nghe-Tinh to organise 
armed resistance. 
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tion of kingship eroded the will to resist among hard-pres-
sed officials, some of whom might have fought on for the 
king but not for Thuyet and Tuong. Others, like Nguyen Huu 
Bo, simply refused to obey the Regents' orders. 141 By the 
start of 1884, however, it hardly mattered. Hue's writ no 
longer ran in the North, where the French had already begun 
to organise their own civil administration without even in-
forming the Vietnamese government. 142 
In Trung-ky, the climax came in July 1885, on the 
anniversary of the signing of the Protectorate Treaty of 
1884. Thuyet staged a surprise attack on the recently re-
inforced French garrison in Hue before fleeing the capital 
with the latest king, Ham-Nghi, the Dowager Empresses, and 
much of the court. But within a few days the party divided. 
Thuyet and the king took to the mountains; the empresses 
and princes wound their doleful way back to the devastation 
in Hue, and to the French. With the decision taken, they 
never faltered. Prince Tho-xuan accepted the presidency of 
a hastily-assembled military council barely a week after 
Ham-Nghi's flight. 143 Tuy-Ly, in exile in Quang-ngai, equally 
rejected requests to lead local resistance forces and 
hastened back to the capital as soon as possible. 144 As the 
141 Ordered to commit suicide, Bo refused. Nguyen The Anh, 
Withering, pp.10-11. Sogny, 'Nguyen Huu So', p.188 says the 
Regents tried to have him killed in February 1885. 
142 
iers 
Ibid, p.13. 
A. Delvaux, 'La Legation de France a Hue et ses prem-
titulaires (1875-93)', BAVH, III, 1 (1916), p.65. 
144 Sogny, 'Tuy-ly', p.195. He later became principal Reg-
ent for Thanh-Thai (1889-1897). 
country rose around them in enthusiastic and bloody respon-
se to the Can vuong (Aid the King) proclamation Thuyet had 
issued, the French slowly recognised the need to set their 
own king on the throne in Hue to counter the appeal of the 
fugitive Ham-Nghi. In September, they enthroned the last 
adopted son of Tu-Bue, with a French guard of honour, as 
Bong-Khanh. From then on the imperial clan as a group open-
ly embraced French protection. 
So did a large proportion of the central Trung-ky 
political elite. General Hoang Ke Viem, for example, recal-
led to Hue as a thuong tho after losing a Bac-ky strong-
point to the French in early 1884, stayed at his post in 
1885. In 1887 he won promotion to Imperial Tutor rank 
(Thai-tu Thieu-bao) and a seat on the Co Mat, before re-
tiring in 1889. 14e From an important, but still comparat-
ively junior posting (ranked 3-1) in the Northern adminis-
tration, Nguyen Huu Bo catapulted to the mandarinal summit 
almost overnight as the effective Vietnamese head of the Co 
Mat, reorganising the go·:vernment of his son-in-law, Bong-
. .,, 
Khanh. For 1 some months before his death in 1887, he also 
became the most powerful Vietnamese in the North as the 
imperial commissioner (kinh luoc su) at the head of the 
Tonkin mandarinate. 14~ But even more significant was the 
way the next generation of leading families from the Hue-
based elite rallied to the Protectorate. Phan Thanh Liem, 
ber, 
YNDNT-B, p. 93. 
Sogny, 
1888. 
'Nguyen Huu Do', pp.186-92. He died in Novem-
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whose father Phan Thanh Gian had suicided over the loss of 
the South in 1867, became a-tong doc under Bong-Khanh.i47 
The sons of Truong Bang Que, who father had urged resist-
ance to the invaders, accepted high office under the new 
order.i4 e The Nguyen Khoa returned to prominence, supplying 
ministers and tong doc until the end of colonialism.i4~ 
Tran Tien Thanh's son, Hoi, rose through the mandarinate to 
reach. hiep bien 'in 1919, in time to preside over the very 
last triennial examination.ieo Tran Binh Phac, son of Tran 
Binh Tue and the thirteenth minister from his long-des-
cended Nguyen retainer lineage, also reached hiep bien. He 
died in peaceful old age in 1914,iei unlike his nephew Tran 
Binh Khuyen, who was killed at his post by communist rebels 
in December 1931 as tri phu of Anh-son district, Nghe-
an.ie2 
The list could continue without even including the new 
graduates from solid, if less successful, families like Cao 
Xuan Ducie~ or Huynh Con,ie4 whose later high rank derived 
.1.4?' VNDNT£J, p. 394 • 
.1.48 VNNDT£J, p.509; and Orband, 'Les Morts de 1914', p.62 • 
i 4~ For example, Nguyen Khoa Tan and his younger brother, 
Nguyen Khoa Ky. Nguyen Tien Laryg, 'Quelques mandarins', pp. 
158-61 for Tan. 
ieo Ung Trinh, 'Notice necrologique: SE Tran Tien Hoi', 
§BY.t!, v, 4 (1919), pp.541-44. 
iei Or Phat. Orband, 'Les Morts de 1914', pp.60-61. 
ie2 CM, 30 Dec 1931. AOM ICNF 290/2505. According to BAVH 
membership lists, Khuyen, a tri phu in the early 1920s, 
spent 1923 to 1927 managing Baron Perignon's concession at 
Tour Cham before rejoining the administration. 
ie3 From a Nghe-an family, he had fought in the 1870s 
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from their active co-operation with the French military in 
the can vuong repression. But its point is made. Nothing 
like this wholesale defection had happened in Vietnam since 
sections of the Red River delta literati had chosen to col-
laborate with the fourteenth century Ming invaders. And 
even then, it is doubtful that they represented quite the 
roll-call of luminaries that we find in the 1880s. Why did 
the Hue ruling elite go over to the French almost en masse? 
In the first place, the psychological ground for col-
laboration had been thoroughly prepared since the 1870s. 
The kingdom's steady deterioration was evident to all, but 
in a highly centralised system presided over by a jealous 
autocrat and driven by an inflexible bureaucratic machine, 
the possibility of needed reforms, urged since the mid-
1860s, became less likely as time passed. Forced back on 
the king (and court) for solutions, Tu-Buc's hand-wringing 
incapacity to address, let alone resolve, the country's 
manifold problems bred frustrations in the provinces and a 
fated sense of inertia and impotence in Hue. 19e Along with 
this went a debilitating erosion of resources. The loss of 
the South, indemnities to the French, and inflation and 
creeping anarchy in the North, all took a worsening toll on 
state revenues. The imperial clan in Hue grew increasingly 
impoverished, 19• while administrative finances gradually 
1 D 4 Huynh Con and Jean Jacnal, 'Memoires', 1-2 (1924), 
pp.31-52 and 3-4 (1924), pp.181-204 for this period. 
155 Tsuboi, L'Empire vietnamienne, pp.241-46 and 251-57 
for an outline. For Tu-Buc's feelings, see the autobio-
graphical account on his funeral stele. 
15• According to Dr Auvray, members of the royal family 
who depended on Tu-Sue's generosity were so poor by 1880 
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disintegrated. As early as the mid-1870s, even quite high 
officials in the North found they needed to wait for one, 
two, or eyen three years to receive their meagre pay and 
rations. 1 e 7 As time passed, the situation only worsened. It 
set in motion a vicious circle in which endemic official 
corruption corroded organisational ideals and public pro-
bity, which only further demoralised the ruling elite. 
To this.must be added the morale-sapping hysteria 
about western military supremacy, fed by Tu-Sue's stubborn 
insistence on compromise and negotiation with the French, 
whatever the circumstances. Though hardly a disinterested 
witness, Petrus Ky, described a fatalistic Northern offic-
ialdom in 1876 as more or less waiting for the axe to fall: 
~they are all convinced of the impossibility of making the 
least resistance to the French and that if France wanted to 
take the country she could do so without much difficulty or 
expense'.iee But if any one thing lay at the root of the 
pragmatic acceptance of collaboration in the 1880s, it was 
undoubtedly.Tu-Sue's 1873 use of French~orces against the 
Nghe-Tinh scholars' revolt. At a stroke, the king had sym-
bolically changed the French from absolute to conditional 
enemies. In a sense, he had legitimated them as a regional 
that they sold off the bricks from the walls around their 
houses to make ends meet. A. Auvray (ed H. Cosserat). 'Dix-
huit mois a Hue', BAVH, XX, 3-4 (1933), p.257. Hong-khang, 
for example, only inherited two sets of clothes and 1/3rd 
of a mau of land in 1870 from his father, Prince Tung-
thien. Le Breton, 'Hong Khang', p.173. 
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ie7 As Petrus Ky reported to the Admiral-Governor of Coch-
inchina from his conversations with them. P.J.B. Truong 
Vinh Ky (trans anded P.J. Honey), Voyage to Tongking in 
the Year At-Hoi (1876) (London: SOAS, 1982), pp.123-24. 
Ibid, p.125. 
power who might properly be called on to help restore order 
within the kingdom. It set a dangerous precedent for harri-
ed mandarins in the war-torn and bandit-ravaged North, too 
often besieged in their own yamens. By the end of the dee-
ade Nguyen Huu 9o, for one, had taken the next logical step 
of regarding the French as less of a menace to the social 
fabric of the kingdom than the anarchy that surrounded 
him.ie9 This lack of imaginative insight into the nature of 
the French threat, as not merely political but fundamental-
ly social and cultural as well, spread more widely through 
upper elite circles as the 1880s progressed. In the desper-
ate circumstances of mid-1885, many at court found them-
selves prepared to accept the illusion that French protec-
tion represented the lesser of two evils that confronted 
them. 
The final catalyst for collaboration, however, was the 
usurpation of power by Thuyet and Tuong, and the manifest 
threat they posed to all that the central Trung-ky politi-
cal elite v•lued most highly. The Regents' disregard for 
-
Tu-Buc's will, their assassination of at least two ritually 
enthroned kings, their imprisonment of high-ranking and in-
fluential imperial clansmen, and their murder of opponents 
of the stature of Tran Tien Thanh, all rankled with the in-
timidated and silently embittered court. But it was the 
threat to dynastic survival among the carnage and chaos 
ie9 According to Huynh Con, in the late 1870s Nguyen Huu 
Bo, then governor of Hanoi, tried to mount such a joint op-
eration against the Black Flags bandits. Con was one of his 
subordinates at the time. Con and Jacnal, 'Memoires', (3-4, 
1924), pp.185-86. 
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that followed Thuyet's surprise attack on the French garri-
son in Hue that galvanised the imperial clan and their up-
per elite_ relatives into focusing clearly on their para-
mount goal - the preservation of their family and dynastic 
heritage. 
In one traumatic night, French artillery had blown 
apart their world as it exploded the magisterial calm of 
Hue. Hong-khang's experiences typified many. With one sis-
ter killed in the French counter-attack, Hong-khang offered 
to escort another to her husband while he himself sought 
his elderly mother, a daughter of Truong Sang Que. In the 
countryside, prince and princess suffered strip-searches, 
robbery, and rough handling. Hong-khanh was almost beaten 
to death by one group before escaping to arrest by the 
French as a suspect spy. Released by them, he was robbed 
again of all but a loincloth. When he finally came across 
his mother both were destitute. With state stipends lost in 
the administrative collapse, necessity forced them to turn 
to a French missionary, Mgr Allys, for help. As a result, a 
grandson of the Nguyen emperor who had bann~d Christianity 
found himself dependent on the charity of Vietnamese Catho-
lics for his family's survival. Far worse things had hap-
pened to the common people for decades in the North; but 
nothing quite so shocking had ever burnt itself into the 
cultured consciousness of the sheltered imperial clan. 
Hong-khanh for one never forgot it - nor its lesson of 
preserving dynastic loyalty above all else. 1 • 0 
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For imperial clansmen, the enthronement of Gong-Khanh 
brought not simply a welcome illusion of normality, and the 
chance to.restore order and respect for hierarchy and stat-
us in a world gone mad. It also provided an opportunity to 
snatch as much as possible from the fire before it was con-
sumed. The French riot of vandalism and looting in the 
Imperial City in the months following the July attack had 
conjured up the hideous spectre of cultural annihilation 
that the Harmand ultimatum had first raised. 161 To lay the 
ghost, a scared and vengeful imperial family and high poli-
tical elite scapegoated Thuyet and Tuong. The Regents, not 
the French, had 'considered the Sovereign and the Empire as 
nothing [and] had thrown them away as if they were without 
value', Nguyen Trang Hiep thundered in the North. Thanks to 
their disloyalty and usurpation, 'the government had almost 
been overthrown' and everything almost lost, echoed the 
proclamation announcing 9ong-Khanh's accession. 1 • 2 From July 
1885, the royal clan and their elite kin closed ranks to 
save whatever they could under the French in Annam, and to 
consolidate their position around a functioning, if neces-
sarily straitened, Nguyen monarchy. When the French pro-
posed a new king the Grand Empress Dowager, Tu-Sue's moth-
1 • 0 Le Breton, 'Hong Khang', pp.174-76 and 188 for his 
teaching his grandchildren about 'the sufferings of the 
people and the Royal Family during the time of troubles'. 
1 • 1 For the devastation, see Nguyen The Anh, Withering, 
pp.22-23. It was undoubtedly deliberate: General Prudhomme, 
for example, camped in Thieu-Tri's cult temple until the 
end of November. Delvaux, 'La Legation de France', p.70. 
1 • 2 Both quoted in Adophe Delvaux, 'La Mort de Nguyen Van 
Tuong. Ancient Regent d'Annam', BAVH, X, 4 (1923), p.429. 
er, eagerly agreed, and praised their generosity. Her pro-
clamation betrayed no hesitations: 163 
_if we do not act according to the circumstances, 
the nine ancestral altars of the kings will re-
main deserted [and] the people ••• will have no-
one on whom they can rely ••• We should not be 
opposed to the good intentions of men [ie the 
French] who have given us back what was lost and 
restored what was broken ••• 
A kingdom with a grown king already possesses 
the principal ingredient of its happiness; thus 
it is for us, first because it has satisfied the 
wishes of the dead kings, and then because we 
content the appeals of the people. The kingdom 
henceforth has [its king] and I, an old woman, 
can see again the magnificence of days passed. 
That it was Trung-ky which mattered to the imperial 
clan and the court elite was underscored soon after. In 
early 1886, the Grand Dowager.Empress offered the new and 
apparently more sympathetic civilian Resident General, Paul 
Bert, to relinquish all claims to Tonkin in exchange for 
internal administrative autonomy in Annam, respecting its 
customs and traditions. 164 Bert countered with another pro-
posal: he would rescind the convention that allowed direct 
French rule to be extended in all but name to Trung-ky, im-
posed on the court on 30 July 1885, in exchange for the 
granting of plenipotentiary powers to the Tonkin kinh luoc. 
The court agreed. It was a political masterstroke for the 
1 • 3 Extracts in Stephane Doumoulin, Le Tonkin (Paris: Ch. 
Delagrave, 1886?), pp.330-32, quote at p.331. Bong-Khanh's 
proclamation echoed it: 'by night and by day there was no-
one to render homage to the queens, and incense no longer 
burned on the ancestral altar. Seeing the kingdom in peril 
and the people without a master, I obeyed the wishes of the 
venerated queens ••• · Quoted in Charles B. Mayben and Henri 
Russier, Lectures sur l'histoire d'Annam depuis l'avenement 
des Le (Hanoi: IDEO, 4th ed, 1921), p.118. 
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1 • 4 The offer was first made in later 1884, with some Ton-
kin revenues sought in exchange. Nguyen The Anh, Withering, 
pp.15 and 24. 
French: in place of an already unworkable convention they 
got 'all the advantages of annexation [in the North] with-
out its i8conveniences' , 1 •= plus a fund of good will in Hue 
for simply reverting to the Treaty of 1884. By then, Bert 
knew it was politically risky in France to be fighting two 
major wars in Indochina, and that Tonkin mattered more. 1 •• 
It made sense to cultivate a co-operative Royal Government 
in Annam while the French concentrated on pacifying the 
North. To that end, Bert ordered the return of looted cult 
and pal~ce treasµres, and insisted French officers publicly 
treat the king and high mandarins with the respect their 
official dignity demanded. 
After H~m~Nghi~s capture in 1888 deprived the resist-
ance of its greatest rallying-point, the court may have 
felt a guarded optimism about the future. Some even let 
themselves dream of a resurgence, as did Tu-Due's literary 
consort, Nguyen Thi Bich, in a contemporary poem: 'Under 
the protectorate there are high mandarins once more. Surely 
they will recover and govern as in the past' , 1 • 7 she sang. 
Ibid, p.26. 
1 •• The Ferry government had already fallen in 1885 over 
the cost of the Tonkin expedition. 
1 • 7 Medel, p.111. Woodside gives the first line as 'there 
will again M high mandarins·, but .. lai co quy quan•could 
also be in the present tense, as here. To Woodside the poem 
typified a bureaucratic, cyclical view of history that min-
imized the significance of dynastic collapse because it as-
sumed the traditional administrative system would continue. 
This seems an odd view for a royal consort to take, especi-
ally given hew far the Nguyen went to preserve the dynasty. 
If as seems likely, however, it was written in the late 
1880s (Woodside gives no date), it may have reflected a 
strain of court optimism arising from the loose Protecto-
rate regime of the time. 
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But the past that would be recovered under colonialism in 
Annam would not be that of Vietnamese experience so much as 
an amalgam of French myths and misunderstandings nourished 
by the self-interest of the central Trung-ky political 
elite. 
The nineteenth century political elite, and their 
twentieth century successors, could accept French Protect-
ion - and the later the colonial myth of their own history 
and political culture as "old traditional Annam" - because 
they were not the dogmatic and bankrupt custodians of a 
millenial Confucian tradition, as the French had expected 
and the little China fallacy predicted. Though trained in 
the classical canon, none came from long-descended scholar-
ly families, sinicised in depth over many generations. For 
most, their Confucian studies overlaid more basic and en-
during commitments to ancestral duty, historical loyalties, 
regional ties, and the survival of family and kin. All 
these considerations combined to teach them their primary 
loyalty lay with the Nguyen dy.nasty. S~me, like Nguyen Huu 
Bo, lineag~ descendarit of Nguyen Huu Oat, held that French 
intervention had saved the state from its own decadence; 
and that, under the Protectorate, the people might 'walk 
progressively on the path to prosperity and well-being·. 
But only in collaboration, only, as he urged the French on 
his death bed, if:ioe 
you leave our mandarins to exercise their funct-
ions while following your wise advice and confor-
ming to your enlightened policy ••• Let the dyn-
ioe 'Notes et Documents. Lettre d'adieux de SE Nguyen Huu 
Bo ' , Bl.. ( n s ) , XV I I , 1 ( 1 912 ) , p • 7 5 • 
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asty of the Sovereigns of the Kingdom of Annam 
continue to be perpetuated in the future as now. 
These are my dearest wishes 
At no tim~ in 1880s Trung-ky did many outside Thanh-Nghe-
Tinh willingly gamble the dynasty's future (and their own) 
on a gloriously hopeless, last ditch effort before the bar 
of national history to try to avoid their impending colon-
ial fate. Like their chua era ancestors, most of the cen-
tral Trung-ky elite settled for pragmatism and political 
accommodation, preferring to defend their homes, families, 
~nd customary usages with whatever inglorious practices 
came to hand. 
The outsiders who rose to prominence in collaboration 
with the French took an even more minimalist view. Opper-
tunists like Hoang Cao Khai consoled themselves that the 
will of Heaven had manifestly altered. Times had changed 
and men must change with them, he tried to persuade the 
die-hard rebel Phan 9inh Phung in 1894:~•• 
When the capital was lost, and the king's carri-
age began its travels, you stood up bravely to 
answer the call of righteous fidelity. Taking all 
things into account, at that time you behaved 
properly ••• But things have changed. Ask your-
self if your life can continue this way any long-
er. Even the unintelligent, with little educat-
ion, know the answer is no. How is it that a man 
like you, an outstanding individual, does not see 
that too? ••• Man may act, but Heaven determines 
the outcome of his actions ••• 
For the hard-fisted realist Nguyen Than, the man who dug up 
Phan Binh Phung's bones to burn and scatter, collaboration 
appeared as the only viable option. Vietnam's fate had been 
sealed, he declared brutally. France would be master of the 
Bao Trinh Nhat, Phan-fJinh-Phung, pp.202-03. 
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country for centuries - and anyone who wanted to live had 
better be obedient and submit. 170 
We will conclude our description of the historical 
setting by tracing the colonial evolution of the nineteenth 
century political elite, and its further compromises under 
colonialism, in the next chapter. 
170 Attributed to him by Nguyen Hien Le, ~onq-Kinh Nqhia-
Thuc (Sai-gon, 1956). For a short biography, see Orband, 
'Les Marts de 1914', pp.61-62. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PROTEGES AND PROTECTORS: NEW ELITES IN ANNAM 
In his introduction to political myth, the British 
political scientist Henry Tudor cautions that myth-making 
is •a fairly ordinary human activity;.~ Political myths, he 
adds, are 'historical phenomena; and if we wish to under-
stand them, we had best attend to the concrete circumstan-
ces in which they occur•. 2 That is the aim of this chapter. 
It surveys the political changes in the Protectorate from 
the 1897 arrival of Paul Doumer to the early 1920s, the 
main period of local adaptation of the political myths con-
sidered in Part Three. It also sketches the groups most 
closely involved in the process: the collaborating Viet-
namese elite, and the local French community. 
We begin with the historical overview. 
Trung-ky in the Colonial Cauldro~, 1897-1908 
As we have seen, the political elite in Hue surrender-
ed to the French and collaborated with colonialism out of a 
sense of obligation to their dynastic ancestors, and in the 
hopes of salvaging as much as possible of the current reg-
ime (and their own positions) under the Protectorate· Treaty 
of 1884. For the next twelve years the move seemed success-
ful, even though the 1889 death of 9ong-Khanh had allowed 
~ Henry Tudor, Political Mvth (London: Pall Mall, 1972), 
p.138. 
Ibid, p.139. 
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the French to order the succession and influence the choice 
of Regents, Nguyen Trong Hiep and later Nguyen Than, under 
Prince Tuy~ly's nominal authority. Than and Hiep had both 
earned their preferment by ruthless repression of anti-
French resistance fighters in the North and Centre; but 
both, Hiep especially had enjoyed sufficiently distinguish-
ed careers before 1884 to make them acceptable at court.~ 
Distracted by the conquest war in Tonkin, direct French in-
fluence in Annam barely penetrated beyond the capital, 
their key mandarinal allies, and the posts of the Garde in-
digene militia. In the early 1890s only six small Residen-
cies existed outside Hue. 4 However, when the Tonkin war 
ended in 1896, so did the circumstances justifying such 
loose, indirect rule in Annam. 
In 1897, the new Governor-General, Paul Doumer, real-
ised that peace had opened a window of opportunity for 
radical change. He ruthlessly rammed through an agenda of 
administrative and economic reform that transformed Indo-
china. In five energetic years, Doumer set up the fiscal, 
~ Hiep, a tien si and thuong tho from an old Northern 
scholarly ~amily, had been royal delegate (kinh luoc) in 
charge of the Tonkin mandarinal administration before re-
turning to Hue. [QT~KL, pp.151-55]. Nguyen Than from Quang-
ngai, a much lesser figure, had been governor of the mount-
ain hinterlands of Nam-Ngai in 1885 before military succes-
ses made him thuong tho of War, according to his account to 
Paul Doumer in Indochine fran~aise. Souvenirs (Paris: Vui-
bert et Nony, 1905), pp.161-63. 
4 Ibid, pp.163-64. Also see Alexis Auvergne, 'Note sur 
les reformes effectuees en Annam de 1897 a 1901' in Paul 
Doumer, Situation de l'Indo-Chine (1897-1901) (Hanoi: 
Schneider, 1902), pp.425-6; and Alphonse Delvaux, 'La Lega-
tion de France et ses premiers titulaires (1875-93)', BAVH, 
III, 1 (1916), pp.70-74. Auvergne wrongly claimed residents 
existed in all provincial seats from 1886. France had the 
right, but lacked the resources or interest. 
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administrative, and economic framework that persisted, 
despite its numerous flaws, until the end of colonialism. 
At the Union level, he turned the frail General Government, 
which had existed in name only since 1887, into a powerful 
central body with its own budget raised from customs and 
indirect taxes (r~gies) on alcohol, salt, and opium. He 
also attacked the bureaucratic parochialism that riddled 
colonial administration by creating a single Indochinese 
civil service into whose new structure he organised all 
French officials.e 
Second only to his influence at the Union level was 
Doumer's impact on Annam.• Rejecting arrangements that made 
French colonialism 'more apparent than real" 7 here, he re-
placed them with head-spinning speed in 1897-98. Fundament-
al constitutional reforms came first, in September 1897, 
mere months after his arrival. As young king Thanh-Thai at-
tained his majority, the monarchy found itself stripped of 
its political and administrative powers and reduced to a 
figurehead. Without warning, the royal administrative role 
was summarily transferred to the Resident Superior: the 
Frenchman even became ex officio head of the Ton Nhon Phu, 
the royal family council. From then on, the king's only 
real constitutional function became sealing into law the 
• For the General Government, see Francis Decaux, Les 
pouvoirs du Gouverneur General de l'Indo-chine (Lille, 
1919). For the administrative changes, see Jean Suignard, 
Une grande administration indochinoise: les service civils 
de l'Indochine (Paris: Larose, 1931). 
• Auvergne gives the fullest account of the changes. 
\Note•, pp.425-32. 
Ibid, p.426. 
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ordinances made by the Council of Ministers. He could issue 
no written instructions, not even in regard to his own per-
sonal affairs, without prior French permission.a From 1897 
to the end of colonialism, the 'sole weapon of the Protect-
ed monarch [was] refusal. He [could] not act, he [could] 
only abstain',~ although always at the risk of being re-
moved himnself. 
The Co Mat, too, completed the colonial evolution 
started in July 1885 when a French official, de Champeaux, 
had become Minister of War. Doumer reformed it into a cent-
ralised Council of Ministers which became in turn the sole 
administrative organ of the re-organised Royal Government, 
now known as the Government of Annam. Under the presidency 
of the Resident Superior, the new Council adopted French as 
the language of its deliberations. French delegates arrived 
in the Hue ministries to oversee their operations, while a 
rapidly expanding network of residents plugged the gaps in 
the countryside. Recruited from Cochinchina or from among 
junior military officers, they often brought little local 
knowledge - and even less local sympathy - to their new 
roles. Simultaneously, Doumer set up a Protectorate Govern-
ment empowered to raise and levy direct taxes on the local 
economy. He also gave it a new head. Doumer dumped the 
long-serving incumbent Resident Superior, Ernest Briere, 
a Thanh-Thai could not even organise a pleasure trip on 
his own initiative, though no other objection to the pro-
posal existed. RS Luce, Confidential Report on King Thanh-
Thai' s conduct, 30 July 1902. AEP GGIC 9620. 
9 Roger Pinto, Aspects de !'evolution qouvernementale de 
l'Indochine fran~aise (Paris: Receuil de Sirey, 1946), p. 
170. 
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who had dared criticise his proposed salt regie as unpopu-
lar and impolitic, in favour of a former Resident Superior 
of Laos and Tonkin, Leon Boulloche. Two years later the job 
went to the young Alexis Auvergne, whose enthusiasm for 
modernisation and will to direct rule matched Doumer's 
own.J. 0 
In 1901, as Doumer's term concluded, Auvergne praised 
the new constitutional system as a 'wonderfully flexible 
instrument' that allowed the Protectorate 'complete, abso-
lute supervision over all the branches of the [mandarinal] 
Administration' without wounding any local feelings.l.l. Dou-
mer, too, claimed that by not ~changing anything in the 
character of the Protectorate as it appeared to the popula-
tion, by leaving the Royal Government all its prestige, all 
its legal initiative, and, indeed, enjoying the same res-
ponsibility for measures taken in the eyes of the subjects 
of the kingdom, it [had been] possible to ameliorate its 
administration, to give French representatives an influence 
more effective than apparent, to work towards the economic 
10 Auvergne (RS 1900-1902, and 1903-04), a former naval 
doctor, had been deputy resident in Vinh (1886-1892) at the 
age of 27 before fighting in Tonkin. Briere was Resident 
Superior for much of the 1890s (1891-1894, and 1895-1898). 
Boulloche, a professional Resident Superior, arrived in 
1887. He became RS in Annam (1894, 1898-1900), Laos (1895-
95), Tonkin (1897) and Cambodia (1901-02). For short bio-
graphies, see J. Brebion, Dictionnaire bio-bibliographigue 
ancienne et moderne de l'Indochine fran;aise [henceforth 
DBB] (Academie des sciences coloniales, Paris, 1935), 
pp.15, 45, and 50 respectively. 
l. l. Auvergne, 'Note', p.426. 
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prosperity of the country, and to open it up to French 
colonialism.' 1 2 
Whether these smooth lies formed part of a political 
strategy designed to appease the growing current of metro-
politan opinion opposed to assimilationist colonial poli-
cies is hard to say. They may have owed more to the common 
European assumption that, in Asia, 'form always prevail[ed] 
over substance, when it [was] not the substance itself', 13 
to borrow Pierre Pasquier's pithy 1931 formulation. In this 
regard, the two men may have arrogantly reasoned that pre-
serving the traditional facade of government alone ensured 
the local people did not notice the fundamental changes 
Doumer had imposed. But whatever the case, both men knew 
nothing of the sort had happened. Doumer had intended his 
changes to be profound - and profoundly disturbing - and 
they had been implemented with an eye to fast results, ir-
respective of local factors. As Doumer himself later put 
it, before his arrival no-one 'had been able to do better 
or go further' in Annam; but tbough ·~ve~ything remained to 
be done', he had become 'master of the hour'. 14 Under his 
control, the General Government, 'henceforth giving impul-
ses everywhere [would] draw Annam from its political and 
1 ~ Doumer, Souvenirs, p.295. An almost identical state-
ment appears in Situation, p.92. 
13 CM, 3 Nov 1931. AOM ICNF 290/2505. 
14 He also claimed it all happened 'without haste, 
without shocks and without causing offence', something 
quite untrue in Annam. Doumer. Souvenirs, p.164. 
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economic stagnation'. 1 e Gradualism, or genuine indirect 
rule, had no place in his calculations. 
This crass spirit of mastery and Olympian certitude, 1 b 
muted until then by circumstances in the Protectorate, also 
infected many post-Doumer French appointees in Annam. They, 
eagerly embraced the challenge of jolting its traditional 
society with modernising 'impulses'. Unhappily, however, 
time quickly showed they lacked the resources available 
elsewhere to fund modernising development projects. As a 
result, in Annam their 'impulses' rarely went beyond the 
brash application of self-interested western notions of 
uniformity, regularity, and economic rationality to almost 
any institution outside the family. For ten years, in a fe-
ver of administrative activism, Protectorate officials took 
a fiscal bludgeon to customary rights and expectations in 
the name of Progress. 1 7 
The Royal Government fell early victim to a bout of 
chain-saw surgery intended to cut it down into a subordin-
ate colonial agency on the Tonkin model. 18 Doumer began the 
Ibid, p.295. 
1 • Chapter Six considers the role of Doumer's projection 
of identity onto the Vietnamese in this_ sense of certainty. 
17 For example, soon after his arrival in 1906 RS Levec-
que demanded economies in the palace in regard to customs 
arising from the king's sacral nature. Noting the king's 
everyday utensils were discarded after use, Levecque stig-
matised the practice as simple waste and insisted the min-
isters find a way of 'avoiding the disappearance of objects 
which could be used for several years', even though a mere 
800p was involved. CM, 26 May 1906. AEP GGIC 20131 
18 For more details see Nola Cooke, "Proteges and Protec-
tors: Relations between the Protectorate Government and the 
Government of Annam, 1897-1925", MA thesis, University of 
Sydney, 1980, pp.194-258. 
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process in 1900 by promulgating new retirement provisions 
for mandarins that ignored their special status as royal 
servants_and reduced them to simple bureaucrats. 1 • From 
then on, the Protectorate hacked away at organisational 
ethics or practices inconsistent with its needs or aims, 
while also modifying the traditional education system and 
the examinations to colonial ends. And much worse followed. 
Doumer had short-changed the court in 1898 when he 
transferred its fiscal powers to the Protectorate Govern-
ment in exchange for an indemnity supposedly equal to the 
previous tax collection. 20 By 1902, the Government of Annam 
found itself in serious financial straits. Imperial family 
stipends were heavily economised, 21 while French officials 
leapt at the chance to rationalise the mandarinate. Between 
1902 and 1907 they abolished thirty percent of all mandari-
nal positions in Hue, plus many others in the provinces. 22 
19 Previously mandarins needed the king's approval to re-
tire. For details of the early reforms, see Roy Jumper and 
Nguyen Thi Hue, Notes on the Political and Administrative 
History of Vietnam, 1802-1962 (Saigon, 1962), pp.97-99. 
20 He only handed over the amount received in Hue after 
official disbursements in the provinces, which he called 
corruption. [Doumer, Situation, pp.14 and 93, and Souven-
irs, p.163.] The court had to pay all officials and royal 
family stipends from the reduced receipts, which only rose 
from the original 935,000 piastres to 960,000p. by 1915-16. 
Of that, the royal family alone consumed 200,000. BJ.., 29 
July 1901, pp.666-69; and AOM ICNF 203/1496 & 203/1498. 
21 Only 387 stipends remained. They were restricted to 
current recipients and fixed between 38p and 400p, with no 
family members under 21 eligibility. Letter of RS to GG, 19 
Jan 1909. AEP GGIC 9620 
22 In Hue civil numbers fell from 404 to 278, and milita-
ry from 471 to 352. Nguyen The Anh. Phonq-trao Khang-thue 
mien Trung nam 1908 (Sai-gon, 1973), p.11, fn 1. To fund 
the pay increases of 1906, 70 positions were abolished, 
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Along with the cuts went direct French interference at 
every level of its operation. From 1898 on, the French had 
begun openly to meddle in mandarinal affairs, with only a 
perfunctory show of consultation. Now even that caution 
evaporated. The Resident Superior made all senior appoint-
ments, while in the provinces residents replaced, or dis-
missed, mandarins in their jurisdictions on their own 
authority. 23 The ministers in Hue, themselves bullied by 
domineering Residents Superior, proved unable or unwilling 
to protect their rural subordinates. As a result, the hier-
archical integrity of the mandarinate crumbled. Essential 
information from the provinces began to dry up: in 1906, 
for example, even repeated sabotage of the railway between 
Vinh (Nghe-an) and Nam-dinh failed to reach minis~erial 
ears in Hue. 24 By 1907, the new Resident Superior, Fernand 
Levecque, reported •anarchy at all levels' of the Vietnam-
ese administration~2e 
Out in the countryside rural mandarins found they had 
to fend for themselves in new and perplexing conditions. 
Ooumer's reforms had unloosed a plague of General Govern-
ment officials accountable only to Ha-noi, among whom were 
many lowly-ranked customs functionaries who delighted in 
bossing the mandarins about and who refused to defer to 
including 45 in the provinces. CM, 10 Nov, 1906. AEP GGIC 
20131 
23 As the court complained in a letter from Thanh-Thai to 
Doumer, dated 19 Mar 1900. AEP GGIC 9620 
2 4 CM, 9 June 1906. AEP GGIC 20131 
2 e RS Levecque's report of 15 May 1908, quoting an ear-
lier report. AOM ICNF 50/598 
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local residents. 2 ° Caught in the cross-fire between war-ring 
French officials, mandarins felt perilously exposed. Morale 
plummeteq. Further, many unseasoned residents, impatient 
for results rather than reasons for failure, treated their 
Vietnamese counterparts with a ·humiliating disdain'. 27 It 
was a dangerous mix. With fewer than fifty French adminis-
trators spread among four to five million Vietnamese, the 
Protectorate relied on the mandarins for essential services 
and information. But by 1906, as the reformist scholar Phan 
Chu Trinh bluntly warned Governor-General Beau in his 
famous letter of that year, •there (was] not a mandarin 
who [did] not tremble in fear in the pr-esence of a French 
official ••• at the simple thought of antagonising him by 
his answers or of incurring his anger·. 2 e In these diffi-
cult circumstances, the desire for self-preservation led 
many Vietnamese into •the habit of saying "good", "very 
2 • Customs agents even arrested peasants without inform-
ing the resident. (GG Klobukowski's report, 'Indochine 
fran;aise: 1908-1911'. ADM Indochine A20 (62) Carton 10] 
For a general dis~ussion, see Virginia Thomson, French 
Indochina (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1937), pp.79-82. 
~7 A description of French attitudes in Annam as witness-
ed by Gervais Courtellemont, L'Empire colonial de la France. 
L'Indo-Chine (Paris: Challamel, 1901), p.128. 
28 From the French translation in ATK, 5 Ap 1922. This 
partisan political tract needs careful handling. David Mar-r 
has correctly noted that, as an expression of Phan's ideas, 
'there is no reason not to take this letter at face value'. 
[Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925 (University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1971), p.163.] But its blanket denunciations 
of mandarins in office and refusal to blame colonialism for 
any of the problems it described do raise questions of 
intent. So does its (Confucian) solution of replacing exis-
ting mandarins with ·carefully chosen people• whose autho-
rity would be backed by improvements in French conduct. 
Though not naming himself or his friends, it is hard to 
imagine who else Phan saw in this role. For- a longer ana-
lysis, see Cooke, "Pr-oteges", pp.216-24. 
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good" to all [French] proposals',~9 and shrugging off the 
consequences as a French responsibility. 
How~ver, for a minority of mandarins and some provin-
cial literati, from central Trung-ky especially, the years 
in which the old order was disintegrating brought not only 
fear and anxiety but hope as well. The chance for modernis-
ing regeneration and progress, so resolutely resisted under 
the previous regime, finally seemed possible.~·~ Reformist 
literati outside the administration, like Phan Chu Trinh, 
began to open small businesses, set up plantations, and 
found schools specialising in the new western learning, all 
the while passionately arguing for thoroughgoing reforms to 
customs and institutions as part of developing the country. 
These men have received most scholarly attention;~i yet 
they were not unique at the time. Within a mandarinate re-
formist scholars universally condemned as corrupt, obscur-
antist, and the self-interested champion of outmoded cus-
toms and institutions, numbers of officials also tried hard 
to interest the French in a reform program in many ways 
~9 According to the complaints of Thanh-hoa literati col-
lected by a former servant of RS Dufrenil in May 1908. ADM 
ICNF 50/598. They added: 'The Administration considers the 
king and mandarins as reeds, it keeps all the power and 
treats the interpreters and literati as sand •.. [But] the 
French cannot rule alone; they need the co-operation of the 
mandarins, interpreters, and literati. They must therefore 
treat them with respect.· 
3 ° For an interesting example of these views from a sen-
ior collaborating mandarin, see Hoang Cao Khai, En Annam 
(Ha-noi, 1910), pp.7-25. 
3 i Marr, Anticolonialism, Chapters 6 to 8; or Nguyen Hien 
Le, ~onq-Kinh Nqhi-thuc (Sai-gon, 1956). 
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similar to that advocated by Phan Chu Trinh. 32 They failed 
for the same basic reason as the reformists: most French 
officials at the time, in Annam especially, considered the 
Vietnamese as a backward people incapable of breaking the 
bonds of their own Chinese past. Most Frenchmen regarded 
Vietnamese aspirations and stumbling experiments in change 
in much the same light as they would have seen the clumsy 
attempts of young children to determine their own futures. 
But even if Vietnamese reforming hopes had not been patron-
ised or squashed, Doumer's modernising program held no 
place for them, designed as it was to serve French colonial 
ends, not Vietnamese national needs. Thus even pro-French 
mandarins made little impact on French officials in these 
years. 
If the mandarins became increasingly politically in-
effectual and their status deteriorated in these years, the 
real victim of Doumerism remained young king Thanh-Thai. 
The full brunt of the·changes bor_e down on him personally 
as on no-:-_qi:i.e el~e~::s::s Ths- young king's restricted court up-
bringing had poorly-prepared him for the sudden eruption of 
colonial activism, or for the Protectorate's abrupt rever-
sal of policy towards the throne. Doumer scorned Paul 
Bert's former policy of public respect for the forms of the 
sacred monarchy and the king's majesty. Instead, his re-
32 As detailed in z, 'La tradition et l'enseignement', 
RI, No. 36, June 1906, pp.905-13; or 'Les mandarins indo-
chinois a Paris', fil., No. 47, Dec 1906, pp.1831-37. Also 
see C. Le Maitre's keynote speech at the Marseilles Colo-
nial Exposition, reprinted as 'Enseignement indig~ne dans 
l'Indochine annamite', fil., Aug, 1907, pp.1136-48. 
For more detail, see Cooke, 11 Proteges 11 , pp.79-103. 
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forms insisted the king act like any other bureaucrat, dis-
charging his allotted duties and accepting the discipline 
of routine-.procedures and appropriate channels. But Thanh-
Thai could never reconcile himself to this pinched royal 
role. In 1900, for example, he flew into a futile rage on 
discovering that he must seek the permission of a French 
official to access his own treasury when he exceeded his 
monthly allowance. 34 Far worse, and almost casual, humilia-
tions followed. 3 e All underscored the monarchy's new 
figurehead status and political irrelevance, as did French 
reactions to his vain outbursts of frustrated defiance. 30 
Already wayward in the 1890s, as the pressure intensified 
Thanh-Thai's behaviour grew progressively more erratic, 
hysterical, and brutal towards collaborating officials (and 
their daughters unfortunate enough to be married to him). 37 
34 Letter of 19 Mar 1900. AEP GGIC 20313 
35 For example, Thanh-Thai had to host to dinner, at his 
own expense, most French travellers passing through Hue: 
'The palace became a table d'hdte, and the imperial master 
of the house, the centrepiece of the menu, was devoured 
with the eyes like a curious beast', as Jean Ajalbert 
recalled. Ces Phenomenes. Artisans de l'Empire (Avignon: 
Edouard Aubanel, 1941), p.238. 
3 • For examples, see RS Luce's confidential report of 30 
July 1902. AEP GGIC 9620 
37 The Resident Superior three times entered the palace 
on his own authority to removed women kidnapped from Hue. 
On the last two occasions, he also released maltreated roy-
al wives. Levecque in particular hated the king, insisting 
he desist from 'activities that the Representative of the 
Protectorate [could] not excuse'. Luce's report [AEP GGIC 
9620]; and CM, 23 Oct 1906 (for quote) and 25 May 1907. AEP 
GGIC 20131 
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As early as 1902, high court mandarins had pleaded for 
his removal, 38 while the people of Hue reportedly despised 
him as ''the Frenchmen's king''. When the experienced Acting 
Resident Superior, Paul Luce, realised the extent to which 
royal prestige had declined in a few years, it disturbed 
him considerably. He rightly recognised that diminishing 
the monarchy could only expose the French politically in 
Annam. As he warned, it made 'France, and France alone, in 
the eyes of the natives . . . responsible for what the King 
has done until now, and for what he will do in future'. 3 • 
He might well have added that without the illusion of con-
tinued royal power, the Vietnamese would also hold the 
French responsible for what the Royal Government did as 
well. Luce's report exposed Doumer's conceit - that his 
system allowed the Protectorate to act unseen behind a 
facade of Royal Government responsibility - virtually as 
soon as it had been formulated. Yet despite this, and des-
pite the almost universal French loathing for the king, 
Thanh-Thai actually had to murder a palace offi~ial before 
the Protectorate moved against him. Even then, only the 
Council's frantic threat of mass res~gnation convinced 
Paris to drop a proposal that would have still kept Thanh-
Thai on the throne as ~a minor in tutelage'. 40 In September 
CM, 29 Aug 1902. AEP GGIC 9620 
Luce's report of 30 July, 1902. AEP GGIC 9620 
•° CM, 12 and 20 Aug 1907. AEP GGIC 20131. Later nation-
alist mythology (for example, VNDNTB, p.438; or Joseph 
Buttinger, Vietnam: A Political History (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1967), p.119_) held Thanh-Thai's patriotism cau~ed 
his removal. Nothing I found in the archives supports it. 
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1907 a seven year old son was enthroned as Duy-Tan, and the 
court breathed more easily for a while. 
Notliio_g symbolises more the difference Doumer made in 
Annam than this outright rejection of the received wisdom 
of the 1880s concerning the sacred monarchy. Whereas ~he 
king had appeared to Bert and his generation as the indis-
pensable intermediary whose great authority and prestige 
cloaked colonialism in legitimacy, Doumer and his followers 
never believed it, despite their occasional lip-service to 
the notion. Instead, as we will see later, in·their version 
of the myth of old, traditional Annam, the sacred monarchy, 
like almost everything else in the Protectorate, represent-
ed just another anachronistic failure, a doomed relic of a 
disappearing past and thus irrelevant to the new colonial 
future. 41 For Doumer, outside the royal citadel ~everything 
[in Annam] was transformed' • Thanks to France (and him-
self), ~European realism had penetrated [and] was conquer-
ing, putting its imprint onto men and the land'. Even the 
celebrated rites, •however sacrosanct they might be', could 
not escape soon being 'retouched, made more flexible, and 
modernised'. How could the things of the failed past, whe-
ther monarchy or 'archaic pagan ceremon[ies)', hope to be 
'kept intactr, Doumer asked, before the 'great levelling of 
4 ~ Or in Courtellement's words: the throne of 'the emper-
ors of Annam is today crumbling and the dust of history 
will soon bury its last traces ••• The conquering civilisa-
tion [has] overthrown the former edifice of this age-old 
kingdom and a ~ew future will soon bloom ••• ' L'Empire 
fran;aise, pp.107 and 109. 
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human life and customs' wrought by France's broad roads, 
steel girded bridges, and advancing railways?42 
Within this grandiloquence lurked another, but unask-
ed, question: what could the backward Vietnamese contribute 
to this masterpiece of a superior civilisation? Plainly 
they could give only their labour and resources; and about 
that contribution they were given no choice. As part of his 
1898 budgetary reforms, Doumer required the five regional 
administrations to fund themselves, and their future econo-
mic development, from direct taxation of the local economy. 
But in Annam, despite a stream of new charges, the local 
subsistence economy could never generate by itself the 
funds required for the massive infrastructure projects that 
so bedazzled Doumer and his disciples. They reacted, how-
ever, not by modifying their demands but by squeezing what-
ever they could from the local economy. Rural mandarins 
quickly learned that extracting full payment of the invent-
ive tax and corv~e dues levied by the expanding Protector-
ate guaranteed they pleased their new masters, and eased 
the pressure on themselves. Not all reneged on their duties 
towards the people, 4 z but few dared resist the demands of 
cash-strapped French officials (or colonists) indefinitely. 
So while Doumer and the Trung-ky peasants watched the 
old order collapse around them, only the Frenchman smiled. 
All quotes, Doumer, Souvenirs, pp.171-73. 
4 z For example, the father of Tran Phu, first general 
secretary of the Indochinese Communist Party, is said to 
have committed suicide in March-April 1908 rather than 
force Quang-ngai peasants to perform additional corvee at 
French behest. Trinh Chi (ed), Nhunq Nquoi Cong Son (Ho Chi 
Minh City, 1977), p.10. 
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After a century of relative fiscal stability, insatiable 
new demands spiralled around the people. The Protectorate 
condensed c;:_tlanges that had taken a decade or more in North 
and South into a few short years in Trung-ky, with predict-
able traumatic results. Taxes on previously free goods and 
services, like markets or forest produce, dealt subsistence 
livelihoods a savage blow, while the General Government's 
salt and alcohol monopoly threatened to wipe out small pea-
sant industries vital to family survival. Traditional land 
and head taxes also changed beyond recognition almost over-
night in 1898-99. 44 Suddenly, all taxes (and many commuted 
corvee days) had to be paid in scarce silver, rather than 
copper and kind. A high uniform head tax replaced regional-
ly variable rates. The previous sixty-seven fiscal categor-
ies of communal and private agricultural and other land 
unilaterally shrank to ten, in a process which also saw the 
tax owed on most fields rounded upwards. Rate increases by 
administrative fiat, like levying centimes additionelles on 
head taxes, soon followed. 4 a As the Ministry of Colonies 
44 Auvergne, 'Note', pp.427-30 for all details. For colo-
nial taxes in Annam generally, see Samuel L. Popkin, The 
Rational Peasant (University of California Press, 1979), 
pp.142-70; James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant 
(Yale University Press, 1976), Chapter 4; or Vu-Van-Hien, 
'L'ImpOt personnel et les corvees de 1863 A 1936', RIJE, 11 
(1939) pp.93-97. 
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4~ In 1907, for example, they added 81.. (CM, 10 Nov 1906. 
AEP GGIC 20131] Another method compensated for inaccuracies 
in traditional tax registers by deeming, without land survey;o 
an extra amount of land which was then taxed. Court records 
suggest its impact: in the nine provinces from Thanh-hoa to 
Phu-yen (where data appear uncorrupted) the area of taxable 
land rose by 381. between 1899 and 1906. Overall, the amount 
of land tax paid increased by 901. in the same period. My 
calculations from BNNTC (SGJ, various volumes, 1960-65. 
admitted after the 1908 anti-tax movement shook Annam: •it 
could be said that we administer Indo-China as if the nat-
ives could_Jiave no other relations with us than the payment 
of the charges we impose on them'. 46 
In 1901, Doumer had congratulated himself for bringing 
•order and probity into •• the kingdom's finances ••• with-
out increasing the charges'. 47 Few peasants would have 
agreed. For them, the status quo had dissolved into fiscal 
instability, arbitrary exactions, and a losing battle be-
tween ancestral rights and new state prerogatives. 48 And it 
was pain for no gain. Despite the pressure, between 1899 
and 1908, Protectorate revenue rose overall by only 30%, 4 • 
virtually all of it from direct taxes on the peasant econ-
omy and the sale of market licences.eo Yet in 1908 three 
items alone - French residencies, the Garde indig~ne mili-
tia, and the court and mandarinate - consumed two-thirds of 
the budget.e 1 One quarter of all outlays went to pay Euro-
pean personnel. Public ·works, by contrast, consumed under 
4 • MinCols, Note on events in Annam, 3 Sept 1908. AOM 
ICNF 50/598 
4'7 Doumer, Situation, p.93. 
48 Nguyen The Anh, 'L'elite intellectuelle vietnamienne 
et le fait colonial dans les premiers annees du XX• siec-
le', 9uong moi/La voie nouvelle. No. 6, 1987, pp.36-41 out-
lines several examples. 
49 From 2,030,820 p. to 2,915,000 p. Auvergne, 'Note', p. 
430; and 1908 budget receipts at AOM Indochine K63(36). 
eo These sources accounted for 96.5'l. of all revenue. My 
calculations from Budget receipts at AOM Indochine K63(36). 
e 1 All calculations Ibid. It was still an improvement 
over 1901 when they consumed 81'l. of revenue, according to 
f_igures published in BJ.., No. 145, 29 July 1901, p.666. 
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12/. of revenue, of which irrigation, its sole enterprise of 
direct benefit to the peasantry, received the derisory sum 
of 10,000 pJastres (or 3.51. of the public works budget). 
Education and health were even worse served, together ac-
counting for a mere 5.5/. of outlays, half of which dis-
appeared on the salaries of a few Europeans. 
But from the peasants• perspective, far worse was the 
endemic abuse of unpaid, conscripted labour that took them 
away from food production, or from the petty trading and 
handicrafts that helped them survive and meet the state's 
other imposts. For French residents (and others), corvee 
labour appeared a "cost-free'' traditional means of carrying 
out small projects for which no other funding existed. The 
Protectorate thus repeatedly sliced away the days original-
ly devoted to local works, so that by 1907 only two remain-
ed for essential village needs. 52 As the work still had to 
be done, communal authorities joined the queue of mandar-
ins, French militia officers, and colons who routinely and 
illegally requisitioned peasant labour.=z The practice 
weighed most heavily on poor peasants who, in the absence 
of official tax cards, had no way of proving they had al-
ready discharged their obligation. Corv~e abused rankled so 
deeply that it finally sparked the spontaneous demonstra-
tion, in Quang-nam in late January 1908, which triggered an 
e:: For the convolutions of the corvees, see 'Documents. 
Le voyage du Gouverneur-General en Annam', Bl., No. 93, 15 
Nov 1908, pp.667-69. 
ez For various Quang-nam examples, see Phan Chu Trinh (ed 
and trans Le Am and Nguyen Q. Thang), Trunq Ky Dan Bien Thi 
Hat Ky (Sai-gon, 1973), pp.28-32. 
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anti-tax movement that swept through central and southern 
Trung-ky in the following months.~4 
The.tax riots themselves posed no threat to Protector-
ate control. Mostly more noisy than dangerous, they rarely 
topped a thousand and crowds usually dispersed after pass-
ing their grievances to the mandarin or French resident. 
Nevertheless, they shook the local colonial administration 
to the core, and panicked Fernand Levecque into summoning 
white.troops from Tonkin. This was largely because the 
movement had caught the Protectorate entirely unawares, 
with no effective warning and little hard information about 
the state of popular feeling either before or after it 
erupted. 55 The mask of deference worn by the mandarinal 
'Agents of France'=• had hidden peasant discontent, and 
much more, from French eyes. Although most Vietnamese offi-
cials had been silently distancing themselves from the Pro-
tectorate for years, cultural arrogance or reforming zeal 
had deceived many post-Doumer officials into mistaking 
their apparent command of the mandarinate for control of 
54 Ibid, p.28 insists on the spontaneous character of the 
first demonstration. For the whole movement, see Marr, 
Anticolonialism, Chapter 8; or Nguyen The Anh, Phonq-trao, 
passim. Peter Baugher and Vu Ngu Chieu have translated Phan 
Chu Trinh's account as A Complete Account of the Peasants' 
Uprising in the Central Region (Centre for Southeast Asian 
Studies, Wisconsin-Madison, Monograph 1, 1983). As a polit-
ical tract written largely from memory, however, its claims 
need more cautious treatment than they allow. 
55 RS Levecque obfuscated the point, but fooled neither 
GG Bonhoure or the Ministry. See Mincols'Historical Note on 
the Recent Troubles in Annam, 25 July 1908 [AOM Indochine 
A30 (115) Carton 22]; or Bonhoure's letter of 10 Ap 1908. 
AOM ICNF 50/598 
5 • GG Bonhoure's description of mandarins in office in 
Annam. Report of 22 July 1908. AOM ICNF 50/598 
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the countryside.e7 As one of the most senior French offic-
ials in Annam later realised, with hindsight intervening, 
'mandarins, from the ministers down, seeing their powers 
reduced, [had] detached themselves from their functions and 
very cleverly abstained from giving any information, leav-
ing to the Protectorate Government a responsibility that no 
longer fell on them•.ea As 1908 revealed, however, it was 
not a responsibility the French could shoulder alone. 
By acting after Doumer as if no limits existed to col-
onial power in Annam, French officials had in fact proven 
the opposite. Comfortable assumptions of French supremacy 
over their alien environment fractured under the uneasy 
realisation that physical factors limited their direct ad-
ministrative control in Annam. The 'superficial state of 
[French] organisation, the vast extent of territory that an 
Annamite province represent[ed], the smallness of the means 
at [French] disposal [and] the difficulties and slowness of 
communications'e• all conspired to force the Protect6rate 
to rely on the active and willing co-operation of Vietnam-
ese mandarins here. As grudging as the admission appeared, 
even the high-handed Fernand Levecque had to acknowledge 
its truth.•0 
In the current state of our organisation ••• we 
cannot do without the help of the mandarins. To 
e 7 Levecque ignored the few dissenting residents, accord-
ing to Bonhoure (who was, J admittedly, no admirer). Report 
of 22 July 1908. ADM ICNF 50/598 
58 Ibid. 
59 RS Levecque. Report of 15 May 1908. ADM ICNF 50/598 
• 0 Ibid. 
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the extent they lose. influence and authority, we 
ourselves lose it. 
How to restore and bolster that influence and authori-
ty~ and to ensure it worked for colonial ends at least as 
much as mandarinal self-interest, became the major polit-
ical problem for the French in Annam after 1908. Despite 
various attempts, the Protectorate never managed to solve 
it, as the rebellions of 1930-31 would later reveal. To a 
considerable extent, the roots of this failure also went 
back to 1908, in this case to the French explanation of the 
anti-tax movement, and its proposed political remedy. 
The blood had scarcely dried in mid-1908 before a 
round of finger-pointing exculpation began. French adminis-
trators found culprits everywhere, even occasionally in the 
Doumer administrative and fiscal system.•~ However, most 
settled blame on the reformist scholars. Because most of 
their activities had been open and uncontrolled by the ad-
ministration, the reformists had quickly attracted official 
French ~u~p~cions that portrayed their schools and commer-
cial enterprises as 'pretexts' behind which they were 'or-
ganising themselves to fight French authority'. 62 By a 
logical sleight-of-hand, French officials characterised 
·~ Bonhoure blamed aspects of the Doumer system; but added 
the administration was locked into it by, inter alia, the 
huge debts run up for capital development. Report of 22 
July 1980. ADM ICNF 50/598 
• 2 GG Bonhoure, letter of 10 Ap 1908. ADM ICNF 50/598. 
Ironically, clandestine anti-colonial opposition groups had 
an easier time in Annam in these years as they had only the 
militia to contend with, and Protectorate officials had few 
reliable sources of information. Patrice Morlat, La Repres-
sion coloniale au Vietnam (1908-1940) (Paris: L'Harmattan, 
1990), pp.40-41. 
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Vietnamese reformists, like the movement they supposedly 
led, as reactionary and traditionalist. Levecque, for 
example, -who claimed to find a critical spirit among the 
handful of graduates of French schools in Annam, could not 
detect anything modern or progressive about the reformist 
literati. Rather, they were mere mean-spirited malcontents. 
Having failed to win mandarinal positions, ~pride of caste' 
made them refuse 'to lower themselves' to agriculture, in-
dustry, or commerce, he reported. Thwarted in their ambi-
tion, they had turned instead to 'exploit[ing] the resent-
ment all people feel at all times towards taxes' and, dis-
guising their political motives, had stirred up the 'ignor-
ant and hard-working people'. 0~ Acting Governor-General 
Bonhoure, too, dismissed them as nothing new, simply 'skil-
ful sophists, intelligent lettres, recruited from the rest-
less literati class which, in all periods in the history of 
Annam, has caused difficulties for the government'. 04 
But Bonhoure also faulted the French Protectorate. In 
his view, reiorming zealbts fr~m Le~ecque down had forgot-
ten, ignored, or flouted the punctilios of form and style 
so vital in this area. They had disregarded the fact that 
'all novelty, even that favourable to the natives, risk[ed] 
being exploited against [the French] in Annam'. By denigra-
ting the monarchy and disdaining the mandarins, Protector-
ate officials had lost sight of the basic principle that, 
• 3 The people would not have knowingly supported politic-
al revolt, he added. Levecque's report of 15 May 1908. ADM 
ICNF 50/598 
•~ Bonhoure's confidential report of 22 July 1908. AOM 
ICNF 50/598 
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in this conservative bastion, preserving 'form and respect 
for political traditions [provided] excellent ways to gain 
the conf{d~pce of the people'. 6 e The ministry in Paris en-
tirely concurred. The instigators of the anti-tax movement, 
'princes, former mandarins, and literati', all still seen 
by the people of 'old Annam' as their 'natural leaders', 
had been provoked, among other things, by the 'profound 
modifications' imposed by the Protectorate on a court and 
government system which they had believed 'beyond change, 
since it rested on scrupulous observance of the Chinese 
morality that [had been] theirs for centuries'.•• The myth 
of old, traditional Annam returned to reassure them. 
The analysis suggested its own solution. France should 
revive the Paul Bert strategy of symbolic restitution, of 
compromising over the symbols and public forms of royalty 
and mandarinal office to win back the influential support 
of the alienated local political elite. In this special 
bastion of Sinic traditions, public French respect for age-
old customs and institutions seemed to offer the easiest 
and most effective means of ensuring order and tranquillity 
among the people. The assumed millenial Annamite past, 
blithely consigned to oblivion a decade before, rebounded 
onto the Protectorate political agenda with a vengeance. It 
would remain there until the end of the colonial era. 
To execute the policy reversal, Paris appointed an 
1886 aide of Paul Bert, Antoni Klobukowski, as Governor-
•~ Both quotes, letter of 8 May 1908 to MinCols. ADM ICNF 
50/598 
•• MinCols' Note, 3 Sept 1908. AOM ICNF 50/598 
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General. 67 Before the court in Hue, Klobukowski invoked the 
spirit of his 'late, lamented master who from the first had 
understood the Annamite soul' 0 e before signalling a retreat 
from the worst excesses of Doumerism. In a simple statement 
whose sentiments had not been officially expressed for over 
a decade he declaimed: 'our entire policy in Annam is based 
on respect for institutions and customs, in a word, on 
everything to which the Annamite people are particularly 
attached'. 0 • In private session with the Council he spelt 
out what the rhetoric meant: the Protectorate would shore 
up the monarchy and share local administration with a func-
tional Government of Annam in exchange for effective and 
responsible co-operation from its officials. 70 Mandarins 
would become honoured collaborators, not scorned subordin-
ates, and their opinions (albeit non-binding) would be 
sought in all matters effecting the Vietnamese. But the 
Doumer fiscal system stood, as did his changes to the Gov-
ernment of Annam. 
hv~~ the.riext ~ontHs, Klobukowski and his hand-picked 
Resident Superior, Groleau, worked to restore and protect 
the hierarchical integrity of the mandarinate. General Gov-
ernment employees found themselves placed under the polit-
ical c·ontrol of the Protectorate and, along with r~sidents, 
• 7 A professional diplomat, he worked in Indochina from 
1882 to 1887 and later married one of Bert's daughters. 
DBB, pp.213-14. 
'Voyage', p.657. 
Ibid, p.656. 
70 Ibid, pp.654-7 for speeches and Council minutes. The 
minutes are also held at AEP GGIC 20131. 
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forbidden to interfere directly in mandarinal affairs. In 
1909 Groleau follow-up by implementing a cumbersome consul-
tative p~ocess that required regular meetings between resi-
dents and provincial mandarins, with the minutes routinely 
dispatched to Hue for vetting. Where local disagreements 
arose between the two sides, the details had to be passed 
to Hue for resolution. 7 i These 1909 structures and proce-
dures then remained in operation until World War Two. 
Klobukowski's procedural reforms successfully rescued 
the Government of Annam from casual French interference in 
its lower levels. But in solving one problem, the Governor-
General unwittingly helped create another, potentially far 
more dangerous, one. Although Klobukowski later disingenu-
ously claimed that his policy in Annam had 'put back in 
their place the people and things that ten years of a re-
gime conflicting with the customs of the natives and clash-
ing with their interests had profoundly disturbed', 72 mani-
festly it had not. Nor had he intended to turn the clock 
back to the ea~ly 1890s~ d~spite such rhetoric. His goal 
had always been to make the colonial system more effective 
by a judicious accommodation, where necessary, to its Asian 
environment. 7 z But the political environment in Annam had 
changed in ways Klobukowski never really understood. As a 
7 i RS Groleau's Circular on the application of GG Klobu-
kowski's instructions about the role and attitude of French 
authorities in the provinces, 1909. AEP GGIC 21745. 
From his report, "Indochine: 1908-1911". ADM Indoch-
ine. A20(62) Carton 10. 
73 This aim underlay some his other bureaucratic reforms, 
as the 1908 circular on administrative arrangements showed. 
Reprinted in Decaux, Les Pouvoirs, pp.17-18. 
218 
result, his reforms miscued and helped bring about some 
quite unintended consequences in the next decades. 
Trung-Ky Becomes "Old, Traditionalist Annam": 74 1908-1920 
Several factors combined to make 1908 the watershed 
year in the brief colonial history of Central Vietnam. 
Before the anti-tax movement, few French officials had 
assumed Central Vietnam required any special political 
treatment, nor offered any particular resistance to 
colonial modernisation. The French interpretation of the 
anti-tax riots stood that judgement on its head. Under its 
influence- in the decade that followed Trung-ky completed 
its colonial evolut~on. From being •cochinchina properly 
speaking• 7 = in Luro's account, it had become 'Annam pro-
perly speaking• by Doumer's day. 7 • Now it took on its 
mythological guise as old, traditional Annam, the kingdom 
whose 'old, conservatjve peopJe•, 77 as Pierre Pasquier des-
cribed them i~ 1923, required policies sympathetically 
tailored to their special character and circumstances. This 
section and the next consider some of the elements that 
74 GG Albert Sarraut, Report on Changes in Senior Person-
nel in the Government of Annam, 24 may 1917. AOM ICNF 18/ 
166 
7 = J.B.E. Lure, Le Pays d'Annam (Paris: Leroux, 1897, 2nd 
ed), pp.21-22. 
Doumer, Souvenirs, p.32. 
77 RS Pasquier, report to GG on primary edu~cation in An-
narn, 2 Jan 1923. He added: 'What is good for Annarn is not 
necessarily good for Tonkin or Cochinchina•. AEP GGIC 51080 
219 
made Annam seem so different to Frenchmen in those years 
from the other Vietnamese regions. 
First, the repression of the anti-tax movement began 
the process by clearing the field of most non-mandarinal 
progressive elements in the Vietnamese community in Trung-
ky for nearly a generation. In one blow, it eradicated 
almost the entire intellectual leadership of the reformist 
movement among provincial literati. Levecque had blamed 
their propaganda and activities for the outbreak of peasant 
unrest, and he demanded the Council arrest as many of these 
offenders as it could catch. Under French supervision, man-
darinal courts sentenced 435 people, almost all provincial 
reformist literati, to exile on Con-son island, or penal 
servitude in the fever-ridden mountain prison at Lao-bao, 
for periods ranging from nine years to life. 78 
At the same time, Levecque presided over a purge of 
the mandarinate which left it far more homogeneous than it 
had been in the previous decade. While the courts sentenced 
fifteen officials, 7 • Levecque ruthlessly hunted down any 
others who had shown sympathy for the reformists by such 
actions as investing in their businesses, or whom he sus-
pected of leniency in the repression. All mandarins with 
78 Nguyen The Anh, Phong-trao, pp.116-17. They included 
Phan Chu Trinh, though his metropolitan reputation and ear-
lier involvement with the Ecole fran~aise in Ha-noi later 
won him better treatment and later exile to France. [Note 
on the Phan Chu Trinh affair, 13 Mar 1909. AOM Indochine 
A30 (116) Carton 22] Levecque's report of 15 May 1908 shows 
his deep involvement in the repression. AOM ICNF 50/598. 
7 q Nguyen The Anh, Phong-trao, pp.116-17, 132-33, 167-69 
for mandarinal casualties. 
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young relatives involved were also punished. 90 Rank protec-
ted no-one: Prince Tung-thien's son, the loyal Hong-khang, 
found himse_l f among the four provincial governors sacked in 
the shake-out. Levecque believed him weak because, as tuan 
vu of Ha-tinh, he had only arrested men against whom evid-
ence existed, and then had sentenced them according to the 
evidence presented rather than according to the province's 
rebellious reputation. 91 
On the French side, 1908 was equally as significant. 
Although the movement had never threatened colonial con-
trol, it still left many Protectorate officials deeply 
uneasy. Shocked by their lack of warning, and the large 
scale of the unrest, it disturbed their comfortable cer-
tainties of French superiority. Vague doubts began to gnaw 
in many minds, and the new political climate of enforced 
co-operation following Klobukowski's reforms did nothing to 
assuage them. Many French administrators in Annam lost 
their earlier assurance that they bestrode the Asian land-
scape as masters of its alien Otherness. Many stumbled, and 
found themselves slowly sucked into the mire where they 
floundered about trying to deal with mandarins as more or 
less equals, as counterparts rather than subordinates. From 
1908 onwards, formerly sharp lines of command began to un-
ravel ambiguously around the edges. No-one remained un-
affected, not even the man at the very top. 
ao Levecque's report of 15 May 1908; and Dufrenil's note 
of 22 Sept 1908. Both ADM ICNF 50/598 
81 H. Le Breton, 'La vie de SE Hong Khang CL'un des der-
niers lettres d'Annam)', ~' XX, 3 (1933), p.184. 
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Although the Resident Superior's political authority 
increased after 1908, its successful exercise in regard to 
the Government of Annam became less overt, more a matter of 
subtle manipulation and of persuasion rather than autocrat-
ic dictation. Before the anti-tax movement, Council minutes 
reveal the extent to which domineering Residents Superior 
like Levecque had tried to run the Vietnamese administra-
tion through their bullying of the ministers in Council and 
control of the French delegues in the ministries. But 1908 
ended official tolerance for that style of rule. In August 
1908, even before Klobukowski's arrival, Levecque had been 
dismissed on the grounds that he lacked the 'subtle diplom-
acy'Q2 and the 'tact and understanding of the customs of 
the country'83 which had suddenly materialised as essential 
qualifications for the Resident Superior in Hue. Yet while 
the official emphasis shifted to suasive personal relation-
ships and re•pect for local customs, French officials re-
ceived little more than generalities or platitudes to guide 
them through the strange and unfamiliar territory. 
Not all made the crossing safely. Two more Residents 
Superior after Levecque would end their careers prematurely 
by straying too far across the invisible line into the no-
man's land of politically unacceptable conduct. In 1913, 
following a public hue and cry, Georges Mahe was dismissed 
for excavating for buried treasure in king Tu-9uc's tomb. 84 
a 2 Dufrenil's term. Note of 22 Sept 1908. ADM ICNF 50/ 
598 
MinCols' note of 3 Sept 1908. AOM ICNF 50/598. 
We return to him below. DBB, p.249. 
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Then in 1920, after king Khai-Binh warned the Governor-
General he would abdicate over proposed tax rises, Acting 
Resident.S4perior Tissot was also hustled out of Hue in 
favour of Pierre Pasquier, a man with a 'deep experience of 
the native soul and a profound understanding of the poli-
tical and administrative institutions of the country'.ee In 
the twelve years between 1908 and 1920, three Residents 
Superior of Annam wrecked their careers on political mis-
calculat~ons that their superiors considered offended too 
deeply against local cu•toms.Nowhere else but in old, tra-
ditional Annam did this happen - nor would it have happened 
in those years. Trung-ky had become a special case. 
This sense of Annam's uniqueness functioned on two 
levels: as a psychological fact in French colonial minds 
reinforced by the experience of daily life in Trung-ky. We 
will consider them in turn. 
As we noted before, 1908 had exposed the hidden flaw 
in the Doumer system here. The structural weakness of the 
Protectorate made the French dependant on a mandarinate 
that 1908 had suddenly revealed as something other than the 
plaint colonial agency of French imagining. And the local 
people, too, had shown themselves unstable, capable of 
being transformed virtually overnight from their usual 
tractable and industrious selves into a irrational, riotous 
mob ready to explode into violence at the lying instigation 
of their traditional leaders. Thoughts like these stirred 
Q~ Charles Bernard, Au Service de l'Indochine: L'Oeuvre 
de Maurice Long (1919-1923) (Paris: Larose, 1931), pp.141-
42 for the story and quote. Bernard was Long's son-in-law. 
223 
anxieties deep in French minds about the real extent of 
colonial penetration in this region where, as the long-
serving offjcial Bonhoure put it, 'the old literary tra-
dition [had been] maintained with the most constancy and 
the national spirit [had] most strongly survived•.e• Here 
more than anywhere else loomed the dark spectre of "Annam-
ite tradition'', an arcane power whose reactionary force 
opposed all for which France stood. In the decade after 
1908, everywhere F~enchmen lobked in Trung-ky they per-
ceived, not the rapid westernising change that had so 
delighted Doumer, but the inertia of old Annam, where the 
stiffling grip of. archaic traditions and customs had made 
'the progress of [modern] ideas and institutions slower 
than anywhere else,' 97 to quote Albert Sarraut in 1917. 
But while Sarraut found the amorphous power of "An-
namite tradition" a challenge, others like Georges Mahe 
perceived it as more sinister, an ill-defined threat to 
himself and to the colonial power with which he identified. 
This feeling comes through very clearly in his extraordin-
ary, 'very confidential' 1912 report on the old and ailing 
minister, Cao Xuan Duc. 88 
An intelligent pragmatist, Due had joined the French 
in Tonkin in the early 1880s. Unlike many of his collabo-
rating colleagues, however, he had retained an independence 
Bonhoure, Report of 22 July 1908. AOM ICNF 50/598 
87 GG Sarraut, Report on the Political Situation, 9 Ap 
1917. AOM ICNF 18/166 
aa RS Mahe, Very Confidential Report on Cao-Xuan-Due, 4 
May 1912. AEP GGIC 9620 
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of mind that often brought him into conflict with colonial 
officialdom.e9 Appointed Minister for Public Instruction in 
-1907, he ha~ gone on to fight a losing battle to preserve 
what was valuable from the past while pursuing a policy of 
selective modernisation. 90 In the Council his vigorous (but 
unsuccessful) opposition to the newly-appointed Georges 
Mahe's plan to set age limits for candidates at the trien-
nial examinations incurred the Resident Superior's enmity, 
and somethintj~more. To Mahe, Due transmogrified into the 
personification of post-1908 "Annamite tradition". 'On the 
pretext of attachment to the rites of the past', Mahe re-
ported, 'he presents himself as the most active represent-
ative of the past and of the ideas of stagnation against 
which we strive to react'. 91 Due's subversive powers seemed 
so all-pervasive to the Frenchman that Mahe added \proposi-
tions made by the Council were often perverted' in practice 
by his influence. 
When the septuagenarian minister fell ill, therefore, 
Mahe felt unable to ask for his resignation simply on the 
ground that 'his health no longer allowed him to exercise 
his functions'. 9~ 
This course could create enormous difficulties. 
It might happen that HE Cao-Xuan-Due will not ac-
cept being retired, and he need only remark that 
s 9 For a biography, see Charles Patris, 'Notice necro-
logique: SE Cao-Xuan-Due', BAVH, XX, 4 (1923), pp.436-64. 
90 Thus Due was the only minister to suggest any reforms 
to Klobukowski in his 1908 Council meeting. 'Voyage', pp. 
666-70. 
Mahe's report, p.4. AEP GGIC 9620 
All quotes Ibid, p.5. 
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HE Truong-Nhu-Cuong, President of the Regency 
Council, is the same age and that therefore re-
tirement from office must be applied to both. 
Perhaps HE Truong will judge it opportune on 
this occasion to support HE Cao and will demand 
to be retired or offer his resignation himself. 
If such an eventuality occurred, it would result 
in serious embarrassment which it is in our in-
terests to avoid at the moment •.. 
This fretful catalogue of hypothetical problems ap-
pears no balanced assessment of the situation by a man con-
fident in his ability to rule. Rather, Mahe's report opens 
a rare window onto the hidden fears and anxieties that 
stirred in many French minds during these years when con-
fronted by individuals or institutions that attracted the 
disquieting projection of Vietnamese Otherness in the 
potent guise of mysterious "Annamite tradition". By ident-
ifying Due with this shadowy force, Mahe inflated the old 
minister into an opponent mighty enough to thwart Protecto-
rate policy from being implemented in Annam. He became to 
the Frenchman a figure compelling enough to galvanise into 
anti-Fr~nch.a~tivity_.~ supine colonial lackey like Truong 
Nhu Cuong, a man whom Albert Sarraut later accurately des-
cribed as someone 'on whose loyalty we could count in all 
circumstances 1 • 93 If we consider Mahe's 1913 assault on Tu-
Buc's tomb against this background, it seems less an act of 
arrogant stupidity than a defiant gesture of bravado, a 
sort of direct challenge at its source to the menacing pow-
er of "Annamite tradition" that Due, by then no longer a 
minister, had personified for the Resident Superior. 
GG Sarraut, Report of 24 May 1917. AOM ICNF 18/166 
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As we mentioned earlier, the psychological sense of 
Annam's uniqueness in French colonial minds at this time 
received-daJly reinforcement from the experience of living 
and working in the Protectorate. French officials in Annam 
did face practical difficulties quite dissimilar from those 
of their colleagues in Tonkin or Cochinchina. Here most 
provincial residents and their assistants lived in tiny 
isolated groups scattered along a thousand kilometres of 
rugged coastline. Most lacked any French community life to 
balance and sustain them. In 1908 the garrison town of Hue, 
the concession-port of Tourane, and Thanh-hoa town, which 
housed some small colonial businesses, were the only places 
in which the French population topped fifty. The next lar-
gest settlement, Nha-trang in the far south, only boasted a 
couple of dozen Europeans because it included the staff of 
the Pasteur Institute of medical research. 94 Poor communi-
cations compounded the isolation. Annam's only railways ran 
between Vinh and Nam-dinh in the north and, from 1906, be-
tween Hue and Tourane. All other residencies had to make do 
with often impassable roads,~e or an infrequent coastal 
launch service. In 1871, not quite ten years after the 
first provinces had been ceded to France, Cochinchina al-
94 Gabrielle M. Vassal, On and Off Duty in Annam (New 
York: D. Appleton, 1910), p.39. She had married one of the 
medical staff. 
9 e H. Cosserat, 'La Route mandarine de Tourane a Hue', 
BAVH, VII, 1 (1920), pp.129-34. 
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ready held a much higher European population in a far more 
concentrated area that Annam would do forty years later.•• 
Not-oojy were they fewer in number and more isolated 
here, but in the decade after 1908 French officials in 
Annam also found that Klobukowski's policy of conciliation 
with the mandarinate evolved rather differently in practice 
than he had anticipated. What should have been a matter of 
developing a. more collaborative style in relation to their 
.Vietnamesi co~nter-parts ~nwittingly came to entail changes 
in the substance of the relationship as well. Essentially 
this occurred because ~est Vietna~ese officials, from the 
ministers down, effectively refused their part of Klobukow-
ski's one-sided bargain. Instead of shouldering most of the 
responsibility for good government as he had hoped, most 
Vietnamese officials in the purged mandarinate persisted in 
the pre-1908 view of public affairs as essentially a matter 
for the French. Many preferred instead to concentrate more 
on exploring the greater latitude that the changed politi-
cal conditions after 1908 increasingly opened up for the 
pursuit of their own private interests, which they did in 
ways that often eluded effective French control. During the 
1910s, dealing with the slippery Government of Annam became 
a qualitatively different experience for French officials 
than handling their Vietnamese subordinates in the two 
other regions. 
9 • Charles Meyer, La Vie guotidienne des fran~ais en In-
dochine, 1860-1910 (Paris: Hachette, 1985), p.70. There 
were 873 permanent residents in the South, plus a floating 
population of over 6,000. 
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Indeed, so successfully did elements within the man-
darinate pursued their own agenda during this decade that, 
by the 1920s, circumstances had brought about a situation 
in which the Protectorate gradually accepted that it could 
essentially only exercise a haphazard and diminishing con-
trol over the Annam mandarinate as a whole. The interaction 
of two basic: factors accounted for this development. First, 
in the post-1908 decade, the operation of Klobukowski's 
system allowed the ministers to come to dominate the manda-
rinate via a shady network of patronage that cut across or 
ignored the formal structures of administration. And 
second, French administrative dependence on the Government 
of Annam set up a contradiction between public policy and 
political necessity within which mandarinal malfeasance 
could flourish virtually unchecked. The remainder of this 
section discusses each in turn. 
When Ooumer centralised the Council of Ministers into 
the sole organ of the Government of Annam in 1897, he had 
assumed that the Resident Superior as president would con-
trol the ministers and thus the mandarinate from the top 
down. But as we saw, other colonial officials began almost 
immediately to pressure the Council's institutional author-
ity over its rural sobordinates. By 1908 very little of it 
remained.•7 Klobukowski tried to resurrect the Council's 
former prestige and authority, although apparently without 
ever realising how much of the Council's slim ethical basis 
had been whittled away in the previous decade. As a result, 
• 7 GG Bonhoure, letter of 8 May 1908, and confidential 
report of 22 July 1908. Both AOM ICNF 50/598 
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when he placed mandarinal personnel matters solely in the 
hands of the Council in 1908, and charged the ministers to 
advise on t~em, the reform did not thereby provide 'the 
most serious guarantees' of impartial decisions, as the 
Governor-General claimed to believe.•s Rather, it handed 
the ministers a new and potentially lucrative lever of 
control over ambitious mandarins while equally presenting 
them with the tempting opportunity to traff ick in their 
administrative influence. 
The impartial personnel decisions Klobukowski dreamed 
of required either honest and disinterested ministers, or a 
Resident Superior up to their tricks and as well informed 
as they about the private affairs of scores, if not hund-
reds, of Vietnamese officials. Neither condition applied. 
Between 1910 and 1920, the weight of local knowledge and 
institutional continuity lay with the ministers. Seven 
I 
Residents Superior passed through Hue in those years, only 
four appointed from Annam.•• Among the ministers, however, 
a central core remained in office for over a decade: Huynh 
Con (1902-1917), Truong Nhu Cuong (1902-1917), Ton That Han 
(1906-1923), 100 and Nguyen Huu Bai (1906-1932). 101 And 
where Klobukowski had intended the Council be consulted in 
'Voyage', p.664; or CM, 13 Oct 1908. [AEP GGIC 20131] 
For Residents Superior until 1916, see Qlfil!, pp.19-11. 
100 He returned as Regent during the Bao-Bai interregnum 
(1925-1932). For his career, see E. Levadoux, 'Ephemerides 
annamites. S.E. Ton That Han prends sa retraite', BAVH, X, 
4 (19230, pp.393-94. Lik~ the other three, his later career 
suc~ess rested on service in the can vuong repression. 
1 ·~ 1 Nguyen Tien Lang, 'Quelques mandarins d'hier', BAVH, 
XXVI, 2 (1939), pp.137-38; or VNDNTB, p.259. 
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mandarinal appointments, archival material shows that with-
in two decades Protectorate practice had allowed minister-
ial preferences to become far more decisive. 102 
The roots of this development went back to the 1910s, 
when Council members had first began to manipulate the 
changed political climate in Annam to their own ends. 
During these years, the ministers in particular enjoyed a 
real freedom of manoeuvre because, for many senior French 
officials, they had come to incarnate or at least symbolise 
the arcane force of "Annamite tradition"~ Thus whatever 
irritation or anxiety the Council or its individual members 
might sometimes cause senior French officials at the time, 
the Protectorate never moved against them. On the contrary, 
ministers won •a licence in their bearing, in their con-
duct, in their deeds, and in their words ••• that had never 
been tolerated before', 103 as Eug~ne Charles reported when 
he took over from the disgraced Mahe in 1913. And although 
Charles talked toughly about curtailing this freedom, he 
never seriously disciplined any ministers. Nor did he re-
move any, notwithstanding Governor-General Roume's express 
demand that Truong Nhu Cuong and Huynh Con be retired in 
102 Council minutes for the 1910-1920s were not available 
during my research at Aix; but those at the rue Oudinot 
archive from the early 1930s showed a marked difference in 
this respect from those before 1908. Despite rebellion in 
Nghe-Tinh, pe~sonnel matters provoked far the livelier and 
longer-running debates in Council. CM, 1930-32. AOM !CNF 
290/2505-06 
103 Quoted in GG Roume's report on the events in Annam, 
20 May 1916, pp.16-17. AEP GGIC 7F-50 (2) Both attributed 
their manoeuvres to the 'uncertainties• of a Regency 
period. 
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May 1916. 104 When put to the test, no-one in the Protector-
ate Government in those years wanted to risk provoking a 
popular outburst by touching these supposedly-influential 
defenders of customs and traditions. 10 e And by 1916, as the 
circumstances surrounding king Duy-Tan's attempted revolt 
suggest, 10• the ministers themselves understood the situa-
tion quite well and knew how to exploit it to their own 
ends. 
In May 1916, teenage king Duy-Tan had quit the palace 
in the hope that a war-time revolt would force the French 
to re-negotiate the Protectorate Treaty. Unknown to him, 
only weeks before Governor-General Ernest Roume had written 
to the Colonial Ministry in Paris outlining a plan to abol-
ish the monarchy and extend direct administration to Annam-
Tonkin. Duy-Tan unwittingly played right into his hands. 
Almost on the point of leaving for France, Roume hurried to 
Hue expressly to forestall the succession until he could 
lobby Paris in person. He failed. Resident Superior Eugene 
Charles (according to Huynh Con's memoirs) 107 had warned 
the court of the Governor-General's hidden agenda. In per-
sonal interviews in advance of the Council meeting, each 
minister held out bravely against Roume's pressure in de-
104 Ibid 
1 oe GG Sarraut describe~ this as a wartime policy, but RS 
Mahe had used a similar reason for not seeking Due's resig-
nation in 1913. Report on Changes in Senior Personnel, 24 
May 1917. AOM ICNF 18/166 
For more detail, see Cooke, "Proteges", pp.112-129. 
107 Huynh Con and Jean Jacnal, 'M~moires de son excellen-
ce Huynh Con·, Ell. (ns), XLI, 9-10 (1924), p.249. Con said 
it was himself and Nguyen Huu Bai Charles warned. 
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fence of the monarchy. 109 It was, of course, a matter of 
self-defence as well: no king meant no ministers, either. 
Through rt-~ 11 none hinted that they knew of Roume's 
proposal. Instead, they played the high card of "Annamite 
tradition", as understood by the French political myths. 
Men who had consistently rejected Thanh-Thai's futile 
demands for his traditional rights as king. now discovered 
that administration would become impossible in Annam with-
out a reign title by which to date documents, and that 
without a king on the throne the people would refuse to pay 
their taxes. Even more important, they explained at the 
special Council meeting, rebels still at large held royal 
proclamations sealed by Duy-Tan himself. Without a new king 
to invalidate them, they would encourage bad elements and 
might even spark uprisings in Tonkin and Cochinchina as 
well. 10• At the cruc~al moment, Roume dared not call their 
bluff on any of it, or on their discreet threat to withdraw 
co-operation en masse without an immediate succession. 110 
The Governor~General backed down and agreed that Buu-9ao, 
son of the first collaborating king, Bong-Khanh, should 
&OQ Though Huynh Con and Boan 9inh Nhan wavered somewhat, 
according to transcripts by Du Pac de Marsuli, 9 May 1916. 
AEP GGIC 7F-50 (2) 
10• Possibly a reminder of the can vuong movement, but 
more likely a reference to the recent troubles instigated 
by a royal pretender, Phan Xich Long, in the South. Morlat, 
La R~pression, pp.41-42 and 44-46. 
110 RS Charles contradicted none of it; and the minutes 
recorded nothing from him during the meeting. CM, 10 May 
1916. AEP GGIC 7F-50 (2) 
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take the throne as, in Nguyen Huu Bai's words, the •sole 
legal candidate'. 11 1 
Having __ trumped Roume with the Sinic card, however, the 
'faithful observers of the traditions and rites of our 
State•, 112 as the court described itself, went on almost 
immediately to reveal just how little Confucian orthodoxy 
actually now meant to them. In a proclamation to the Resi-
dent Superior of Tonkin announcing Khai-9inh's accession, 
they condemned Duy-Tan for 'fail[ing] in his duties towards 
his august ancestors and towards the Protecting Spirits of 
the country, as well as [for] showing ingratitude to the 
Protectorate". With a novel extension of Mandate theory 
they concluded: 'His mandate is declared to have fallen'. 
In other words, the court was claiming the Mandate of Hea-
ven as personal to the king, not attached to the whole dyn-
asty, and as less in heaven's gift than its own (in con-
junction, of course, with the Protectorate). But no French 
official at the ~ime remarked on this radical departure 
from C~ine~e· traditi6~ in-~01d, trad{~i~n~l Annam". They 
may have still be too •stupefied', 113 too 'surprised and 
amazed', as the doyen of Annam colons, de Monpezat put it, 
that 'a child whose mind [they had] had the privilege of 
111 Ibid. In private he had been far more flexible: 'Give 
us a king, it doesn't matter who'. If Buu Bao was unaccept-
able, ·indicate another and we will accept him'. Most mini-
sters had wanted Ham-Nghi back, but knew it was unlikely. 
Du Pac de Marsuli, 9 May 1916. AEP 66IC 7F-50 (2) 
112 All quotes from the court's Proclamation to RSCTK), 
15 May 1916. AEP 66IC 7F-50 (2) (my emphasis) 
113 68 Roume, chronology of events, 10 May 1916. AEP GGIC 
7F-50 (2) 
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forming', whose every act had been observed, 'and whose way 
of thinking should have been known to (them]' 114 could then 
foment a revolt under their very noses, without the Protec-
torate hearing a word about it until only hours before it 
occurred. 
Reporting the meeting later, Roume wondered uneasily 
if the ministers had known more than they let on. Their 
protestations of loyalty had seemed sincere enough; but if 
they were, where was their foresight and common sense? Duy-
Tan's mercurial behaviour over the previous year or so had 
broadcast his intentions to any willing to hear them. Had 
the ministers, like the Protectorate, mistaken the young 
king's actions for adolescent tantrums? Roume worried. Was 
he faced with 'calculation or real ineptitude' on their 
part?11 e Neither he nor Sarraut in 1917 could fathom it. 110 
Nor could Protectorate officials, who played safe and 
passed up the opportunity of Khai-9inh's enthronement to 
retire the two oldest ministers as Roume had insisted. Nor 
would they have gone until the end of the War, Sarraut lat-
er confirmed, if the Council's disregard for Khai-9inh's 
opinions had not so irritated the new king that he request-
ed their removal. on the basis that the law required minis-
ters to retire at seventy. Reporting the changes, Sarraut 
114 Letter of Monpezat, Annam representative on the 
Colonial Council, to GG Roume. 15 May 1916. AEP GGIC 7F-50 
( 2) 
11 e GG Roume's report of 20 May, 1916, p.14. AEP GGIC 7F-
50 (2) 
11 • GG Sarraut's report of 24 May 1917. ADM ICNF 18/166 
He mainly suspected Nguyen Huu Bai. 
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could hardly disguise his relief that the departure of the 
two ministers, only belatedly characterised as 'supposedly 
influenti~~_personalities', 117 had passed almost without 
notice. 
For Sarraut, the occasion suggested two interesting 
developments in Annam. First, it showed 'the masses [were 
now] attached to [the French] by feelings having other . 
causes than the influence or prestige of these high manda-
rins'; 11• and second, that unlike his immediate predeces-
sors the new king 'strongly want[ed] to play his role and 
not be ••• the prisoner of a Council of Ministers whose ob-
sequious but tyrannical tutelage [had previously] forbade 
him all personal initiative·. 11• Taken together, they form-
ed the earliest expression of the nee-traditional and pro-
monarchical policies that, with Sarraut•s blessing as Colo-
nial Minister in the early 1920s, Pierre Pasquier later 
tried to implement in Annam, first as Resident Superior 
(1921-25) and then as Governor-General (1928-32). This 
politique· iry_di'~ene rest,ed op Pasqui.er· s conviction that 
~the ritual and quasi~religious prestige of the king re-
tain[ed] all its strength~ in the 1920s, 120 and that it 
could be placed in the service of the French if the Protec-
117 Ibid. 
11• Ibid. 
11• GG Sarraut's report oh the political situation in 
Indochina, 9 Ap 1917. ADM ICNF 16/166 
120 Note of 17 Oct 1921, printed in Continuite de la 
politigue du Protectorat en Annam-Tonkin avant et apr~s 
l'av~nement de sa majeste Bao Bai (Documents politiques, 
Seria 1, Hanoi, 1934), p.10. [Henceforth CPPJ 
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torate freed him from the power of his usurping ministers, 
the men who 'since Dong-Khanh [had been] the real heads of 
the government'. 121 
But Pasquier's insistence that the king, not his 
ministers, channelled the force of tradition in old, tra-
ditional Annam came too late to stop or reverse existing 
trends. By 1921, the established ministers, Nguyen Huu Bai 
in particular, had already riddled tha mandarinate with 
complex networks of influence and patronage. After seven 
years absence from Annam, the revelation of systemic cor-
ruption at the highest levels of the Government of Annam 
struck the new Resident Superior with great force. In 1921 
Pasquier reported the existence of an 'edifice of lies, ex-
tortion and corruption' at court, with ministers and senior 
officials deeply involved in protecting the networks from 
which they drew •personal profits'. 122 Eighteen months lat-
er, he described 'a sense of clientage growing more and 
more among mandarins in office, [with] corruption poorly 
repressed because of the links that bind and interconnect 
the interests of serving officials'. 123 Mandarinal posi-
tions went ~to the highest bidders, or those with the best 
connections 1 , 124 he added. 
With Nguyen Huu Bai's appointment as Chief Minister in 
1924, these shady networks of graft and patronage became 
Ibid, p.7. 
' 122 As the revelations suited his policy, he may have 
exaggerated in some respects. Ibid, p.8. 
Note of 13 Dec 1922. Ibid, p.16. 
Ibid, p.17. 
institutionalised within the Government of Annam, at least 
according to Acting Resident Superior Thibaudeau's private 
recollectiDA in 1934: 12~ 
No-one knowledgeable in the ways of this pays 
could fail to know of the predominant, if not ex-
clusive, role of Nguyen Huu Bai [in those years]. 
All or almost all the mandarins in office owe[d] 
their nominations to him ••• Rare were the previ-
ous nominations, promotions, and designations 
that had not been the object of transactions ••• 
Some [mandarins] accommodated themselves, others 
deplored the situation, [but] all or almost all 
found ways to make the population bear the ex-
penses incurred and those envisaged for the 
future. 
There must have been some substance to the charges since 
Bai amassed such a fortune in office that, despite his poor 
Catholic background, he retired to a Quang-tri concession 
large enough to contain hundreds of peasants settled in 
four villages. 12• This level of asset accumulation from an 
official salary alone seems improbable, although in the 
1920s only the crusading Argus Indochinois of Hanoi dared 
publicly accused him of corrupt dealings. 127 
If those who understood "the ways" of Annam in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s knew all about Nguyen Huti Bai:s 
illicit activities, as Thibaudeau casually asserted, why 
12~ RS Thibaudeau, report on political and administrative 
matters, July 1934, pp.12-13. ADM ICNF 330/2664 
12• Nguyen Tien Lang,'Quelques mandarins·, p.137; and 
VNDNT-B, p. 259. 
127 It accused his wife of peddling influence through a 
shop-front. a.I., 14 Dec 1927. Earlier that year, it had also 
published detailed denunciations of Vuong Tu Bai, governor 
of Quang-binh and later a minister, whom it said delegated 
his corrupt dealings to a particular underling. a.I., 12 Feb, 
19 Mar, and 23 Ap 1927. Cf. similar charges in 1923 against 
the governor of Phan Rang, Nguyen Hy, a son of Nguyen Than. 
ai, 8 Aug and 27 Oct 1923. 
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did he remain in office? His energy and usefulness to the 
French certainly worked in his favour; but the main reason 
was not pe..-sonal. It lay in French organisational depend-
ence on the mandarinate, and the contradiction it caught 
the Protectorate in. As Levecque had realised in 1908, 12e 
so long as mandarinal co-operation remained indispensable 
for colonial administration in Annam, political necessity 
forced the French to defend the collective honesty and 
competence of its essential allies in public, whatever in-
dividual administrators might think in private. 129 This 
meant, as Levecque had also realised, the Protectorate 
could never respond to general or unsubstantiated allega-
tions against its closest mandarinal allies who, by de-
finition, formed the most likely targets of anti-French 
elements. Official action over anonymous complaints could 
only play into their enemies' hands, while undermining 
mandarinal confidence in the French. 
As mandarins came to realise the latitude they enjoyed 
in these circumstances, those with influential patrons es-
pecially, the French attitude placed a screen of myth, dis-
tortions, and empty gestures over their collective behavi-
our, behind which few French cared to peer too closely. 
Tokenism replaced the sort of decisive action that would 
have signalled a genuine French refusal to tolerate abuse 
Report of 15 May 1908, pp.29-30. ADM !CNF 50/598 
129 For examples, see Roume's report of 20 May 1916, pp. 
14-16 [AEP GGIC 7F - 50(2)]; or GG Sarraut's report of 24 
May 1917 [ADM !CNF 18/166]. Pasquier's 1921-22 reports were 
only published in 1934, and then as part of a political 
exercise designed to show that the Bao-Bai reforms had 
dealt with the old abuses. 
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of official authority. The Protectorate might exhort the 
mandarins to proper behaviour through paternalist plati-
tudes, 130 royal homilies, 131 and Council directives;132 but 
the only 1920s mandarin ever to be dismissed remained the 
minister Boan Binh Nhan, for an intrigue against Khai-Binh 
that helped cause the removal of Acting Resident Superior 
Tissot. 133 Politics aside, experience taught delinquent 
mandarins they had nothing more to fear than mild adminis-
trative sanctions during the 1920s. The first reported dis-
missal of another Annam official appeared in 1930, when a 
Thua-thien mandarin, who had been accused of torturing an 
extortion victim to death, was sacked after an enquiry. No 
report of subsequent criminal charges followed, however. 134 
If ordinary people made allegations against mandarins 
the Protectorate demanded hard proof, as well as insisting 
that accusations be tried in the mandarinal courts. Few 
cared to risk the possibility of retribution afterwards by 
13° Cf. GG Klobukowski urging mandarins 'to accept a real 
part of the responsibility for decisions' since residents 
asked for their (non-binding) advice: "Everyone must be-
lieve in the usefulness of the common task they are carry-
ing out'. 'Voyage', p.664. 
131 Cf. Khai-Binh's 1919 Royal Ordinance forbidding cor-
ruption among the mandarins. EA, 2 Mar 1928 for full text. 
13~ Cf. a 1916 directive ordering mandarins 'always [to] 
accept responsibility for their actions' and to 'discharge 
their duties fully'. CM, 12 July 1916. AEP GGIC 7F-50 (2) 
133 Boan Binh Nhan (or Duyet) was demoted to tuan vu 
and retired. EA, 27 Aug 1921. RS Pasquier alluded to him in 
CPP, p.9. 
134 a!., 5 Mar 1930. The press did however report occa-
sional mild sanctions as, for example, when the military 
governor of Hue used his men to steal government material 
and he lost three grades, but kept his position. a.I., 20 
Sept 1924. 
240 
denouncing one set of mandarins to another. In any case, 
under the Gia-Long Code which still ruled such matters in 
Annam, mak~ng false accusations could itself become a crime 
if a case failed. In 1923, Pasquier set up a mandarinal 
Commission of Inquiry into official corruption, but it sank 
on exactly this problem. Although 'the most serious com-
plaints' might be made before French officials, a later 
Resident Superior, Eugene Le Fol reminisced, no-one would 
repeat them to the mandarins of the Commission. The myth of 
old, traditional Annam saved him from seeing any sensible 
caution in their behaviour. For Le Fol it represented just 
one ~ore example of the frustrating 'Annamite mentality' at 
work, of that 'general indifference and passivity of the 
population' which tied French hands in such matters.~~~ It 
was equally thanks to this pervasive attitude, Resident 
Superior Yves Chatel complained in 1931, that while man-
darinal offenders might be caught and punished in Tonkin, 
'in Annam it [was] rare to be able to confound the guilty 
and difficult to get sufficient sanctions levied against 
Yet if the guilty had been confounded, why did it 
still prove difficult 'to get sufficient sanctions levied 
against them' in Annam? The answer lay not in the local 
mentality, but in the operation of the shady networks of 
protection and patronage upon which the real influence of 
~z~ All quotes, RS Le Fol recounting his experience in 
1923. Not surprisingly, the ministers all agreed that the 
problem lay in the people's stupidity. CM, 11 Feb 1931. AOM 
ICNF 290/2505 
CM, 1 May 1931. AOM ICNF 290/2505 
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the ministers, and of Nguyen Huu Bai especially, actually 
rested. Essentially, Council ministers enjoyed personal 
rather than-collective authority: it flowed from their con-
trol of client hetworks rather than the formal operation or 
the nominal rules of the administration. Clearly this per-
verted the proper functioning of the administration; but it 
also undermined colonial control of the mandarinate via the 
Council of Ministers. As a group, the.Council lacked the 
will and authority to try to force mandarins protected by 
its individual members to obey its collective directives. 
By the 1930s the whole mandarinal system had become tainted 
by practices that pl~ced protected individuals effectively 
beyond the reach of legal or administrative sanctions. Two 
examples from the Council's own records illustrate the 
problem. 
In March 1931, towards the end of the communist rebel-
lion in Nghe-Tinh, the Council discussed sending a strongly 
worded circular to rural mandarins demanding, for a second 
time, that they stop 'profiting from the circumstances to 
commit abuses'. This time, they threatened to bring 'the 
full rigour of the law' against anyone who disobeyed after 
receiving the second circular.~~7 Four months later, when 
angrily informing the Council he had discovered a long-
running tax fraud by Binh-dinh mandarins, the new Resident 
Superior, Yves Chatel, took the trouble to warn ministers 
that 'from now on [he] intended to apply the law when dis-
trict heads [were] presumed guilty of corruption'.~~• Taken 
CM, 11 Mar 1931. ADM ICNF 290/2505 
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together, the examples suggest that, by the early 1930s, 
the mandarinal administration had become so corrupt and 
arrogant in_Annam that even a major rebellion could not 
frighten all its members into~short-term display of sens-
ible prudence, nor goad Hue into much more than tardy 
threats of punishment against its most politically-inept 
officials. 
The root cause of the problem lay in the French refus-
al ~o a~ci~p~ responsibili~y for colonialism in Annam under 
the dual ad~inist~ative ~ystem. While the Vietnamese shared 
in administration, the French insisted.they be .accountable 
for its results; but while the French monopolised power, 
the Vietnamese held them responsible for the consequences 
of colonialism. From 1908 onwards, each side blamed the 
other and justified itself, 139 while maladministration and 
malfeasance flourished uncontrolled in-between. 
It was a situation tailor-made for unconscious projec-
tion and mythological solutions, something the circumstan-
cea of the French administration also facilitated. The next 
section considers this factor in more detail. 
My emphasis. CM, 28 July 1931. ADM ICNF 290/2505 
139 Cf. the exchange between RS Chatel and Vuong Tu Bai. 
Ch&tel: 'They wait inside their yamens ••• thinking always 
of their personal profits, saying that ••• if they are too 
maladroit [and get caught], they will pass some time in a 
ministry before ••• getting another profitable position at 
the head of a district'. Bai responded: 'As long as you, M. 
le R~sident Superieur, have not taken measures of necessary 
rigour, nothing will happen. There will always be the same 
life of blissful ease among the mandarins, the same indif-
ference to the fate of those they administer'. CM, 11 Aug 
1931. AOM ICNF 290/2505 
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The Protectorate Regime: Cut-Rate Colonialism 
In the decade after 1908, the resurgence of the Gov-
ernment of Annam and the unexpected complexities involved 
in co-operating with its mandarins did help make the Pro-
tectorate seem qualitatively different in French eyes 
slower, older, and more traditional. Nevertheless, in these 
years the principal reason for the difference Frenchmen 
perceived between Trung-ky and other regions of colonial 
Vietnam lay elsewhere, outside the purview of colonial 
myths. Annam ~ different; but not because Trung-ky alone 
clung tenaciously to some deep, mystical bond with its sup-
posedly age-old Sinic customs and traditions. The French 
needed to look no further than themselves for an explana-
tion. Modernisation required investment and progressive 
reforms cost money: the slowness of economic and social 
change in post-1908 Trung-ky, which so justified and re-
inforced the myth of old, traditional Annam, basically 
reflected the lack of colonial investment and the chronic 
under-funding of the Protectorate budget. More than any-
thing else, French colonialism transformed Trung-ky into 
"old, traditional Annam". This section considers the finan-
cial constraints that helped make the region so apparently 
impervious to change in the early twentieth century. 
In 1908, Klobukowski's promise of no new taxes stopped 
deadthe previous decade's modest expansion of revenue. With 
the exception of a 24% hike in 1913-14, revenue only grew 
by 2.5% from 1909 to 1912 inclusive, and then 4% between 
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1915 and 1919. 140 In these circumstances, to implement any 
expensive new programs also required impolitic new tax inc-
reases, and usually failed to gain approval. Even a vital 
project like upgrading the Mandarinal Road linking Hue with 
Ha-noi and Sai-gon to allow wheeled traffic along its whole 
length had to wait for General Government funding. 141 Im-
provements to the local peasant economy fared much worse. 
For instance, despite the existence of detailed plans for 
irrigation works dating back to the early 1900s, and Klobu-
kowski's promise of their speedy implementation,.real work 
only started in 1918. 142 
Financial factors also shackled the introduction of 
western education. A rickety Franco-Vietnamese school sys-
tem had been set up in 1906; but by 1911, despite high 
Vietnamese demand for modern education, it still only pro-
vided 1,596 places. The local Catholic system, by contrast, 
offered 604 places to fewer than 10% of the population. 143 
140 My calcui~tioris from data in Jean Boyer, 'Les impOts 
directs en.Indochine', RIJE, 11 (1939), p.492. 
141 J. De Fargues, 'Travaux publiques', BAVH, XVIII, 1&2 
(1931), p.215. From 1913 to 1930, the General Government 
spent 19 m. piastres upgrading it as Colonial Route 1. 
14~ In Thanh-hoa. For Klobukowski's promise, 'Voyage·, p. 
659. For the work, de Fargues,'Travaux', pp.224-25. Smaller 
works, also delayed for financial reasons, were occasional-
ly undertaken as famine relief, as occurred in 1916. 'La 
Situation politique de l'Indochine en 1916', Bl. (ns), XXVI, 
11-12 (1916), p.472. 
143 The Catholic system also had 30 French-born teachers 
compared to 2 in public schools, a number only reached in 
1918 (31 from 150). [L'Annam scolaire. De l'enseignement 
traditionel annamite A l'enseignement franco-annamite, (Ha-
noi: IDEO, 1931), pp.12-22 and 96-112 for pre-1919.] In 
1911, the church also supplied many more places in vocat-
ional training (300 to the government's 100). Report on the 
1910-1911 scholastic year by the head of the Annam Educat-
ion Service. AEP Annam R.1. 
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Lack of resources also delayed until 1919 the implementa-
tion of the 1917 general re-organisation of public instruc-
tion, whi~h included the abolition of the traditional exam-
ination system. Even then fiscal restraint ruled, with the 
Acting Resident Superior, Tissot, directing residents to 
'modify the current system only to the extent that communal 
and local budgets could cover the costs of innovation, and 
where the Education Service is capable of supplying suff i-
cient personnel. 1144 (This s~ould be contrasted to the 
explanation for tardy educational reform in Annam offered 
two years later by the metropolitan mythologist, Charles 
Regismanset, who blamed 'the less direct means of (French] 
action- and "the greater strength of tr~dition in this 
pays' for the unsatisfactory result. 14~) 
It would require the.massive General Government sub-
ventions of the 1920s before any serious and sustained edu-
cational effort began in colonial Annam. 14• Indeed, Trung-
ky benefited enormously from the General Government's post-
War policy change·'to large....,sC:ale reg.ional subventions. Be-
tween 1921 and 1929,. 25.1 million piastres, or one-third of 
its total budget, came directly from this source. 147 For 
Circular note, 30 July, 1919. AEP GGIC 51080. 
14~ Charles R~gismanset, Le Miracle fransais en Asie 
(Paris: Editions Cr~s, 1921), p.213. 
14•. Thanks to these funds the 1921 education budget jumped 
94'l. in a year. Bernard, Maurice Long, p.134. 
147 Cf. Tonkin where a similar amount (24.5 m) formed on-
ly 17'l. of the local budget. From 1913 to 1920 Annam had on-
ly received 3.9 m in GG subventions. My calculations from 
Resume statistigue relatif aux annees 1913 ~ 1940 (Hanoi: 
IDEO, 1941), p.37. 
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the first and only time, circumstances in the 1920s allowed 
the Protectorate Government to initiate social reforms and 
public works without undue pressure on the local peasant 
economy. 148 But one group never esca~ed the iron grip of 
fiscal restraint, even in the 1920s. Ironically, it was the 
French personnel of the Protectorate Government itself. 
European officials, indispensable in these years in 
areas like administration, security, medicine, engineering, 
and education, were also very costly. As a result, these 
functions remained constantly understaffed, virtually from 
Doumer on. The civil service suffered most. Although Annam 
contained the largest area and the second highest popula-
tion in colonial Vietnam, it always employed the smallest 
number of French administrators, 14~ a situation further 
exacerbated by the personnel reductions of the First World 
War. Post-War recruitment moved slowly and, as new func-
tions developed, serving officials found themselves spread 
thinly, and liable to transfer at short notice. The possi-
bility of s~veral years' tenure in the same province, rela-
tively common before the War, became unusual after it. 150 
14• 1920s outlays on capital works stayed around 18% of 
the expanding budget, but proportional expenditure on heal-
th and education doubled. In 1930 these items accounted for 
45% of the budget, with health and education consuming 3.14 
m. (or 27%). For total outlays, Ibid, p.36. For public 
works, de Fargues, 'Travaux', p.213. For education, L'Annam 
scolaire, p.22; and for health, Dr Normet, 'L'Assistance 
medicale', BAVH, XVIII, 1&2 (1931), p.199. 
14~ In 1912 Annam had 48 compared to 75 in Cochinchina or 
81 in Tonkin. The number had been stationary for years. 
Jumper and Hue, Political and Administrative History, p.94. 
1 =0 As indicated by data on postings published in ATK, 
which also shows a similar pattern among French teaching 
personnel, in the early 1920s especially. 
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Budget strictures equally ruled security matters. To open 
scratch militia posts in the developing highlands required 
the clos~r~_or rationalisation of others in the more popu-
lous lowland provinces.iei Even the SOrete was not exempt. 
Budgetary pressures repeatedly denied 1920s requests from 
Annam SOrete Head, Leon Sogny, for more resources, especi-
ally for more trained staff.ie2 By 1930 Annam SOrete field-
ed only ten French officers and seventeen trained Vietnam-
ese subordinates, with a further twenty-three in the ident-
ity service. At the same time, the Cochinchina SOrete dis-
posed of 109 Europeans and 356 Vietnamese agents supervis-
ing a geographically compact population numbering perhaps 
two-thirds of that of Annam.ie3 
While fiscal restraint stalled colonial economic and 
social development in the 1910s, it also subtly affected 
French administrative style and practices. Fewer personnel 
not only increased the isolation and work-loads of existing 
residents' ;ie4 it also encouraged them to cut corners, and 
iei RS Le Fol's evidence, MC interview 1, p.34. ADM ICNF 
332/2684. Document 181 gives militia numbers by province, 
1913-1931. French officer numbers fell from 76 in 1913 to 
57 in 1930. ADM ICNF 334/2688 
~~2 Annual SOrete reports, 1926-27, pp.38-9; 1927-28, p. 
21; and 1928-29, pp.21-22. AEP GGIC 7F 18. 
ie3 Two French officers were on leave and one detached to 
the identity section in 1930. Morlat, La Repression, p.135, 
fn.14. Cochinchina SOrete also had 74 clerks. Figures from 
Guy Gran, "Vietnam and the Capitalist Road to Modernity. 
Village Cochinchina, 1880-1940", PhD, Wisconsin-Madison, 
1975, p.212. 
ie4 At the turn of the century there had been 3 French 
administrators and 5 clerks at Vinh Residency discharging 
less complex tasks than those of the 2 Frenchmen stationed 
there in 1920s, Resident Bottini complained to the Morche 
Commission. MC interview 30, p.3. ADM ICNF 332/2684 
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to give only perfunctory attention to their more time con-
suming or tedious duties.iee In 1909 Resident Superior Gro-
leau had_ urged residents to 'divest [themselves] to the 
greatest degree possible of a part of the office work that 
[had] absorbed [them] until then in order to visit [their] 
provinces frequently~. 1 e0 But the cumbersome bureaucratic 
regulations he established to govern relations between the 
two administrations in the countryside produced the oppos-
ite effect. By multiplying residents' written tasks, 1 e 7 
Groleau's system guaranteed they spent more time in their 
offices, while its extra demands also served to justify the 
informal practice of organising work to suit their own 
interests. Important routine matters might fall victim to 
the circumstances. Thus, for instance, the upkeep of local 
prison, police, and conviction registers, and their monthly 
communication to Hue, was repeatedly 'lost sight of in most 
provinces' in 1913 and 1914, despite the real difficulties 
it created for the proper supervision of mandarinal justice 
and surveillance of former political prisoners.iee Around 
the same time, too, monthly residents' reports revealed a 
iee Complaints about such practices appeared in RS Levec-
que' s Circular to R~sidents, 25 Ap 1908 and RS Dufrenil's 
confidential report of 22 Sept 1908 [both AOM ICNF 50/598], 
as well as in Pasquier's Note of 17 Oct 1922, CPP, p.17. 
ie• 1909 circular on the application of GG Klobukowski's 
instructions about the role and attitude of French autho-
rities in the administration of provinces. AEP GGIC 21745 
ie7 For the full range of residents• work, see Suignard, 
Les Services civils, pp.123-39; or A. Bonhomme, 'Annam -
Administration', BAVH, XVIII, 1&2 (1931), pp.117-20. 
iee 'Notes et Documents. La situation politique et admin-
istrative de l'Indochine fran~aise en 1914. Annam', !i!_ 
(ns), XXIII, (Mar 1915), pp.315-17, quote p.316. 
249 
similar laxity. Every province duly returned twelve; but 
although they took the form of standard, pre-printed ques-
tionnaires, not one man managed to fill in all twelve fully 
or consistently. 1~~ As a result, Hue lacked a full statis-
tical record of the most basic rural information like the 
local piastre exchange rate, or the rice price. 
The same slackness might infiltrate the newly compli-
cated relations with Vietnamese officials. The Protector-
ate's permanent lack of resources could easily lead resi-
dents into informal accommodations and expedient comprom-
ises with the men on whose co-operation they relied for es-
sential tasks like maintaining order, gathering political 
and other information, and collecting taxes. Although the 
situation is unclear for the 1910s, certainly by the 1920s 
laissez-faire French supervision of mandarinal justice lent 
itself to such bureaucratic formalism. 
Under the Gia-Long Code, which regulated purely Viet-
namese affairs, district and provincial mandarins acted as 
local magistrates whose courts initially deal with all 
cases. By Protectorate direction, the provincial resident 
could only involve himself after the event, when translated 
summary copies of judgements landed on his desk to be scru-
tinised for errors in law or deliberate mandarinal obfusca-
tion designed to disguise abuse of process. If they found a 
problem, residents could not ~ask (the mandarins] to change 
a judgement they had pronounced, but (had] to leave them 
the entire responsibility for their actions vis-a-vis the 
1 ~9 The 1914 reports were the only ones available during 
my research. They are held at AEP Annam El, E2, and E3. 
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court'. 160 Instead, the abuses or errors they had discover-
ed had to be flagged for the Resident Superior's attention, 
and the files sent to Hue, where they piled up awaiting his 
final decision. 1 • 1 In practice, then, the integrity of the 
system depended mainly on the knowledge, interest, skills, 
and attitudes of a transitory handful of Frenchmen in the 
provinces, most of whom lacked the time or ability to check 
original documents (many still in Chinese) and probe the 
circumstances df apparently routine cases that crossed 
their desks. 
With such a system, 1920s residents could supervise 
mandarinal justice from their offices, and devote the rest 
of their time to the myriad new demands arising from the 
increased tempo of colonial change. It all depended on in-
dividual choices in particular circumstances, something 
local mandarins learned to note carefully. Where non-Viet-
namese speaking residents became distracted by other mat-
ters, or revealed themselves as too gullible, or too will-
in~ to accept ad hoc compromises, mandarinal corruption or 
abuse of power could flourish. Early 1920s Thanh-hoa pro-
vides an example. There the resident's blind trust allowed 
his Vietnamese clerks to form a cabal with certain district 
mandarins, supported in turn by their provincial superiors 
and protected from Hue, that tarried out 'intoler~ble exac-
1 • 0 A. Bonhomme, 'Annam', in GGIC, La Justice en Indo-
chine. Organisation g~n~rale. La Justice indig~ne (Paris, 
1931), pp.162-63. 
1 • 1 In 1925, one correspondent claimed a 300 case back-
log of files pending decision in Hue, with more arriving 
daily. a.I., 14 Feb 1925. 
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tions' 1 • 2 under the resident's unsuspecting nose. In 1920s 
Annam, the Protectorate system operated to facilitate rath-
er than di~courage such situations, for the colonial admin-
istration contained too many officials who 'could not find 
the necessary time to know [their] province[s], guide and 
supervise the mandarins, and repress abuses', and who con-
sequently discharged their functions from behind 'walls of 
ignorance'. 103 
Fiscal constraints helped foster the growth of danger-
ously irresponsible maladministration in rural Annam during 
the 1920s. At the same time, they handicapped the security 
service's ability to unco~ef and suppress ~ncipient politi-
cal opposition outside a small, well-known anti-colonial 
circle. io a very real extent, the SQrete's analysis of 
rural Annam in the 1920s rested on conjecture or political 
myth rather than on hard information. Apart from residents, 
who rarely afforded security matters the priority the ser-
vice thought they warranted, the skeletal SOrete in Hue de-
pended mainly on paid informers. As far as provincial man-
darins were concerned, little of value emerged. For all of 
1929 nothing untoward appeared in the reports of Nghe-an 
provincial mandarins to alert the Council of the coming 
storm, according to Resident Superior Le Fol's evidence to 
the Morche Commission. 1 • 4 
RS Pasquier's note of 13 Dec 1922, CPP, p.17. 
1 • 3 From Suignard's conclusions about the whole Service, 
including Annam officials. Les Services civils, pp.157-63 
(quotes p.157). 
1 • 4 MC interview 1, pp.7-8. [ADM !CNF 332/2684] Earlier 
he had explained that communist propaganda spread easily 
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Disarmed, the SOret6 never guessed at the real situa-
tion by the end of 1929. As late as June that year, SOret~ 
Chief Sogny predicted that no general disorder should be 
feared in Annam, ~neither for the present, nor it seem[ed] 
for the immediate future'. 1 •e Sogny never knew - then or 
later - that a clandestine anti-colonial group, the Tan 
Viet party, had recruited and organised hundreds of members 
in Nghe-Tinh villages since 1926; nor that their involve-
ment in local issues, especially defending communal land 
against usurpation by notables, had won them peasant res-
pect in numerous villages. 1 •• They would soon form the org-
anisational backbone of the Nghe-Tinh Soviet rebellion. 
When a wave of political assassinations rolled across rural 
Nghe-an from October 1929 to February 1930, leaving forty 
notables dead, 147 it quickly silenced all local informants. 
~because the surveillance of the native authorities was 
illusory and the Sarete only existed in an embryonic form' 
[p.2]. 
SOrete report for May-June, 1929, p.1. AEP GGIC 7 F 
16(3) 
1 •• Tan Viet leaders, arrested and released on bail in 
late 1929, concocted a cover story of political incompet-
ence and failure to penetrate the countryside. It matched 
Sarete expectations so perfectly that the French swallowed 
it whole. Bao Duy Anh, one of the leaders, later claimed 
the deception protected ~many hundreds of party members' in 
Nghe-Tinh, and 'over one hundred' members and aspirants in 
Hue alone. ['Hot vai Van khuc ve Bang Tan Viet', Tap San 
Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, No. 5 (Dec, 1978), pp.83-84.J Two Ha-tinh 
local histories, which noted 54 Tan Viet members in Thach-
ha and 25 in Can-loc districts alone, back his claim. They 
also detail Tan Viet involvement in land and other local 
struggles. Lich su Xo-viet Thach Ha tronq Cao Trao Xo-viet 
Nqhe-Tinh, 1930-31 (Ha-tinh, 1931), pp.18-23; and Lich su 
Xo-viet Can Loe tronq Phonq-trao Xo-viet Nqhe-Tinh, 1930-31 
(Can-lac, 1974), pp.22-26. 
L• 7 Evidence of Ho Bae Khai, governor of Nghe-an from 
February to September, 1930. MC interview 2, p.4. ADM ICNF 
332/2684 
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Hue never realised that a large-scale rebellion had actual-
ly begun. Even after a bloody May Day demonstration in Vinh 
in 1930 alerted the French to a security problem, it was 
not until violent demonstrations erupted in September that 
they realised the extent to which Protectorate power was 
crumbling in Nghe-Tinh villages,~•s and began to organise 
ruthless counter-measures. 
It was no accident that the longest-running twentieth 
century anti-colonial and pro-communist revolt in Vietnam 
should have occurred in late 1920s Trung-ky. In this region 
alone an under-funded and over-stretched colonial adminis-
tration, incapable of penetrating the countryside itself, 
had delegated the oversight of purely Vietnamese affairs to 
a self-serving mandarinate over whose members it exercised 
little effective control. As the 1920s progressed, the ad-
ministrative system that resulted allowed mandarinal cor-
ruption and abuse of power to flourish behind a facade of 
French supervision. In pursuit of their own self-interest, 
Vietnamese officials manipulated the information they pass-
ed to colonial authorities, withholding or colouring it to 
suit themselves rather than French political needs. In the 
end, the system b~came so flawed that it actually facili-
tated rebellion: not only did it allow a serious revolt to 
take root and grow, virtually without warning the French; 
but when the colonial authorities began belatedly to res-
pond to the challenge, the ineffectual administrative tools 
at their disposal only helped prolong the rebellion. 
~•a As the Morche Commission report, Part Two, clearly 
reveals. ADM !CNF 212/1597 
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But now let us move our focus from the administrative 
system to the two groups that supplied most of its members. 
We will consider the colonial collaborating elite first, 
before concluding the chapter with an outline of the French 
community in Annam. 
The Protectorate Elite of Colonial Trung-ky 
As in the nineteenth century, mandarinal families 
still comprised the core element of the twentieth century 
Trung-ky elite. But by 1908, both elite and mandarinal ad-
ministration were deep into a colonial transformation. The 
former predominance of the royal clan and of families from 
the old Bai-Nam political elite had slowly eroded from the 
1690s on. Privately distrustful of men who had held power 
under Tu-Bue, colonial officials replaced them on retire-
ment with former subordinates from the can vuong repression 
who seemed less doubtful in their eyes. The French clients 
that elbowed their way into the administrative elite now 
came largely either from lesser literati families, or from 
the Catholic community. The first were acceptable: in the 
nineteenth century, talented men from undistinguished lite-
rati backgrounds had often worked their way into the polit-
ical elite through talent, luck, and diligence, especially 
in bandit or rebel suppression. Catholics, on the other 
hand, had been social outcasts, and often figured among the 
bandits and rebels being suppressed. Their new elite status 
represented an extraordinary reversal that requires further 
comment. 
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Catholicism pre-dated colonialism in Trung-ky by more 
than two centuries. 109 The authorities had never welcomed 
it, however, because of its foreign derivation, its rejec-
tion of the ancestral cult, and the communal exclusiveness 
of its converts. Intermittent bans and persecutions began 
in the eighteenth century, but were suspended in the South 
during the Restoration in deference to Nguyen Anh's French 
and Catholic supporters. Gia-Long continued the policy of 
toleration but, frgm Minh-Mang on, l~ter Nguyen kings re-
verted to banning Christianity as a standing challenge to 
the universalist claims of the state ideology. 
Catholics appeared ipso facto as dissidents and paten-
tial rebels, both in the eyes of the state and of actual 
rebels who tried to enlist them as allies. 170 Some Christ-
ians also acted on their rebellious reputation in defiance, 
according to one missionary source, of their pastors. 171 
The most important, Ta Van Phung, instigated a major Le 
restorationist rebellion in the Red River delta in the 
early 1860s, with covert French support, partly to help 
1 • 9 For an introduction, see Nicole-Dominique Le, Les 
Missions-Etrangeres et la penetration fran~aise au Viet 
Nam, (Paris: Mouton, 1975), Chs 1-3; or The Hung, 'The 
Catholic Church and the French Colonisation', VS, No. 53 
(1978), pp~ 8-72 for a critical Vietnamese view. 
170 Hong-bao had tried to win Catholic support [Bui-
Quang-Tung, 'La succession de Thieu-Tri', BSEI (ns), XLII, 
1&2 (1967), pp.43-45) and they were also involved in Le Van 
Khoi's revolt in the South (1833-36). 
171 In 1859-60, according to Louvet in La Cochinchine 
religieuse, 'the bishop could not in conscience call on 
[Christians] to revolt against their legitimate sovereign;, 
asking 'are we to be taken for revolutionaries or Garibal-
dian condottiere?' Quoted in Jean Marquet and Jean Norel, 
'L'Occupation du Tonkin par la France (1873-74), d'apres 
des documents inedits', BSEI (ns), XI, 1 (1936), p.105. 
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relieve the French forces invading the South. 172 By then, 
of course, Catholics may have felt they had little more to 
lose: the ~9urt had already banished missionaries on pain 
of death (and executed recalcitrants), banned all Chris-
tians from the administration, and decreed their villages 
be broken up. 173 If so, they were wrong. As Vietnamese 
Catholics soon discovered, they still had their lives to 
lose; and many did, as events of the 1860s inextricably 
linked th~m i~ the popular mind with the foreign invaders 
as the enemy withi~~ 
The Treaty of 1862, which ceded three Nam-ky provin-
ces, had also imposed religious toleration, but Hue proved 
unable or unwilling to implement it. As public order dis-
integrated in the North from the 1860s on, polarisation 
along religious lines hardened, to the detriment of both 
sides. Religion and politics fatally entwined. Francis Gar-
nier's mad attempt to take Tonkin with a handful of troops 
in 1873 triggered the deaths of thousands, Catholic and 
non-Catholic, in an orgy of payback killings. 174 The Cath-
olic massacres in Nghe-Tinh during the Scholars' Revolt of 
the following year have already been mentioned. And Viet-
namese Christians, responding aggressively and at times 
with provocative opportunism, did lit~le to reduce the 
escalating violence. 
172 Georges Taboulet, La geste fran;aise en Indochine, II 
(Paris: Maisonneuve, 1956), p.492. 
173 Philippe Grandjean, Le Statut legal des missions 
catholigues et protestants en Indochine fran;aise (Paris: 
Recueil de Sirey, 1939), pp.27-38. 
Le, Missions-Etrang~res, pp.126-131. 
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Outside Nghe-Tinh, hatred simmered below the surface 
in Trung-ky until early 1884, when the first killings 
occurred~~7 ~ The real slaughter came a year later, when can 
vuong partisans settled accounts in a campaign which, in 
places, approached systematic extermination. In five weeks 
in Quang-tri, for instance, about half the Catholic popula-
tion was murdered, and many small settlements wiped out. 
Over eighty percent of the people of Cao-xa, maternal home 
of the later Chief Minister, Nguyen Huu Bai, died in a few 
days in September 1885. By October his old school, An-ninh 
Seminary, remained the sole Catholic community in Quang-tri 
not devastated, and then only because it had withstood as-
sault for nearly a month. 170 Bai himself had picked up a 
minor interpreting post in Hue the year before: it may well 
have saved his life. Certainly nowhere much outside Hue 
offered real safety for Catholics in late 1885. In August, 
for example, General de Courcy's dwindling command in Hue 
had reacted slowly to missionary accounts of the southern 
Trung-ky massacres. When help finally arrived, over twenty 
thousand Catholics had died, along with eight French miss-
ionaries. 177 Similar scenes bloodied the entire region; and 
17~ Delvaux, 'La Legation de France', pp.49-50. 
17* Pierre Jabouille, 'Une page de l'histoire du Quang-
Tri. Septembre 1885', BAVH, X, 4 (1923), pp.395-426 details 
a tally of 8,000 deaths. Also see A. Laborde, 'La Province 
de Quang-tri', BAVH, VIII, 3 (1921), pp.115-128. Father 
Girard, who withstood the siege, headed the seminary into 
the early 1920s. 
177 Delvaux, 'La Legation de France', p.67. Alfred 
Schreiner, Abrege de l'histoire d'Annam (Sai-gon, 1906), 
pp.426-29 claimed over 20,000 deaths in Binh-dinh alone (or 
nearly 60/. of the community), and all but two settlements 
destroyed. The Societe de Saint Augustin said about 30,000 
258 
some demographic data suggest that the Catholic communities 
from Quang-tri south had not yet recovered in the early 
1920s from-~he mid-1880s massacres.i 7 a 
For mission-educated Catholics who survived, the next 
years teemed with opportunities to join colonial military 
columns as interpreters and, in the process, to forge valu-
able links with French officers in the suppression of can 
vuong (and other) rebels. For men like Ngo Binh Khai 7 • and 
.N~uyen Huu Bai in the later 1890s, the backing won in these 
years served as a springboard for a jump into the mandarin-
ate at ~uch higher levels than their qualifications warran-
ted, or would have otherwise been possible.iQo At the time, 
they and others like them must have appeared, to French 
patrons and former enemies alike, as colonial stooges plan-
ted in the heart of the court. But their situation felt 
more ambiguous to the Catholics themselves, prompting num-
bers of them to refuse to act as simple French lackeys. As 
the later career of Nguyen Huu Bai in particular would 
illustrate, some Catholic mandarins in Annam accepted the 
Protectorate out of mutual interest rather than common 
cause. Other factors weighed too heavily with them. 
Catholics from Quang-nam south had been murdered between 
mid-July and September, because General de Courcy 'let it 
happen'. Souvenirs franco-tonkinois, 1879-1886 (Lille: Des-
clee, DeBrouwer, 1900), pp.247-48. 
L?a From a comparison of tables in 'Les Missions catholi-
ques en Indochine (Oct 1924)', p.93. AOM ICNF 198/1475 (1). 
VNDNTB, p.133. He was the father of Ngo Binh Diem. 
iQo Bai, as his enemies never forgot, was a mere 'scholar 
without academic title' when he joined the mandarinate. 
Nguyen Tien Lang, 'Quelques mandarins', p.131 
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Some were negative. Although the colonial military may 
have saved many Catholic lives in 1885-86, many thousands 
more had -b~en lost due to French unpreparedness and their 
tardy responses to Catholic pleas for help. Furthermore, 
not all French left their anti-clericalism at home when 
they went to Indochina, so that Vietnamese Catholic off i-
cials met discrimination and prejudice, as well as support 
and encouragement, from Frenchmen. 161 Experience also sug-
gested that if the French were saviours, they were not al-
ways reliable ones. For the new Catholic mandarins, prud-
ence dictated they forge links outside the French colonial 
establishment to balance their historically precarious 
position. Seeking to win over a covertly hostile, court-
based elite might req~ire tact and patience, but it entail-
ed no hardship. The seductive panoply of king, court, and 
mandarinate, so long denied them, beckoned the former Cath-
olic pariahs, even in its reduced colonial form. Once sett-
led in Hue, most quietly chose to emulate the cultural con-
servatism of the Hue-based elite rather than act as the 
Trojan horse for colonial change. 
The first glimmers of this unexpected development be-
came public in 1907, when the Catholic, Ngo Binh Kha, be-
came the only high court mandarin to protest the dethrone-
ment of Thanh-Thai publicly. His unlikely gesture of tradi-
tional propriety cost Kha his mandarinal position - and his 
1 Q 1 Thus a 1890 Tonkin resident closed churches, forbade 
new conversions, and invited recent converts to revert to 
their former religious status. 'Les missions catholiques ' 
p.105. AOM ICNF 198/1475 (1) 
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pension 1 e~ - but won precious praise for his gesture in the 
saying: 'day vua khong Kha, dao ma khong Bai~ (Kha would 
not overthi:-_c;iw the king, nor Bai violate the royal tomb). ie3 
How far the couplet circulated outside Catholic circles is 
moot, but its import was plain: on the two occasions when 
devotion to king and dynasty had been most recently tested, 
only Catholic ministerss had acted like true Confucians and 
loyal subjects. This proposition laid the groundwork for 
the later colonial rapprochement between the previous ene-
mies, an alliance of interests that came to define the Pro-
tectorate elite of Annam. 
In the early twentieth century, the glad Catholic 
embrace of elite cultural conservatism probably did more to 
stamp the style and character of the 1880s Hue-based calla-
berating elite onto its colonial successor than did many of 
those sprung from the older elite's own ranks. 1 e 4 By then, 
the brightest members of its first colonial generation, 
young imperial clansmen especially, had already reviewed 
their position under an interventionist Protectorate Gov-
ernment and begun moving to non-mandarinal careers. Any 
hopes princely families might have held of returning to the 
comparative financial security of earlier decades faltered 
in 1890 with the first reductions in state stipends. They 
On Levecque's orders. Nguyen The Anh, Phong-trao, p. 
10. 
iQ3 The second refers to Nguyen Huu Bai's sole objection 
among the ministers to Mahe's excavation of Tu-Buc's tomb. 
Quoted in VNDNTB, p. 259; and Duong Binh Khue, La Littera-
ture populaire vietnamienne (Sai-gon, 1967), p.40. 
ie4 The analysis derives from biographical details in 
contemporary journals, archival references, SN and BAVH. 
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vanished completely in 1903. Almost all the stipends that 
survived the second cuts, none of which could now be in-
herited, had emerged virtually worthless.iee Few of the 
thousand or so members of the imperial clanieo enjoyed in-
dependent wealth. Necessity compelled their sons to find a 
source of income. Some preferred to throw themselves on 
their families for support, with one disgruntled group tak-
ing this strategy to a sacrilegious extreme in 1902 by pil-
laging imperial ancestral tombs.ie 7 Most others, however, 
looked to the expanding opportunities that their privileged 
access to modern education made available. 
Royal clansmen and their upper elite relatives had 
flocked to the mandarinate after 1885; but in the 1890s and 
1900s few found favour on account of their parentage. Most 
lacked the one credential - active service in the can vuong 
repression - common to virtually all mandarins with the in-
ner running before 1908. While such French proteges could 
apparently do no wrong, or at least be waived punishment 
for their errors, mandarins from even the best connected 
families enjoyed no such latitude. A comparison of some ad-
ministrative sanctions illustrates the point. In 1897, as 
bo chanh· of Thanh-hoa, the Catholic Nguyen Huu Bai, sent a 
consignment of flawed fruit to the king as part of the pro-
~Qe In that year 387 stipends were fixed between 38 and 
400 piastres p.a. Letters of GG Broni, 6 Sept 1902 and of 
RS Groleau, 19 Jan 1909. AEP GGIC 9620 
~Q• My only hard data for the imperial clan are for 1820 
and 1943. For 1943, Ton That Con gave 4,922 imperial des-
cendants, with a further 5,800 in the ton that lineages. 
Hoang toe luoc bien (Hue, 1942), passim. 
Letter of RS Auvergne, 23 March 1903. AEP GGIC 9620 
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vince's annual tribute. Although fined a year's salary, his 
pardon followed immediately and he was soon promoted.~ee 
Six years later another bo chanh, this time the young Than 
Trong Hue in Quang-nam, lost four grades and was suspended 
for omitting a ritual gesture in a public ceremony. The two 
men could not have been more dissimilar. Scion of an old 
loyalist family and husband of one of Prince Kien-thai's 
daughters, Hue also boasted, uniquely for the time, seven 
years' education in France, including three at the Ecole 
coloniale.~e• It is possible that resentment at his French 
education partly explains the harshness of his punishment; 
but the poin€ is that no French official intervened to 
mitigate it, nor did the court feel obliged to tread care-
fully here as with Bai. Other anecdotal evidence equally 
supports the conclusion that only can vuong veterans won 
special French favour at the time.~•0 
Given all this, it is no surprise that when the Quoc 
Hoc college, with its modified French curriculum, opened in 
Hue in 1898, young royal clansmen and their upper elite re-
latives rushed to exploit their privileged access. For sev-
eral years after, half the students, and the great bulk of 
LQQ Nguyen Tien Lang, 'Quelques mandarins', p.133. Of 
course, favourable treatment of royal favourites could also 
occur traditionally. 
LQ<;> Ho ~ac Khai, ·s.E. Than Trong Hue',~' XIII, 3 
(1925), pp.209-10; and Pierre Pasquier's funeral speech, 
~' XIII, 3 (1925), pp.212-13. Hue worked in Tonkin until 
1921, when recalled by Pasquier as a minister. His marriage 
made him an uncle of king Khai-Dinh. 
L 9 o Ton That Tram and Tran Tram, both from old loyalist 
elite families, suffered similarly harsh punishments in the 
1890s. Nguyen Tien Lang, 'Quelques mandarins', pp.145-46 
and 155-56 respectively. 
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Quoc Hoc graduates, came from these circles. 191 Although 
most families ensured one son at least entered the mandari-
nate, other-s came under less pressure to follow suit. Many 
young Quoc Hoc graduates therefore moved straight from the 
college into the lower levels of the French ~dministration 
as secretaries, clerks, and interpreters, positions else-
where filled by much less exalted individuals. 192 A small 
number went further, electing to study western versions of 
traditional professions like medicine and teaching in high-
er colonial institutions. Three of Prince Tuy-ly's grand-
sons, for example, stood among the first such profession-
ally qualified Vietnamese in these fields in Annam. 192 In 
1907, as Phan Chu Trinh and his reformist friends argued 
about the need for modern education with conservative lit-
erati, Ung-thong, an early graduate of the Hanoi Medical 
Faculty, was quietly starting to work in Hue Hospital. 
After 1908, when Klobukowski's reforms enshrined res-
pect for local customs and traditions (and for those who 
symbolised them) as official Protectorate policy, young 
1 • 1 They formed a disproportionately higher number of 
graduates as, unlike others who took private jobs before 
finishing, they rarely quit early. L'Annam scolaire, pp.96-
101; P. Antoine, 'L'Enseignement• BAVH, XVIII, 1&2 (1931), 
p.183; and E. Le Bris, 'Le Quoc Hoc', ~' III, 1 (1916), 
p.80. 
1 • 2 For_ example, Ung-uy, 1905-1915 [SN, p.101]; Ung-bang, 
1902-17 [SN, p.3]; Ung-binh, 1904-1911 [SN, p.5]; Buu-
trung, 1912-31 [SN, p.96]; or Buu-thao, 1907-1920 [SN, p. 
83]. 
1 •: Ung-thong [SN, p.87], and his cousins Ung-qua, a tea-
~her, and Ung-heat, a later graduate of the Hanoi medical 
faculty. L~on Sogny, 'Les families illustres: Son Altesse 
le prince Tuy-Ly•, BAVH, XVI, 4 (1929), p.198 for examples 
of the professions practiced among his 400 descendants. 
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elite men found the road to mandarinal success once more 
smooth. Biographies in Souverains et Notabilites de l'Indo-
chine fran~4ise,i•4 admittedly a limited source, show seve-
ral, whose careers had begun in teaching or the French aux-
iliary bureaucracy, now drifting back into the mandarinate 
under the changed conditions.i•~ The traditional cachet at-
tached to being an official still exercised its allure, and 
so too, no doubt, did the easing of Protectorate pressure 
on its Vietnamese collaborators. Even so, not everyone re-
turned exclusively to the mandarinal path. The early explo-
ration of non-mandarinal activities continued. In Annam, 
members of the older, pre-colonial elite thus beat everyone 
but Catholics by a generation into the new professions and 
opportunities created by colonialism. They became leaders 
in the new fields. Pioneering entrants in the colonial 
bureaucracy now equally found their families· connections, 
prestige, and status won them influence among their peers. 
And if they tired of the French service, their language 
skills and family contacts eased lateral transfers into 
senior mandarinal positions. Thai Van Toan, a grandson of 
Prince Tung-thien, provides one outstand~ng example. After 
graduating from the Ha-noi College of Interpreters in 1900, 
Toan joined the Protectorate service where he later headed 
Hanoi: IDEO, 1943. 
i•~ So many that, in 1936, one-third (or 23/67) superior 
mandarins were royal clan members, despite fifty retire-
ments in 1933-34. Jumper and Hue, Political and Administra-
tive History, p.100. The high proportion arose from special 
treatment for royal clan members, which had seen 'several~ 
become provincial governors out of turn, according to CM, 
29 Sept 1931. ADM ICNF 290/2505 
265 
the employees' Amicale des Fonctionnaires Indigene des 
Residences, before transferring to the mandarinate in 1924. 
A minister-by 1929, he remained in Bao-Bai's cabinet until 
1941. l. 9 <!:> 
Similarly when the tiny professional sector began to 
expand in the 1920s, Tuy-ly's grandson, Ung-thong, emerged 
as the doyen of Vietnamese doctors in Annam and a leading 
member of several medical and educational societies.i97 By 
then the next generation of the collaborating elite had 
begun to emulate the pioneers, but in far more diverse 
fields. For instance, the sons of the 1910s minister Ho Bae 
Trung (himself a grandson of Prince Tung-thien) spread 
themselves between the mandarinate, surgery, mining engi-
neering, law, and pharmacy.i 9 e In their case, as in many 
others, elite families prolonged their early advantage by 
using their impeccable credentials as loyal collaborators 
(and their greater resources) to send sons, and occasional-
ly daughters, to study in France. Descendants of nineteenth 
century luminaries even moved into commerce. The Quang-ngai 
grandsons of Truong Bang Que, for example, became business-
men in the 1920s, successfully exploiting their access to 
i 9 • SN, p.93 for a career summary. For family details, 
see Le Breton, 'Hong Khang', p.174. 
i 97 Apart from official appointments like to the Grand 
Council of Economic and Financial Interests in 1935-36, he 
also belonged to various charitable organisations and had 
been a founder member of the Du Hoc Hoi, an association for 
promoting overseas study founded in 1927 in Hue. SN, p.87 
i 9 s Ho Bae Khai (SN, p.39) became the high mandarin in 
Annam. His brothers Di (SN, p.18), Lien (~, p.49), Biem 
(SN, p.19), and An (~, p.19) respectively took profession-
al degrees in France. 
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capital and official contacts;i 99 while another of Tuy-ly's 
ubiquitous grandsons, Ung-du, the local agent for Standard 
Oil and De~obert et Fiard between 1907 and 1914, moved into 
plantation agriculture.~00 Others settled for more parasit-
ic activities like acting as guarantors for public works 
contracts,~0 i something that might have been quite lucrat-
ive in the 1920s when the public sector, and construction 
especially, boomed. 
As their forebears had done under Minh-Mang, in the 
early decades of colonialism leading families in the old 
Nguyen loyalist elite proved once again able to change 
their spots to save their skins. Families whose interests 
and commitments had pushed them to collaborate in 1885 re-
mained resilient enough to respond pragmatically to what-
ever opportunities arose in the rapidly changing times. It 
goes without saying that these qualities of flexibility, 
pragmatism, and a relative openness to the new found no 
echo in the little China fallacy, nor the later French myth 
of 6ld~ tr~ditional Annam; Yef many olde~- eli~e families in 
the early twentieth century displayed these attributes, 
just as they had in the nineteenth. Even so, the most sur-
prising example of their willingness to modify former atti-
tudes in response to new circumstances remained, as noted 
earlier, their willingness to accommodate formerly-despised 
i 99 They were sons of Truong Quang Bang. A. Laborde, 'La 
Province de Quang-ngai', BAVH, XIII, 3 (1925) p.166. 
~00 SN, p.22. 
=0 i For examples, see Nguyen Van Trinh and Ung-Trinh, 'Le 
Quoc Tu Giam', BAVH, IV, 1 (1917), pp.48-49. 
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local Catholics within elite ranks. 
The rapprochement that started with Ngo Binh Kha in 
1907 blossomed in the 1920s on the basis of strong Catholic 
commitment to the monarchy. Nothing could have suited the 
older Hue elite more. Their whole position in the Protect-
orate hinged crucially on preserving the Nguyen monarchy. 
Without a king there would be no court, no ministers, and 
no Government of Annam, for Vietnamese administration would 
stop at the provincial level as in the North and South. 
Exactly why Catholics became such avowed monarchists is 
less immediately obvious. Part of the reason probably lay 
in the same desire for acceptance that had motivated the 
first generation of Catholic mandarins. But perhaps equally 
as important was the influence of mission conservatism. 202 
Once assured of security of person and property, and 
with freedom of religion guaranteed, the missions and lead-
ing Catholic families in the early twentieth century found 
much to admire in the authoritarian traditional kingdom. 
Like the missions,. it had demanded respect for existing 
order and hierarchy, of which monarchy remained the great 
enduring symbol. It had also upheld similar values like 
moderation, propriety, obedience to authority, and accept-
ance of one's lot in life. By the late 1920s, Catholic con-
servatism in Annam, as expressed in a 1927 anti-communist 
tract by a well-connected Vietnamese priest, had attained a 
level of autocratic elitism and reactionary conservatism 
202 Thus it was not until the 1930s that the apostolic 
vicariats of the Societe des Missions etrangeres changed 
their seventeenth century names and configurations to re-
flect contemporary realities. · 
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that would have passed unnoticed at Tu-Buc's court. In an 
apocalyptic vision of universal collapse into communist 
chaos, from--which only the Catholic Church could save the 
world, Father J-M Thich denounced communism for 203 
taking current events and politics, which are the 
business of government, and discussing them with 
the poor and the young, who do not know how to 
reflect on things and examine them properly, [in 
order to] take advantage of the wickedness and 
greed of the lower orders, and with wild and 
violent means to speed their aims. 
Buried in a footnote there appeared an astonishing eulogy 
to the system of. government that had martyred his nineteen-
th century co-religionists. It suggests just how deep the 
anachronistic Catholic attachment to the monarchy and the 
institutions of the pre-colonial kingdom could run. 204 
The hoang trieu hoi dien, the laws of Gia-Long 
and Minh-Mang, are important and it is not true 
that they are no good, that we should follow 
the laws of European civilisation. It is still 
unnecessary to change. The social organisation of 
earlier days ~excluding the program of studies 
and religion) was truly excellent. 
By the end of the 1920s, only mission opposition to 
mixed marriages prevented leading Catholic families from 
full integration into the older court-based elite. But even 
here the Church ultimately fell short of its goal. In 1933 
the marriage of young king Bao-Bai to a wealthy Southern 
Catholic heiress finally provided a symbolic representation 
of the attachment of Vietnamese Catholics to the protected 
~·:.3 Van de conq san (La Question du communisme) (Qui-
nhon, 1927), p.33. The Protectorate paid for a second edit-
ion. Annam SOret~ report, Nov 1927. AEP GG 7 F16 (1) His 
father had been a senior court official. 
Ibid, p.35, fn 1. 
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throne. The union roused great Church opposition. The Vati-
can refused a special dispensation for any future children, 
. 
while the br.ide's father and uncle, two of the missions 
chief patrons in Cochinchina, found themselves briefly ex-
communicated for refusing to withdraw from it. Without Gov-
ernor-General Pasquier's personal backing, the marriage may 
never have taken place.~oe All the fuss proved that for a 
less politically sensitive cause, and a less exalted per-
sonage, the prospects of intermarriage without conversion 
still remained vanishingly slight. But by then the need for 
such reinforcing family bonds had lessened, thanks to the 
1920s fusion of Catholic and "Confucian" conservatisms as 
the basis of the new Protectorate elite. 20• 
• 11 • II This Catholic alliance, seconded by its members' stra-
tegic early expansion throughout the new colonial sector, 
helped ensure that many older elite families around the 
throne survived the difficult transitionary years to emerge 
later at the head of the new colonial collaborating elite. 
They set the style that others followed. Individuals from 
these older elite families, and imperial descendants in 
~0 e RS Thibaudeau's report, July 1934, pp.19-23. [ADM 
ICNF 330/2664] He does not give Pasquier's reasons, though 
he may have seen the marriage as a symbolic means of draw-
ing Southerners, Catholics, and French educated youth to 
the throne. Her family's wealt~ also undoubtedly helped, 
given the state of the Annam treasury. Bao-Dai does not 
mention Pasquier's involvement beyond saying he introduced· 
them in Ba-lat: he may not have known of it. Bao-Dai, Le 
Dragon d'Annam (Paris: Plon, 1980) 
20• Ngo Binh Diem embodied this Catholic/Confucian fus-
ion. Thus the 1950s American dispute over 'whether Diem 
[was] basically a Confucianist with a Catholic overlay, or 
vice versa• [Bernard Fall, The Two Vietnams (New York and 
London, 1963), pp.236-37] was a historical nonsense based 
on ignorance of colonial Annam. 
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particular, formed the public face of the Protectorate 
elite for most French officials. They worked opposite each 
other in "ti}~ ·provinces, 207 while in Hue they also socialis-
ed together in key cultural, educational, and charitable 
organisations. The Amis du Vieux Hue (AVH), the Enseigne-
ment mutuel, and the Ligue des Amis de l'Annam209 provided 
a social stage on which the collaborating elite could enact 
legitimising traditional virtues like scholarship, benevol-
ence, and civic-mindedness, while underscoring their status 
in more or less equal relationships with the French. 209 
Members of the older elite also led many of the progressive 
associations set up in 1920s Trung-ky. For example, the 
first Vietnamese women's association in the area was estab-
lished in Hue in 1926 by Sam-Phuong, daughter of a prince 
and herself married into one of the great loyalist families 
from the chua era, the Nguyen Khoa. 2 ~0 Then when the 1930s 
207 In -the 1920s, e~ery Annam province was headed at 
least once by men ' from the imperial clan or who were 
matrilineal descendants of Nguyen kings, not to mention 
several others in ton that lin~ages. 
208 The Enseignement mutuel, under the patronage of the 
Alliance fran~aise, was active in Hue from 1914, with other 
branches at Thanh-hoa, Ha-tinh and Quang-ngai. Letter from 
Deletie, Inspecteur-conseil to RS Annam, 8 Jan 1915. AEP 
Annam R1. The other two are discussed below. 
209 They were also used to vet socially ambitious indivi-
duals from outside upper elite circles. Denis Le Phat An, 
rich uncle of the future Nam-Phuong empress, won entree to 
Hue elite circles in this way, mainly through charitable 
activities in the Ligue des Amis de l'Annam. CATK, 17 July 
1928 and 7 Aug 1929] He was also an AVH member, as was Nam-
Phuong' s younger sister briefly. 
2 ~0 A grand-daughter of Minh-Mang. In 'Voi nu su Bam Phu-
ong', Song Huong, No. 12, April 1985, np, Tran thi Nhu Man 
said Bam-Phuong had herself needed to use the domestic 
skills she later taught in the Nu Cong Hoc Hoi (Women's 
Work-Study Association) because her new husband's family, 
the Nguyen Khoa, were 'in decline·. If so, it must have 
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Buddhist regeneration movement reached Annam via the Hue 
Society for Buddhist Studies, Bam-Phuong's brother-in-law, 
-
the retired-minister Nguyen Khoa Tan, became its first pre-
sident, 211 followed by one of her nephews, Ung-bang. 212 The 
later 1920s Association to Encourage Study in the West, 
(An-nam Nhu-Tay Du-hoc-bao-tro-hoi) under the presidency of 
the Catholic Chief Minister, Nguyen Huu Bai, provided the 
main exception. Even so, men from older elite families 
still figured prom±nently among its other office holders 
and council members. 21~ 
By the start of the 1920s, almost everything the Fren-
ch saw in Annam, and almost all the Vietnamese they asso-
ciated with on a relatively equal footing, repeatedly vali-
dated in their eyes the colonial image of a region steeped 
in its age-old Sinic past. Yet, as we have seen, this pie-
ture was historically false or misleading on almost every 
count. Outside Thanh-Nghe-Tinh, Trung-ky lacked the depth 
of Chinese tradition found in the North: the nineteenth 
century spread of Chinese orthodoxy in Nguyen government 
and Trung-ky society stood in contrast to two centuries of 
been early in the century, as two of her husband's broth-
ers, Tan and Ky, later became Council ministers. For the 
Association, see David G. Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on 
Trial, 1920-1945 (University of California Press, 1981), 
pp.214-16. 
211 For a short biography, see Nguyen Tien Lang, 'Quel-
ques mandarins·, pp.160-61. 
212 §ti, p.3. Joined the Residency Service in 1902 as a 
Secretary. Moved to the mandarinate in 1917 and reached 
tong doc of Binh-dinh in 1930. Retired 1936. President of 
the Society for the Study and Exercise of Buddhism in Annam 
in 1941, AVH member 1916 to 1931. 
213 Plus some newer colonial families. They are listed in 
its journal, Du Hoc Bao, No.3, 1 Sept 1927, pp.14 and 32. 
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quite different experience in former Bang-trong. In the 
colonial era, too, "old, traditional Annam" was no timeless 
-land wedded_to its Sinic heritage in anything but French 
myth. On the contrary, its leading families had success-
fully met the colonial challenge in the early twentieth 
century, just as they done previously under Ming-manh. 
Against much tougher odds this time, they had neutralised 
the threat posed by the Catholics, the single group that 
might have monopolised the vital intermediary role between 
French rulers and Vietnamese subjects. Instead of competing 
with their former enemies, Catholic mandarinal families 
threw in their lot with them in a process that made many 
almost indistinguishable, socially and culturally, from 
their elite models. Their adopted elite values spread a 
patina of "tradition" over the new Catholic mandarins that 
hid from casual French observers just how extraordinary, in 
historical terms, was their presence at the heart of the 
new colonial elite. 
That so many Frenchmen, officials especially, failed 
to understand what was happening in front of them testifies 
in part to the power of their own preconceptions, and to 
the explanatory force of the colonial myths of Vietnamese 
society and culture constellating around them in Annam at 
the same time. We will complete the chapter by sketching 
the French community, whose members contributed so much to 
the final form of those myths. 
The French Community in Annam 
Whife_Jt is convenient to refer to "the French in 
Indochina", ::u. 4 the phrase can be deceptive. It conjures up 
a unitary image when in fact the small civil French popu-
lation, only thirty thousand by 1930, 21 ~ subdivided into 
local communities that could vary considerably in social 
composition, as well as in the interests and expectations 
of their members. During most of the period under review, 
the French community of Annam stood at one extreme of the 
colonial social continuum. Its members faced challenges 
from their environment quite at odds with those experienced 
by most of their their fellows in Cochinchina or Tonkin, 
while its peculiar social profile before the mid-1920s re-
inforced its members' sense of parochial difference. 
In the first place, the community was tiny: the 1921 
census counted 1,843 French in Annam, or barely 12% of the 
total in Vietnam. And unlike Tonkin or Cochinchina, they 
overwhelmingly comprised single or unaccompanied males. 
Most worked for the colonial administration, with profes~ 
sionals like teachers and doctors, or lesser functionaries 
in services like customs or public works, far outnumbering 
the fifty administrators of the Civil Service. Missionaries 
The best general work is Meyer, La Vie guotidienne, 
passim. 
21 ~ Of the 16,256 French in Indochina in 1921, 14,563 
were in Vietnam. By 1929, the civil population had reached 
30,040, with 27,400 in Vietnam. For 1921, 'La population de 
.l'Indochine', BEI, 153, Mar-Ap 1922, p.163. For 1929, 'La 
population europeene de l'Indochine', BEI, Jan 1930-A, 
pp.A38-A40 
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formed the next largest group. Outside three towns (Tour-
ane, Hue, and Thanh-Hoa), population density was very low: 
-
as late as.1923, for example, all the French in Ha-tinh 
province (plus the provincial mandarins) could still dine 
together in one room. 2 i 0 And until the 1920s' expansion in 
the means of communication, some still remained days, rath-
er than hours as elsewhere in most of colonial Vietnam, 
from their nearest fellows. Even after new roads had been 
built, old reputations died hard. In the mid-1920s, for in-
stance~ Protectorate officials reputedly still considered 
Quang-ngai a 'filthy posting where fever, boredom, and iso-
lation wore down the miserable, poorly-connected [soul] 
that the Administration sen(t] there.· 2 i 7 This reflected 
that fact that, until repairs to the Mandarinal Road during 
the War, it had taken eight days' march from Faifoo or Qui-
nhon to reach the Residency. No comparable posts had exist-
ed in the South for decades, and only parts of the distant, 
predominately non-Vietnamese, mountain border provinces 
rivalled it in the North. 
The second peculiarity of the French community in An-
nam - its largely official derivation - reflected the rela-
tive lack of new colonial entreprises here. Notwithstanding 
Doumer's blithe predictions of rapid economic development, 
Trung-ky rarely attracted colons or investors. 2 ie It held 
ATK, 4-5 June 1923. 
2 i 7 A. Laborde, 'La province de Quang-Ngai', BAVH, XII, 3 
(1925), p.153. For 1920s road building, see De Fargues, 
'Travaux publiques', BAVH, XVIII 1&2 (1931), pp.213-18. 
~~~ For Doumer, see Situation, pp.56-60. Yet Auvergne had 
reported that French concessions only rose from 6 to 42 
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no easily accessible, unexploited natural resources like 
the Northern coalfields; nor large tracts of semi-wasteland 
suitable "for ·quick agricultural development, like the Mek-
ong delta marshes. On the contrary, it contained some of 
the worst terrain, poorest land, and most erratic climate 
in Indochina. Until the 1920s, footpaths outnumbered roads, 
and few commercially viable links existed to the mountain-
ous hinterland. And topping off the other drawbacks, almost 
no reliable economic information could be had about the 
region. When Doumer founded the Annam Mixed Chamber of Ag-
riculture and Industry in 1900, that 55 of its 110 members 
described themselves as missionary-planters, comp•red to a 
mere 15 colon-planters, was not surprising. 21 • Until after 
the First World War, under-capitalised, part-time planters, 
whether officials or missionaries, numerically predominated 
in a colonial agricultural sector limited to the small-
scale production of tea, coffe~, share~cropped rice, and 
animal pasturage. Between 1903 and 1924, the total acreage 
under concession scarcely changed (41,000 h. to 44,000 h.), 
while the actual area under production never topped 20,000 
hectares until 1925. 220 In agriculture, as in every other 
between 1897 and 1901 ('Note', pp.433-35). A rare success-
ful businessman like H.Bogaert had to spread his interests 
very widely to off-set the smallness of the economy. H. 
Bogaert, 'Thaun An de 1883 a nos jours', BAVH, VII, 3 
(1920), pp.329-40; and ATK, 12 Ap 1926. 
Meyer, La Vie guotidienne, p.240. 
220 Pasturage or low value rice fields took up half. For 
1903, see RS Auvergne, 'Rapport de la Conseil superieur·, 
B1_, No.256, 14 Sept 1903, p.834. For 1924, F. Roule, 'Annam 
- La Colonisation', !iaY.!i, XVIII, 1&2 (1931), p.240. 
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colonial sector, growth stalled until the mid-1920s - and 
even then much of it only happened on paper. 221 
TABLE 1: FRENCH POPULATION OF COLONIAL VIETNAM, 1929 
Ann cc TK VN all IC 
men 1449 6120 3454 11023 12372 
women 624 4431 2871 7926 8582 
boys* 479 2055 1721 4255 4584 
girls* 447 1853 1896 4196 4502 
civilians 2999 14459 9942 27400 30040 
military 399 2016 5920 8335 8490 
total 3~99· ·1647'5 ·15B62 35735 38530 
* Under· 15 ye~rs 
Source: 1929 Census [BEI, Jan 1930-A, pp.A38-A40] 
The demographic imprint of this masculine, bureaucrat-
ic community remained at the end of the 1920s, as the 1929 
census summary in Table One shows. In Annam, males over the 
age of 15 still comprised nearly 50% of the civil commun-
ity, compared to 37% in Cochinchina and 22% in Tonkin. In 
1929, women still accounted for ba~ely 21% of the French 
ti~il population in Trung-ky, com~are~,to approximately 30% 
in the other two Vietnamese pays. Even so, this was much 
higher than in the pre-War years. 
221 The 1920s mining boom typifies the problem. From 1925 
to 1931, Annam averaged 27% of personal authorisations per 
year; but at the same time its average share of active per-
mits fell ~o 17.5%)> as did requests for concessions (to 
12%). Actual production averaged a mere 0.75% of the Indo-
china total, peaking in 1930 at 2% of the colony's mineral 
output. ~My calculations from figures in 'Renseignements 
d'Indochine. L'Industrie miniere de l'Indochine en 1932', 
BEI- B, Sept-Dec 1933, pp.875-83.] The late 1920s rubber 
speculation in the highlands equally brought little actual 
development: of the 87,133 h. under provisional concession 
in 3 provinces in 1929, only 7,818 (or 9'l.) were cultivated. 
My calculations from Rapport agricole de l'Annam pour 
l'annee 1929 (Hanoi, 1930), p.84. 
277 
278 
Similarly, if we examine the professions of adult men 
in 1929, as given in Table Two below, we find that almost 
half sti 11---worked for the administration, compared to one 
fifth in Cochinchina or one-third in Tonkin. Again, the 
TABLE 2: ACTIVE CIVIL POPULATION BY PROFESSIONS, 1929 
a. officials Ann cc TK 
m f m f m f 
colonial services 82 642 10 476 28 
municipal " 103 1 56 2 
customs 159 1 295 15 231 14 
public work~ 89 150 121 1 
post c:sffice 38 4 117 30 99 36 
justi.ce 6 123 1 55 1 
teaching 28 23 149 138 139 133 
police, GI etc 102 229 2 220 4 
others 62 17 
totals 566 45 1808 197 1397 209 
b. non-officials (men only) 
Ann cc TK total 
agriculture/hunting/ 
fishing 173 446 117 736 
extracting industries 16 48 64 
trans formative II 62 653 352 1067 
transport 40 347 204 591 
banking 305 60 365 
hotels 39 113 69 221 
commerce 91 2266 434 2811 
religious 163 150 207 520 
private education 43 29 72 
judiciary 3 118 23 144 
unemployed 4 33 29 66 
totals 591 4494 1922 6657 
Source: 1929 Census, BEI, Jan 1930-A, pp.A38-A40 
majority filled low status positions in customs, public 
works, or the post office. Elite administrators of the Ser-
vices civils provided a tiny 14.51. of government employees 
in Annam, compared to an average of 351. in the other Viet-
namese regions. In addition, employment opportunities out-
side the administration still remained limited. More than 
half the non-official adult males in Annam clustered in two 
census categories: agriculture, hunting and fishing (29/.); 
and religiQ~S (27/.). 222 The small proportion of commercial 
employees indicated the low level of economic development, 
despite the hopes of the mid-1920s. Only 15/. of non-offi-
cial adult males here made their living in commerce, com-
pared to 51/. in the South and 22.5% in the North. 
However, the 1929 census did capture the significant 
underlying change of the 1920s - the gradual growth of urb-
an family life as the French community norm (although still 
on a small scale compared to the other regions). From 1921 
to 1929 the French population of Trung-ky almost doubled 
(from 1,843 to 3,398). As children under fifteen and their 
non-working mothers formed half the French population by 
the end of the decade, it must be assumed that they accoun-
ted for much of the 1920s demographic growth. This develop-
ment re-organised interests and changed priorities within 
the community to bring them more into line with the desire 
and expectation of post-War Fren. •ch residents in Annam to 
'-.;' 
lead a more normal family life than had their predecessors. 
By the end of the 1920s, Annam had ceased to be the 
isolated, exotic backwater of earlier years, 223 both in 
French perception and experience. The spread of roads and 
motor vehicles stimulated the existing trend of focusing on 
Residency towns: more distant, rural d~legations were clos-
2 a2. Cf. 13/. in the South and 17/. in the North. 
2~•. For a personal comparison between the pre-War situa-
tion and the late 1920s see Rene Vanlande's 1930 interview 
with GG Pasquier. ATK, 18 Nov 1930. 
279 
ed, 224 while officials limited their tournees to day trips 
to the parts of their provinces accessible by car. The ad-
vent of sanitation and paved roads, plus the addition of 
sporting and other facilities, provided welcome amenities 
that improved life in provincial seats, as did the supply 
of piped water and electricity by private entrepreneurs 
from the mid-1920s. 22~ It all helped to tame the foreign 
perils of tropical Asia and, ultimately, to insulate newer 
members of the French community materially and socially 
from their otherwise alien surroundings. By. the end of the 
1920s, the colonial retreat to Residency towns had effect-
ively left only missionaries, colons, and petty functiona-
ries of the Garde indigene, Forestry, and Customs services 
in the countryside. There may well have been fewer French 
in the hinterland in 1930 than there had been under Doumer 
thirty years before. 
However, this transformation of French perceptions of 
Annam did not derive solely from 1920s material changes. 
Its psychological roots lay in the 1910s, when the need to 
accommodate French colonialism to "Annamite tradition" had 
pushed many leading French figures here into reworking 
existing colonial political myths as a means of resolving 
their predicament. Chapter Six considers this process; so 
for the moment we shall simply note its significance, and 
2 &4. RS Le Fol, MC interview 1, p.34. ADM !CNF 332/2684. 
22d. For examples, see reports on activities in Nha-trang 
(Annam, 20 May 1926), Bong-hoi (~, 13 Jan 1924) and Ha-
tinh (ATK, 4-5 June 1923). Electricity reached Faifoo and 
Qui-nhon in late 1925 and early 1926 (ATK, 6 and 30 Jan 
1926), while piped water reached Ha-tinh town in late 1926 
(ATK, 2 Mar 1926). 
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not digress too far from the aim of this chapter, which is 
limited to presenting the specific circumstances in which 
they myths-~lourished. To that end, most of this section 
focuses on the 1910s and early 1920s. 
At that time, French society in Trung-ky largely com-
prised single men drawn from two extremely hierarchical 
organisations, the colonial administration and the Catholic 
Church. Its ruling ethos reflected these bureaucratic and 
hierarchical origins, with seniority and official position 
conferring (and defining) social status. At its apex stood 
the Resident Superior, with the various Heads of Protector-
ate or General Government services below him. Provincial 
residents and heads of the bureaux of the Residence Super-
ior, flanked by the Hue Commandant of Troops and the four 
French bishops of Annam's apostolic vicariats, ranked next. 
Then came a sprinkling of long-term and relatively success-
ful local businessmen, like Monp~zat, Bogaert, and Rigaux, 
who moved easily in official circles and often represented 
Annam on various quasi-official consultative councils. 
In the newly-complicated political conditions after 
1908, many of these men, officials especially, became in-
volved in trying to understand the mysteries of the "Annam-
ite soul" (1 'ame annamite) in order to contain or neutral-
ise the potentially perilous force of tradition in Annam. 
Their personal circumstances encouraged the endeavour: un-
like any other time, in the years between 1908 and the ear-
ly 1920s comparatively few social, familial, or other bar-
riers separated Frenchmen in Annam from their Vietnamese 
environment. While some welcomed the chance to immerse 
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themselves in Vietnamese elite culture, many more felt psy-
chologically exposed, as they tried to negotiate the hidden 
pitfalls -i~ __ c.ollaborating with Vietnamese and respecting 
local traditions, institutions, and customs. For them, 
Georges Mahe's 1913 disgrace provided a worrying reminder 
of the high price that falling too foul of "Annamite trad-
ition" might exact from their own careers. 
Fortunataly, anxious times called forth their own 
solution. In that same year an organisation appeared in Hue 
that quickly devoted itself almost exclusively to charting 
the depths of the Annamite soul ~ the Association des Amis 
du Vieux Hue (AVH). The AVH owed its existence to mission-
ary Father Leopold Cadiere, 220 a devotee of Vietnamese lan-
guage, history, and culture who had lived among his parish-
ioners in rural Quang-tri and Quang-binh since 1895. In 
1913, alarmed at the visible deterioration of historical 
sites, and fearful that the past was 'disappearing before 
our very eyes', 227 he organised seventeen French and Viet-
22• Arriving in 1892, he took up a missionary post three 
years later. A major ethnographer and linguist, a corres-
ponding member of the EFEO, he was the main force behind 
AVH as editor of its Bulletin. Detained by the Viet Minh 
(1945-53), he stayed in Vietnam till his death. For short 
biographies, see Bernard Bourotte, 'Notes sur le R.P. Cadi-
ere (14 Fevrier 1869 - 6 Juillet 1955)', BS.E.L (ns), XXXI, 2 (1956), pp.135-39; or Bui-Quang-Tung, 'Le R.P. Leopold Ca-
diere (1869-1955)', BEFEO, XLIX, 2 (1959), pp.649-57. For 
his vast output, see Georges Condominas, 'Deux grands eth-
nologues pratiquement inconnus de la profession: Les peres 
Fran~ois Cal let et Leopold Cadiere', in Britte Rupp-Eisen-
reich (ed), Histoires de l'anthropologie: XVI-XIX siecles 
(Paris: Klinsieck, 1984), pp.167-95. 
22~. Cadiere explaining to Bao-Bai why the AVH had been 
founded twenty years before. 'Documents concernant !'Asso-
ciation. Seance du 28 Mars 1933. Reception de S.M. l'Emp~­
reur', BAVH, XX, 4 (1933), p.315. 
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namese friends in Hue 228 into a modest learned society 
pledged to 'research, conserve, and transmit old memories 
of a political, religious, artistic, and literary order, 
both European and indigenous, that attach[ed] to Hue and 
its surroundings'. 229 These recovered materials, and the 
discoveries he anticipated from members' research missions 
into the countryside, would then be published in a quarter-
ly bulletin 'of a scientific character', 230 the Bulletin 
des Amis du Vieux Hu~. 
But far greater needs were to kidnap Cadiere's censer-
vation project, transforming his humble learned society 
into the darling of the Protectorate and the organisational 
expression of French life in Hue. In its heady first dee-
ade, these needs turned the AVH into the dream factory in 
which local French mythologists crafted and burnished the 
versions of the Vietnamese past and visions of the Franco-
Vietnamese future that we will discuss in Chapter Six. The 
speed with which the AVH's influenc~ spread suogests the 
timelin~ss df~its d~eafion. ~ithin a year its original mem-
bership had tripred and, more significantly, it had enlist-
ed the official (and personal) backing of both Governor-
General Sarraut and Resident Superior Charles. By 1917, its 
now 209 ordinary members already included most senior ad-
22Q They included Leon Sogny, permanent Head of the Annam 
saret~ (1916-1941), and two top officials of the later 
1920s, Bonhomme and Le Fol. The three Vietnamese were 
prince Buu-liem, Bao Thai Hanh, and Nguyen Binh Hoe. BAVH, 
I, 1 (1914), p.93. 
2 29 L. Cadiere, 'Statuts de l'Association', BAVH, I, 1 
(1914), p.87. 
2zo Ibid, p.88. 
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ministrators and residents in Annam, among whom numbered 
four future Residents Superior (Fries, Jabouille, Le Fol, 
and Ch~tel). 231 Current or later Heads of Protectorate Ser-
vices like Education (Deletie), Treasury (Gras), Health 
(Sallet, Normet, and Gaide), Forestry (Guibier), and Secur-
ity (Sogny) also figured among its active members. Leading 
businessmen like Bogaert, Rigaux, and Cosserat had also 
joined early. 232 The fact that many were "old Annam hands", 
men who had spent the greater part of their working lives 
in the Protectorate, added weight to its pronouncements. By 
the 1920s, the Bulletin enjoyed an international reputation 
and everyone adjudged the AVH an expert and authoritative 
body. 
The existence in its ranks of 'numerous native collea-
gues represent[ing] the elite of their nation' 2 ::s::s added an 
extra lustre to the accumulated French expertise. The AVH 
had early attracted members from the imperial clan and 
their friends and relatives in Hue inner elite circles. 234 
2 :.s.:i. ThC)ugh not Pasquier until he became Resident Superior 
in 1920, after which he became an enthusiast. 
232 They all gave talks and published articles, for exam-
ple: M. Rigaux, 'Le Long Tho. Ses poteries anciennes et 
modernes', BAVH, IV, 1 (1917), pp.21-32. H. Cosserat, 'La 
route mandarine·, pp.1-136, or ~Les F~tes du T~t en 1886 a 
Hue: promenade publique du roi', BAVH, XI, 3 (1924), pp. 
301-06. H. Bogaert, 'Thuan-An', pp.329-40. 
233 L. Cadi~re, 'Allocution du Redacteur du Bulletin a 
Monsieur le Gouverneur G~n~ral Sarraut', BAVH, IV, 1 
(1917)' p.9. 
2 ::s4 By 1917, members included two Nguyen Khoa brothers 
(Tan and Ky), three Ho Bae brothers (Khai, Ham and 9e), 
prince Buu-liem, Thai Van Toan, nine imperial descendants 
and nine royal family members (Ton That) from fifty seven 
Vietnamese, or just under half. BAVH IV, 4 (1917), pp.344-
48. 
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In its first decade, Vietnamese accounted for thirty to 
forty per_ cent of AVH members, with men from the imperial 
clan and royal family forming a consistent core of one-
third to one-quarter of their ranks. 2ze Ministers of the 
Government of Annam also regularly attended meetings until 
well into the 1920s. All these men knew the value of culti-
vating multi-stranded relations with influential Frenchmen; 
but other motives also moved them, in particular, the erg-
anisation's fas~ination with elite culture and history. 
This abiding French interest in their ancestors and relat-
ives flattered and gratified the Hue-based elite. It also 
subtly and continuously reinforced their elite status in 
French eyes, both personally and politically. So highly did 
they value the AVH that at one stage elite Vietnamese mem-
bers even mooted the possibility of printing a quoc ngu 
version of the Bulletin. 230 But not all Vietnamese shared 
their enthusiasm. The active participation of mandarinal 
superiors also drew prudent or ambitious subordinates into 
the AVH in these years: in 1920, for instance, the promo-
tion of two long-standing Vietnamese members to provincial 
governorships resulted in their sponsoring between them al-
most one-third of that year's Vietnamese applicants.2z7 
2 ze My calculations from membership data (summarised in 
Table Three) which, with attendance and minutes of each 
meeting, appeared at the end of every annual volume. 
23• The request failed on financial grounds; but also be-
cause Cadiere maintained no translators, nor Vietnamese 
capable of editing a quoc ngu version of the Bulletin, 
could be found in Hue. BAVH, XIII, 4 (1926), pp.459-60. 
2 37 Tran Binh Bach and Bang Ngoc Danh sponsored 15 from 
47 new members. My calculations from membership details in 
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Numerous Protectorate officials no doubt joined for 
the same reason, finding in AVH membership an easy means of 
attractirig_!he favourable notice of superiors who were 
deeply involved in the Association. For men stationed in 
Hue, membership may have represented simply another diver-
sion, like tennis or the club; or a means of proclaiming 
their own status in local French society by rubbing shoul-
ders each month with its leaders. And of course for the 
minority truly captivated by Vietnamese elite culture, the 
Association offered a spiritual home in its ranks. 
Irrespective of their motives, however, everyone found 
in the Friends of Old Hue a safe haven, a source of psycho-
logical re-assurance and comfort, and a strong affirmation 
of their own French identity. Even its form as a provincial 
learned society sounded a familiar echo of home. 238 Simple 
membership associated the least educated among them with 
the most celebrated cultural values of metropolitan society 
like rational analysis, intellectual enquiry, and artistic 
taste and refinement. They won gratifying praise as schol-
ars and Frenchmen from visiting dignitaries~ In 1922, for 
example, the respected Coll~ge de France orientalist, Pro-
fessor Sylvain Levy, lauded the Association as embodying a 
peculiarly French genius of generosity and humanitarianism 
that acknowledged 'the true, the beautiful and that which 
everywhere gives honour and dignity to human life*, 2~• 
'Documents concernant l'Association', BAVH, VII, 4 (1920). 
pp.492-7. See fn.244 below for their attrition rate. 
2 za For provincial learned societies in France, see Theo-
dore Zeldin, France 1848-1945. Vol II. Intellect, Taste, 
Anxiety (Oxford University Press, 1977), pp.38-43. 
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wherever it was encountered. Heady praise also came from 
Governors-General who visited in person to 'tell us that 
our work w~~ good because it served the French cause'. 240 
So predominant was the AVH at this time that it effec-
tively formed the organised expression of the French cultu-
ral life of Hue. Friends of Old Hue involved themselves in 
an extraordinary array of activ1ties. They played a practi-
cal part in town planning and beautification projects in 
Hue. 241 They hosted concerts and tried to encourage a re-
naissance of indigenous art. Their taste imprinted itself 
on items as diverse as postage stamps and the design of a 
war memorial of 'purely Annamite character'~ which later 
cropped up in other Vietnamese areas. 242 In 1922, the Assa-
ciation won the great accolade of officially representing 
Annam at the Marseilles Colonial Exposition. A similar coup 
followed in 1923, when Resident Superior Pasquier appointed 
leading French and Vietnamese members to the commission 
charged with organising and operating the government-funded 
Khai-9inh Museum. 243 (As a symbol of Annam's mythic Franco-
Vietnamese past~ the museum occupied the same palace pavil-
ion that housed the AVH itself.) 
~' IX, 4 (1922), p.365. 
240 H. Guibier, 'Le Gouverneur-general au "Vieux Hue"r, 
~' VII, 4 (1920), p.478. 
241 For details, Cadi~re, "Oeuvre', pp.31-43. 
242 Ibid, pp.45-47 (quote p.46). 
243 The AVH's collection, begun in 1916, was transferred 
to the Museum, which had recorded over 7,000 visitors by 
1926. P. Jabouille, 'Musee Khai Binh: Historique du Mus~e·, 
BAVH, XVI, 2 (1929), pp.89-100. Badly damaged in 1945, the 
remains of its library and collections. were then dispersed. 
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Given all this, the Association's sudden crash in the 
middle 1920s seems at first quite surprising. As Table 
Three shciw~, overall membership peaked in 1925; but it fell 
almost immediately, with local French numbers dwindling 
TABLE 3: AVH MEMBERSHIP, 1916 - 1931 
category 
FRENCH 
officials 
[admin* 
businessmen 
missionaries 
colons 
other 
VIETNAMESE 
all 
[royal clan] 
total 
1916 
79 
33 
14 
5 
1 
10 
41 
(15 
169 
1919 
91 
46 
24 
4 
2 
16 
83 
21 
248 
1922 
143 
58 
38 
4 
7 
16 
103 
33 
360 
1925 
229 
90 
35 
7 
11 
81 
152 
31 
561 
1928 
153 
54 
22 
7 
1 
42 
83 
21 
356 
Source: my calculations from AVH membership data 
* listed as serving administrateurs 
1931 
161 
62] 
24 
8 
3 
44 
78 
21] 
356 
badly. Meetings became very infrequent: instead of twelve 
or more per year as in its first decade, its members manag-
ed barely three or four ill-attended gatherings in the mid-
1920s. Two, rather than four, Bulletins began appearing per 
year. In addition, Protectorate Vietnamese outside the roy-
al family and upper elite also drifted away, preferring to 
join the newer, practical organisations, often founded by 
Vietnamese themselves, that seemed to promise more immedi-. 
ate and direct benefits to their own people. 244 As interest 
~44 Analysis of Vietnamese membership shows: 
- from 1920-25 76 joined, of whom 90% lived in Annam; and 
- from 1926-30 24 joined, of whom 60% lived in Annam. 
By 1927 only 9 remained from the 1920 intake of 47. 
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waned, so did membership dues. By 1927 only a special ex 
gratia official subvention, followed by repeated annual 
-
subsidies, .saved the Bulletin. 24 e Although the numerical 
decline levelled off in the later 1920s, from then on only 
the dedication of founder members like Cadiere or Sogny 
prevented the AVH from degenerating further into a vener-
able but essentially moribund colonial monument. What had 
gone wrong? 
Two principal factors accounted for the AVH's sudden 
reversal of fortune. In the fi~st place, its mythologising 
had ended up too successful for its own good. By the early 
1920s, as Chapter Six will show, the locally-adapted myths 
of Self and Other it had developed were circulating widely 
in Indochina, and even in France. As a consequence, much of 
the anxiety about ''Annamite tradition" that had fuelled the 
AVH's phenomenal rise and expansion in Trung-ky evaporated. 
From the mid-1920s, it actually became the sort of learned 
society Cadiere had originally envisaged, with predictable 
results. 
Second, the Protectorate was changing. We have already 
mentioned how the post-War growth in French family life was 
modifying the social profile of the community, along with 
the personal expectations of many of its members. And be-
hind it, speeding the transition, surged a new wave of con-
fidence unseen since Doumer's days. From 1925 to 1930 espe-
cially, an investment boom seemed set to revolutionise the 
245 L. Cadiere, ·Rapport du Redacteur', BAVH, XIV, 3&4 
(1927), pp.229-30 for the crisis; and L. Sogny, 'Rapport du 
Tresorier·, Ibid, pp.231-32 for the official subsidies. 
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meagre Protectorate economy. In 1926 alone, the area of 
land under concession sky-rocketed from 59,000 hectares at 
the start to a record 307,000, as rubber stock speculators 
blitzed the central and southern highlands, sight-unseen. 
The already expanding public works program, especially road 
and railway construction, boomed in anticipation of coming 
demand. New businesses opened, as French and Vietnamese 
alike looked forward to unprecedented prosperity. 24• Past 
1925, as the mi$e en valeur bulked large on the horizon, 
interest in the intellectual exploration of the Annamite 
cultural wofid paled before the exciting prospect - never 
to be realised in fact - of exploiting its material 
resources. 
Right on cue a different French organisation appeared 
that embodied the new interests - the Ligue des Amis de 
l'Anna~. In most respects, the Ligue formed the antithesis 
of the Amis du Vieux Hu~. Set up in 1926 by businessmen, 
colons and missionaries, plus a few Vietnamese business 
figures, 247 it boldly rejected official members and refused 
government subventions until 1930. It also attracted the 
participation of French women, as the AVH had never done, 
for the Ligue focused on practical rather than intellectual 
goals. It channelled their energies into high status chari-
24• For more details, see Charles Robequain (trans Isabel 
Ward), The Economic Development of French Indochina (Oxford 
University Press, 1944), Chapters 4 to 6; Roule, 'Colonisa-
tion', pp.239-51; De Fargues, 'Travaux publiques', pp. 213-
22; and L. Gilbert, 'Les Produits: produits d'origine v~ge­
tale~, ~' XVIII, 1&2 (1931), pp.128-40. 
For office holders and main members see ATK, 7 Aug 
1929. 
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ty work like the Ligue's first major project, the Pierre 
Pasquier anti-tuberculosis clinic in Hue. 248 Typical of the 
Ligue' s et~_~s, the project targeted an issue of equal con-
cern to colonial economic interests and to the growing num-
ber of French families who risked catching the disease from 
infected Vietnamese. Unlike the AVH, the Ligue acted upon 
its Vietnamese environment from outside and above, with 
well-defined psychological and social barriers separating 
its members from the objects of their charity. No echo re-
mained in its activities of the romantic idealism of the 
AVH, where French and Vietnamese literati- 'worked together 
without distinction of race, origins, profession, material 
situation, or social rank', in the rousing estimation of 
its 1920 President, Guibier. 249 
That Ligue members felt free to ignore the mysteries 
of the Annamite soul and concentrate on creating the robust 
health that 'gives the human machine a good yield' 2 eo per-
fectly symbolised the new assurance among the French in 
later 1920s Annam. But it was not only the long-delayed 
prospect of economic growth that bred such optimism. It 
also owed a great deal to the AVH's earlier success in 
exorcising the spectre of "Annamite tradition" that had 
haunted French minds after the anti-tax movement of 1908. 
Thanks to their efforts, Annamite tradition had been pene-
The clinic opened in 1930. ATK, 3 Mar 1930. 
Guibier, 'Le Gouverneur-gen~ral', p.480. 
2 eo Dr Normet, Director of Annam Health Service, laying 
the first stone of the Pasquier Clinic in Hue. ATK, 23 July 
1928. 
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trated, dissected, defined, and categorised in ways that 
defused its mystery. By making it intelligible, French 
-
science had. made it controllable as well. Thus Pasquier's 
nee-traditional policies in the 1920s and early 1930s rest-
ed absolutely on the conviction that his (and other French-
men's) knowledge and experience of the "Annamite soul" had 
grown sufficiently subtle and deep to allow him to manipul-
ate its elements in Trung-ky for colonial political ends. 
While Annam always remained 'a traditional land' 2 e 1 in 
French colonial eyes, by the end of the 1920s only romant-
ics still perceived it as mysterious or alien. For most 
colonial French, the mythologising of the AVH had secured 
this formerly insecure borderland between French Self and 
Vietnamege Other by arming them with an all-purpose under-
standing of Vietnamese cultural identity which, although 
apparently locally derived and historically validated, had 
been unconsciously designed to satisfy collective French 
needs. No matter how little the colonial French might have 
actually known about Vietnamese people, past and present, 
from the mid-1920s their knowledge of the Vietnamese Other 
seemed complete, certain, and enduring. The myths that con-
veyed this knowledge barricaded the French Self safely be-
hind the conviction that, come what may, the Vietnamese 
Other could never again surprise or dismay the local French 
society by assuming unknown, ill-defined, or psychological-
ly threatening forms. 
2 ~ 1 J.T. McAlister and Paul Mus in The Vietnamese and 
Their Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p.119, 
describing Central Vietnam. 
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This point leads us to Part Three, to a closer consid-
eration of certain aspects of this powerful French colonial 
construct._~e begin in the next chapter with an assessment 
of the influential French model of Vietnam as little China, 
and its inherent shortcomings; before concluding in Chapter 
Six with an analysis of the myths and projections of Self 
and Other touched on lightly throughout this chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE COLONIAL MODEL AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS 
Introduction 
As we mentioned in Chapter One, the colonial fallacy 
that portrayed traditional Vietnam as a backward imitation 
of China arose in part from the synchronicity of first con-
tact. Frenchmen holding erroneous preconceptions about China 
confronted a newly sinicised Vietnamese government in the 
nineteenth century, and drew their own conclusions in the 
form of the little China fallacy. Right from the start Viet-
nam's presumed Chinese cultural identity mediated French 
experiences and observations of the mid-nineteenth century 
kingdom. No-one eluded its unconscious grip, not even men 
like Lura or Philastre who strove for a degree of balance 
and objectivity.& To other French officials, themselves pol-
itical actors in the great drama of colonisation, the evid-
ence of their own senses sufficed to confirm what European 
scholarship had already prepared them to find. To these 
busy, practical men, the little China fallacy became the 
paradigm that elucidated the Vietnamese present by reference 
to its model and mentor, old China. 
& I stress the point because of the heavy and often uncri-
tical reliance both Truong Buu Lam and Yoshiharu Tsuboi have 
placed on nineteenth century French materials, and secondary 
works based directly on them. See Lam, New Lamps for Old: 
The Transformation of the Vietnamese Administrative Elite 
(ISEAS Occasional Paper No. 66, Singapore, 1982), Part One; 
and Tsuboi, L'Empire d'Annam face a la France et a la Chine 
(Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987). Tsuboi's bibliography lists only 
three Vietnamese primary sources (and no secondary ones) 
compared to four pages of mainly colonial French sources. 
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It also organised their understanding of the Vietnamese 
past. The French who came to Asia in the later nineteenth 
century we!'".e primed to discover Bossuet's "immutable 
Orient', 2 and duly did so. They believed that to understand 
contemporary Vietnam they needed to uncover its age-old pat-
terns and lay bare the fixed laws that governed its essenti-
ally timeless culture and cyclical history. The little China 
fallacy proved invaluable in this endeavour by focusing 
their attention on the assumed well-spring of Vietnamese 
cultural identity in China. Convinced that the fundamental 
elements of Asiatic societies persisted unchanged and un-
changing over time, and confronted by a sinicised Bai-Nam, 
the conclusion followed almost inevitably that Tu-Buc's 
kingdom represented simply the latest flowering of age-old 
ideas and institutions planted long before by the Chinese. 
The seductive but false French belief that the mid-nineteen-
th century typified all previous eras set off a process of 
colonial redefinition of Vietnamese history and identity 
that ended in an intellectual colonisation of the country's 
past no less thorough than the military invasion that allow-
ed Europeans to dominate and distort its colonial present. 3 
2 Cited in A. Bouinais and A. Paulus, L'Indo-Chine fran-
)aise contemporaine, II (Paris: Challamel, 2nd ed, 1885), 
p.654. They complimented Bossuet on his insight, given that 
the Chinese and Vietnamese annals which confirmed his usage 
had been unknown in the seventeenth century. 
3 The later nineteenth century Vietnamese political elite 
also engaged in historical revisionism, though more consci-
ously than the French. Court chronicles tried to match the 
dynasty's unorthodox past to the Chinese model in order to 
enhance its legitimacy. Thus while a superficial reading of 
court sources may seem to confirm the Sinic colonial model, 
it misconstrues their intent as highly selective political 
tracts whose content, aimed partly at future generations, 
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The elision of Vietnam and China defined the nature of 
Vietnamese culture for the French as basically derivative 
and unorig~Qal. To colonial French observers, the testimony 
of Vietnamese history proved that the local people lacked 
the creativity and vitality necessary to effect progressive 
change by their own unaided efforts. Vietnamese absorbed 
this view of themselves in turn, along with the little China 
fallacy, in their school history te~ts4 and through the 
French-language press and other colonial organs. Obviously 
such a useful explanation of Vietnamese society and culture 
provided a valuable ideological prop for the colonial order, 
sweetening French conquest with the implicit promise that it 
offered a modern future otherwise beyond the reach of the 
ineffectual Vietnamese. 
Few would condone this premise now; but several of its 
less offensive aspects continued to be accepted, even by 
Vietnamese, until quite recently. Despite its inadequate 
historical basis, the imprint of the little China fallacy 
can still be detected in scholarly works published as late 
as the 1980s.e Yet even in instances where colonial model 
comparisons of Vietnam to China might seem valid or useful 
at first glance, careful examination almost always reveals 
the basic flaw. The little China fallacy never measured 
addressed nineteenth century concerns. For a longer discus-
sion, see Philippe Langlet's introduction to La Tradition 
vietnamienne (Sai-gon: BSEI, 1970), pp.2-15. 
4 For an early example, see Leopold Cadiere, Resume histo-
rigue de l'histoire d'Annam (Quinhon: Libraire Imprimerie, 
1911); or for a later one, Nguyen van Huyen, La Civilisation 
annamite (Hanoi: IDEO, 1944). 
See fn. 1 for two examples. 
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traditional Vietnam against China as an historical entity, 
but against a China of European imagining. The "China" to 
which it ·appealed was an intellectual construct built on an 
earlier European fascination with the interplay of identity 
and difference between reported Chinese institutions, cus-
toms, or norms and those prevailing in Europe. In other 
words, it was to a projection of Chinese Otherness (as de-
fined by the collective European Self) that the nineteenth 
century French model (and its advocates) compared tradition-
al Vietnam. The China of the Chinese people, about which 
Europeans knew precious little at the time, scarcely entered 
into it. 
We will demonstrate the point by considering some of 
the key nineteenth century European beliefs about China that 
would equally underpin the colonial French image of tradi-
tional Vietnamese political institutions. 
China Through The Looking Glass 
Raymond Dawson has devoted an entire volume to exposing 
the cavalcade of European ignorance of China through the 
centuries, including our own. As it repeatedly shows, until 
recently China mainly functioned in the European mind as a 
social mirror whose bright surface reflected the changing 
'history of the observer rather than the observed 1 .b Even at 
the height of China's fashionableness in the eighteenth cen-
tury, European interest in her civilisation rarely progress-
• Raymond Dawson, The Chinese Chameleon (Oxford University 
Press, 1967), p.8. 
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ed beyond the superficial. 7 In an era charmed by chinoise-
rie, Enlightenment philosophers reacted against absolutism 
at home by-adopting as a political ideal the Jesuit vision 
of the Chinese empire. On the basis of second- or third-hand 
reports many, including Voltaire ('the human mind could not 
imagine a better government'•), championed its assumed uto-
pia as a model for European reform.• 
Yet, even then, not everyone agreed. Montesquieu, Con-
dorcet, and Herder figured among those who preferred to harp 
the old, perennial themes that contrasted Asiatic servility 
with Europe's genius for liberty, or Oriental stagnation 
with western progress. 10 These ancient antitheses attained 
their apotheosis in the nineteenth century mania for vast, 
unilinear schemes that ranked all human civilisation from 
contemporary Europe, unchallengeable on the topmost rung, 
down to the lowest primitives. This new intellectual fashion 
dashed China from its eighteenth century pedestal, even be-
fore biological determinism delivered the knock-out blow to 
all but the white race. The backward, agricultural Chinese 
empire now aroused far more scorn and contempt among Euro-
peans than admiration. 
7 Leibniz was one exception. David E. Mungello has analys-
ed his sources, informants and interests in Leibniz and 
Confucianism: The Search for Accord (Honolulu: University 
Press of Hawaii, 1977). 
• Essai sur les moeurs et l'esprit des nations, II (Paris: 
Garnier Fr, 1963), p.785. 
Dawson, Chameleon, Chapter Three. 
10 Ibid~ pp.57, 66-67, 94-95, and 196-98. John M. Stead-
man, The Myth of Asia (London: Macmillan, 1970) also deals 
extensively with such analogies and comparisons. 
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Hegel's 1830s exposition of the Chinese Other in the 
guise of analysing Chinese history typifies the change. But 
-
we conside~-it here for another reason as well: a generation 
later, the same beliefs about China, still resting on sup-
position rather than knowledge, 11 would re-emerge as central 
to Eliacin Lura's seminal account of traditional Vietnamese 
political institutions. 
In The Philosophy of History, Hegel described the Chin-
ese empire as \the only durable kingdom in the world'. 12 It 
was no accolade, however. The empire endured because1~ 
its principle has such substantiality that ••• it 
is at once the oldest and the newest (empire]. 
Early do we see China advancing to the condition 
in which it is found at this day ••• Every change 
is excluded, and the fixedness of a character 
which recurs perpetually takes the place of what 
we should call the truly historical. China .•• 
lie[s], as it were, still outside the World's 
History •.• 
The Chinese themselves he characterised as alien to all Eur-
ope cherished most, a people weighed down by a ~servile con-
sciousness' and the ~meanest opinion of themselves [ ••• ] and 
of humanity in gener~l' . 14 Nor· when it came to the political 
11 Looking back from the 1880s Gobineau remarked: 'Until 
1830, people discussed Asia almost exclusively from the 
point of view of India. The rest was virtually forgotten in 
Europe ••• (as all but] an abstract geographical concept' un-
til the 1840s, with the First Opium War. Quoted in Michael 
D. Biddiss, Gobineau. Selected Political Writings (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1970), p.241. Raymond Schwab's study of Euro-
pean Orientalism from 1680 to 1880, translated by Gene 
Patterson-Black and Victor Reinking as Oriental Renaissance 
(Columbia University Press, 1984) confirms Gobineau. 
12 G.W.F. Hegel (trans J. Sibree), The Philosophy of His-
tory (New York: Dover Books, 1956), p.115. 
Ibid, p.116. 
Ibid, p.138. 
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organisation of the kingdom could Hegel find anything to 
admire. A theocratic despotism, the spirit of its constitu-
tion had, he asserted, 'always remained the same'.ie Only 
two classes existed, with a gulf between them. On one side 
stood the emperor, the one 'ever wakeful, spontaneous active 
Soul',i0 and on the other, everyone else, lumped together in 
'absolute equality [in which] all the differences that exist 
are possible only in connection with the administration'. 
Although granting that imperial princes and sons of high of-
ficials enjoyed some precedence, Hegel traced it exclusively 
to their fathers' administrative positions. There was 'pro-
perly [speaking] no elevated rank, no nobility among the 
Chinese ••. [so that] only those have a share in the admin-
istration of affairs who have ability for it'. 17 Such extre-
me meritocracy elicited no praise, however: equality without 
freedom only meant despotism. 
Although Hegel noted that Chinese government had often 
been held up as an ideal in Europe, he profoundly disagreed• 
Rather.than representing a masterpiece of human reason, he 
dismissed it as more like 'a convenient habit' that persist-
ed as imperturbable as •the course of nature, [which] goes 
its own way, at one time as at another'.ie Neither conscien-
tiousness nor a sense of honour had ever kept a single man-
darin up to his duty, he added. Only the fear of punishment, 
Ibid, p.120. 
Ibid, p.127. 
Both quotes, Ibid ,p.124. 
Both quotes, Ibid, p.127. 
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and the active oversight of the emperor, the sole legal pow-
er in the land, motivated officials. The emperor's role thus 
loomed as _C!-_bsolutely paramount:.i.• 
In virtue of his position he is obliged personally 
to manage the government and must himself be ac-
quainted with and direct the legislative business 
of the Empire .•• Notwithstanding this, there is 
little room for the exercise of his individual 
will for the whole government is conducted on the 
basis of certain ancient maxims ••• 
Any imperial failure doomed the entire system, leaving it 
'paralysed from head to foot, and given over to carelessness 
and caprice •.2° 
The extent to which nineteenth century Europeans consi-
dered China an unchanging, homogeneous Confucian society in 
thrall to its past cannot be exaggerated. At best China ap-
peared to them, to quote Ranke, in a state of 'eternal , 
standstill'; 2 .i. at worst it typified, as for Marx, a •fossil 
form of social life'. 22 So all-encompassing did Chinese bon-
dage to its Confucian past appear to Europeans that in 1854 
Gobineau, a trained Orientalist, described the country as 
ruled by a 'tyranny of rites and traditions'. 23 
Authority is •.• in fact quite restricted, for ••• 
in this empire, whose governing principles have 
never varied in regard to essentials, what former 
times considered good has become, simply because 
of that, better today. Tradition is all-powerful, 
Ibid, p.123. 
Ibid, p.127. 
Quoted in Dawson, Chameleon, p.65. 
22 In an 1862 article on the Taiping rebellion, quoted in 
Shlomo Avineri (ed), Karl Marx on Colonisation and Moderni-
sation (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1969), pp.444. 
23 Arthur de Gobineau, Essai sur l'ineqalite des races 
humaines, I (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1940), both p.480. 
and is already a tyranny over an emperor [if he] 
strays in the least detail from the usages fol-
lowed by the ancestors ••• The Son of Heaven can 
do _everything, provided he only ever wants to do 
~~at is already known and approved. 
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The principal cause of this situation, Gobineau claimed, lay 
in the dominance of the public examination system, in which 
success required reiterating what previous generations had 
known, in an identical form. Developing or expounding new 
ideas only guaranteed failure and disgrace. As a result, the 
•verbose compilations' of Chinese literature all 'lack[ed] a 
critical faculty'.24 
The little China fallacy applied these and other erron-
eous assumptions directly to _a traditional Vietnam that was 
often doubly damned in the process. Not only did it make 
~ai-Nam appear trapped in a mindless emulation of all things 
Chinese; but, as we saw in Chapter One, by factoring in neg-
ative local elements, like the supposed deleterious effects 
of climate and geography on Vietnamese abilities, the French 
model also implied that local attempts to imitate China were 
inevitably doomed to degenerate in maladroit Vietnamese 
hands. It was a useful premise, for it enabled French obser-
vers to characterise variations from assumed Chinese models 
as examples of the corruption or decay1customs over time 
rather than of Vietnamese cultural originality. 
While certain twentieth century colonial authors took 
issue with particular elements of the little China fallacy, 
in some areas its assumptions persisted with unquestioned 
authority. In the colonial analysis of the traditional men-
All quotes, Ibid, p.484. 
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archy and mandarinate in particular, its axioms always ruled 
supreme. 2 ~ Much of this unchallenged primacy can be traced 
back to tha-influential analysis of these institutions found 
in Eliacin Lura's highly-regarded study, Le Pays d'Annam, 20 
which derived almost entirely from the little China fallacy. 
The next section considers Lura's projection of Chinese 
Otherness onto pre-colonial Vietnam. 
Lura and the Colonial Model of the Traditional Kingdom 
A young naval officer, Lura joined the Native Affairs 
unit of the infant Cochinchinese administration in 1865. 27 
After lengthy language study at the College of Interpreters, 
he became a provincial magistrate in 1868, only to be re-
called to Saigon in 1869 as Philastre's deputy in the Bureau 
of Native Justice. A close and sympathetic observer of Viet-
namese life in Cochinchina, Lure recognised that France 
could not 'dominate straight off a civilisation two thousand 
years old, and that [the French] could only become its mas-
ter after having studied it deeply and by conserving its 
basic principles'. 2 e As a consequence, he strenuously advo-
2~ A general analysis of the nineteenth century French 
model appears in Nguyen Van Phong, La Societe vietnamienne 
de 1882 a 1902 (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 
1971). 
2 • Le Pays d'Annam: Etude sur !'organisation politigue et 
sociale des annamites (Paris: Leroux, 2nd ed, 1897). 
27 For details of his life see BSEI (ns), XV, 1&2 (1940) 
which is entirely devoted to him and his family. 
28 J. Perin, 'La Vie et !'oeuvre de Lura', BSEI (ns), XV, 
1&2 (1940), p.23. 
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cated the training of French administrators in Vietnamese 
language and customs before being allowed to take up offi-
cial duties. In 1873, the administration concurred and set 
up of a short-lived Probationers' College in Saigon under 
his initial direction. 29 As class notes, Lure produced the 
Cours d'administration annamite, 30 the first such detailed 
French study and the basis for his posthumously published 
and far more widely-known Le Pays d'Annam. 
In the early 1870s, Luro ranked himself with Philastre 
and Father Legrand de Liraye as one of a tiny handful of 
French experts on Vietnam. 31 And certainly where he describ-
ed Vietnamese life from first-hand observation and personal 
knowledge, his comparatively objective accounts deserve 
their high reputation. But where Luro had to rely on second-
hand sources, and on local informants who themselves might 
actually possess little personal knowledge of, or insight 
into, particular matters, his account must be treated 
29 Founded in 1873 in Saigon with a mammoth curriculum, 
poor results forced its closure in 1880. 
30 The later colonial myth-maker Charles R~gismanset hail-
ed the Cours as 'the breviary of numerous generations of ad-
ministrators' [Le Miracle fran;ais en Asie (Paris: Editions 
Cres, 1922), p.182]. In fact, it had almost been lost: only 
odd hand-written copies had survived until 1905, when thirty 
were finally printed. L. Malleret, 'Le Souvenir de J.-B. 
Eliacin Luro en Cochinchine•, BSEI (ns), XV, 1&2 (1940), p. 
9. Aware of its errors and poor organisation, Luro had earl-
ier forbidden its publication in the hope of remedying its 
faults in Le Pays d'Annam. According to Alfred Schreiner, 
who closely studied the two texts, Lure died before properly 
succeeding in this aim. Les Institutions annamites en Basse-
Cochinchine, III (Saigon: Claude et CL•, 1902), pp.ii-iv. 
z 1 Because they alone could read the Sino-Vietnamese 
script in which many documents were written. G. Taboulet 
(ed), 'Jean-Baptiste-Eliacin Luro, Inspecteur des Affaires 
indigenes en Cochinchine', BSEI (ns), XV, 1&2 (1940), p.76. 
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accordingly. The outline of traditional monarchy and mandar-
inate in Le Pays d'Annam falls under this caution. The auth-
or never ~~ft Cochinchina, nor even observed a functioning 
royal administration at one remove, for all mandarins had 
either resigned or quit the South while he was still study-
ing at the Interpreters' College. The first permanent court 
representative in Saigon, the consul Nguyen Thanh Y, 32 only 
arrived in 1876, the year Lure himself left. But if the 
Frenchman quizzed Sou~hern literati about the kingdom's gov-
ernment, a pitfall yawned. Had any been royal officials pre-
viously, they could only have been lowly clerks, with few 
insights into a government whose Nee-Confucian facade they 
themselves had never penetrated. 33 Yet if Luro turned to 
written texts, their Sinic orthodoxy would have sent him 
back, like all his other sources, to the little China fall-
acy, or to comparisons with Europe. As a result, Luro's out-
line of king, ministers, and mandarinate in Le Pays d'Annam 
basically represented, as for Hegel and Gobineau before him, 
an unconscious exercise in delineating the Asian Other by 
comparison to the European Self, whether by direct analogy 
or indirectly, via a European projection of China. 
Let us analyse two examples more closely, beginning 
with Luro's problem of accounting for an "Annamite aristo-
cracy'' in a society where, the author also insisted, ab-
solute equality reigned between all citizens. 
VNDNTB, pp.301-02 
33 Luro probably also consulted the same Catholic sources 
as he had done for his outline of early Vietnamese history 
Legrand de Liraye, the works of Father Bouilleveaux, and 
Petrus Truong Vinh Ky. Pays d'Annam, p.64. 
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Lure began his account confidently, with a formulation 
straight from Hege1.z4 Vietnamese government was pure monar-
- ' 
chy, he decJared. Unlike Europe, neither parliament or nob-
ility counterbalanced the king's power. 'Equality between 
citizens is absolute; accession to office is open to every-
one; we notice no other social distinctions than those which 
attach to office, merit or wealth•.ze As with Hegel's China, 
Luro began by identifying only two classes: the emperor and 
the people. But, tinlike H~~el, he knew from personal observ-
atio~ that a 'sort of nobility' also existed, which he then 
laboured to explain by muddled comparisons with Europe. The 
"Annamite aristocracy". became 'a class which, 'for the lack 
of a better expression, we can designate by this term; but 
we must be careful not to use it here in its ordinary sense 
and to believe in the existence of a hereditary aristocratic 
class#.z• Distinguished military or civil service alone won 
noble rank and, although it might be inherited by one des-
cendant, its value diminished with each inheritance. The 
fam~ly of even the most exalted individual returned to the 
commonality ~fter five generations, unless outstanding ser-
vice won further ennoblement. Again with Europe in mind, 
Lure noted that noble 'birth serve[d] for nought' when it 
34 Other writers concurred. For instance, see Schreiner, 
Institutions (I), pp.223 and 254-55; E. Diguet, Les Annam-
ites. Societe, Coutumes, Religions (Paris: Challamel, 1906), 
pp. 121-22; or Pierre Pasquier, L'Annam d'autrefois (Paris: 
Challamel, 1907), pp.66-67. 
z~ Lure, Pays d'Annam, p.85. Other versions appear in 
Nguyen Van Phong, Societe, p.109; and Robert Petit, La 
Monarchie annamite (Paris: Louiton, 1931), p.50. 
Lure,. Pays d'Annam, p.85 (my emphases). 
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came to •exercising a public function' in Vietnam; examina-
tion success alone gave access to office. Noble titles af-
-
forded ~no _ _right to political, administrative or military 
functions', and provided 'only a simple social distinction 
accompanied by certain rights of precedence in public cerem-
onies and some immunity from taxes'. 37 After two disjointed 
pages, he concluded by re-iterating the purely honorific 
nature of Annamite nobility. A French reader could have been 
forgiven for wondered why something of so little significan-
ce to the Vietnamese had detained the author so long. 
Yet, despite Lura's slighting assessment, attaining 
noble rank mattered very much in the Nguyen kingdom. Lura's 
problem was that nineteenth century practice fitted neither 
the Sinic axioms of the colonial model nor, even less, any 
explanation by analogy that took European aristocracy as a 
norm. Luro's comparison of "Annamite" and European aristo-
cracy succeeded only in revealing what it was not. His 
floundering comments shed so little light on the real mean-
ing and value of noble rank in Vietnam that he even missed 
mentioning its most salient feature, as we will see below. 
Later French writers avoided Lura's predicament by finding 
European analogies that managed to make Vietnamese nobility 
sound unexceptional, even familiar. Thus Schreiner, for in-
stance, claimed it parallelled 'our Legion of Honour' in 
several points; 3 e while Pasquier summed it up with a long 
reference to a French author's vision of a non-hereditary 
37 All quotes, Ibid, p.86. 
Schreiner, Institutions (!), p.235. 
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nobility of excellence. 39 Both approaches failed as badly as 
Luro's in conveying what noble rank actually meant in nine-
-
teenth century Vietnam. The little China paradigm, with its 
axiomatic Confucian presuppositions, hid the reality from 
French eyes. 
Like most other Frenchmen, Lura held as a great funda-
mental truth that the 1860s primacy of classically-educated 
examination graduates in Vietnamese society and administra-
tion had persisted from.time imm~morial. 40 But applying this 
notion to the concept of "Annamite aristocracy" hid its es-
sential character. Until the eve of colonialism, soldiers 
formed the vast majority of ennobled men for whom I have 
found biographical details. And where civilians were con-
cerned, almost all had won noble status as a direct conse-
quence of military success, just as in the chua era. 41 Gia-
Long had wanted such titles limited to senior officers whose 
courage had helped defend and preserve the state, with only 
occasional grants to old and very distinguished civilian 
officials. Otherwise, his Code laid down, even high court 
mandarins should only be ennobled after death, 43 an injunc-
tion that contemporary biographies suggest his successors 
largely obeyed. As a result, very few nobles existed (cer-
39 Pasquier, L'Annam, p.80 citing Alphonse Karr in Les 
Femmes. 
40 Lure, Pavs d'Annam, p.97; or Schreiner, Institutions 
(I), p. 271. 
41 Thus 17 of the 19 Trung-ky men ennobled between 1800 
and about 1870 were generals: even Truong Bang Que's first 
noble title only came after his sole military campaign. The 
one exception I have found was the poet Nguyen Du. 
42 CEJPK, p.430. 
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tainly not enough to describe as a ~class'), almost all of 
them active or former generals. 43 Given this, the egalita-
rian assertion by Lure (and others) 44 that a quite lowly 
(civil) official might be ennobled at a higher level than 
his superiors clearly never happened in practice; while the 
one basic fact about noble rank in nineteenth century Viet-
nam - that it was essentially a military prerogative - never 
appeared. Nor is it adequately acknowledged in any other 
colonial account I have seen, thanks to the camouflage the 
little China fallacy drew so effectively over actual Viet-
namese practice. 45 
Lura's odd insistence on absolute equality between all 
subjects also needs further comment. In all but a narrowly 
western and legalistic sense, it is quite misleading. Far 
from being egalitarian, as it suggests, traditional Vietnam 
was 'fortement hierarchisee', 4 • to quote one of the more 
sensitive of the next generation of French observers. Luro's 
emphasis most likely reflected conventional European think-
ing about China, compounded by his own experience and obser-
43 In some respects, noble titles seem the military equi-
valent to honorifics in the first grade of the mandarinate 
for civil officials. 
44 Lure, Pays d'Annam, p.86 claimed that 'a low official 
could merit and obtain the highest degree of nobility (Cong) 
while a superior official might have to be satisfied with 
the fifth degree (Nam)'. Schreiner, Institutions (I), p.235; 
and Pasquier, L'Annam, p.80 agreed; but no-one cited any 
examples, probably because they had none. 
45 Although Schreiner [Institutions(I), p.236] did note 
that the two highest titles were mainly reserved for sol-
diers, biographies show that lower titles usually went to 
military achievers as well. 
Diguet, Annamites, p.121. 
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vation in Nam-ky. As noted above, Hegel believed their lack 
of legal rights before the king rendered all subjects equal, 
a comparison other French writers adopted and which manifes-
tly rested on projected European norms. 47 But Lura's know-
ledge of the South may well have seemed to verify the idea. 
Still thinly populated and comparatively rich, the nineteen-
~ 
th century Nam-ky elite placed greater stress on accumulat-
ing land and wealth than academic titles, and the other 
prized honours, awards, and exemptions that bestowed social 
distinction and higher status on families in the poorer reg-
ions north of Binh-dinh. 48 It is also possible that, in the 
1860s, with almost all its.great political and military fam-
ilies resettled in Hue, Nam-ky at the time may well have ex-
hibited far fewer gradations of status than would have been 
encountered anywhere else in Vietnam. 
But whatever the reason, Lura's sweeping assertion of 
absolute equality misrepresented social reality at the same 
time that it badly misconstrued the way the political system 
actually worked, at least in regard to access to office and 
later career success, as Chapters Two and Three have argued. 
His disparaging dismissal of noble rank ('only a simple soc-
ial distinction accompanied by certain rights of precedence 
in public c~remonies and some immunity from taxes' 4 •) was 
similarly misplaced. In the first place, tax exemption re-
47 Cf. Schreiner, Institutions (I), p.240. 
48 Alexander Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model (Har-
vard University Press, 1971), p.221. That Lure advanced 
wealth as a basis of social distinction supports this view, 
for it occurred far less outside the South. 
Lure, Pays d'Annam, p.86. 
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presented a keenly sought privilege in nineteenth century 
Vietnam. It became so widespread after Tu-Bue began selling 
lesser man~~rinal grades that one authority has estimated, 
by 1897, ten percent of the tax payers in Ha-noi province 
enjoyed complete legal exemption. So highly was it esteemed 
that early colonial administrations felt obliged to offer it 
to their own employees on the same basis as the mandarins.eo 
Second, Lure missed something far more important, the 
family dimension. Though vested in individuals and diminish-
ing over time as he described, a noble title nevertheless 
swelled the prestige of the recipient's family. It enhanced 
their status and magnified their influence in local affairs~ 
Patents of nobility, cherished documents bearing the king's 
own seal that could be ritually presented to the recipient's 
ancestors, took pride of place on family altars; while the 
state, not his descendants, met much of the costs of the il-
lustrious man's cult through the grant of land or money.e 1 
Families could thus enact the more elaborate rituals of anc-
ester worship (which in turn served to uphold their elite 
status) at comparatively little expense to themselves. Irre-
levant in Europe, and absent from Lura's Eurocentric compar-
eo Vu-Van-Hien, 'L'Impot personnel et les corvaes de 1862 
a 1936', RIJE, 13 (1940), pp.93-99. In South and North it 
was reduced in 1903 and 1914, and then abolished in 1920 and 
1919 respectively, but continued unchanged in Annam until 
1928. 
e 1 Nguyen The Anh, Kinh te va Xa hoi Viet-nam duoi cac vua 
trieu Nquyen (Sai-gon: NXB Lua Thieng, 1971), pp.62-66. 
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isons,e2 these factors nevetheless loomed large in Vietnam-
ese calculations. 
-
From tbe 1880s, later French writers elaborated the 
notion of equality between subjects into a powerful image of 
traditional Vietnam as a sort of dual society. While appar-
ently egalitarian or democratic at its village base, at the 
national level it remained autocratic, ruled by a distant 
imperial hierarch whose bureaucracy welcomed all talented 
graduates on merit alone.ez French observers believed that 
unrestricted access to education, combined with a policy of 
reserving official positions for laureates of public examin-
ations, ensured that •the poorest of coolies could make [his 
intelligent son] into an official whose merits would ennoble 
him'.e4 Their exemplars,se however, all tended to be either 
special cases, as with Nguyan Van Tuong,e6 or quite inappro-
52 Schreiner, Institutions (I), p.238 and Pasquier, L'An-
!12.ffi., p.81 mention it briefly as a grant to assure posthumous 
homage. 
sz For other examples see Nguyen Van Phong, Soci~te, pp. 
109 and 117-118. Schreiner, Institutions (I), pp.254-55 also 
calls the people 'democratic or republican'. It was equally 
applied to China. Cf. H.B. Morse's description of China as 
\an autocratic rule superposed on a democracy' in The Admi-
nistration and Trade of the Chinese Empire (London: Long-
mans, Green, and Co., 1908), p.46. 
54 Jules Boissiere, cited in Nguyen Van Phong. Societe, 
p.117. The notion resurfaces in Truong Buu Lam, New Lamps, 
p.7, who directly quotes Lure; and in Tsuboi, L'Empire 
vietnamienne, p.179 who provides a similar formula from 
Annam resident, A. Bonhomme, from 'La Ville des mandarins·, 
BAVH, II, 2 (1916), p.170. 
Nguyen Van Phong, Societe, p.117. 
5 • Tsuboi says Tuong's career only really blossomed after 
he was sent to negotiate with the French in Hanoi in 1874 
and claimed full credit for the success. L'Empire vietna-
mienne, pp.234-35. 
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priate, as with Phan Thanh Gian, whose literate father had 
been a minor government employee before falling foul of his 
superiors.':'? Certainly it was true that able men did some-
times rise high from humble beginnings; but ta.lent alone 
never sufficed in the nineteenth century. Under the Nguyen, 
such men needed the right regional credentials too: had Gian 
or Tuong been Northerners, neither might have ma.de his mark. 
Although no legal barriers existed, and peasants may well 
have fantasized about their sons conquering the mandarinate, 
most knew full well that:=e 
Kings' sons will always become kings, while sons 
of the pagoda watchmen will sweep the banyan 
leaves. 
While the system never operated so rigidly as to ex-
elude brilliant outsiders, in normal circumstances very few 
men moved into or out of the political and administrative 
elite in one generation. (Indeed, French conquest arguably 
brought the greatest turn-over in Nguyen elite ranks for a 
century, or more.) The slow ascent (or decline) of families 
over two and more generations was far more usual than the 
meteoric rise of a gifted individual in one. Huynh Con's 
family typified the process.=9 Con's grandfather had been a 
mid-level military officer under Gia-Long whose son, a tu-
=7 Lure, Pays d'Annam, pp.101-04. P.Daudin and Le Van 
Phuc, 'Phan-Thanh-Gian 1796-1867 et sa famille, d'apres 
quelques documents annamites·, BSEI (ns) XIV, 2 (1941), 
pp.34-5. 
=a Cited in Phan Thi Dae, Situation de la Personne au 
Vi@t-Nam (Paris: Editions du Centre de la Recherche scient-
ifique, 1966), p.40. 
=9 Huynh Con and Jean Jacnal, 'M~moires de son excellence 
Huynh Con', B.!. (ns), XL, 1-2 (1924), pp.31-52. 
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tai regional graduate, had forfeited his government stipend 
after failing his second attempt at cu-nhan. Returning home, 
he marri~d the daughter of a comfortable local literati fam-
ily - one of whose sons later reached tham-tri (2-2) - and 
devoted himself to Sino-Vietnamese medicine and other liter-
ate pursuits. His son Con passed cu-nhan and then tien-si at 
his second attempt, in 1877. This success brought marriage 
with a daughter of one of his father's former class-mates 
now elevated to thuong-tho, the influential Vo Trong Binh. 
The adoption of a literati way of life, the accumulation of 
examination titles over generations, and the pursuit of 
strategic marriage alliances, all characterised a previously 
undistinguished family's infiltration of the nineteenth cen-
tury literati and political elites. Once in the system, the 
privileges and educational advantages accorded the sons or 
grand-sons of district magistrates (or higher)•0 meant that, 
in normal times and barring disaster, it was easier to per-
petuate elite status than to achieve it in the first place. 
So why di~ most Frenchmen hi~hlight the one-in-a-mill-
ion individual jackpot in preference to the common experien-
ce of almost all Vietnamese? Largely, the answer lies in 
their unconscious projection of identity onto Vietna~. The 
crucial factor, as Peter Baugher has argued, was the narrow-
ly legalistic interpretation of liberty and equality preva-
lent under the Third Republic. From the 1880s, with the Re-
public firmly established and the battle for universal pri-
mary education won, bourgeois officials and politicians in 
As discussed previously in Chapter Two. 
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France believed that the absence of legal barriers to the 
pursuit of official or public careers left every Frenchman 
free to rise as far as his abilities merited. Superficial 
resemblances in the Vietnamese situation attracted a pro-
jection of identity: Paul Doumer's aide, Louis Salaun, for 
one, was not alone in claiming that mandarins were recruited 
'by a democratic system of examinations quite similar to the 
ones we ourselves use to select our officials 6 • 01 Few, if 
any, colonial accounts recognised that, whatever the theory, 
in practice inherited advantages skewed the mandarinal sys-
tern to favour the few over the many, as the existing elite 
intended it to do. Like various other colonial perceptions 
of Vietnamese customs or institutions, the French image of 
careers wide open to talent, and of 'an administration based 
on the principle of the broadest democracy: the accession to 
office by merit alone', 02 was distorted by unconscious pro-
jections, in this case of identity. They reveal more about 
the French observers than the Vietnamese observed. 
Let us now turn to our second example of little China 
errors in Lura's understanding of traditional political 
institutions. This time we focus on the single most import-
ant of them, the monarchy. Lura's formulation, whether ack-
nowledged or not, went on to appear in almost every French 
colonial description of traditional Vietnamese kingship. It 
became the standard account, to which later authors only 
• 1 Peter Baugher, "The Contradictions of Colonialism", Ph 
D, University cf Wisconsin-Madison, 1980, pp.47-49, quote p. 
47. Though he did not use the concept of projected identity, 
Baugher's study provides numerous examples of it. 
Pasquier, L'Annam, p.17. 
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ever contributed greater detail and texture.•~ And when it 
came to delineating the attributes of the Vietnamese king, 
Luro (and ~Jl the rest) immediately iMvoked the European 
image of the Chinese Son of Heaven as the key to his local 
replica.•e We begin with a summary of Luro's ideas. 
Like Hegel had done for China, Luro described Vietnam 
as a theocratic despotism. Responsible to Heaven alone, the 
sacred monarch retained all legal powers and exercised every 
superior office in the land. Everything emanated from him, 
and returned to him, without priesthood, hereditary aristo-
cracy, or parliament to intervene. The 'first literatus of 
the kingdom, that is to say, the most faithful observer of 
•z Thus some or most of what follows is reproduced in 
Bouinais and Paulus, L'Indo-chine fran;aise, p.653; Schrei-
ner, Institutions (I), pp.228-29; Pasquier, L'Annam, pp.66-
67; Petit, Monarchie, pp. 38-41 and 48-49; Nguyen Van Huyen, 
Civilisation annamite, pp.106-07; and even, as ironic testa-
ment to the strength of the colonial model, by the last 
Vietnamese king, Bao-Dai, in Le Dr~gon d'Annam (Paris: Plon, 
1980), p.52. Others like Diguet, Soci~t~, pp.121-23 descri-
bed identical characteristics but in their own words. 
•
4 In his Resum~ (pp.62-3), Cadi~~e quoted a passage from 
Legrand i;:le Lira.ye' s· .Notes hi.storiques sur la nation annami te 
(which Luro had ~arlier cited) that described independence 
from China in terms very similar indeed to those Luro him-
self would later use.[Pays d'Annam, p.76-77]. This raises 
the question of the influence of missionary-scholars like 
Bouillevaux or Legrand in forming Lura's conceptions, where 
personal observation was impossible. His outline of the mon-
archy may have drawn more directly on such sources than on 
contemporary European beliefs about the Chinese emperor, but 
I have not had access to their writings to cross-check. 
•~ It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the 
errors in the nineteenth century European image of the Chin-
ese monarchy as expounded in Luro and Hegel. Published works 
readily expose many, however. See, for example, Joseph R. 
Levenson, Confucian China and its Modern Fate, II (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964); Jonathan D. Spence, Emperor 
of China, (Penguin Books, 1977); or Paul Rule, 'Traditional 
Kingship in China', in Ian Mabbett (ed), Patterns of King-
ship and Authority in Traditional Asia (London: Croom Helm, 
1985), pp.44-57. 
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the doctrine of Confucius', the king was also Son of Heaven, 
a 'title symbolic of his submission to traditional religious 
ideas ••• - '-=--'=" The system was .. monarchy pure, absolute, with-
out control, without effective constitution, without any 
other limits than powerful custom, become almost ritual, and 
a code transmitted from time immemorial, from dynasty to 
dynasty'. 67 From the tenth century onwards, when the newly-
independent Vietnamese king had taken 'the same titles as 
the emperor of China [and] the same powers',•• the monarchy 
had remained explicitly Chinese and Confucian in nature and 
form. 
We must read the canonical books (the Kinh) to get 
an idea of what a Chinese or Annamite sovereign 
is, or at least of how he is educated and of the 
influence of the mandarins, chosen from the lite-
rati graduates of public examinations, who sur-
round him. 
In this system of pure monarchy, the monarch is 
imprisoned by the formulas of a poorly defined 
traditional cult that goes back more than thirty 
centuries before our era, and which has no other 
limits than those of the doctrine of Confucius, 
followed by all the literati of the nation. 
Like Hegel's image of a Chinese mandarinate as imper-
turbable as 'the course of nature', Luro's monarchy recalls 
a natural phenomenon far more than a human institution. The 
glacial inertia of Sinic tradition had ground on its inexor-
able way 'from time immemorial', with its immutable immens-
ity erasing all real differences between epoches and dynas-
ties within Vietnam, and between independent Vietnam and 
China. The kingdom ruled by Gobineau's •tyranny of the 
""'"" 
Luro, Pays d'Annam, p.90. 
Ibid, p.91 • 
•• Ibid, p.90 
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rites' thus existed in space, but not time.• 9 At its centre 
stood a series of interchangeable sacred emperors, each at 
once maste~_and victim of the system, bound by the exigen-
cies of 'minutely detailed practices of religious ceremonial 
borrowed from [Chinese] traditions and sacred texts'. 70 But 
no small matters, these: the fate of the dynasty hung on the 
king's discharging his all sacred duties scrupulously. 7 .i. 
Confucius and the philosophers of his school have 
traced the rules of conduct of the emperor; if he 
strays from them he sins, he forfeits his mission, 
he loses the "mandate of heaven" ( Thien f'1ang). 
To lose the mandate of heaven is to lose the 
empire, for when a sovereign governs tyrannically 
history shows us, every now and again, a superior 
man steps forward at the decisive moment, echo of 
the ideas of all, and declares that the sovereign 
has lost the mandate of heaven. This fatal excom-
munication, engendered and reverberating in the 
public consciousness, is enough to make the dyna-
sty fall. But this [slow] evolution of minds ••• 
entails frightful sufferings, for it is an act of 
impiety, a sacrilege, to revolt against the one 
who holds the mandate of heaven. 
Yet revolt provided no real solution. It could only 
establish a new dynasty, since 'an Annamite [or] a Chinese 
can hardly comprehend government without the monarch, offi-
cial representative of the purely rational morality of Con-
fucius while being at the same time pontiff of a hereditary 
and traditional national cult~. 72 Burdened with the same 
• 9 Cf. Hegel's view, later refined by Marx, that oriental 
states were doomed by their nature to repeat the same cycli-
cal pattern, whether their rise and fall following external 
conflicts or dynastic upheaval. 'This history too is, for 
the most part, really unhistorical, for it is only the repe-
tition of the same majestic ruin.· Hegel, History, p.106. 
?•::> Bouinais and Paulus, L'Indo-chine fran~aise, p.654. 
7.1. Lure, Pays d'Annam, p.91. 
Ibid. 
319 
flawed institutions, the new dynasty could only ultimately 
fail like its predecessors. The root of the problem lay in 
the belief __ ~hat government, as an expression of royal autho-
rity, could never be questioned by the people. Instead, they 
had to rely on superior officials, and ultimately the king 
himself, to detect and put right any administrative wrongs 
they suffered. Echoing Hegel, Lura noted that, 'in the last 
analysis, everything [came] down to the king'. Yet circums-
tances invariably doomed him to failure. How could a man 
'ordinarily raised in the harem and kept distant from busi-
ness during his youth' be expected to fulfil the onerous 
task of personally supervising the entire administration? It 
could not be done. With the king's 'will, intelligence and 
strength for work' rarely up to requirements, it left 'the 
sovereign motor of this very powerfully centralised machine 
•.• almost always inert'. The administration lacked 'regul-
atory impulses', the people found themselves ·fatally mis-
governed•,7z and revolt festered yet again. 
To a foreigner, the public face of the Tu-Bue reign 
displayed so many of these pessimistic and doctrinaire fea-
tures that it must have seemed like proof positive of the 
colonial model. But as we saw in Chapter Two, it was only 
under Tu-9uc that the kingdom had begun to evolve towards 
the rigidities of a Confucian state, so dissimilar from the 
Nguyan rule of the previous two centuries - and then for 
reasons not canvassed by the French colonial model. Nor, it 
should be noted, did the constricting Nee-Confucian imperial 
73 All quotes, Ibid, pp.100-01. 
320 
ideology of the mid-nineteenth century, so central to the 
colonial paradigm, tower over all Vietnamese history in the 
-
way the French assumed. 
Confucianism had only finally displaced Buddhism as the 
official imperial ideology under the fourteenth century Le 
(though it had increased in power under the later Tran). But 
by the seventeenth century, the unorthodox chua system in 
Ha-noi began slowly to erode standards of official Confucian 
studies in the North. 74 By Minh-Mang's 1820 accession, orga-
nised Chinese studies had been in serious decline for nearly 
a century. Although their revival formed a key component of 
the king's strategy for dynastic survival, Woodside judged 
that resuscitated Confucian studies had not yet struck deep 
local roots by the mid-century. 7 e Certainly we see nothing 
comparable in Nguyen Vietnam to the robust and diverse Con-
fucian discourse of contemporary China. Given this, the nar-
row scholasticism that the French perceived in Vietnamese 
Confucianism at the time may have not only derived from 
their own expectations of its supposed venerable and sacro-
sanct status. It could also have reflected the still rather 
artificial and self-consciously imported nature of organised 
Chinese studies, and their limited social role. 
74 Scarcely ever more than rudimentary in Bang-trong, Con-
fucian studies suffered a mortal blow in the North when 
Trinh Giang (1729-40) began selling mandarinal posts below 
the fourth grade. Langlet, Tradition, p.232, fn.3. For the 
decline of official Confucianism see pp.64-71; or Nguyen 
Khac Vien, 'Traditional .Vietnam. Some Historical Stages, 
Part V. Cultural Evolution', in VS, No. 21 (1969), pp.132-
45. 
7 e Model, pp.223-33. Woodside does not mention its parlous 
state in the previous century. 
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Another factor may also help explain the mid-nineteenth 
century French experience of Vietnamese Confucian studies as 
a matte~ ~! rote learning and intellectual rigidity. In the 
absence of a flourishing local Confucian discourse, revived 
Chinese studies depended heavily on the patronage of the Hue 
court. But as we saw in Chapter Three, the majority of high 
policy makers at court for almost the entire pre-colonial 
nineteenth century came from families lacking deep scholarly 
tradi tion_s. Most w~,re first, or at best second, generation 
laureates for whom t~e main significance of Confucian stu-
dies lay in their central role in the official examination 
system. When Minh.;...Mang's reforms began to alter the politic-
al climate in Hue in the 1830s, the existing, regional-based 
elite found in the examinations a means to prolong their own 
status and power, and to continue rationing outsiders' ace-
ess to the royal administration. For these men, revived of-
ficial Confucianism essentially represented a means to an 
end, rather than an end in itself. Most had memorised the 
stock literary formulas necessary to produce the passable 
poetry expected of an educ~ted man, and had digested the 
narrow range of classical knowledge and opinions required to 
succeed in the regional examinations. 7 • But once in the ad-
ministration, few cared to stray beyond the limits of accep-
ted accomplishments into the by-ways of philosophical specu-
lation or literary invention; nor did they encourage it in 
76 According to a passage quoted by Tran Trong Kim, Minh-
Mang himself realised the problem late in his reign. Scho-
lars too often approached the examinations the wrong way, he 
complained, happy to reproduce ~antiquated and worn-out for-
mulas' because they only cared about winning the academic 
title. Vi~t-nam Su-Juoc (Sai-gon, Tan-Viet XB, 1958), p.435. 
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others. 77 Thus, ironically, when the little China fallacy 
applied Gobineau's misconception of Chinese intellectual 
life as a formulaic re-iteration of the past to Bai-Nam, it 
seemed to explain quite well what the French observed in 
mid-century Vietnam. But the reasons behind it had nothing 
in common with the racial-cultural explanations proposed by 
Gobineau, and often seconded by later colonial Frenchmen. 79 
The French misconstrued the Confucianism they encoun-
tered at ~he court of Tu-Bue. They interpreted its role and 
sign~ficance through the filter of their own ignorance and 
prejudice, and then projected their own image backwards over 
the entire Vietnamese past. Not even the court mandarins of 
the Nguyen Annals Office, ordered by Minh-Mang in 1820 to 
·weigh and compromise' official records to ensure they con-
formed to proper Sinic orthodoxy, 7 • rivalled the nineteenth 
century French in fixing a sinicised mask on the Vietnamese 
past. By accepting the Chinese imperial ideology of the Tu-
Bue reign at its face value, Lure and the rest unwittingly 
paid the new Sino-Vietnamese elite the great compliment of 
taking them at their own best estimation, at their ~wn ideal 
self-image. And by imagining contemporary Vietnamese politi-
77 
see 
For the difficulties of Cao Ba Quat, who did so wander, 
Model, pp.225-33. 
78 For French description of the pre-colonial Vietnamese 
character that might have come straight from Gobineau's 
chapter on the yellow race, see E. Mathieu, 'L'•volution 
intellectuelle et sociale des Annamites sous !'influence 
fran~aise•, BSEI (ns), V, 3 (1930), pp.166-170. 
7 • Li Ta Na, "Central Vietnam in the Seventeenth and Eigh-
teenth Centuries: Some Social and Economic Aspects", seminar 
delivered at the Australian National University, 20 Septem-
ber 1990, citing a document in the Han-Nam Institute in Ha-
noi. 
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cal institutions represented ten centuries of unbroken Con-
fucian continuity, the nineteenth century French created 
and later enforced as colonial political fact - an image of 
the Vietnamese monarchy appropriate to their understanding 
of such a supposedly age-old, Confucianised political order. 
For them, the king became "nothing but" the Confucian Son of 
Heaven, •a being of quasi-divine essence, [hidden] in his 
palace like an idol in the depths of the sanctuary•,eo whose 
~premier duty above all' lay:in 'respect for the Rites•.ei 
Incorporated into later colonial political myths of the 
Vietnamese Other, this nineteenth century French misconcep-
tion would cast a long shadow into the twentieth century. 
Luro's account of the Vietnamese monarchy based itself 
almost entirely on classical Chinese texts, in much the same 
way that most nineteenth century Vietnamese would have done 
in similar circumstances. But while both concerned them-
selves more with Sinic theory than contemporary practice, 
few Vietnamese literati would have removed the royal insti-
tution from time and history to the extent that Luro's dog-
matic assertions effectively did. Nothing in Luro's account 
hints, for example, that history furnished numerous examples 
of kings (or rulers) acting with 'great patriarchal absolut-
ism' and flouting 'the rules of conduct traced by Confucius' 
without losing power as a result. 92 Ignorance may played a 
eo Diguet, Societe, p.122. 
•i Paul Doumer, L'Indochine fransaise. Souvenirs (Paris: 
Vuibert et Nony, 1905), p.165. 
92 As Schreiner noted a generation later. Institutions 
(I), p. 224. But his explanation was racial: as the king 
chose his ministers, ~for anyone who knows the Asiatic char-
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part; but the whole tone of his account suggests the cause 
lay elsewhere, in the influence of the contemporary European 
Orient~li~t discourse. 
The earlier excerpts from Hegel and Gobineau have al-
ready suggested how many pre-existing European assumptions 
about China surfaced unacknowledged in Luro's description of 
traditional Vietnamese pol i ti-cal institutions. His fundamen-
tal methodology al~o reflected a similar source. European 
Orientalists ~t the time stressed the analysis of classic 
texts and ancient scriptures as the best means of reconsti-
tuting the essence of "Oriental" religious, political, or 
cultural institutions in their pristine (and hence most au-
thentic) state.e3 Understanding their changing manifesta-
tions over time or their contemporary usages paled before 
the intellectual quest to reconstruct idealised, essential 
forms. Lura's outline of Vietnamese political institutions 
unquestionably fits this project. His voice joined with 
those of other early French writers like ~Aubaret, Legrand 
de Liraye, Land~s, Philastre, Sylvestre', men later so ~of-
ten copied',e4 to produce an Indochinese annex to the wider 
Orientalist discourse of the time. Together they erected the 
framework of a written ~tradition ••• whose material presen-
ce or weight, not the originality of a given author, [was] 
acter, this observation suffices 
telligent and active emperor 
whatever he wished' [p.225]. 
French views, see Nguyen Van 
and makes clear how an in-
could integrally encompass 
For a sample of the range of 
Phong, Societe, pp.112-15. 
93 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1978), pp.52-53 and 94-100 for the issue generally. 
94 Schreiner, Institutions (III), p.iv. 
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really responsible for the texts produced out of it' .ee In 
the form of the little China model of Vietnamese culture and 
identity,---their collective contributions combined to wield a 
formidable intellectual authority, especially where the mon-
archy was concerned. We need only glance at Robert Petit's 
1931 study, La Monarchie annamite, for instance, to discover 
the extent to which later researchers assumed the nineteenth 
century model had summarised all essential knowledge of the 
subject. As a result, no colonial study ever perceived the 
kingship as we would understand it n6w, as pfimarily an 
indigenous Vietnamese institution influenced by Chinese 
models, rather than a Chinese institution stranded in 
Vietnam. Their value is correspondingly limited. 
The imprint of these colonial and Orientalist assump-
tions lingered long after the demise of French colonialism. 
As late as the 1960s, we still find scholarly accounts that 
based themselves directly on the little China paradigm. We 
conclude the section with two brief examples, one describing 
the traditional state and the other the monarchy. 
The first, from a second generation colonial scholar, 
Paul Mus, presents a heavily-romanticised image of the mid-
nineteenth century kingdom as if it typified all previous 
centuries. 96 
ee Said, Orientalism, p.94. 
86 John T. McAlister, Jr and Paul Mus, The Vietnamese and 
Their Revolution (New York and London: Harper and Row, 
1970), p.31. Examples abound. For instance, the authors as-
serted that an aristocracy based on great estates and poli-
tical off ices •could not happen in Viet Nam because the em-
peror never granted permanent titles. The entailed estates 
were always ritualistic and symbolic ••• ~[p.33] True of the 
Nguyen (1802-1884), it was wrong for the Tran (1226-1400), 
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The traditional Vietnamese state was conventional-
ised in accordance with Confucian political thoug-
ht; it was withdrawn behind a wall of Chinese cha-
-·-racters [and] guaranteed conformity to the models 
provided by Chinese tradition ••• 
A principal goal of th~ ritualistic state, we are told, lay 
in preventing villagers from going astray, so that87 
its chief "ministers" ••• [formed] a kind of high 
tribunal sitting in judgement upon lapses from the 
Conrucian model. Therefore, the state recruited 
its personnel for all but the humblest positions 
from the literati, whose learning consisted en-
·tir.ely of Confu-cius, the ·classics, and the c:ommen-
t.aries. 
China provided a · description of this sort of 
system in a rich collection of writings and exege-
ses. Society was the content of its own literature 
•••• [and all ideals] to be achieved lay in the 
past. Since present evils resulted from neglect of 
the Confucian model, their cure lay not in innova-
tion but in return to the ideal ••• 
The 'Confucian balance between the ritualistic: state and the 
autarchic: village#•• enabled the state to assure ~unity and 
order in the world by a harmony between human institutions 
and the laws of nature, and the learnirig of China sustained 
that tranquillity'.•• 
All Vietnamese history from the tenth to thirteenth 
centuries, and most of the rest, escapes this particular 
model. Where in its timeless vision of preter-human tradi-
tional harmony can dynamic:, pragmatic: 9ang-trong fit? How 
can it accommodate the nearly two centuries during which, in 
whose extended clan became just that sort of aristocracy; 
and also for the eighteenth century, though more by default 
than design in the North. Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du Viet-
nam des origines a 1862 (Paris: Sudestasie, 1981), pp.128-30 
and 172-73. 
87 Mc:Alister and Mus, The Vietnamese, p.32. 
•• Ibid p.36 • 
.... Ibid, p.42 • 
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an ·upheaval unheard-of in history',•0 the Trinh chua reduc-
ed a long sorry procession of pathetic Le emperors to ritual 
-
figureheads, bereft of virtue or substance? What can it hope 
to tell us of the Gia-Long era, or even the activist Minh-
Mang reign in which Hue imposed a Chinese land tax system on 
Southern villagers more or less at sword-point? Innumerable 
exceptions remain, but the point is surely made. Using Chin-
ese political theories and models as a guide to pre-colonial 
history can only ever part~y elucidate traditional Vietnam, 
and then ~ainly the later fi~teenth ~nd mid-nineteenth cen-
turies, both times of emphatic sinicisation. More often, 
however, Vietnamese historical experience fails to conform 
to the expectations of what effectively seems little more 
than a European projection of Chinese Otherness onto old 
Vietnam. The Vietnamese past can only be forced into this 
doubly-distorting Euro-Sinic mould by violating its indigen-
ous integrity, or by ignoring everything that does not fit. 
The same exaggerated respect for Sinic ideology and 
theory over Vietnamese historical practice also appears in 
our second example, Bang Phuong-Nghi's description of the 
eighteenth century monarchy in Les Institutions publiques du 
Viet-Nam au XVIII• Siecle.•i 
Although the eighteenth century witnessed the nadir of 
Chinese-style imperial kingship (hoang de), the "little 
China" image of the monarchy as a primordial Confucian in-
• 0 The 1780s' general Nguyen Huu Chinh, quoted in Le Thanh 
Khoi, Vietnam des oriqines, p.320. 
•i 9ang Phuong-Nghi, Les Institutions publiques du Viet-
Nam au XVIII• Siecle (Paris: EFEO, 1969), pp.43-52. 
328 
stitution, unchanged by time and wielding the same sacred 
authority regardless of era or circumstance, still weaves 
its magic; __ over the analysis. Occasional disclaimers appear 
in footnotes to admit that practice contradicted theory at 
the time: in the text, however, the traditional discourse 
triumphs. Thus we hear how, in the eighteenth century, •the 
greatest respect surrounded the sacred person of the sove-
reign, the Son of Heaven 1 ;•2 that ~the King was an-absolute 
monarch who required the obedience of all his subjects• and 
whose 'edicts always demanded immediate execution·;•~ how 
'the sovereign ••• [was] identical with the kingdom of which 
he was a sort of incarnation•,•4 and so forth. •one can 
hardly insist too much on the religious role of the King·, 
we are told, •for, in Vietnam, religion as manifested in the 
rites overshadowed all other preoccupations'.•• None of this 
hints that the situation of the eighteenth century emperors, 
stripped of all but ritual duties, may have differed in any 
respect from that of most previous (and later) kings. We 
even hear that in the 1720s Trinh Cuong twice refused to 
usurp the last imperial prerogatives•6 of the degraded Le 
hoang de •tor fear of lese-majeste~,•7 without any sugges-
tion that providing Qing China with a pretext to intervene 
Ibid, p.46. 
Ibid, p.52. 
Ibid. 
•• Ibid, p.45 • 
•• To dress in imperial yellow in 1721, and to perform the 
sacrifice to Heaven and Earth in 1724. Ibid, pp.44 and 46. 
Ibid, p.44. 
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on behalf of a deposed Le emperor, as would later happen in 
1789, may have provided a far more compelling reason for the 
Trinh to·m~intain the status quo. 
Despite the abundant evidence of royal humiliation and 
institutional decline in the sources,•• Bang Phuong-Nghi 
still advanced the standard interpretation of monarchy a la 
chinoise. He managed this by the extraordinary expedient of 
combining king and chua, for political purposes, into a com-
posite 'royal authority'.•• The strategy certainly ensured 
that the eighteenth century would fit the author's opening 
"little China" generalisation c•royal power in Annam had not 
changed, in principle, since its appearance .. 100 ), but at real 
cost to the analysis. Blinkered by a preconceived con-
clusion, Sang's account of eighteenth century kingship for-
feited the opportunity to formulate new insights into the 
circumstances of a time when, as we suggest below, the Viet-
namese monarchy may well have been evolving in ways that af-
fected both royal institution and basic principle alike. 
T~e early colonial image of traditional Vietnam as a 
timeless Confucian kingdom, ruled by Sinic rites and tradi-
tions incarnated in its sacred emperor, essentially unchan-
•a For the extent of Trinh usurpation of royalty, see 
Langlet, Tradition, pp.89 fn.6, 97 fn.1, 107-08, 167 fn.1, 
207 fn.1 and 2, and 208 fn.3. For the Trinh's casual king-
mak1ng, see K.W. Taylor, 'The Literati Revival in Seven-
teenth-Century Vietnam', Jnl of SE Asian Studies, XVIII, 1 
(March 1987), pp.2-5. 
•• For examples see Bang Phuong-Nghi, Institutions 
publiques, pp.50-52. 
.1.00 Ibid, p.43 (my emphasis) • 
ged and unchangeable for a millenium, informed French 
understanding of Vietnamese identity and institutions all 
through the colonial era, and beyond. Foremost among its 
errors must be counted its classical Chinese definition of 
the Vietnamese monarchy. To a degree that most French never 
understood, the simple fact of colonial domination posed a 
standing challenge to dynastic legitimacy in Vietnam. So 
when men like Pasquier implemented pro-monarchical policies 
based on their "little China'' image of a Confucian king, 
they only compounded the problem. By seeking to draw the 
king closer to colonialism, they unwittingly severed the 
Protected Vietnamese monarchy even further from its indige-
nous roots. Where similar policies in Cambodia left some 
royal prestige intact at the end of colonialism, in Vietnam 
French ignorance of the popular expectations of kingship 
made it extremely unlikely that the ritual monarch in Hue 
would be able to survive the difficult transition from col-
onialism to independence. Some thoughts on this indigenous 
monarchical ideal conclude the chapter. 
King and People in Late Traditional Vietnam 
In traditional Vietnam, as in pre-modern societies 
elsewhere, monarchy functioned as both an institution and 
an ideal. Though people at all levels of society shared 
certain basic expectations of what royalty was and should 
be, elites and peasants tended to prize different aspects 
of these common beliefs more highly than others. We have 
touched on the sovereign in Chinese theory, and mentioned 
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something about what the Nguyen king meant to members of 
the Trung-ky political elite. But let us now turn to what 
the monarchy seems to have signified for Vietnamese pea-
sants; and suggest how circumstances in the century and a 
half preceding colonialism might have effected the popular 
attitude towards the kingship. 
The first manifestation of Vietnamese monarchy pro-
vides an early indication of what the king meant to his 
people. When Vietnam won its independence in the tenth cen-
tury, the new rulers adopted two ceremonial.Chinese terms 
for kingship: vuong, which later became the title that 
Trinh and Nguyen chua ruled under; and de or hoang de, 
which signified the imperial Son of Heaven. But alongside 
them stood an indigen6us Vietnamese term for "king'', vua, 
with a quite different import. Vua meant, in Keith Taylor's 
estimation, •a ruler who governs according to the estab-
lished customs and traditions of the people#; while the 
more formal Chinese terms implied for Vietnamese 'a commis-
sion to rule from above, without any sympathetic link to 
the people themselves'. When written in demotic Vietnamese 
(nom), Taylor added, vua combined the Chinese character for 
vuong with the nom character for "father .. , conveying the 
intimate sense of a ruler with fatherly attributes. 101 
The projection of parental qualities onto the king ap-
pears quite frequently in pre-industrial monarchies: the 
Russian Tsar's sentimental title of 'the little white fath-
er', for instance, springs readily to mind. In China (and 
101 Keith Weller Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam (University 
of California Press, 1983), all quotes p.206. 
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Vietnam), in a tradition dating back to Mencius at least, 
we similarly find the king designated as 'the father and 
mother of---the people'. One among innumerable such examples 
can be found in Nguyen Hue's 1788 edict announcing his ac-
cession as the Quang-Trung emperor: 'The way may vary, and 
times may be easy or harsh, but the Sage has only one line 
of conduct - to follow the way of Heaven in gov~rning the 
country, and to make himself the father and mother of the 
It is possible that members of the elite may have ba-
sically understood this notion, and the title that went 
with it, as a conventional metaphor describing the king's 
ideal relations with his subjects. For the peasantry, how-
ever, it may have carried a far more concrete meaning. In 
Vietnam, with its strong emphasis on family, for the king 
to proclaim himself 'father and mother of the people' con-
veyed a symbolic freight that was far from abstract. It 
suggested a superior power that gave life to the people, 
·nurtured and protected them, defended and guided them, and 
chastised them with a loving hand when necessary. Nor did 
it imply a one-way relationship. As we will see later, it 
could also contain a filial sense of reciprocal obligation, 
a feeling that the people owed a life-debt to their king in 
return for his land and care. In peasant life and imaginat-
ion, as Woodside noted, the vua figured as no remote and 
J.o:z Quoted in Huynh Le ( ed), Hop tuyen tho v•n Viet Nam 
the ky XVIII nua dau the ky XIX, III (Ha-noi, 1978), p.327. 
[Hereafter TVVl\f.l It is also interesting to note that 
Oiguet, a close observer of ordinary Vietnamese, reported 
that the king's most valued title was 'Father and Mother of 
the People'. Annamites, p.122. 
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forbidding sacred hierarch but as a 'protector figure (like 
the Vietnamese kitchen god or vua bep)'.i0~ This does not 
deny that_the king's majesty also inspired popular fear and 
awe; peasants who experienced his authority via royal offi-
cials wisely feared it. At the same time, however, few con-
founded the king's mandarins (or their behaviour) with the 
vua ideal. 
A strong analogy seems to exist between popular mon-
archism as outlined here and the peasant notion of Heaven 
described by L•opold Cadi~re.io4 Beneath its encrusted Sinic 
accretions, Cadiere detected an indigenous core within the 
notion of "Heaven'' which echoes the feelings clustered 
around the idea of the king. For peasants, Heaven (troi) 
signified not the impersonal Sino-Vietnamese thien to which 
the emperor sacrificed but an imminent presence accorded, 
like ong vua, the respectful familial title of "father's 
father" (ong). Ong troi ordered all that occurred in the 
world, and in human life, whether for good or ill. Heaven 
might not prevent human wickedness, but nothing eluded it. 
It understood the motives and intentions hidden in men's 
hearts and would redeem the innocent who begged it for jus-
tice, while punishing the transgressor. Like ong vua on a 
cosmic scale, ong troi personified ~an all-powerful being, 
intelligent and good, omniscient and just, to whom one had 
io~ Model, pp.9-18, quote p.12 
io4 L. Cadiere and A. Bonhomme, 'Annam. Les Habitants (Po-
pulations, Langues, Religions)', in BAVH, XVIII, 1-2 
(1931), pp.83-86. Also see L. Cadiere (trans I.W. Mabbett), 
'Religious Beliefs and Practices of the Vietnamese' (Monash 
University Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Working Pap-
er No. 60, 1989), p.26. 
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recourse in suffering, as one instinctively called on one's 
father or mother; Troi oi! "Oh Heaven": Cha oi, He oi: "Oh! 
father, Oh! mother, help me in my pain"!' 10~ 
Furthermore, despite Chinese imperial theory, not just 
anybody could take the throne and become the people's vua. 
Any aspirant to kingship who wished to attract a popular 
following needed the support of the spirit powers. To be 
descended from auspicious ancestors, 106 particularly from 
one buried by heaven in a king-maker hole (huyet de vuong), 
provided one of the strongest popular tokens of other-
wordly backing. Without the honour of a heavenly burial 
( thien tang) among his forebears, or other fateful indica-
tions like omens and prophecies predicting success, only 
the most extraordinary individual could have hoped to gath-
er sufficient support for a successful tilt at the throne. 
Binh Tien Hoang (968-979), for example, may have fought his 
way to the kingship as a great warrior; but the tale of how 
he had fooled a Chinese geomancer to bury his own father's 
bones in a king-maker hole discovered by the Chinese, was 
soon circulating among the people. 107 All dynastic founders, 
including the Trinh and Nguyen, boasted an ancestor buried 
by Heaven - and took care that it was widely known. Lesser 
imperial graves also acted as a source of spiritual power 
for the ruling dynasty, so that plots to destroy them 
10~ The translation is as given in Cadiere and Bonhomme, 
'Les habitants', p.84. 
10• The discussion is from Nguyen Ngoc Huy's valuable es-
say, 'Fate in the Vietnamese Spirit', in T.D.R. Thomason 
(ed), Understanding Vietnam (Bussum: The DPC Information 
Service, 1982), pp.319-48. 
Ibid, pp.338-39. For other examples, see pp.337-46. 
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ranked second to treason. It was to eradicate any lingering 
traces of ancestral power that Gia-Long not only destroyed 
the Tay~~gn brothers' graves and those of the previous two 
generations, but equally sacked that of their distant Nghe-
an ancestor for good measure. 109 It was also for this reason 
that Nguyen Van Thanh's denigration of the site of Gia-
Long's mother's grave in 1812 was said to have helped fest-
er the royal suspicions that finally cost the Grand Marshal 
his life in 1817. 10• But despite the best precautions, in-
herited merit and virtue (phuc due) alone could never sus-
tain a dynasty indefinitely. Successive kings had to re-
plenish the family stock, lest one day they find it all 
squandered, and with it their grip on the throne. 
None of this was entirely unknown to the French. Early 
colonial observers of Vietnam understood something of these 
spiritual and occult matters, but never thought them worth 
incorporating into their model of the monarchy. As nine-
teenth century rationalists, they preferred instead to dis-
miss it all as superstitious nonsense. Gabriel Aubaret's 
reactions in his 1863 translation of the Gia-dinh Thong-Chi 
were typical. He disposed of these beliefs and the cosmolo-
gical system upon which they rested in two short notes: 1 1o 
109 Ibid, p.342. This was most unusual, and reflected Gia-
Long's hatred for the Tay-son, which also caused the Nguyen 
to deny Quang-Trung had ever been a legitimate king. By 
contrast, Gia-Long ostentatiously tended the Le tombs in 
Thanh-hoa. 
10• Le Van Phuc, 'Le Vie et la mort du mar~chal Nguyen van 
Thieng, vice-roi du Tonkin sous Gia-Long·, BSEI (ns), XVI, 
1 (1940), p. 36-37. 
1 10 G. Aubaret (trans), Histoire et Description de la 
Basse-Cochinchine (Pays de Gia-dinh) (Paris: Imprimerie im-
and 
The inhabitants of the empire of Annam are extr-
emely superstitious ••• We could say that their 
religion is entirely a matter for diviners and 
-sorcerers; 
It is quite impossible to follow the inhabitants 
of the empire of Annam in their suppositions 
about the influence of the stars; their total 
ignorance of the system of the world denies all 
serious criticism. 
Aubaret far preferred the Confucian Chinese concept, re-
marking at one point that when the text mentioned 'heaven, 
or Thien ••• it (was] the same as that referred to in the 
philosophy of Confucius 1 .iii That may have been correct for 
the part-Chinese Trinh Hoai euc, author of the Gia-dinh 
Thong-Chi, but not for all Vietnamese. 
If, as we have argued, the peasants expected their 
king to nurture, defend, and protect them like a parent, 
how did these beliefs and expectations fare in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries when the Trinh chua reduced 
the captive Le kings to a token imperial status, deprived 
of all but ritual duties? Though evidence is scanty, some 
suggests that the peasant concept of monarchy adapted over 
time to the changed circumstances: and that it did so dif-
ferently in Bang-trong and eang-ngoai. 
As mentioned earlier, traditional kingship always ope-
rated on two levels. It was at once the ruling institution 
and a collective ideal, the embodiment of an unconscious 
projection of sovereignty that bestowed a numinous autho-
p~riale, 1863), pp.31 and 70 respectively. Cf. Schreiner's 
scathing comments on the same issue in Institutions, II, 
pp.144-47. 
iii Aubaret, La Basse-Cochinchine, p.50. 
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rity on the incumbent. The royal personality thus kindled 
·a divine force which inhabits a man ••• the king 
heals the sick, he brings prosperity to the coun-
try. This tendency to make the king responsible 
for the prosperous passage of events was partic-
ularly accentuated in China ••• but it still re-
mains active today in our democracies where the 
man in the street automatically accuses "the gov-
ernment" as a whole of being responsible for mat-
ters totally beyond its control. 
If the ruling monarch consistently rebuffed collective ex-
pectations, however, he might cease to embody the project-
ion of sovereignty. Usually the erosion of royal legitimacy 
that accompanied the withdrawal of the projection would en-
courage contenders, one of whom would ultimately replace 
the discredited king or dynasty. But such a crisis of con-
fidence might instead prompt an institutional evolution 
that increasingly divorced the sacred or emblematic aspects 
of monarchy from the mundane and political functions of 
rulership. Something of this sort may have happened very 
early in Japanese history, for instance. For well over a 
. . . . • ·- v 
millenium here everyone recognised that the imperial fam-
- . 
ily's dire~t descent from the Sun Goddess uniquely quali-
fied it to intercede with their divine ancestor on behalf 
of the nation; but few further believed it endowed the em-
perors with any special role or rights in government.ii~ 
337 
112 Edmond Rochedieu, 'Le Caract~re sacr~ de la souverain-
ete a la lumiere de la psychologie collective', in The Sac-
ral Kingship (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1959), p.51. 
11 ~ Harold Bolitho, •Japanese Kingship~, in Ian Mabbett 
(ed), Patterns of Kingship and Authority in Traditional 
Asia (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp.26-30. 
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When the Trinh chua prevented the Le vua from carrying 
out his royal responsibilities, there are some indications 
that, by the eighteenth century, a similar divergence be-
tween the monarchical institution and ideal may have begun 
in Vietnam. We will consider the Northern situation first. 
By the 1660s~ the Trinh had bowed to political necess-
ity and kept a Le on the imperial throne. 114 But they had 
also dispensed with any illusion of subordination to him. 
The chua set up his own court, appropriated royal terms of 
address, usurped royal prerogatives like the dispensation 
of moral precepts to the populace, and ceased to prostrate 
himself before the throne except during the sacrifice to 
Heaven and Earth, which only the Son of Heaven could pro-
perly perform. 115 That the king should be so publicly 11• 
humiliated and banished from government contradicted all 
Chinese imperial theory and practice117 as well as the hist-
orical experience of independent Vietnam. Yet by the late 
114 They feared provoking Chinese intervention or inciting 
challengers to 'restore the Le', including the Nguyen from 
the south. A solemn oath, supposedly sworn by Trinh Kiem, 
may also have stayed them, as it promised that 'while the 
Le are preserved the Trinh live; if the Le fall, the Trinh 
will disappear'. Of course, it may equally have been 
invented later to justify the status quo. Quoted in Nguyen 
Ngoc Huy, 'Fate•, p.330. 
115 For Trinh arrogation of the royal role, see Langlet, 
Tradition vietnamienne, p.89, fn.6, p.97, fn.1, pp.107-08, 
p.167 fn.1, p.207 fn.1 & 2, p.208 fn.3. 
11• In this context, "public~ refers to the literate 
elite. Taylor, 'Literati Revival·, pp.2-5. 
117 • As Ray Huang noted, government based on ritual monar-
chy could only function if everyone believed in it, and ac-
ted on that belief, including the Son of Heaven himself. 
1587. A Year of' No Significance (Yale University Press, 
1981), pp.46-47, 75-103. 
seventeenth century ambitious mandarins and literati aspir-
ants had managed to accommodate themselves to the Trinh 
dictators·h-ip, even creatively adapting Chinese political 
concepts to cloak their manoeuvres around the Trinh power-
holders. 118 In one striking example, a Trinh chief minister 
was attacked in Nee-Confucian terms hitherto only appropri-
ate to the king:119 
The government of a state depends on the chief 
minister ( te tuong): the prosperity or decline of 
government thus depends on the integrity or depr-
avity of a single man ••• Over the last years, 
earthquakes, floods, comets, droughts, locusts, 
and other strange phenomena have appeared, but no 
mandarin of the court has dared denounce [the 
chief minister's] faults. 
And if the mandarinate lacked orthodox Confucian convic-
tions, the usurping chua could not have pretended to the 
role of sage-king, either. Even Trinh Tac, who encouraged a 
short-lived literati revival in the mid-seventeenth cent-
ury, remained capable of the decidedly non-Confucian gest-
ure of offering the heads of army mutineers in sacrifice to 
the spirit of a senior adviser whom they had murdered. 120 
Nevertheless, the major victims of the situation re~ 
mained the people, who suffered a century of civil war fol-
lowed by a gathering rural crisis. From the 1720s to the 
1750s, almost continuous peasant rebellions, many under the 
slogan ~restore the Le, exterminate the Trinh'(phu Le~ d~et 
Trinh), exhausted Bang-ngoai. Although this wave of revolt 
finally subsided, when the Tay-son general Nguyen Hue mar-
11• Cf. Taylor's conclusion, 'Literati Revival', p.22. 
Langlet, Tradition vietnamienne, p.195 (my emphasis). 
Ibid, p.164. The mutiny occurred in 1674. 
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ched on Ha-noi in 1786, the revered phu Le inscription on 
his banners drew crowds of supporters, as it would also do 
in 1802 for Nguyen Anh.i:zi The first episode is understand-
able; the second far less so. In the interim, the last Le 
king had called in a massive Chinese army to restore him to 
the throne after Nguyen Hue finally deposed the dynasty in 
1788. At the bar of Vietnamese history, this act alone 
should have permanently damned the Le, descendants of the 
hero who had liberated the country from the Ming invasion 
in the fifteenth century. Yet clearly it did not. As we saw 
in Chapter Two, stubborn Le restorationism persisted in the 
North, with one early 1860s pretender (Ta Van Phung) even 
willing to foment a rebellion in the delta as a diversion-
ary tactic to help the French expeditionary forces seize 
national territory in the South.i:z:z Le loyalism troubled the 
Hue government right up to the imposition of the Protector-
ate. Even in the 1930s, the sentiment endured among die-
hards in Tonkin.i23 
Why was this? Le Thanh Khoi has speculated that under 
the Trinh the Le became idealised in a folk-memory of the 
golden age under the dynasty's early kings.i:z4 But this 
explanation alone seems inadequate to account for Northern 
intransigence before the claim of Nguyen Hue (the ritually 
Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du Vietnam, pp.320-21, 339. 
Tsuboi, L'Empire vietnamien, pp.216-17. 
iz3 Alan Broderick reported northerners told him of a Le 
king hidden in the mountains, waiting to come forth, whom 
Broderick compared to King Arthur of Britain. Little China 
(Oxford University Press, 1942), pp.37 and 149. 
Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du Vietnam, p.308. 
enthroned Quang-Trung emperor), and then of Gia-Long and 
his successors. As we noted previously, ordinary Vietnamese 
did not a-s-sume that royal merit and virtue automatically 
continued indefinitely. They also accepted that, when times 
changed, even the most virtuous could not prevail against 
the will of Heaven. Classical Chinese (and Vietnamese) pol-
itical theory and practice reinforced these ideas by teach-
ing that the man upon whom Heaven bestowed its mandate be-
came Son of Heaven, irrespective of his antecedents. On the 
face of it Gia-Long, who came to the throne fourteen years 
after the last Le king had fled to China, apparently dis-
posed of all the attributes necessary for kingship. Yet ob-
viously many Northerners did not agree, and forced his army 
to campaign in old Bang-ngoai for the entire reign. Why was 
the new Son of Heaven unacceptable here? 
It may be that this popular refusal fully to legiti-
mise the political status quo reflected a subterranean 
fracturing of the monarchical ideal in the North long be-
fore 1802. Two things might have happened. As the idealisa-
tion of the Le progressed in the chua era, the long-frust-
rated vua ideal and the Le imperial clan may have coalesced 
in some Northerners' minds, causing them to see the salva-
tion of the state as conditional on the restoration of a 
functioning Le vua. Or conversely, some Northerners may 
have slowly invested the centuries-old imperial house with 
an aura of "divine right" to the ritual monarchy, regard-
less of where actual power lay.i 2 e Events in 1802 hint at 
i 2 e Such an evolution was not unthinkable, given Nguyen 
Van Huyen's 1944 remark about the colonial monarchy: 'Just 
as the head of the family must carry out the ancestral 
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this second development (though either or both might have 
occurred). Why would Bang-ngoai literati, who surely sus-
-pected Nguyen Anh would not return the Le to full power in 
1802, still suspend disbelief far enough to hope he would 
"restore the Le", as his banners proclaimed? Could phu Le 
by then have come to imply restore the Le as emperor (hoang 
de), while someone else ruled as chua and vuong? 
Of course, it may be that we are starting at shadows 
here. A ~loser examination of other factors, .regional par-
ticularism especially, might adequately.explain the subse-
quent failure of the Nguyen to embody the vua ideal for 
their Northern peasant subjects. Much more research is nee-
essary. What is clear, however, is that the Nguyen did fail 
to incarnate the monarchical ideal for very many ordinary 
Northerners, especially under Tu-Bue. A glance at some po-
pular 1850s satirical songs (ve) from the former Bang-ngoai 
area of Nghe-Tinh12• illustrates the point. By linking Tu-
Sue's irregular accession with the catalogue of disasters 
that followed, the songs communicated his failure to live 
up to the popular monarchical ideal. Thus we hear in one 
that: 127 
Since the enthronement of Tu-Bue, 
There has been neither peace nor plenty. 
cult, [so] the king must make sacrifices on the altars of 
his [ancestors]. And as the greatest of his ancestors is 
heaven, the emperor must offer a ceremony to it, the Nam 
Giao'. Civilisation annamite, p.106. (~'j ~pl...a.$•5.) 
Tri', 
Quoted in Bui-Quang-Tung, 'La Succession de Thi~u­
BSEI (ns), LXII, 1-2 (1967), pp.52-56 and 73-76. 
Ibid, p.54. 
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Another spelt out the indictment in more detail. 128 
From when I grew up until now, 
Ong vua Tu-Bue has messed everything up. 
---The people are hungry 
But their plaints never reach his ears. 
Both money or rice 
Simply dwindle away. 
(Once) ong vua Tu-Bue took the throne 
The harvests were lost. 
And when the king failed as vua, as a third mid-century 
verse suggests, his orthodox gestures as Confucian hoang de 
might als~ attract popular scorn and ridicule. Thus when 
Tu-Bue .rendered Minh-Mang's 1830s "ten moral prescriptions" 
into poetry for recital and study in the villages, some 
disaffected Northern ~ags riposted iM kind: 12• 
It's fun to attend the theatre, 
And swimming leaves nobody sad. 
We'll manage to watch a procession, 
And even a funeral's not bad. 
But to go hear the 'Ten Prescriptions', 
You'd have to be stark, staring mad. 
In former 9ang-trong, by contrast, the people felt 
quite differently about .the Nguy~n:dynas~y. 1~0 As we saw in 
Chapte~ Two, the Le stirred no hearts here, either before 
or after Gia-Long's accession. Although the Nguyen chua had 
never arrogated the hoang de title, they had twice tried 
to establish an independent tributary relationship with 
128 Ibid, p.74. The f~ll Vietnamese text, with a French 
translation, is at pp.74-75. 
12• My free rendition of a French version in Nguyen Khac 
Vien and Huu Ngoc (eds), Anthologie de la litterature viet-
namienne, II (Ha-noi: Editions en Langues etrangeres, 
1973), p.12. I have assumed a northern provenance by com-
parison with southern poetry discussed below. 
izo Cf. the description of Tu-Bue in an 1860s Nam-ky pro-
clamation: 'King Tu-Bue is both sage and intelligent'. Chu 
Thien et al, Tho van yeu nuoc nua sau the ky XIX (1858-
1900) (Ha-noi, 1972), p.376. [Henceforth TVYN] 
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China after which, had they succeeded, they might well have 
proclaimed themselves hoang de in the eighteenth century, 
instead of-simply vuong. 131 As it was, over the generations 
of Nguyen rule here, the notions of chua and vuong gradual-
ly fused with that vua - but of a vua without Sinic impe-
rial trappings. Evidence for this appears in numerous 
poems, tracts, and proclamations of Southern partisans in 
the 1860s, all of which invoked the Nguyen king in Hue in-
different~y .as vua, vuong or chua. As these appeals sought 
to rouse a mainly peasant atidience to risk their lives 
fighting the French, we must assume the authors employed 
the strongest a~guments and images they knew. And if so, 
what they said reveals, over and again, a bed-rock accept-
ance of the mid-century Nguyen king as vua in the South. In 
addition, the appeals also tonfirm the centrality of a re-
ciprocal sense of obligation between king and people in 
peasant monarchism, the crucial factor lacking in relations 
between the Southern dynasties (both Tay-son and Nguyen) 
and their new Northern subjects. 132 Let us consider some 
typical examples. 
131 Charles B. Mayben, Histoire moderne du pays d'Annam 
(Paris: Pion, 1920), p.113. 
132 The regional bias disappears in current translations. 
Both Nguyen Khac Vien and Huu Ngoc (eds), Vietnamese Liter-
ature (Ha-noi, 198?) [henceforth VL] and Truong Buu Lam, 
Patterns of Vietnamese Response to Foreign Intervention: 
1858-1906 (Monograph Series No. 11, Southeast Asian Stud-
ies, Yale University, 1967) always give "king", regardless 
of the Vietnamese original. TVYN also invariably glosses 
chua as vua/vuong in Southern materials. As for hoang de 
(or similar), I have never found it·used of the Nguyen king 
in Southern materials of the period. 
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The first excerpts come from the elegy to the resist-
ance fighters of Can-giuoc by the blind poet and village 
teacher, Nguyen Binh Chieu:i33 
You believed that: 
Every inch of earth, every green shoot comes by 
the chua's favour and is tended on behalf of our 
homeland .•• 
Living you venerated the vua, dead you do so 
still 
In the shrines of our righteous warriors fragrant 
incense burns, giving thanks due to the words 
'king and land' [vuong tho]. 
The second occurs in a ~862-63 appeal by the partisan lead-
er, Truong Cong Binh. It weaves together personal family 
and Nguyen king with human obligations to heaven and earth 
and to the chualvua to create a moral universe in which the 
living should repay their debt of life to family, king, and 
country:i34 
I believe, in the words of the song, that 
Water comes from a spring, trees from their 
roots; 
Thus if all living people have teeth and hair, 
how can they not recognise their chua or their 
father? 
If all living people have homes and families, how 
can they not know fidelity and filial piety? 
Are we not men who stand on the ground and hold 
up the sky? 
In everything imbued with the same customs, the 
subjects of one country! 
i 33 For a short biography, see VL, pp.405-06, and for a 
full English translation, pp.407-12; or Truong Buu Lam, 
Patterns, pp.66-72. Disagreements between the two prompted 
my own literal translation, from TVYN, pp.49-50. 
i 34 • My translation from TVYN, p.371. David G. Marr, Viet-
namese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925 (University of California 
Press, 1971), pp.30-33 for biographical details. 
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How can you claim to 'help the chua pacify the 
country'? 
How can you say you •attend to family (and) found 
the empire'? 
Reason allows we must discharge our moral oblig-
ation bravely and loyally, 
To repay the past, those nine months spent in our 
mothers' wombs; 
Reason allows that wife must advise husband and 
child urge father 
To acquit our past [debts accrued] from living on 
the land of our vua, our fistful of food and 
simple shelter. 
The sentiments expressed in these examples suggest 
that, if not the peasants themselves, then the local parti-
san leaders who led them against the French in the 1860s, 
often in opposition to the court, did so not only from the 
desire to defend their homes. They were also motiv~ted by a 
sense of moral and material obligation, 'to acquit past 
debts' to the Nguyen chua/vuong/vua, whose land and protec-
tion had helped their families survive for generations. 
It should be noted, too, that nothing in the excerpts 
quoted above confirms Truong Buu Lam's belief that Southern 
partisans felt court disapproval trapped them in a conflict 
of loyalty between Hue's orders and the need to fight. Dr 
Lam considered this conflict caused resistance fighters to 
draw •a careful distinction between the person of an indi-
vidual king and the moral principle of loyalty to the mon-
archy' which then let them to fight in the name of 'a ruler 
who would be worthy of that title'. This transformed the 
monarchy into ~an idealised institution not tarnished by 
any accidental deviation from the ideal'.i~e The famous 
lines quoted above, however, suggest that while Southern 
Patterns, p.10 (my emphasis). 
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guerillas did cherish a monarchical ideal, it was rather 
more concrete. They did not fight from some abstract prin-
ciple of l~yalty, but from a sense of indebtedness to the 
ruling king, to repay their ancestors 1 rice- and life-debts 
to h~s ancestors. And this, they accepted, might require 
obedience to a higher duty than Hue's orders. This notion 
comes through strongly in Nguyen Binh Chieu's elegy for the 
resistance leader, Truong Cong Binh: The high mandarins had 
failed their king in the crisis, but the people had not 
as their chua.ought to recognise. 130 
Despite royal o~ders to ig~6re the enemy, 
His loyalty equalled the people's deep fidelity. 
He helped (them] with full and utter devotion to 
repay their human debt. 
No proper chua would care to call him a rebel-
lious subject. 
The last line of the poem highlights the fundamental 
sense of moral reciprocity underlying the peasants' ideal 
perceptions of their relations with the king. Both sides 
had to play their parts properly for the relationship to 
thrive. A king who ~eneged on his duties - whether in fact 
or in popular perceptions - would sooner or later exhaust 
the stock of obligation stored up by his predecessors, 
along with the fund of royal virtue also inherited from 
them. If the people's sense of connection to the ruler fad-
ed, so ultimately would their active loyalty. In the short 
term, others, like evil advisers (or the Trinh chua under 
13• My translation from TVYN, p.52. Lam, Patterns, p.11 
also gives the following from Truong Cong Binh: 'The Emper-
or (sic) calls us rebels but in the depth of his heart he 
cannot help but praise our loyalty. When the day of victory 
comes, not only will the Emperor forgive us, he will furth-
ermore grant us all kinds of awards'. 
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the Le), might be popularly blamed for the royal failure. 
But if the king's perceived inability to protect and defend 
the peopl~-persisted too long, it would bankrupt their sen-
se of moral obligation towards the ruling house and fatally 
erode the collective projection of sovereignty that had 
legitimised the dynasty. 
Once set adrift from the ruling family, peasant monar-
chism became a subversive force, free to attach itself to 
anti-dynastic rebels or mystical hero-figures. And all the 
while between revolts, it continually undermined the reg-
nant king by blasting his shortcomings in terms of a vua 
ideal that everyone recognised and cherished. The peasant 
projection of moral reciprocity onto the vua ultimately 
made popular monarchism as conditional as the trung-nghia 
offered the emperor by his most proper Confucian officials, 
and for similar - if less well-articulated - reasons. The 
Nguyen might have held that 'loyalty to the king and loyal-
ty to the country were equivalent~.i37 Luro and the French 
might have insisted that revolt equalled sacrilege. But the 
Northern peasants who swelled successive anti-Nguyen rebel-
lions did not see themselves as traitors. Rather, by mid-
century, they regarded themselves as men acting to right a 
great wrong that had brought disaster on all, and to re-
place an impious impostor with a true Le vua.i~e They re- -
i 37 Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism, 1925-45 (Cor-
nell University Press, 1982), p.29 incorrectly generalising 
what was a court and Southern attitude in the nineteenth 
century. 
i~a See, for example, the 1871 proclamation quoted in 
Chapter 2, p.104. 
mained loyal, but to an ideal image of the defunct Le rath-
er than to the ritually enthroned, Chinese-invested Son of 
The French knew of the unrest in the North, and the 
lack of popular supoort for the Nguyen that fuelled it. But 
just as role of the spirit world never found a place in the 
colonial model of Vietnamese monarchy, neither did these 
contemporary facts modify French understanding of the Viet-
namese Son of Heaven. Seminal commentators like Luro pre-
ferred to seek their inspiration in ancient Chinese texts 
and Sinic political theories. Their official successors of 
the 1880s, however, did incorporate current events; but in-
terpreted them in ways that served to confirm existing as-
sumptions about the fundamentally religious and ritual nat-
ure of the Confucian monarchy, and of the people's unshake-
able attachment to their 'living idol' i 3 • in Hue. We will 
conclude with the kproof# of the 1880s. 
From Cochinchina and Paris, E}iacin Lure had theorised 
about the king's imprisonment within the minutiae of mille-
nial Confucian rites and traditions inherited from China. 
Men who travelled to Hue in the 1870s and 1880s added an 
extra dimension to the royal predicament. Although 'in ap-
pearance the absolute master of the life of his subjects, 
from the greatest prince to the weakest beggar', Tu-9uc was 
~in reality the slave of his ministers', according to the 
~~9 Marcel Monnier in 1899, quoted in Nguyen Van Phong, 
Societe, p.112. 
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1879-1880 Legation doctor, Auvray.i 4 o Like Tu-Sue's situa-
tion, that of the •ghost kings' who succeeded him, all mere 
'hostages-~nd victims•i 4 i of the regents, proved Luro's pre-
diction of inevitable royal failure beneath the burden of 
their mammoth administrative task. It also revealed how the 
king's dependence on his ministers, the real powers behind 
the throne,i42 always risked leaving the monarch as •a fet-
ish in the hands of his ministers'.i 43 Yet the king's weak-
ness never reduced the authority of his government. The 
royal word remained law, as the 1885 can vuong (aid the 
king) movement demonstrated. When his July 1885 surprise 
attack on the Hue garrison failed, the regent Ton That 
Thuyet had fled with young king, Ham-Nghi, whom the French 
claimed to be Thuyet's prisoner. Yet the king's captivity 
never discredited the can vuong edict: issued over the 
royal seal and in his name, it raised the country at his 
command.i 44 The French never realised that more than the 
awesome prestige of the Son of Heaven was involved here, 
that Ham-Nghi's defiant appeal had also invoked the vua 
i 40 If only because he was so poorly informed. A. Auvray 
(ed H. Cosserat), 'Dix-huit mois a Hue', BAVH, XX, 3-4 
(1933), p.255. 
i 4 i Bouinais and Paulus, L'Indo-chine fransaise, p.654. 
i 43 Bao-Bai's bitter complaint that he was only 'a theat-
rical character who appeared occasionally in scenes but ne-
ver led the play·, would have surprised many nineteenth 
century French, who saw the pre-colonial king as more like-
ly to symbolise than wield power. Dragon, p.52. 
i 43 De Bizemont's description in 1884, quoted in Nguyen 
Van Phong, Societe, p. 113. 
i 44 For the war generally see Marr, Anti-colonialism, pp. 
44-72 or Charles Gosselin, L'Empire d'Annam (Paris: Perrin, 
1904), pp.248-306 for Trung-ky. 
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ideal. After twenty-five years of piecemeal invasion, the 
king had finally shouldered his paramount duty in the popu-
lar tradition, to 'raise the people in the just cause and 
drive out the invader',i 4 e in Quang-Trung's words from a 
century before. 
Though they misjudged its cause, two months of massac-
re and anarchy convinced the French that, like it or not, 
they needed a royal presence in Hue to counter the appeal 
of the fugitive Son of Heaven in the mountains. In Septem-
ber 1885, General de Courcy personally enthroned the last 
available adopted son of Tu-Bue, and Ham-Nghi's elder bro-
ther, as 9ong-Khanh. But concessions to the new king came 
grudgingly. It took until end of November for the new com-
mander, General Prudhomme, to move his quarters from Thieu-
Tri's mausoleum,i40 while Bong-Khanh himself was summoned to 
French dinner parties and expected to give private audi-
ences to even junior officers.i47 Worse followed in February 
1886. Prudhomme decided to test further Bong-Khanh's 'will-
ingness to break with the age-old errors of the monarchy 
that made the sovereign an inaccessible myth to his sub-
jects'i4 e by sending him off at Tet in an open carriage to 
drive around Hue. The ensuing sensation convinced Prudhomme 
i 4 e Quoted in Nguyen Khac Vien, Histoire du Vietnam (Par-
is: Editions sociales, 1974), pp.88-89. 
i 40 Alphonse Delvaux, ·La Legation de France a Hue et ses 
premiers titulaires (1875-93)', BAVH, III, 1 (1916), p.70. 
i 47 Nguyen The Anh, The Withering Days of the Nguyen Dyn-
asty (!SEAS, Research Notes and Discussions No. 7, Singa-
pore, 1978), pp.22-23. 
i 4 a Quoted in Gosselin, L'Empire, p.246. 
that the sacred emperor need only show himself to his sub-
jects to quell the fighting, 14• a plan the new Resident 
General, Paul Bert, put into operation a few months later. 
The short tour became a humiliating fiasco since, as Gos-
selin later put it, 9ong-Khanh's only popularly respected 
quality was 'his relationship to Tu-9uc~. Otherwise the 
populace felt 'indifference, defiance, or hated him'.ieo 
But no matter how far an individual king's majesty was 
debased, Frenchmen believed the royal institution itself 
suffered no permanent damage. Provided the Son of Heaven's 
religious function remained inviolate, in the long run so 
did his numinous influence over the people. Thus, in Paul 
Bert's 1886 view, if the Protectorate began to treat king 
and court respectfully in public,iei guaranteed the age-old 
rites, and restored the appearance of local traditions, it 
would cloak colonialism in undimmed royal authority. The 
king would effectively act as intermediary between the Pro-
tectorate and the people. In other words, if king and court 
collaborated with colonialism on the basis of French res-
pect for the forms of Sinic rites and traditions in Annam, 
ultimately the rest of the population would follow. France 
might then rule unseen from behind the throne, as so many 
powerful ministers had done before. It all depended on 
their respecting the sacral nature of the Son of Heaven, 
i 4 • Ibid; and H. Cosserat, 'Les F@tes du Tet en 1886 a 
Hue: Promenade publique du Roi·, BAVH, XI, 3 (1924), p.304. 
Gosselin, L'Empire, p.239. 
iei 'As he lacks this authority •.• it is incumbent upon 
us to give it to him by dint of attention and respect'. 
Nguyen The Anh, Withering, pp.26-7. 
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which meant in practice on preserving intact his Confucian 
ritual duties. 
The Son of Heaven of French imagining might possibly 
have lived with this arrangement, however uncomfortably: 
the Vietnamese vua could not. A collaborating king funda-
mentally betrayed his highest duty - the vua was supposed 
to drive off invaders, not attend their dinner parties. For 
Confucian educated literati, too, a proper king had to be-
have like one: a too willing conformity to foreign behavi-
our and western usages equally scandalised their image of 
royalty, regardless of whether supposedly vital rituals 
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like the Nam Giao were still performed. So although the 
court, when pressed, managed to make whatever adjustments 
were required to preserve the Nguyen monarchy, popular and 
literati ideals of a true or proper king proved far less 
flexible. As a result, despite contrary colonial expecta-
tions and the assurances of the myth of old, traditional 
Annam, the protected king in Hue could never appear gener-
ally as 'the living symbol of the nation#.~~z Instead, where 
Nguyen kings had embodied both monarchical institution and 
ideal for nearly two centuries in former Bang-trong 
provinces, new colonial conditions withdrew the projection 
of sovereignty that had sustained those perceptions from 
their twentieth century successors. It left the Son of Hea-
ven in Hue a politically ambiguous figure in the Nguyen 
heartland. A deceptive ~ura of popular interest might still 
cling to him, but it derived much more from the glamour 
that attached to the ancient institution than from the 
4~z Petit, Monarchie, p.32. 
numinous authority of its incumbent. The captive king in 
Hue, like the Le hoang de before him, lost the power to 
inspire awe (or even obediance) among those who gained most 
from his institutional survival; while for many others, the 
monarchy drifted into irrelevance as all but a permanent 
symbol of division, defeat, and betrayal. 
No matter how carefully the foreigners preserved the 
imperial ritual role, long after it had vanished in China, 
a protected Vietnamese monarch could never passively endow 
colonialism with the legitimacy by association that various 
Frenchmen from Bert to Pasquier asked of him. Royal bondage 
to foreigners flouted too far the expectations of literati 
and popular monarchism alike. But the Sinic model of monar-
chy, and the colonial myths into which it was later incor-
porated, blinded most French to the indigenous elements in 
Vietnamese kingship, and to its increasingly equivocal 
standing in colonial Vietnam. By the 1920s, some conserva-
tive Vietnamese-began to hope that, by evolving into a con-
stitutional monarchy, the kingship might be brought safely 
into the future.ie3 But instead, the French insisted on de-
fining (and treating) the institution as inherently "Confu-
cian" and ritualist. The Convention of 1925, which handed 
Protectorate administration to French control during the 
ie3 For example, the mandarin Nguyen Ba Trac (an emigre 
follower of Phan Boi Chau in the early 1900s), who argued a 
constitutional monarchy would be a natural extension of its 
Confucian predecessor in 'Giai thich nghia chu Tan-cuong', 
Du Hoc Bao, 7 (1 Nov 1927), pp.11-17. More cautious claims 
came from Pham Quynh, 'Vers une constitution', NP, 151 
(June, 1930), pp.39-46; or Nguyen Nang-Quoc, ~Lap hien la 
gi?', NP, 153 (Aug 1930), pp.134-136 and 'Giai nghia hien-
phap', t:J.E., 154 (Sept 1930), pp.335-41. 
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minority of Bao-Bai, spelt out these essential elements of 
the royal role in colonial perceptions. First came the as-
sertion that:ie4 
the multiplicity of business [did] not allow the 
Sovereign to intervene personally in the daily 
administration of the country, while still con-
tinuing to assure the execution of the first of 
his duties, which remains the celebration of the 
rites upon which depend the order and peace of 
the kingdom •.• 
After that there followed a guarantee to honour 'the 
spirit of the Kingdom's oral constitution'. Pasquier had 
already defined what this meant in a 1922 report, in lan-
guage almost straight from Luro. It wasiee 
based .•• on the scrupulous observance of the 
rules and precepts of the Chinese canonical books 
to which it is always necessary to refer when we 
want to understand the mechanism of power and the 
absolute and imperative general rules which har-
monise in a perfect equilibrium the different in-
stitutions that help the son of Heaven govern the 
Empire. 
Or, as the Convention held, it promised that Protectorate 
administration would conform to •the ritual prescriptions 
that enable[d] the Sovereign holding the mandate of Heaven 
to reign, but which delegate[d] to the Ministers the care 
of governing and administering the Empire'. 
Pasquier never altered any of his convictions about 
the nature and principal role of the Protected monarchy, as 
as October 1930 address to the Conseil de Gouvernement de 
ie4 All quotes from Document 4 in Continuite de la poli-
tigue fran;aise du protectorat en Annam-Tonkin avant et 
apr~s l'av~nement de sa majest6 Bao-Dai (Documents politi-
ques, Serie No.1, Hanoi 1934), pp.21-22. 
iee Quoted from his report of 13 Dec 1922, Document 2, 
Ibid, p.18. 
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l'Indochine made plain. Although its import occasionally 
disappeared later into the cloud of reformist rhetoric sur-
rounding Bao-Bai's return, it had clearly foreshadowed what 
the abrogation of the 1925 Convention would bring - no mod-
ernising institutional evolution but a monarchical restora-
tion 'in line with Annamite national tradition'. 1 e 7 
After so long a dynastic past, the land of Annam 
could not cease to be a Kingdom. The Head of 
State, even in the eyes of modernised Annamites, 
must stay the privileged being who perpetuates 
the ancestral cult, personifies the collective 
soul and acts as the Father and Mother of his 
subjects. Dignity and prestige are his indefect-
ible attributes. Popular instinct refuses to ad-
mit any other constitutional form ••• The devol-
ution of royal duties must avoid politics and be 
regulated solely by a monarchical statute 
Most contemporary colonial French opinion, shaped by 
the myth of old, traditional Annam, echoed these sentiments 
about the monarchy.iee Most Vietnamese also routinely ap-
proved them in public, whatever they may have thought in 
private. But by the 1920s some more outspoken individuals 
had begun to reject them. One was Phan Chu Trinh, who de-
nounced Khai-Binh from exile in France. In 1922, Pasquier 
had accompanied the king on an official visit to France 
that delivered his only son, the future Bao-Bai, to his 
ie7 All quotes from ATK supplement, 28 Oct 1930. The same 
words also appear in a speech titled 'Education et politi-
que', in NP, No. 155 (Oct 1930), p.31. 
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iee For example, see Ernest Tisserand, "Vari~t~s sur l'em-
pereur d'Annam' [ATK, 9 Dec 1925] for the contemporary king 
described directly from Luro; or Jean Joly, 'Une autre 
cause du malaise annamite' [ATK, 9 Ap 1930] which accounted 
for the lack of French authority among Vietnamese by saying 
they only recognised as legitimate authority based on the 
'delegation of divinity'. Similarly, for Marc Dandolo in 
1931, the king remained ~the personage who symbolises and 
personifies for Annam the social and moral ideal, [and] 
fidelity to the ancestral heritage'. •La Monarchie en An-
nam', ATK, 17 Ap 1931. 
future education in Paris. On their landing in Marseilles, 
the old reformist scholar had tried unsuccessfully to re-
monstrate-·with Khai-Binh in a seven point petition that was 
later printed in France. 1 e 9 Its idiosyncratic mix of demo-
cratic and Confucian grievances failed to impress Pasquier, 
or the Native Consultative Chamber back in Annam. 160 But 
some of Phan's denunciations of Khai-Binh as no true king 
sprang directly from the heart of the literati imperial 
model. On that score alone, they might have given pause for 
reflection, had Pasquier been less convinced of the right-
ness of his nee-traditional policies 1 • 1 - and far more mod-
est about his own ability to penetrate and manipulate Viet-
namese tradition. 
But Pasquier was a mythologist, not simply a policy 
maker; and he had never seen the pre-colonial monarchy. As 
a twenty-one year old fresh from studying the colonial dis-
course on Vietnam at the Ecole coloniale, he had arrived in 
Indochina in November 1898, a year after Doumer's reforms 
1 e 9 Phan Chu Trinh (trans Tran Huy Lieu), 'That Dieu 
Tran', NCLS, 66 (1964), pp.15-21 and 31. They were: obsce-
nely venerating monarchical power; exceeding the royal pow-
er to reward and punish; enjoying people kneeling and pros-
trating themselves before him; living in luxury; not dress-
ing in the proper style; living a dissolute life; and mak-
ing a suspect trip to France. 
160 They were outraged, apart from anything else, that 
Phan presumed to 'speak in the name of the people of Annam, 
whom we alone represent'. GG to MinCols, notes on the meet-
ing of the Native Consultative Chamber, 31 Oct 1922. AOM 
ICNF 316/1916 
160 Pasquier's period as Resident Superior is analysed at 
greater length in Nola Cooke, "Proteges and Protectors: Re-
lations Between the Protectorate Government and the Govern-
ment of Annam, 1897-1925", MA, University of Sydney, 1980, 
pp.130-171. 
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had cut the kingship down into a ritual and constitutional 
automaton. Edouard Diguet, who brought thirty years- local 
experience~to his assessment of the colonial monarchy, took 
a more sober view of what Doumer had actually accomplished. 
It is worth hearing in some detai1.i02 
Since high antiquity, the Annamites ••• have lov-
ed to surround the majesty of their sovereign 
with a mysterious and divine character. It would 
have been useful •.. to conserve this character 
for the emperors we ourselves have placed,on the 
throne ••• and against whom the people already 
hold [the fact that they are] our creatures. But 
like curious, clumsy children, we have broken the 
idol which represented the Annamite conception of 
royal majesty. The emperor Thanh-Thai ••. promen-
ades in a carriage with one or two of his wives 
and is thus promiscuously exposed, which does 
great damage to his prestige. What do his sub-
jects think of it? 
You could see it in their eyes in the festivi-
ties of 1897, at Saigon, and the Exposition at 
Hanoi in 1902. Someone whom an Annamite regards 
without a frisson of respectful fear, with simple 
curiosity ••• cannot be his King. He thinks with 
bitterness that we could have left intact the ma-
jesty of his Emperor, since we had already taken 
his Sovereignty. 
By the 1930s, Diguet's insights were bearing fruit. 
Although an aura of glamour and curiosity still clung to 
the monarchy in Annam, in the early Bao-Bai years especial-
ly, colonialism was drying up at its source the spiritual 
power that had eminated from, and sustained and legitimis-
ed, earlier Nguyen kings. Colonialism kept a king on the 
throne who neither could nor would embody the popular vua 
ideal. As a result, the people of twentieth century colo-
nial Trung-ky were forced to learn, as had those of Bac-ky 
for three centuries before them, to live with a hoang de 
empty of substance, and no true vua on the throne. 
Diguet, Les Annamites, p.123. 
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The certitudes of myth hid this politically-hazardous 
development from Pasquier and fellow French mythologists. 
It is to these colonial myths that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
MYTHS AND PROJECTIONS OF SELF AND OTHER IN COLONIAL ANNAM 
Introduction 
Rather than move directly to the various myths and 
projections of French Self and Annamite Other that comprise 
the bulk of this chapter, it seems useful to begin with a 
few more general comments about the nature of projected 
Otherness. 
First, as we mentioned in Chapter One, unconscious 
projections of Otherness are always bound to a correspond-
ing unconscious image of the collective Self, even if only 
implicitly. Projected Otherness cannot exist without this 
referent point. Self and Other form a dyad of superior/ 
inferior, or inner/outer, in which the attributes and qua-
lities of both are defined, controlled, and apportioned by 
the Self. The elements of projected Otherness thus always 
mirror the unconscious needs of the Self, no matter how 
distorted the image becomesin the process. Regardless of 
how external or objective the projection feels to those who 
hold it, irrespective of how well it apparently fits the 
projection-carriers, or the extent to which it seems to re-
sult from an actual experience of other people, Otherness 
derives from the Self and not those to whom it is attached. 
The projection flattens the humanity and complexity 
out of the Other. It does not seek to explore the rich, 
vibrant, and contradictory life of the projection-carriers 
rather than to constrain them within certain fixed limits 
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acceptable to the Self. Obviously, Otherness needs to in-
corporate some characteristics native to the projection-
carriers ~o be believable; but when the Self reifies these 
selected features into a model of the Other's identity, it 
can only result in a flawed and lifeless approximation. Al-
though this depiction of the Other may seem comprehensive 
and convincing to members of the collective that created 
it, in reality it is a one-dimensional representation. 1 
Whereas individual human beings might enjoy a dynamic and 
creative relationship with their own culture, modifying its 
expression to a variety of ends and circumstances, the Oth-
er cannot. Its cultural identity is imprisoned within the • 
limited perceptions of the Self and only evolves when the 
needs of the Self change. In the short term at least, if 
the actions of real people in the real world breach the 
limitations of projected Otherness, it avails them little. 
Their actions are less likely to challenge the truths of 
the projection for those who hold it than to make themsel-
ves appear as exceptional as freaks of nature. 2 The surest 
1 Edward Said has denounced the way European Orientalists 
represented Orientals, and their utter conviction in the 
accuracy of their representation. Yet both arose from the 
projected Otherness at the core of Orientalism. The Other 
can only ever be a representation, for the Self creates it; 
while members of the collective that unconsciously shaped a 
projection of Otherness would logically be the ones to com-
prehend it most fully, as Said shows European Orientalists 
claiming to do of the East. But such claims, of course, re-
veal nothing about how much they understood the human pro-
jection-carriers beneath the distorting mask of Otherness. 
Fo~ Said's views, see Orientalism (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 20-22, 34-35, 40-42, and Chapter II 
general 1 y. 
2 The 1879 comments of the French psychologist, Gustave 
Le Bon, on female intelligence provide a perfect example: 
'Without doubt there exist some distinguished women, very 
superior to the average man, but they are as exceptional as 
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way of withdrawing a projection of Otherness remains the 
lengthy process of making more equal the unequal power rel-
ations whi~h sustain and nourish it. 
Second, this centrality of the Self also tends to lim-
it perceptions of the Other to comparisons with qualities 
that the idealised Self claims as typical. The essential 
features of the Other thus naturally appear as either iden-
tical to, or inferior, from, those attributed to the col-
lective Self. The third possibility, that the existence of 
authentic differences between human groups does not negate 
equality of human value, is too antithetical to co-exist 
with a projection of Otherness. Todorov's analysis of the 
sixteenth century European discovery of the Americas illus-
trates the point. If a Spaniard essentially saw the local 
people as human beings like himself, he projected identity 
on them. This buried their authenticity beneath his convic-
tion that they shared (or wished to share, or deserved to 
have) the same basic values as himself. But if he began 
from a premise of difference, the local people immediately 
attracted a projection of sub-human inferiority. In either 
case, the Spanish redefined the native Americans using 
European cultural values as the natural norm. While the two' 
projections often bred different behaviour towards the loc-
al people, both rested on the same bed-rock refusal to ac-
cord them an autonomous identity with any equality of human 
worth. Whether depicting the native peoples as same or sub- ~ 
the birth of any monstrosity, as, for example, of a gorilla 
with two heads; consequently we may neglect them entirely·. 
Quoted in Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (Penguin 
Books, 1981), p.105. We return to Le Bon below. 
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human, each perception rejected the possibility of their 
being 'a human substance truly other, something capable of 
-
being not.merely an imperfect state of [oneself]'.~ 
Todorov's work at times seems to suggest that indivi-
dual sixteenth century Spaniards in America tended to 
favour either perceptions of identity (missionaries espe-
cially) or inferiority in their relations with the Indian 
Other. In colonial Vietnam, however, we find a strong move 
towards combining elements of identity and difference into 
what became a single, all-pu~pose image of the Vietnamese 
Other. As we will see later, this useful adaptation allowed 
the Other to appear comfortingly Same, while nevertheless 
remaining re-assuringly Inferior. 
It may be that we find in this trend an echo of the 
earlier subterranean shift in the European episteme that 
Michel Foucault identified, and which we mentioned in Chap-
ter One. In Foucault's view, this change precipitated the 
intellectual revolution that preceded the development of 
the new human sciences from the mid-nineteenth century. 
This process also pioneered a new analytic, which Foucault 
defined as one of finitude, as basically 'concerned with 
showing how the Other, the Distant, [was] also the Near and 
the Same'. 4 But while traces of this analytic can be detec-
ted in colonial French perceptions of the Vietnamese, we 
invariably find it balanced there with an absolute insist-
~ Tzvetan Todorov (trans Richard Howard), The Discovery 
of America. The Question of the Other (New York: Harper & 
Row~ 1984), p.42. 
4 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things. An Archaeology of 
the Human Science (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p.339. 
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ence on the inherent inferiority (whether in racial-cultur-
al or other terms) of the colonised people. This colonial 
duality"i~_hardly surprising, of course, for the conviction 
of western superiority necessarily formed the key-stone of 
the entire imperial endeavour: nothing strips colonial dom-
inance of its own sense of legitimacy more quickly than a 
real belief in the equality of human value between coloni~-
er and colonised.e But as the human sciences began to ex-
pose the underlying resemblance between Distant and Near, 
it fostered a corresponding unconscious colonial need to 
inf late the validating conviction of the superiority of the 
French (or western) Self and the inferiority of the colo-
nial Other. 
In the metropole, thousands of miles from the psycho-
logical threats of alien colonial Otherness, the conviction 
of superiority sat easily on ·:fhost· who bothered to think of 
it. No-one much in France, for example, thought to question 
it until well after World War One.• Metropolitan demands 
ensured this luxury eluded many in the colonies, however. 
Political considerations in the imp~rial democracies re-
quired that their colonial administrations be seen to just~ 
ify their domination by implementing enlightened, modernis-
ing policies. In effect, it meant colonial governments were 
e For an excellent discussion of this basic idea, see 
Albert Memmi (trans Howard Greenfeld). The Colonizer and 
the Colonized (New York: Orion Press, 1965), passim. 
• Despite occasional colonial lapses, a more or less uni-
versally clear colonial conscience reigned in France until 
almost the 1930s, as Raoul Girardet shows in L'Idee colo-
niale en France de 1871 • 1962 (Paris: Editions de la Table 
Ronde, 1972), Parts One and Two. 
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required to demonstrate western superiority by their pract-
ical results. Not only did this encourage them to inflate 
their achi_e._vements, but it also limited the sort of infe-
riority French officials might project onto the Vietnamese. 
Unlike sixteenth century Spaniards, for instance, they 
could not dismiss the Other as sub-human, or beyond any ra-
tional comprehension, without automatically damning their 
own chances of effecting modernising change. As that mar-
vellous metropolitan mythologist, Charles Regismanset, in-
tuitively recognised, it was essential to renounce ideas 
like 'the Annamite soul is unfathomable', or •the secret 
mentality of Far Eastern races is beyond our western com-
prehension', because they a priori 'paralysed men of ac-
-tion~ in the colonies. 7 Instead, they had to proceed:e 
according to the admirable formula of Newton 
that everything must be done as if the Annamite 
soul was not impenetrable to us, as if we could 
understand it and act on it deeply. All concep-
tion to the contrary, in art as well as politics, 
would be worthless, a conception of hopelessness 
which would take from us all motive and all jus- • 
tificat~on for action. 
So while some colonials might cheerfully hang contemp-
tuous stereotypes of inferior Otherness on all Vietnamese, 
depicting them as, for instance, a people who 'knew nothing 
of deeper feelings' and lived in 'bestial immobility', as 
'cunning' and 'irrational' as children,• most officials 
7 Le Miracle fran-aise en Asie (Paris: Editions Cres, 
1921), p.340. It is an Aladdin's cave, rich in colonial 
myths and projections of French Self and Annamite Other. 
e Ibid, p.179 (emphasis in original). 
• All quotes, Edmond Courtois, Le Tonkin fran~ais contem-
porain (Paris: Lavauzelle, 1891), pp.95-96. 
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could not afford the indulgence. To succeed in their mis-
sion, they had to establish a relationship with the local 
people, o~-with some part of them at least, which would en-
able French rule to routinely demonstrate the moral, mater-
ial and intellectual superiority of western civilisation, 
not simply its military supremacy. They needed to feel they 
could understand, and be understood in return. The problem 
of striking the right balance between identity and inferio-
rity in their relations with the Vietnamese Other helped 
place administrative officials in the front rank of colo-
nial myth-makers in Vietnam, and in Annam especially. Most 
of this chapter concerns their various solutions, and the 
way they merged into a composite, all-embracing image of 
Vietnamese cultural identity that met all colonial needs, 
and persisted to the end of the French era - and beyond. 
Before considering the first such myth, that of Viet-
nam as ancient Rome and the projection of identity that 
powered it, a few final comments should be made. Although 
it is hard to write about projections of · Self and 
Other without seeming to reify them, they are not meant to 
be understood here as concrete phenomena. As psychic for-
ces, however, they were nonetheless real and consequential 
in colonial Vietnam, even though their affects on the mate-
rial world were felt indirectly, through the behaviour of 
those influenced by them, rather than as factors in the~r 
own right. Their presence can therefore be detected, but 
never quantified. 
Indeed, their great strength lay precisely in their 
unconscious nature and in their collective expression, 
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which together made them largely invisible to the contem-
porary colonial French. While we say that the French held 
the projections, in a real sense it would be more accurate 
to say that, by being collective and unconscious, these 
projections of Self and Other held sway over those who 
projected them. Together they acted as an impenetrable 
camouflage around the colonial discourse on Vietnamese 
cultural identity. Some individuals with open minds might 
have questioned aspects of the discourse; and not everyone 
truly believed all the political myths that explained and 
justified the relations between French Self and Vietnamese 
Other. But it required more than a sceptical, inquiring 
mind for any contemporary to become genuinely aware of the 
extent to which French understanding of the Vietnamese grew 
from elements of European culture, systematically inter-
preted and re-interpreted over time. It required a dour 
struggle, and one against the spirit of times, before any 
contemporary might become aware that the popular images of 
French (Self) and Vietnamese (Other) current in colonial 
society were not separate and autonomous, but directly and 
intimately related. Certainly no-one has emerged from my 
research who managed to accomplish this supremely difficult 
feat in colonial Vietnam. 
Nor was it likely, given the psychological pressures 
for conformity that helped defend the small, colonial com-
munity from the alien majority encircling it. Anyone who 
took the first step towards awareness of the way colonial 
myths shrouded French understanding of the Vietnamese, or 
seriously questioned the extent to which the conventional 
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wisdom of the little China fallacy was more convenient than 
wise, ran straight into an adamantine wall of collective 
expecta·t~c:?ns that defended French superiority from the in-
ferior Vietnamese. Even the minority who recognised these 
as prejudices and stereotypes felt their suggestive power 
as a strong undercurrent pulling them towards public con-
formity with conventional opinions and behaviour, whatever 
their private caveats. As we remarked in Chapter One, we 
can never identify for sure how many of the men who mani-
pulated the ideas and images of colonial political myths of 
Self and Other were essentially true believers, or some 
species of political opportunists (or both). But what does 
seem incontrovertible is that no French person who lived 
and worked for a number 6f years in colonial Vietnam es-
caped the influence of these interlocking collective pro-
jections of Self and Other. The interaction between uncon-
scious projections and conscious French attitudes created a 
special psycho-social space, intermediate between the Fren-
ch and Vietnamese communities, that became the political 
arena in which the public drama of relations between colon-
iser and colonised was enacted before a mainly French 
audience. And in this arena the influence of the projec-
tions ensured that, no matter how rational, benevolent, or 
masterful the poses of the French actors might seem to 
themselves, it was a theatre of the absurd in which the 
irrational and the unconscious took starring roles. 
Let us turn now to various myths and projections of 
Self and Other that would finally merge into the all-
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purpose colonial image of Vietnamese cultural identity that 
outlasted its French creators. 
Early Projections of Identity: From Fustel to Doumer 
The sixteenth century Spanish conqu~stadors and mis-
sionaries who travelled to America found there an utterly 
alien human society. By the later nineteenth century, how-
ever, such an experience was no longer possible for educat-
ed Europeans. Distant, unexplored places still existed, of 
course, but none of their inhabitants could ever appear so 
totally foreign. The great scientific laws of linear cultu-
ral evolution and biological determinism had categorised 
all the world's peoples, whether they realised it or not. 
From their comfortable studies, nineteenth century European 
intellectuals had divided all humanity into four basic cate-
gories, hierarchically organised with primitive savages at 
the base, beneath inferior races locked in varying degrees 
of barbarism. Above them came backward cultures like China 
or India, enervated beneath the dead weight of millenial 
traditions. At the top stood the white Aryan race, global 
culture-bearers of civilisation and progress. 
When Frenchmen went to Cochinchina from the later 
1860s on, most carried this grand evolutionary ladder in 
their heads, and knew exactly where their race stood, and 
where the Vietnamese ranked. Unfortunately, however, in 
newly-conquered Cochinchina the fact of French racial-cul-
tural superiority could not automatically solve the myriad 
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practical problems of ruling a complex Asian society about 
which very little real information could be had. 
On Hue's orders, most mandarins had stripped their of-
fices before withdrawing, thus depriving the new rulers of 
competent collaborators at the same time they denied them 
the written compilations necessary to administer the popu-
lation according to local law and custom. 10 In 1865 Gabriel 
Aubaret's hasty translation of the Gia-Long Code finally 
become available to French administrators, but lacunae and 
errors reduced its practical value. Circumstances made dir-
ect administration inevitable, yet opinion divided over 
whether to introduce French methods and institutions imme-
diately, or whether to preserve the existing system as far 
as possible, modifying it in ways designed to bring the po-
pulace gradually to higher French civilisation. 11 Debate 
continued for over a decade. While the latter approach ap-
pealed in principle, practical difficulties damned its 
chances. If Frenchmen wanted to rule effectively through 
existing institutions, they obviously needed to understand 
them first. But before they could even hope to plumb the 
depths of Cochinchinese life, they needed to be competent 
in Chinese characters, their local Sino-Vietnamese usage, 
1 ° For this period, see Milton E. Osqqrne, The French 
Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia: Rule and Response 
(1859-1905) (Cornell University Press, 1969), pp.59-88. 
11 Lure in 1871 believed the Vietnamese could be assimil-
ated, but only 'if they were guided by [French] men knowing 
them deeply, possessing all their science, and always ready 
to prove, by word or deed, the superiority of our intellig-
ence and our civilisation'. G. Taboulet (ed), 'Jean-Bap-
tiste-Eliacin Lure, Inspecteur des Affaires indigenes en 
Cochinchine', BSEI (ns), XV, 1-2 (1940), p.64. 
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and the spoken language and its romanised script, at least 
in Lura's view. 12 The majority, not surprisingly, recoiled 
from the mammoth task, and never progressed beyond the ver-
nacular at best. Yet despite their cultural and linguistic 
ignorance, French officials still had to administer their 
provinces, dispense justice, and maintain public order. 
The 1879 promulgation of the French penal code, a 
giant stride towards assimilation, finally ended much of 
their dilemma. But by then, however, the ground had been 
well prepared for such a change by the first politically 
significant colonial projection of Vietnamese Otherness, 
and the myth of Vietnam as ancient Rome that carried it. 
As·a political scientist, Henry Tudor has argued that 
political myth is a form of practical thinking that addres-
ses problems in the real world, however wrong or fanciful 
its solutions might appear to outsiders. 13 
In their efforts to understand this world of 
pragmata, of ·things endowed with moral or utilit-
arian value, men view their circumstances in the 
light of their purposes, and their explanations 
are simultaneously justifications and prescript-
ions ••• [W]hen practical considerations are 
foremost, men tend to believe what, at that mom-
ent, they find it convenient or necessary to 
believe. 
This describes very well what happened in early 1870s 
Cochinchina. Many Frenchmen there turned to myth to explain 
their circumstances and to assure themselves that, despite 
their actual ignorance of the Vietnamese, they could never-
theless sufficiently understand their new subjects to rule 
12 Ibid, pp.90-93 for his curriculum in the College des 
Stagiaires. 
Political Myth (London: Pall Mall, 1972), p.123. 
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them. The role of the myth was to convince colonial French 
officials that they could solve their dilemma by introduc-
ing elements of their own laws and institutions into the 
South. Its explanation succeeded in this by re-defining the 
Vietnamese, and uncovering their "real" relationship to the 
French. The myth involved derived directly from the metro-
pole, but its great local success ensured that no-one noti-
ced, let alone questioned, its foreign provenance. 
FU.~~1 
The myth relied heavily onA de Coulange' s 1864 imagin-
ative reconstruction of ancient Roman, Greek, and Aryan 
life, La Cite antique. When the book reached the colony in 
the late 1860s it caused a sensation. 'Its readers who had 
come to Cochinchina saw with stupefaction those institut-
ions elucidated by Fustel from bits and pieces of text ••• 
re-animated and living fully before their very eyes'.i 4 
Fustel's insights helped snap into sharp focus what some 
Frenchman here had been slowly piecing together for them-
selves from personal experience and native informants. Sud-
denly, the fundamental basis of Vietnamese society, the 
family, was stripped of its exoticism and stood forth in 
its true colours as the very image of the ancient Roman 
gens. La Cite antique became 'a guide for our administrat-
ors•,ie with at least one young inexperienced official re-
portedly taking all his judgements on family law straight 
i 4 Marcel Ner, 1 Caracteres generaux de l'oeuvre de Fus-
tel', BSEI (ns), V, 3 (1930), p.190. 
Ibid, p.191. 
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from its pages.i 0 And why not? Jules Silvestre, a great 
admirer of the worki 7 and the ranking expert on native 
justice dTter the 1876 departure of Philastre, certainly 
concurred. His two volume Considerations sur l'etude du 
droit annamite brandished the myth of Vietnam as ancient 
Rome as the intellectual key to unlock the whole tradition-
al system of religion, family, and state:ie 
Annamite legislation, like its customs, proceeds 
from the patriarchal regime, which was the cons-
titutive regime of the ancient family, (and] 
which was and has still remained, in these civil-
is~tions stationary for so many centuries, the 
unique, the true religion. It is also on this re-
ligious base that the constitution of government 
rests, for the domestic rules have invaded the 
state, which is only considered as one big family 
of which the sovereign is the father and mother. 
The myth wove itself into nineteenth century colonial 
understanding of Vietnamese society. Even a keen observer 
like Edouard Diguet, with thirty years' experience in the 
country, commented on the great similarities between the 
contemporary Vietnamese family and the Roman gens described 
io Though possibly apocryphal, the second-hand 1929 anec-
dote upon which the story is based has not been challenged. 
First cited in Ibid, it later appeared in Peter Baugher, 
"The Contradictions of Colonialism: The French Experience 
in Indochina, 1860-1940", Ph.D, University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 1980, p.30; and Nguyen van Trung, Chu nqhia thuc 
dan Phap o Viet-Nam: Thuc chat va huyen thoai (Sai-gon: Nam 
Son XB, 1963), p.149. 
ir According to Pierre Pasquier, L'Annam d'autrefois 
(Paris: Challamel, 1907), p.21. 
ie Quoted in Ner, 'L'oeuvre de Fustel', p.204, fn.2 The 
first sentence also appears in Pierre Lusteguy (trans 
Charles Messner), The Role of Women in Tonkinese Religion 
and Property (Behavioural Science Translations. Human 
Relations Area File, New Haven, 1954), p.9. Silvestre's 
study was not available to me. 
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by Fustel.~9 A long-serving civil official, Camille Brif-
faut, consciously produced his two volume La Cite annamite 
in homage-- to Fustel. Five years as Governor-General ( 1897-
1901) taught Paul Doumer that contemporary Vietnam provided 
'scenes of Greek antiquity ••• [for] we find once more in 
the ancestral cult of the Annamites and Chinese, in the al-
tars raised in their homes, [and] in their family laws, the 
primitive religion of the ancient cities of Europe'. 20 'At 
the base ~f ~~l societies [are] the same guiding princip-
les', a young Pierre Pasquier informed his Marseilles au-
dience at the 1906 colonial exposition. Thus ~the first 
chapters of the Cite antique appl[ied] to the Annamite 
people, and if the wise historian had been able to under-
stand these yellow people as well as we do today, he would 
have seen, still alive, the customs that his synthesizing 
genius was able to reconstitute'. 21 
As these quotations suggest, by the early twentieth 
century the basic elements of the myth had assumed the sta-
tus of conventional colonial wisdom. 22 So well entrenched 
did it become that contrary observation of Vietnamese life 
~~ E. Diguet, Les Annamites, Societe. Coutumes, Religions 
(Paris: Challamel, 1906), pp.265, 
20 Paul Doumer, Indochine fran;aise. Souvenirs (Paris: 
Vuibert et Nony, 1905), pp.172-73. 
Pasquier, L'Annam, p.17. 
22 For other examples, see Ner, 'L'oeuvre de Fustel', 
pp.190-91; and Lusteguy, Role of Women, pp.9-11. 
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and dissenting expert opinion proved unable to dislodge the 
notion of the Vietnamese gens until the 1930s. 2~ 
Certainly there were enough superficial similarities 
between Vietnamese domestic life and the practices describ-
ed by Fustel to carry the projection. Even so, at first 
glance such enthusiasm for the idea of absolute equivalence 
between ancient European and contemporary Vietnamese socie-
ty may seem odd, given the rampant racism of the time. Yet 
its popularity in colonial Vietnam lay precisely in that 
equivalence, or rather ih the projected identity at its 
core. The myth worked by linking a major postulate of lin-
ear cultural evolution - that all societies developed ac-
cording to the same principles - to Fustel's reconstruction 
of ancient life. The result transformed the alien social 
environment of Cochinchina at a stroke. Where French ignor-
ance had populated it with potential snares and threats, 
the projected identity at the heart of the myth dispelled 
the dark clouds to reveal to delighted colonial eyes what 
had been hidden all along, the landscape of their own Euro-
pean past. The Vietnamese Other now became the French Self 
at an earlier stage of cultural evolution. Armed with a ~ 
simple and convincing explanation of the basic principles 
underlying Vietnamese society everyone, even new-comers, 
felt assured they could rule effectively. The comfortable 
illusions of modern scientific knowl~dge replaced doubts 
and anxieties, and allowed Frenchmen who wished to do so to 
=~ Luro never mentioned Fustel because he described the 
family as he saw it, as Le Maitre commented dryly in a re-
view of Briffaut. For the arguments against importing 
Fustel, see Lusteguy, Role of Women, pp.11-13. 
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"understand" the Vietnamese without ever having to comprom-
ise their social and psychological distance. Passing the 
-
wand of scientific western intellect over Asian strangeness 
had transmogrified apparently profound differences into ba-
sic similarities, while at the same time perching the colo-
nial French Self safely on a cultural pedestal two millenia 
high above the Vietnamese Other. Not surprisingly, the myth -
enjoyed great success. 
Occasional non-believers, like Philastre in 1873, war-
ned of the dangerous error of 'talking and acting in an at-
mosphere ••. where our illusions and desires are taken for 
reality', and where the idea that 'the Annamites like all 
our reforms' had been repeated to the point of becoming 'an 
article of faith'. 24 But he was already too late. Too many 
officials found the myth too useful to want to question it 
too closely. To quote Marcel Ner, who in 1930 still seemed 
more than half-convinced of its truth, Fustel's work had 
enabled the French •to grasp beneath the almost total op-
position of the two civilisations, the profound kinship of 
origins'. Not only that, but Vietnam provided ·an echo of 
[France's] own past~, a past that, as Fustel's work had 
also proven, still persisted in the form of •hidden surviv-
als' in contemporary French society. It thus forged 'a 
principle of mutual comprehension and mutual sympathy' be-
tween French and Vietnamese, as it marked no ·irreducible 
Quoted in Osborne, French Presence, p.45. 
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differences between the two peoples [but only] their rela-
tive place on the road of progress• • 2 e 
In other words, the classic projection of identity 
within the myth allowed colonial French officials to be-
lieve that they comprehended the Vietnamese, and equally 
important, that the Vietnamese could and did understand and 
appreciate what their colonial tutors were achieving for 
them. The projection of identity created a relationship, 
and. a special one at that, between the Frenchmen and the 
"French of Asia", as one enduring colonial image insisted 
on depicting the Vietnamese. 20 Paul Doumer's aide, Louis 
Salaun, spoke for many (Doumer included) in 1903 when he 
remarked that 'many common tendencies [let] the Annamites 
understand our French way of governing•, making them 'cap-
able of understanding, if not the general spirit of moder-
nity, at least some of its traits'. 27 Indeed, Doumer's 
reforms implicitly rested on this projection of identity 
between modern Vietnam and the ancient European world, 
2 e All quotes, Ner, 'L'oeuvre de Fustel', p.191. While 
perhaps not entirely convinced, but the balance of the ar-
ticle shows Ner was no sceptic either. 
20 It was first suggested by the English envoy Crawfurd 
in the early nineteenth century, apparently as a compliment 
to Gia-Long's military organisation. Louis de Grammont's 
1864 usage in Notice sur la Basse-Cochinchine echoed this. 
But later French interpreted it more widely, and no doubt 
as more complimentary than originally intended. In 1906 
Pasquier extended its use by describing Vietnamese history 
as full of parallels with French history [L'Annam, p.18]. 
Very popular during his term as Governor-General, it pro-
vides a classic example of projected identity rather than a 
consciously deceitful political ploy, as Nguyen Van Trung 
believed. [Chu ng/Ua thuc dan, pp.153-55.J The Grammont ex-
cerpt is from Jean Ajalbert (ed), L'Indochine par les fran-
~ais (Paris: Gallimard, 1931), pp.112-13. 
Quoted in Baugher, "Contradictions", p.22. 
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although futher refined by a generation's colonial 
experience. 
That Doumer's policies rested on his own projections 
of Self and Other would surprise no-one who had read his 
later memoirs, L'Indochine fran~aise. Souvenirs. As the vo-
lume makes painfully clear, projected identity so coloured 
the Governor-General's reminiscences that he apparently saw 
or understood little in Indochina beyond himself. Like the 
British Carl Jung observed in 1930s colonial India, 'all 
living in Europe ••• in a sort of bottle filled with Euro-
pean air•, 2 e Doumer's memoirs also reveal that, although 
physically transported to Asia, mentally the author never 
left home. The same idiosyncratic bases for judgement serv-
ed him as well in the colony as they d~d in France. For in-
stance, when Doumer first met Thanh-Thai in 1897, he repor-
ted that the young man's firm handshake and direct gaze in-
stantly outweighed the reports he had received about the 
king's cruelty towards his wives and servants. 29 
No-one can stop me from believing that the eyes 
and the hand of a man reveal something of his 
character, and (I am] favourably biassed towards 
a straight look, and a firm and frank handshake. 
Nothing in [Thanh-Thai's] eyes or hand ••• led me 
to believe that he was deceitful or fundamentally 
wicked. I was then ready to accord him confidence 
and sympathy ••• 
Doumer's other published opinions of Vietnamese appear 
equally idiosyncratic, and for the same reason: all were 
ultimately clothed in projections from his own unconscious 
~a C.G. Jung (trans R.F.C. Hull). 'The Dreamlike World of 
India', in Psychology and the East (Bollingen Series XX, 
Princeton University Press, 1978), p.90. 
Souvenirs, p.168 (my emphasis). 
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mind. Examples litter Souvenirs. Let us take, for instance, 
his opinion of Nguyen Trang Hiep. At Doumer's first meeting 
with the R~gents in Hue in 1897, he had held a short 'vague 
and ordinary conversation' with Hiep, mediated through an 
interpreter and in the presence of others. Through it all 
Hiep had displayed 'great reserve', Doumer recalled. Never-
theless, the god-like power of projection enabled the Dou-
mer to 'quickly understand what was the state of the soul 
of the man whose approach had captivated me, but whom I had 
not yet learned to know' •30 But sure enough, over time the 
Governor-General's personal qualities caused Hiep to 'open 
himself to me as he had never done to any other French-
man~, 3 i and in the process entirely to confirm the accuracy 
of Doumer's (projected) first impressions. 
The Frenchman was similarly immediately able to pene-
trate Thanh-Thai to the depths. In 1897, Doumer attended 
the Nam-Giao sacrifice to Heaven and Earth, over which the 
emperor presided in person. During what the Governor-Gener-
al deemed the boring and repetitious hours of the ceremony, 
he insisted on engaging the king in 'long discussions on a 
hundred different subjects, man to man', forgetting for the 
purpose' of this anecdote that at the earlier reception he 
had needed an interpreter. But Doumer's perspicacity, not 
historical accuracy, was the point of this story; so in 
those few hours snatched from the ceremony, Doumer boasted, 
30 All quotes, 
bus believed he 
as well as what 
their language. 
Ibid, p.156 (my emphases). Similarly Colum-
could understood what the Indians thought, 
they said to each other, without a word of 
Todorov, Discovery, pp.38-42. 
Souvenirs, p.155. 
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he was able •to penetrate~ the king's mind, and to under-
stand fully his ~character, his intelligence, [and] his 
value·. And just as with Nguyen Trong Hiep, 'my judgement 
was confirmed later', he wrote, ·during five years when I 
knew his daily life, when I saw him often [and] when, won 
over by the confident sympathy that I showed him, he opened 
himself to me and let me see the depths of his soull. 32 
Archival evidence from the Doumer term repeatedly in-
stances Thanh-Thai's genuine sense of grievance at the Dou-
mer reforms, and his erratic, angry behaviour in public. 
Yet in his memoirs, the former Governor-General rejected it 
all. Doumer held steadfastly to his conviction that he 
alone had understood the king, a man who, by happy chance, 
thought and felt in much the same way that Doumer would 
have done in his place. 33 
When it came to the Vietnamese in general, Doumer pro-
jected identity and inferiority onto different segements of 
the population: the common people, as modern citizens in 
the making, attracted his projected identity, while the 
traditional mandarinal elite, doomed products of a bankrupt 
Sinic culture, attracted a projection of inferiority. Men 
at the time may have felt this perceived duality arose from 
Ibid, p.171 (my emphasis). 
33 This unconscious projection may colour some reports 
more than others. For instance, as Doumer found the Sinic 
rites a source of mockery [Ibid, p.171], his claim that 
Thanh-Thai also made fun of the Nam-Giao in 1901 [Ibid, p. 
173] needs to be treated cautiously. At the same ceremony 
(or that of 1904), Jean Ajalbert for one reported seeing 
the king deeply offended by a French resident's mocking 
jibe directed at the ritual. Ces Phenomenes, Artisans de 
!'Empire (Paris: Aubanel, 1941), pp.235-40. 
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their greater colonial experience of Vietnamese society; 
but, implicitly at least, it seems more predicated on as-
sumptions··about whom the local friends and foes of colonial 
reform would most likely be. In any case, Doumer's enthusi-
astic advocacy and the reform program that rested on this 
differential perception of traditional elite and peasantry, 
helped ensure its widespread success among Protectorate of-
ficialdom in the decade between 1897 and 1908. 
Full of metropolitan contempt for senile Asiatic tra-
ditional culture and set on westernising reform and econom-
ic ·development, Doumer's projections of inferiority and 
identity manifestly reflected his own personal desires and 
orieritation. If Doumer decided at first sight that Thanh-
Thai chaffed at the bonds of tradition and the rites, he 
became the object of unconscious projected identity, irres-
pective of the young king's own thoughts and desires. If 
the effete mandarinal elite, on the other hand, appeared to 
Doumer as champions of those same rites and traditions, 
they became immediately characterised as doomed relics of a 
past age. Occasional individuals, the 'perfect type of the 
mandarin• (like his good friend Nguyen Trang Hiep) were,_ 
Doumer owned, 'capable of being regenerated, of understand-
ing, of learning, and of acting'.~4 But few attained this 
stature in his eyes. As with the Court, he dismissed most 
as simply 'defend[ing] former beliefs, and age-old tradi-
tions and mores'.~~ History had consigned them to a well-
Souvenirs, p.161. 
Ibid, p.174. 
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deserved oblivion, along with the impotent and exhausted 
'old Asiatic pomp' that he had found in Hue: rarchaic as 
possible;··grandiose [and] brilliant, but senile, [giving] a 
greater impression of nobility than 6f poweri of represen-
tation rather than action'. 3 • 
When it came to the ordinary people, however, Doumer's 
conviction that they welcomed and supported his program -
and that they comprised exactly the premium labour force 
required to implement it - brought an encomium flooding 
from his pen. The Vietnamese became "incontestably superior 
to all the neighbouring peoples', for none (among whom he 
numbered the Siamese and Laos) had withstood their advan-
ce. 37 In all Asia only Japan shared a 'race of equal value 
and [one which] resemble[d] them'. 38 
The Annamite makes an excellent soldier, discip-
lined and courageous. He is a model worker, a 
good cultivator in the countryside, a fine work-
er, and a deft and ingenious artisan in the 
towns. He is superior, as a worker as well as a 
soldier, to all the peoples of Asia with which 
one can compare him. It is moreover a general 
rule that I have verified over there on twenty 
diverse types of humanity, and which I have also 
been able fully to confirm in Europe: the men va-
li~nt in work are valiant in war, or put other-
wise, courage is one. If a man is courageous in 
the face of fatigue, he is courageous before dan-
ger and death. 
The discredited former elite, shackled to China through the 
ages, had fallen into desuetude and irrelevance along with 
its once great model and mentor. The future lay with the 
Ibid, p.167. 
All quotes, Ibid, pp.32-33. 
38 He attributed it to their sharing 'une parents 
ancienne'. Ibid, p.33 (emphasis in original). 
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courageous and hard-working people. They formed the natural 
allies of colonial progress, as proven by the resemblance 
between their sterling qualities and those of Europeans (or 
'men'), at least according to Doumer's own idiosyncratic 
estimations. But the proof of the proposition lay else-
where, in Doumer's comparisons with the lot of the people 
before and after his reforms in Annam. Personal observation 
convinced the Governor-General that the people embraced his 
liberal regime and the benefits and opportunities colonial-
ism afforded them. A short five year term had brought chan-
ges 'everywhere outside the royal citadel': for the first 
time in history, the king's subjects in Annam enjoyed 'a 
free life, the right to move (se mouvoir), to work as they 
wished, to acquire, to own'.~9 
This "friend and foe" ascription, which depicted the 
peasantry as the natural allies of colonialism and the dis-
possessed former elite as its natural enemies, enjoyed al-
most unchallenged primacy & the Doumer decade. And even 
after events caused a re-assessment, the conviction t~at 
the common people ultimately remained pro-French retained 
its place in the colonial armoury of validating images and 
justificatory arguments. The extent of this conviction· in 
French circles may h'ave reflected how widespread in colon-
ial society was the sort of arrogant self-deception that 
can so easily accompany the exercise of disproportionate 
power. But few questioned it, thanks in part to the intel-
lectual respectability bestowed from two main sources: 
~9 Ibid, p.171. This is Doumer's description of the 
'common lot of the subjects' of Annam after his reforms. 
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European conceptions of the Chinese; and the universally 
accepted colonial interpretation of the Vietnamese past. We 
will cons~9er them briefly in turn. 
A longheld European perception of the Chinese (and 
hence the Vietnamese) portrayed them as inherently and fun-
damentally materialistic. Hegel, for instance, insisted the 
'distinguishing feature' of the Chinese character was that 
'everything which belongs to the Spirit - unconstrained 
morality in practice and theory, Heart, inward Religion, 
Science and Art properly called - [was] alien to it' • 4 ° For 
Gobineau, the notion of material utility supplied the key 
to all of Chinese civilisation. It ruled government, phil-
osophy, literature and religion, with daily life proving no 
exception: 'If this yellow multitude is peaceful and sub-
missive, it is on ~he condition they persist without any 
feelings foreign to the most humble notion of physical 
utility' •41 Less derogatory in tone, ~nd inspired by a pro-
jection of identity rather than inferiority as in Hegel and 
Gobineau, we find versions of these ideas marshalled in 
support of Governor-General Ernest Roume's 1916 proposal to 
abolish the monarchy in Annam. Although Roume conceded that 
a 'vague religious character' still adhered to the person 
of the king, he insisted it signified little politically. 
'The man of the people, the peasant especially, hardly 
[knew] more of the kingship than the mandarinal hierarchy 
40 G.W.F. Hegel (trans J. Sibree), The Philosophy of 
History (New York: Dover Books, 1956), p.138. 
41 Arthur de Gobineau, Essai sur l'in~galit~ des races 
humaines, I (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1940), p.482. 
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of which he complain[ed]'. As sensible men, Roume argued, 
the peasants would 'certainly always prefer to have direct 
dealings with French officials ••• [as], in [their] essen-
tially practical mind[s], material preoccupations domina-
te(d] over theological speculations'. 42 
The second source was the perdurable French image of 
the traditional kingdom as a manifest failure, in one way 
or another. Paramount among its perceived deficiencies on 
most French li~ts came the kingdom's inability to give the 
people what they most keenly desired, the material benefits 
of peace and good order. The great strength of French colo-
nialism, on the other hand, lay precisely in its capacity 
to deliver the peace and material prosperity so long denied 
under the inept rule of the mandarins. In many French eyes, 
this single factor was enough to guarantee popular accept-
ance of colonialism. As reforming Governor-General Maurice 
Long asserted in 1921, the people 'put up with, accept, or 
want to preserve out regime because they feel they are bet-
ter off than before, because they have a more assured mate-
rial life ••• • 4~ By then the idea had become a colonial ar-
ticle of faith. We find it, for instance, in ~he 1927 trial 
of sixteen young men detained for trying to quit the count-
ry illegally. During the trial, the prosecutor took time to 
explain to the young malefactors how their own people made 
no sense of the grievances against the government they had 
42 All quotes, Roume's report on events in Annam, 20 May 
1916, p.27. AEP GGIC 7F-50 (2) 
4~ Charles Bernard, Au Service de l'Indochine (Paris: La-
rose, 1931), p.63. 
raised in court. Rather, liberated by France from the age-
old Chinese yoke, 'the laborious population was grateful to 
the protecting nation for being able to work and progress 
in peace ••• It is tranquillity they desire and nothing 
more', he patiently added, 'confidant that the protecting 
administration will progressively ameliorate their lot'. 44 
But political myths can hold opposites to be true, 
selecting one over the other as circumstances required. So 
alongside the comfortable image of the people as 'hard-
working, disciplined, and docile towards reasonable direc-
tions•, 4 e we find a equally compelling but quite contradic-
tory image of the common people, one based on projected 
inferior~ty. 
Although events of 1908 would catapult this.perception 
to prominence once more, its muffled presence can be detec-
ted well before. Alfred Schreiner, for instance, had never 
shared the idealisation of the peasantry that often accom-
panied unconscious projected identity. For him, the stern 
dictates of biological determinism rendered such 
sentimentality meaningless. As he prophesied in 1906, the 
Vietnamese 'mentality [would] require centuries before [the 
common people] could leave behind their servile and vege-
tative life, for at present they [learned] nothing, 
want(ed] to learn nothing, and (forgot] nothing either'. 40 
44 'Le Proces de Vinh', ATK, 13 Ap 1927. 
4 e Ha-Tinh Resident Monnet's farewell speech, ATK, 4-5 
June 1923. 
4 • Alfred Schreiner, Abreqe de l'histoire d'Annam (Sai-
gon: Imp. Coudurier et Montegout, 1906, 2nd ed), p.127. 
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This obduracy, in Schreiner's view, sprang from an Asiatic 
'racial characteristic' that caused Mongol people stubborn-
ly to ref~~e 'to accord [Europeans] the intellectual supe-
riority of which we furnish them daily proof'. But, he 
warned grimly, 'the psychological and physiological action 
of four thousand years on the yellow race [could] not be 
destroyed or modified in a few years·. It would take cen-
turies, and probably require 'bloody struggles# to achieve, 
one of 'the hard necessities demanded by progress in the 
clash of two civilisations as opposed as [were] those of 
our two races'. 47 A minority opinion among officials in 
Annam at the time, the anti-tax movement soon apparently 
vindicated this pessimism. 
In 1908, Resident Superior Levecque's reports show he 
still shared the Doumerist projections of identity and in-
feriority, and the "friend and foe" ascriptions that went 
with them. As we saw in Chapter Four, his analysis of the 
movement presented the reformists scholars as merely lite-
rati malcontents, unable to adjust to the demands of chang-
ed times. Material self-interest principally motivated 
them, especially anger that the Protectorate had abolished 
numbers of the useless and costly mandarinal sinecures they 
had forme,rly enjoyed. But instead of turning to productive 
work, th~y had chosen to deceive the 'peaceful and hard-
working' people, whom the lies of men they still respected 
had unwittingly astray. Indeed, peasant participation in 
the anti-tax movement struck Levecque as a cruel irony. 
47 All quotes, Les Institutions annamites, I (Saigon: 
Claude etc~-, 1900), p.189. 
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Most, he reported, had only attended the agitators' meet-
ings because ~French schools and French ideas~ had spread 
among ~h~~ a new critical spirit, which had resulted in a 
popular interest in public affairs for the very first time. 
Sadly, however, the foreign skills of analysis and reason 
still remained too new to them, and they had fallen victim 
to literati casuistry. 46 But Levecque assured their vicari-
ous revenge, deeply involving himself in the punishment 
meted out to the literati double-dealers. Under his watch-
ful eye mandarinal courts gaoled more than four hundred, 
many for lengthy terms. 4 • 
Both Levecque's explanations of the anti-tax movement, 
and his over-reaction to it, seem at least partly unconsci-
ously motivated. The unexpected movement threatened both 
his sense of mastery over the Protectorate, and his projec-
tion of Vietnamese Otherness that perceived the people as 
grateful to France for her reforms, and for the chance to 
toil in peace. The otherwise fantastic claim that French 
ideas and education had catalysed an intellectual rebirth 
and kindled a new spirit of public awareness among the peo-
ple only makes sense in these terms. As a matter of eviden-
tiary fact, it is simply untrue: in 1908 modern education 
had scarcely touched the upper elite, let alone penetrated 
the peasantry. But the spread of French education was never 
4S RS Levecque, report of 15 May 1908. ADM ICNF 50/598. 
4 • By his own account, Levecque hardly stopped short of 
making out the warrants: 'I gave [the Council] my thoughts, 
I shared my advice with them, I put at their disposal the 
forces they would require', but "the arrest? were made in 
its name, the sentences pronounced by its tribunals.' Ibid, 
p.25. 
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more than the obvious explanation for something far more 
significant the appearance of new behaviour among the 
Vietnamese, or, at least, new in terms of French percep-
tions of Vietnamese cultural identity. It should be recall-
ed that the little China fallacy held the Vietnamese to be 
incapable of development and cultural innovation on their 
own. By definition, then, when something new occurred among 
them it must have resulted from an outside influence. The 
"new" phenomenon noticed in 1908 was that \whereas previ-
ously [the people had} only shown themselves careless of 
public affairs, absolutely passive before the authorities, 
entirely obedient to the orders of the mandarins', a con-
siderable number of young Annamites now 'interested them-
selves in the news, discussed and criticised the acts of 
the Administration'.eo To Levecque, such a development 
logically implied the spread of French ideas and education 
beforehand.e.i. 
By why nominate young men of the people, rather than 
modernist literati like Phan Chu Trinh, as the standard-
bearers of this new critical faculty? The most likely ans-
wer lies in the influence of the Doumerist "friend and foe" 
ascription, which Levecque shared. The ordinary people, who 
welcomed other colonial reforms, would be naturally eager 
to embrace French ideas, unlike the disgruntled, sinicised 
Ibid, p.11. 
e.i. It also served Roume, who reported 'the faculties of 
analysis and criticism [had] developed among the people 
somewhat under the influence of our ideas and our schools'. 
As with Levecque, it is difficult to take the claim at its 
face value. Report of 20 May, 1916. AEP GGIC 7 F-50 (2) 
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literati whom colonialism had rendered obsolete. The expec-
tations of projected inferiority guided his analysis, and 
helped change reform-minded sch9lars into reactionary tra-
ditionalists, whose commitment to the dying past disquali-
fied them from contributing to the future. The Resident 
Superior may have believed his analysis wholeheartedly. But 
rather than rid Annam of literati reactionaries, the re-
pression he unleashed succeeded instead in destroying any 
chance that Vietname•e outside the administrative-based 
elite might create a modernising role for themselves in the 
Protectorate. Levecque swept away its intellectual leader-
ship at a stroke, leaving the field free for the new Pro-
tectorate elite. It would be the mid-1920s before moderate 
reformers dared again to enter the public arena in Annam.~2 
However, as we saw, not all French officials agreed 
with Levecque. For many, the unexpected riots shattered the 
image of Annam peasants as liberal free-marketeers in the 
making. Far from being peaceful men led astray, the anti-
tax movement had exposed the peasantry as the incarnation 
of all that was most treacherous and unpredictable in "An-
namite tradition". In 1912, when Camille Briffaut explained 
Vietnamese peasant violence in terms of an atavistic racial 
flaw, his analysis pointed in the general direction that 
others were also exploring. For Briffaut, the peasants' 
~2 For reminiscences about life before and after the cam-
paign to pardon Phan Boi Chau in 1926, and the national 
movement of mourning for Phan Chu Trinh in 1926-27, see Bao 
Duy Anh, 'Hue voi buoc dau vao doi cua toi', Song Huong, 
No. 6, April 1984. For these events generally, see David G. 
Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945 (University 
of California Press, 1981), pp.15-23. 
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blood was permanently tainted by the heritage of ancient 
Giao-Chi, that is, of Vietnam before its long Chinese in-
structiun in civilisation. From deep in the peasant soul, 
the violent impulses of their nomadic forebears might burst 
forth at any time, and for no apparent reason, swamping the 
discipline learned from China with a 'brutal suddenness'. 
When a peasant felt '"too oppressed in his spirit" - the 
phrase that sums up all his complaints against the authori-
ties[ •.. or] against the weather', he might suddenly throw 
off all traces of law and restraint, 'abandon his fields, 
his house, and his tombs, threaten everyone and become 
uncontrollable'.e3 
In these circumstances, the Chinese ideas and institu-
tions that exercised some restraining influence over the 
otherwise atavistic and unpredictable peasant masses clear-
ly retained a political role under colonialism. And as we 
saw previously, the events of 1908 pushed the French in An-
nam back into a hasty collaboration with the previously 
despised traditional (Sinic) elite, or those who now seemed 
like them. Yet, equally clearly, the Protectorate could not 
wholly rely on this local elite, whose mandarinal members 
had shown themselves less than satisfactory colonial agents 
in the years before 1908. The obvious solution lay in 
Frenchmen themselves learning how to penetrate "Annamite 
tradition" to its depths, if only to feel secure in their 
ability to understand and guard against its tenacious power 
over the Annamite souls of the Protectorate Vietnamese. 
e 3 Camille Briffaut, La Cite annamite, II (Paris: Sirey, 
1912)' pp.8-9. 
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This became the great project of the Friends of Old 
Hue in its first decade of existence. But before we consid-
er their-£ontribution, we need to introduce the pre-1908 
version of the myth of old, traditional Annam. We also need 
to analyse the valuable new conceptual tool that became 
available to colonial mythologists about that time, one 
which proved indispensable to the re-working of myths of 
Self and Other in Annam. The next two sections address them 
in turn. 
The Myth of Old, Traditional Annam 
The myth of old, traditional Annam ostensibly always 
told the story of the failure of the traditional kingdom. 
But because, like all political myths, it existed to ac-
count for contemporary circumstances and to prescribe or 
justify practical policies or programs in the present, the 
myth never solely or simply concerned the former kingdom. 
Whether as an actor in the drama, or as a clearly discerned 
presence hovering in the wings, France always shared the 
stage with old Vietnam. This feature, if nothing else, be-
trayed the myth's fundamental interest as the current re-
lationship of French Self and Annamite Other, projected 
backwards in time. Generally, the earlier the version, the 
more overt the French role. In Paul Doumer's 1905 account, 
li)e 
whichAconsider in detail here, France assumed a larger role 
than Vietnam itself, as one might have expected from a man 
like Doumer. With him, as with the metropolitan mythologist 
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Charles Regismanset in 1921, the story of old Annam reads 
more like the foundation myth of colonial Indochina.e4 
We wiil reproduce Doumer's version in full, for it is 
rare to find an entire myth in two short paragraphs.ee 
In the 17th and 18th centuries, the French busied 
themselves with Indo-China. They exercised a sort 
of protection over the different States, and the 
kingdom of Siam like the Empire of Annam owed to 
our compatriots their means of defence, their in-
ternal organisation, and their momentary succes-
ses. Then we forgot; French activity spent itself 
entirely in Europe, and the missionaries establi-
shed on Inda-Chinese soil alone formed the chain 
linking the past to modern events. It was for 
them that we intervened and, finding a government 
whose competence was defective, which was incap-
able of maintaining order in its provinces, of 
giving internal peace to its subjects and securi-
ty to its guests, we had to substitute ourselves 
progressively for it. 
The Empire of Annam acquired its greatest pow-
er a century ago when advised and led by French-
men. Become an integral part of France, the mod-
ernised empire, the new Inda-China, can attain a 
prosperity and a glory beyond the wildest dreams 
of the ancestors of our present subjects. The An-
nami tes are convinced of it; we ourselves have no 
doubt of it, and we must act with this faith. 
Doumer's personal version organises the elements of 
the myth in ways most useful for his purposes. But with one 
major exception, it still contains (or implies) nearly all 
e 4 An entirely different version of the French foundation 
myth told how successive governments never stopped dreaming 
of a return to France's Asian empire, cruelly lost after 
her eighteenth century defeat by England in India. For ex-
amples, see A. Bouinais and A. Paulus, L'Indo-Chine fran-
;aise contemporaine, I (Paris: Challamel, 1885, 2nd ed), p. 
xi; or Marcel Dubois' Preface in Gervais Courtellemont, 
L'Empire colonial de la France. L'Indo-Chine (Paris: Chall-
amel, 1901), pp.ix-x. In this instance, Doumer was more ac-
curate, as Raoul Girardet confirms in L'Idee colonial en 
France de 1871 a 1962 (Paris: Table Ronde, 1972), pp.4-10. 
ee Doumer, Souvenirs, p.33. I have reversed the order of 
the two paragraphs. 
the major themes of other common versions of the myth. The 
five main themes here will be analysed individually. They 
are summa~ised as follows. France's long historical rela-
tionship with Indochina gave her a right to rule there. Her 
domination must be for the good of the local people since, 
as history had proven, without French help the Vietnamese 
had been too incompetent to maintain order and peace. But 
with France returned, the Indochinese people could know 
good· governmeht and material security once more. And under 
France's long-term guidance and care, the failed Annamite 
past, with all its traditional paraphernalia, would give 
way before a future beyond its wildest imaginings. 
Let us consider them in turn. 
Doumer's preposterous claim of previous French 'pro-
tection' over 'Indo-china~ seems a personal quirk, and need 
not detain us. But the grossly exaggerated role attributed 
to Nguyen Anh's French officers turns up quite often,e0 if 
only because it so readily naturalised the French presence 
in Vietnam. It gave colonialism local historical roots, 
something the Friends of Old Hue (among others) devoted 
much time and energy to uncovering.e7 It also invoked an 
imagined tutelary relationship in the past that foreshadow-
ed the idealised tutelary relationship of the colonial 
present. 
As a general point, it is worth noting here that such 
Regismanset, Miracle fran~aise, p.233. 
er For their labours, see L. Cadiere, 'L'Oeuvre des Amis 
du Vieux Hue (1913-1923)', BAVH, XII, 4 (1925), pp.24-29. 
Cf. RS Pasquier's 1921 analogy between the 'union of French 
and Annamites of previous times' and contemporary colonial-
ism. BAVH, VIII, 4 (1921), p.304. 
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inflated claims for the influence of .the few Frenchmen at 
Gia-Long's court usually signal a colonial political mytho-
logist -at .. work. e.e Luro, for instance, simply noted their 
presence: 'some officers of merit~ had joi~ed Nguyen Anh in 
1798, he wrote, and the prince had been 'helped by French 
advice·.e.• Pasquier, however, who knew they had not ruled 
from behind Gia-Long's throne, could not help positing an 
almost equally fantastic role for them. After describing 
the Nguyen imperial tombs in L'Annam d'autrefois, he indul-
ged his predilections by musing whether their 'majestic 
dispositions·, and the 'general aspect of avenues and paths 
which recall our Versailles', did not in fact indicate "an 
intervention of our taste brought to the court by the Fren-
ch mission'. The idea is scarcely c~edible, yet Pasquier 
advanced it as ~possible•.•o 
The second theme in Doumer's account - the total in-
competence of all previous Vietnamese government - forms a 
classic statement of a great French colonial truth: when 
left to their own devices, Vietnamese (or Indochinese) 
could not govern themselves effectively.•1 Thus when France 
withdrew to Europe, and the essential outside direction and 
e.e For example, Regismanset wrote: "With the Gia-Long em-
peror, Annam knew its hour of grandeur. But was not this 
grandeur above all due to French advisors ••• ?;Miracle 
fran;aise, p.233. 
e.• J-B-E Luro, Le Pays d'Annam (Paris: Leroux, 1897, 2nd 
ed), p.83. 
Pasquier, L'Annam, p.89. 
•.L It was a harsher variation on an Orientalist theme 
Said discusses, which usually referred to representative 
self-government rather than any effective government. 
Orientalism, pp.33-36. 
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guidance lapsed, the 'momentary' successes of the former 
kingdom vanished. Local government collapsed into its natu-
rally defective (or normal) state. But once France returned 
to Asia, maladministration in Indochina had, like a magnet, 
drawn her progressively to replace the rule of native dis-
order with European competence. In effect, modern French 
colonialism in Indochina had resulted from the failure and 
ineptitude of the traditional regime. 
In historical terms, it is hardly credible for a 
Frenchman to condemn traditional Vietnam for endemic war-
fare when his own country had scarcely managed more than 
two consecutive decades without a war since the sixteenth 
century, 02 not to mention the internal episodes of bloody 
religious strife, revolution, and civil conflict that punc-
tuated the same period. But such comparisons do not inte-
rest mythologists; and it is myth, not history, that con-
cerned Doumer (and others) here, as a glimpse at Luro's 
opinions illustrates. 
Where the next colonial generation found only warfare, 
disorder, and chaos, Luro had discerned a dynamic, expand-
iryg people, 'fortified for ten centuries by its contact 
with Chinese civilisation and rejuvenated by the blood of 
the various races they had subjugated or incorporated in 
their extension towards the south'. So powerful was this 
Vietnamese genie for expansion, 'already ages old', that 
France might even encounter difficulties trying to halt it, 
he cautioned. However, he added with some special pleading, 
02 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers 
(New York: Random House, 1987), pp.41-256. 
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if the French in Cochinchina learned .to understand the 
Vietnamese sufficiently to 'guide their aptitudes and deve-
lop them_~o their highest degree of perfection•, if they 
could 'capture their confidence [and] make them appreciate 
our civilisation•, then France could exploit this native 
dynamism to her own ends and 'be assured [of] the empire of 
Indochina'.•~ Luro based this assessment on personal expe-
rience in Cochinchina. But unlike his derivative, third-
hand Orientalist account of the Vietnamese monarchy, few of 
his compatriots in the mid-1870s (or after) wanted to hear 
a traditional Asian kingdom described in such terms. Most 
preferred the views of linear cultural evolutionists and 
biological determinists, who depicted Asian civilisations 
as sunk in immobility, and hopelessly backward. 
By the twentieth century, the saga of Vietnamese 
struggles for independence and southern expansion that had 
so impressed Luro now appeared universally as a sorry tale 
of endless warfare and continual disorder. Each episode 
served to underline the former regime's utter inability to 
give its suffering people peace. Even a sympathetic spirit 
like Cadiere sadly agreed. In a 1911 school history text he 
wrote: ~It seems that a doom weighs on the Annamite people: 
their history is only one long series of civil wars; when 
struggle ceases on one side, it begins on another'.•4 For 
many political myth-makers, the former kingdom's perennial 
failure to ensure peace and internal order virtually by it-
All quotes, Luro, Pays d'Annam, p.84. 
• 4 L. Cadiere, Resume de l'histoire d'Annam (Quinhon: 
Librairie imprimerie, 1911), pp.74-75. 
self explained, validated, and prescribed the French colo-
nial presence. For example, when Charles Regismanset, doyen 
of the m~~ropolitan colonial mythologists, surveyed the 
millenial history of Vietnam and Cambodia, he found its 
~ 
basic theme wasA'fundamental incapacity of the Indochinese 
races, always given to domination from without, •.• to gov-
ern themselves'. For two thousand years, their history had 
been one long travail of 'internal struggles, dramas, pil-
lages, and carnage', until the French 'saviour gods' had 
arrived, bringing ~rest and peaceP. 0 e (Given this, it is 
not surprising that colonial mythologists greeted the re-
volts of 1930-31 as further proof that more than a few 
short decades of colonial rule would be required to uproot 
the baleful influence of the millenial past, so deeply im-
printed in the Annamite mentality.) 00 
Other metropolitan mythologists caste a wider net, 
tracing this administrative incompetence to a fundamental 
flaw in all traditional Asian kingdoms, not simply those of 
Indochina. This generalisation underscored its derivation 
in current European myths of biological determinism and 
Aryan racial-cultural supremacy. In 1903, for instance, 
Louis Salaun noted that although reasonable laws existed on 
paper, 'Annamite efforts found themselves marked, as [were] 
those of the great part of Asiatic peoples, by an impotence 
in their execution that had made European intervention 
All quotes, Regismanset, Miracle fran~aise, pp.146-47. 
00 See, for instance, Lt-Col. Bonifacy's re-telling of a 
similar version of the myth in 'Les Revoltes en Annam. 
Leurs Repressions', ATK, 22·May 1930. 
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possible'. 07 And even if, as Gervais Courtellemont accepted 
in 1901, European intervention in the form of Doumer's eco-
nomic program was costing the native tax-p~yer dearl~ in 
Vietnam, it nevertheless represented a fair exchange for 
order and peace. French rule meant 'the inestimable benefit 
of peace - internal and external - which over twenty centu-
ries they [had] not known ••• [Where] anxieties for the 
morrow [had] always been the lot of the Annamite people 
today present generations [could] expect to enjoy a state 
of peace' .•e 
Native incompetence had given place to European com-
petence and good order. But this happy state could only 
continue while France remained in control of Indochina. The 
Vietnames.e ( 1 ike the Indochinese races in general) needed 
the governance of a higher civilisation to guarantee them 
the benefits of peace, progress, and the security of goods 
and person, all previously unknown to them. Only the French 
could maintain the intricate modern administrative struc-
tures upon which it all depended since, by definition, the 
backward local races lacked the ability to do so~ 
This deficiency was les• a matter of education and 
learned skills than of race, as Colonial Minister Sarraut 
informed the Chamber of Deputies in 1921. The most intelli-
gent Indochinese, he confided, knew that ~the faculties of 
their own race alone' did not afford the same abilities for 
government and administration as those of the French, whom 
Quoted in Ibid, p.233. 
Courtellemont, L'Empire colonial, p.115. 
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'long, hard centuries of prolonged effort [and] research 
••• [had] endowed with a magnificent scientific and moral 
patrimony_'_. The Indochinese peoples needed France. It would 
be many years before •the more or less backward races' of 
the colony would be ·capable of disengaging a sense of 
nationality from their amorphous mass, with the will and 
capacity to find their way without help ••• through the 
ever growing number of pitfalls-in international life and 
the competition of modern peoples•. 09 Any premature inde-
pendence must spell catastrophe, not for France of course 
but for the local people, doomed to 'disorder, anarchy and 
revolt, until another great power stepped in' to impose 
colonialism once more. Then would they bitterly regret the 
lost protection of 'an idealistic France, all of whose ac-
tions and institutions [were] impregnated with fraternity 
and justice', unlike the other colonial powers. 70 
Doumer doubtless agreed entirely. The same conviction 
implicitly sustained his version of the myth of old, tradi-
tional Annam. Indeed for him history had already demonstra-
ted it. Years of previous French influence and 'protection· 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had still 
failed to impart the art of good government to the backward 
Vietnamese. A mere fifty years after their compatriots had 
raised up a flourishing empire for Gia-Long, Frenchmen re-
turned to the region in the mid-nineteenth century to dis-
09 Quoted in full in Regismanset, Miracle fran~aise, pp. 
342-46. Pasquier agreed in 1928, according to'La politique 
indigene en Indochine', NP, 135, Nov-Dec 1928, p.43. 
Cited in Regismanset, Miracle fran;aise, pp.343-44. 
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cover disorder, insecurity, and maladministration. Doumer 
stood convinced that the Vietnamese would finally attain 
modern French standards; but, as "history" had taught, it 
would be a work of very long duration, and certainly some-
thing that they could never hope to accomplish alone. 
This brings us to the fifth theme, and the major point 
of disagreement between most pre- and post-1908 colonial 
versions of the myth of old, traditional Annam - the con-
temp6rary political significance of traditional culture. 
Doumer never questioned the colonial myth equating 
Vietnam and ancient Rome that clothed the earliest projec-
tion of identity between French Self and Vietnamese Other. 
For him, Vietnam provided 'a vision of an abolished world 
(un monde ~boli) that Europe had known in ancient times and 
that we see suddenly appear at a distance of four thousand 
miles or three thousand years;. 71 The key word here, how-
ever, was the active participle 'abolished~. Change requir-
ed will. Europe's advance had depended on its people put-
ting the past behind them and uprooting the sort of age~old 
customs and ingrained traditions that had struck Doumer so 
forcefully in Annam in 1897. Protectorate Vietnamese could 
only progress in the same way. Full of the future and his 
own plans, the feeble charms of Annam's traditional culture 
never detained a Governor-General who wished only to give 
the Vietnamese what, projecting identity, he knew they 
wanted most, a future beyond anything dreamed of by their 
ancestors. And as we saw in Chapter Four, he acted with 
71 Ibid, p.173. 
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cheerful ruthlessness to set it in train. 
Doumer's contempt and disdain for bankrupt Sino-Viet-
namese civilisation, coupled with his desire for speedy 
reform, guided his policy and practice in Annam. Although 
forced by the Treaty of 1884 to keep the facade of monarchy 
and mandarinate, the Governor-General acted in every other 
way according to his expressed belief that the conquest war 
had made France the 'sovereign nation' in Annam. 72 While 
preserving the traditional forms of royal government might 
help sooth local sensibilities in a transitional era, 73 the 
previous regime had nothing further of value to contribute 
to the new order. It had already degenerated irreparably 
into 'abuses ••• faults [and] vices'. 74 So when Doumer re-
cited the Protectorate litany of France's pledge to 'main-
tain the kingdom's internal and external security, [and to] 
respect the life, mores, beliefs, [and] religious practices 
of the Annamite people', his failure to mention its tradi-
tional administratiye institutions represented no mistake 
or oversight. In Doumer's view, the interests of France and 
of the local people neatly coincided in replacing the worn-
out previous regime with 'the administrative procedures and 
economic means of action of European civilisation'. 7 e Not 
even the rites, which he characterised as 'for us [French] 
••• a subject of mockery·, could avoid being overhauled and 
72 Ibid, p.155. 
73 Paul Doumer, Situation de l'Indo-Chine (1897-1901) 
(Hanoi: Schneider, 1902), p.92. 
74 Souvenirs, p.164. 
7 e Ibid. 
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modernised, if they were to persist into the near future. 76 
In the decade after Doumer's appointment, many other 
French in-·the colony shared these expectations of the im-
minent collapse of Annam's age-old Sinic institutions. In 
1901, for instance, we find Courtellemont portraying Thanh-
Thai as a 'sad and idle fantdme du soderain~, wandering the 
empty palaces of Hue. Bereft of all but ceremonial duties, 
his throne was 'crumbling' and about to be 'buried beneath 
the dust of History'. As for his so-called kingdom, 'reduc-
ed to its simplest expression, [it had become] a sort of 
administrative division [and] properly speaking •.• no lon-
ger exist[ed]'. 77 But from the death of the past came life: 
~In Annam ••• a new future will soon bloom, so different 
from the past that the old survivors of disappeared regimes 
will have to ask themselves if they are dreaming~. 7e 
The few Frenchmen at the time who admired aspects of 
the traditional past, like Pasquier, 7 • resigned themselves 
to, rather than welcomed, the fact that •the court was dy-
ing and [the] dynasty fading away•.eo Suspicious progres...., 
sives denounced even such mild expression of regret. In 
1906, for instance, one advised those Annam-Tonkin adminis-
trators whose studies of the Vietnamese past had 'allowed 
Ibid, p.171. 
77 Courtellemont, L'Empire coloniale, p.107. 
7S Ibid, p.109. 
79 He still saw it as a failure, but in mainly in terms 
of its intellectual limitations. Otherwise, he Sino-Viet-
namese elite culture and idealised its past. We return to 
his views below. 
eo. Pasquier, L'Annam, p.92. 
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them to be seduced by the ancient institutions' into want-
ing to restore them that theirs was an impossible dream. 
'The inst~~utions of other times', the author thundered, 
could •not be adapted to the current ne~ds of a land al-
ready in contact with a western power for several years', 
and whose people, caught up in ~constant transformation', 
only 'aspir[ed] to a better state [and] turn[ed] their eyes 
to the future'. The moribund weight of tradition that had 
previously shackled them must no longer be allowed to 'fix 
them in an immutable order of things, nor stop them from 
••• being transformed in their turn'. In these circumstan-
ces, the sole reason the writer would allow for studying 
local tradition was to gain a fund of knowledge that would 
enable colonial officials to implement reforms in ways that 
least offended the native mentality and sensibilities.ei 
Nothing in the exciting decade following Doumer's ar-
rival in 1897 suggested to the colonial French that "Annam-
ite tradition" posed a special barrier to modernisation and 
colonial change; or that the Protectorate of Annam epitomi-
sed its region of greatest power. But as we have seen, the 
anti-tax movement shook those assumptions to the core. "An-
namite tradition" rebounded into the Protectorate political 
arena; and in circumstances which made penetrating its sec-
rets, comprehending its ways, and disarming its potential 
threats, matters of both personal and public importance to 
Frenchmen in Trung-ky, officials especially. 
Fortunately, however, a new conceptual tool had been 
ei Z, 'La tradition et l'enseignement', BJ.., No. 36, 30 
June 1906, pp.905-09, quotes p.905. 
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developed in the metropole which promised to deliver exact-
ly the results now required in Annam. We find reference to 
it in Klo~~kowski's 1908 speech to the court when he des-
cribed Paul Bert, his 'late lamented master', as a man who 
had 'from. the first moment understood the Annamite soul'.ga. 
In Bert's few months in office in 1886, he had displayed no 
especial sensitivity to the Vietnamese, projecting as crude 
a perception of identity on them as any of Doumer's.93 But 
it was less Bert the man than Bert as the symbol of recon-
ciliation between court and Protectorate that Klobukowski 
invoked. And by using the term, "Annamite soul", he sought 
to stress the sincerity of his promise to respect local 
customs and traditions. 
Klobukowski's pledge implicitly acknowledged the grow-
ing metropolitan influence of the ideas of Gustave Le 
Bon.a+ In 1894, Le Bon had produced a short volume, Lois 
psychologigues de !'evolution des peuples,S5 that basically 
argued a people's racial soul resided in their religious, 
artistic and philosophical beliefs, customs and traditions, 
and in the formative heritage of their past. If this racial 
62 'Documents. Le Voyage du Gouverneur-General en Annam', 
fll., No. 93, 15 Nov 1908, p.657 (my emphasis). 
e~ 'I like this people very much because it resembles the 
French people; it is industrious, it loves the family, and 
it obeys the laws and authorities·. From Chailley-Bert's 
Paul Bert au Tonkin, quoted in Baugher's translation, from 
"Contradictions", p.66. The original was not available to 
me. 
S~. Regarded as a mainstream scientist, Le Bon was the 
main founder of crowd psychology. 
~$. G. Le Bon, Lois psychologiques de l'evolution des 
peuples (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1919, 15th ed). 
soul sickened, it doomed any people's moral well-being and 
hopes for their future. Le Ben's ideas spread more slowly 
in colonial circles, partly because they ran counter to the 
dominant assimilationist trends of the time.e6 Even so, we 
find their clear imprint in the conclusion to Pasquier's 
1906 lectures, L'Annam d'autrefois, when, for instance, he 
called for France to 'study the [Annamite] past' so she 
could ~learn to lead [the Annamites] towards the future'. 
They also appeared in his caution that France not dest-
roy, \under a merciless centralisation, the originality of 
a distant people', and in his warning that, although the 
'hasard des evolutions' had placed the Annamites under 
French care, 'a people's evolution [must ultimately be] 
made by itself', so that France needed to 'respect the 
genie of the Annamite race' .e~ Indeed, as Resident Superior 
and Governor-General, most of Pasquier's politique indigene 
owed its basic inspiration to Le Bon. 
By 1919, Le Bon's remarkably successful work had been 
reprinted fifteen times, while his concept of racial soul 
would soon help justify the French government's official 
change of colonial policy from assimilation to association 
in 1920. In Vietnam, its impact on colonial mythologists of 
e6 Raymond F. Betts, Assimilation and Association in 
French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914 (Columbia University 
Press, 1961), pp.68-69 says Le Bon's views only penetrated 
colonial circles after Leopold de Saussure popularised them 
in 1899 in Psychologie de la colonisation fran;aise dans 
des rapports avec les societes indiq•nes. I have not seen 
this volume; but certainly quotations from it in Betts and 
Baugher ["Contradictions", pp.102-113] seem almost identi-
cal to Le Bon. 
e~ Pasquier, L'Annam, pp.337-38. But he chose to use 
'\ genie where Le Bon would have used •me. 
406 
.. 
Self and Other can hardly be exaggerated. The next section 
outlines its most significant points in some detail. 
Racial Soul, Annamite Soul, and French Genius 
In 1894 the psychologist Gustave Le Bon published a 
short popularisation of the main findings of his studies of 
the evolution of races, cultures, and civilisations. The 
work aimed 'to describe the psychological characteristics 
that constitute the soul of races (l'~me des races) and to 
show how the history of a people and its civilisation der-
ive from these characteristics'; to demonstrate that ~the 
mental constitution [of peoples] follows from their hist-
ory'; and that ~the elements of which a civilisation is 
composed: its arts, institutions and beliefs, are the dir-
ect manifestations of the racial soul and cannot for this 
reason pass from one people to another~.ee Overall, he wan-
ted to elucidate the 'great permanent laws directing the 
march of each civilisation~ the 'most general and most ir-
~ w~ck--
reducible'Ahe nominated as 'the mental constitutions of 
races'.e9 
Le Bon was a biological determinist of long standing. 
Like Gobineau before him, and many contemporary colleagues, 
the urge to expose and combat the dangerous and unnatural 
notion of equality90 between races and genders drove Le Bon 
ee All quotes, Lois psycholoqigues, pp.18-19. 
Ibid, p.17. 
~0 Despite a corpus of similar works, Le Bon liked to see 
himself as a lonely crusader: 'not a psychologist, not a 
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far more than any scientific aim. In 1879, for instance, as 
a disciple of the French craniologist, Paul Broca, he had 
published-~ study of female intelligence that claimed women 
~represent[ed] the most inferior form of human evolution'. 
With children and savages, they ranked far below 'an adult, 
civilised [European] man',•i Le Son's measure, then and 
later, of human superiority. Lois psychologigues extended 
this attitude to humanity in general. 
Le Bon denied the value of individuality. However much 
people might seem to vary, he insisted most members of the 
same race 'always share[d] a certain number of common psy-
chological traits, as stable as the anatomical characters 
that.allow the classification of species'.•2 As the simile 
suggested, changes in these racial mental and psychological 
traits only happened very slowly. It took at least ten cen-
turies, he estimated, to create the 'commonality of feel-
ings and thoughts' that formed a people's soul, and then 
only weakly.•3 To forge a national soul needed much more. 
Although the 'network of feelings, ideas, traditions, and 
beliefs which formed the soul of a collectivity of men' 
traveller, not a statesman with the least learning [failed 
to] know to what extent [egalitarianism was] wrong; and yet 
how few have dared to oppose it'. Ibid, p.16. 
•i Cited in Gould, Mismeasure, p.105. In Lois psychologi-
gues Le Bon used the ~insuperable chasm' that separated 'a 
civilised man and a woman, even if she were highly educat-
ed' to symbolise the gulf between races. Like men and women 
who shared 'common interests, common feelings but never the 
linkage of common thoughts'[p.46], races too were fundamen-
tally separate and unequal. For his ranking, see pp.38-47. 
92 Ibid, pp.23-24. The biological analogy returned at 
pp.25-28 and pp.175-76. 
93 Ibid, p.27. Thus he believed the French did not yet 
form a race, although the English did [pp.63-64]. 
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might appear anywhere, a national soul required the 'notion 
of la patrie as we know it today'.•4 Clearly, only the West 
could qualify. 
If individuals did not count, neither did the current 
generation. Because a racial soul took centuries to form, 
the influence of heredity, of long generations of ancestors 
fixed in the same area and intermingling their blood, dwar-
fed all else in importance. In Le Ben's view, 'it [was] by 
its dead, much more than by its living, that a people [was] 
led',• 5 for the dead played ~the preponderant role in a 
people's existence[ ••• as] the creators of its morality 
and of the unconscious motives of its conduct'.~6 This 
meant any single person 'always and above all [was] the re-
presentative of his race•, joint inheritor of a common 'ag-
gregate of ideas and feelings' whose influence 'in reality, 
rule[d] all the evolution of a people'. 97 
Two elements in particular from this fund of beliefs 
and feelings directed the evolution of races: character; 
and guiding l.deas.beco~e ~nconsc:ious sentiments. 
To Le Bon, character above all meant the exercise of 
will. Perseverance, energy, self-control, and self-denial 
all helped to form it, along with 'morality'- defined as an 
'hereditary respect for the rules upon which society's 
existence rest[ed]'. The superiority of English character, 
• 4 Ibid, p.29. Cf. Sarraut's 1921-22 speeches cited 
above. 
Ibid, p.27. 
Ibid, p .189. 
Both quotes, Ib~d, p.26 
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for.example, explained how '60,000 Englishmen [held] 250 
million Hindoos beneath their yoke, many of whom were at 
least the~r equal in intelligence, and some of whom sur-
pass[ed] them immensely in artistic taste ~nd the depth of 
their philosophical understanding'.""8 Character's signific-
ance far outstripped that of intellect. Education might 
raise the intelligence of a lesser race, for intellectual 
discoveries easily passed between peoples; but character 
needed centuries to form, or be transformed. It was due to 
'this chasm between the mental constitution of diverse 
races' that Europeans had 'never succeeded in getting in-
ferior peoples to accept their civilisation ••• [Its] forms 
of thought, logic, and above all the Occidental character' 
could only emerge from the crucible of the centuries."""" 
If education could only effect superficial improve-
ments, not genuine advances, in inferior races it was hard-
ly worth pursuing, for real hazards attended the close re-
lations between races it required. Different peoples~ Le 
Bon warned, could ~neither feel nor think nor act in the 
same way, nor by consequence understand each other'.ioo If ~ 
a higher people foolishly tried to guide the mental evolu-
tion of their inferiors, rather than leaving them to deve-
lop by painful centuries of effort, the misplaced charity 
risked 'disorganising (their] mental structure•. If that 
occurred, the inferior race could only plunge 'to a lower 
•e Ibid, p.44. As Aryans, Hindus placed among the su-
perior races, though the lowest ranked of them. [p.40]. 
Ibid, pp.43-47, quote p.47. 
J..00 Ibid, p.46. 
level than that which it would have reached by itself'. 101 
With Gobineau, Lewis Morgan, and many others, Le Bon thus 
inveighed-~gainst the dangers of racial mixture that dest-
royed racial originality. Though slow to constellate, a 
people's soul could be irrevocably harmed relatively quick-
ly by the admixture of _foreigners, •even in small numbers·. 
They caused a people 'to lose the ability to defend the 
features of their race, the monuments of their history, the 
works of their forebears'. 102 But for Le Bon, such contact 
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imperilled superior races as much as their inferior-s. He .. 
cited the fall of the Roman Empire as a cautionary example: 
the bar-barian invader-s had respected and admir-ed Rome, and 
wanted to preser-ve it, he maintained, but 'the simple 
influence of their mixtur-e was enough to destroy the Roman 
soul', and with it the empir-e. 10~ 
The second major influence on racial evolution came 
fr-om a tiny number- (at most two or three) of 'fundamental 
guiding ideas in the realm of the arts, sciences; literat-
ure or philosophy'. 104 Their greatest effect occurred after 
they had percolated down from 'the fluid regions of thought 
to the stable and unconscious region of sentiments'. Once 
there, beyond the reach of reason, they might persist al-
most indefinitely. 10 e Even if superseded, they did not van-
Ibid, p.79. 
102 Both quotes, Ibid, p.133. 
1<:>4 
1•:>e. 
Ibid, pp.134-37, quote p.137. 
Ibid, p.144. 
Ibid, p.145. 
ish but rather joined the 'heritage of outdated ideas, opi-
nions, and conventions that [ordinary] people still accep-
t[ed], -ey_~n though they could not withstand a moment's rea-
soned analysis'. 10• 'Precisely this network of traditions, 
ideas, sentiments, beliefs, [and] common modes of thinking 
create[d] the soul of a people'. 107 
The stronger this network, the more perdurable the 
racial soul, as As~a illustrated. Europeans might like to 
imagin~ that Asiatic sovereigns ruled a~cording to their 
'whims', Le Bon commented, b~t in fact their lives were 
'enclosed in singularly narrow limits. In the East, much 
more than elsewhere, the network of traditions [was] power-
ful. Religious beliefs ••• preserve[d] all their empire, 
and the most tyrannical despot never clash[ed] with two 
sovereigns he [knew were] infinitely stronger than himself: 
tradition and opinion'. 106 Of these ruling ideas, religious 
ones 'always formed the primordial element of the life of 
peoples, and consequently of their history'. 10• A new reli-
gion always engendered a new civilisation. But the link be-
tween religion and civilisation could also be fatal. As 
history showed, 'nothing [was] so destructive as the dust 
of dead gods', for ~the civilisation born under their in-
fluence pass[edJ away with them' • 110 
106 Ibid, p.153. 
107 Ibid, p.154. 
10& Ibid, p.155. 
10• Ibid, p.160. 
110 Ibid, p.166. 
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Only the most advanced peoples like modern Europeans, 
whom 'the greatest differentiation and hierarchy [separat-
ed .•. ] from Orientals', might hope to meet such dangerous 
times without disaster. But their hope of success in this, 
as in so much else, depended on the influence of a tiny 
elite of ·beaux genies'. This small band of white, civilis-
ed males alone disposed of the ability to synthesize 'the 
grandeur of their times and their race', while sharing on 
behalf of their race, the glory of having accomplished all 
the works of progress that benefited humanity. 111 Yet this 
indispensable elite now found itself threatened by the fal-
se prophets of egalitarianism, and the foolish demands of 
women for equal rights, demands which could only 'finish, 
if [they] triumph[ed], by making the European man a nomad 
without home or family'. 112 But should Europeans blindly 
succumb to the chimera of equality, they would become 'its 
first victims. Equality can only exist in inferiority', Le 
Bon warned. •Times of savagery alone have realised it.' 11~ 
Contemporaries believed Le Ban's work scientific; and 
some later scholars have dignified it by treating it as a 
theory. 114 But if we measure the ideas outlined above 
against the minimum definition of political myth presented 
in Chapter One we find it revealed as political myth mas-
111 All quotes, Ibid, pp.167-68. Similarly, to succeed, 
statesmen had to embidy the dreams and ideas of their race. 
Ibid, p.17. 
Ibid, p.168. 
114 Cf. Betts, French Colonial Theory, Chapter Four; or 
Baugher, "Contradictions", pp.102-08 which discusses the 
contradic~ions between theory and practice. 
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querading as science. 
As noted there, a political myth is a story involving 
its collective protagonist in a dramatic plot which, as it 
unfolds, explains the group's present circumstances and ar-
gues for, or prescribes, practical action to defend or im-
prove its position. Lois psychologigues fits this defini-
tion exactly. The noble but embattled elite of civilised 
European males, among whom Le Bon counted himself, forms 
its protagonist. Despite embodying the soul of their supe-
rior race, by the end of the nineteenth century some began 
to feel their formerly unquestioned conviction of supremacy 
challenged by the subterranean shift in the episteme that 
Foucault identified. The underlying analytic of Sameness in 
modern consciousness was slowly moving towards the unity of 
Identity and Difference. It appeared at home in the mind-
less egalitarianism of the masses and the alarming demands 
of women; and elsewhere in the contact with lesser races 
whose contagious inferiority threatened to drag their supe-
riors down to their own level. Through a series of linked 
episodes, Lois psychologigues also built up a vestigal plot 
that argued, implicitly and explicitly, for policies and 
practices to reinforce the natural separation between Euro-
pean and inferior races or, failing that, for the least 
possible contact to save higher races from the potentially 
disastrous impact of their inferiors. Finally, if nothing 
else, Le Ban's methodology repeatedly betrayed him as a 
myth-maker. All the techniques of political mythologists 
mentioned in Chapter One (and more) are marshalled in the 
work in order to make all human history conform to a single 
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explanation, valid in all epoches and for all peoples. 
When shorn of Le Eon's personal preoccupations and 
tailored by local mythologists to suit their particular 
needs, the myth of the racial soul, plus many of its sup-
porting arguments, enjoyed extraordinary influence in the 
colonial French psyche in Indochina. Its imprint is mani-
fest everywhere one looks, in newspaper articles, speeches, 
and archival sources, but most of all in political myths 
from the 1920s on, ~or in the colonial context it became 
the key that unlocked everything about the Vietnamese. 
In the fir~t place it reconfirmed the little China 
fallacy as an article of faith. What else could Vietnam be 
after all those centuries but innately Chinese? 
Of myriad examples from the 1920s, let us take Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Bonifacy, retired Colonial Infantry officer 
turned journalist in 1920s Ha-noi. Bonifacy numbered among 
the 'relatively few colonial mythologists in Indochina who 
openly declared himself 'an assiduous reader of Lebon•. 
·Most, as with Pasquier above, tended to use his ideas as 
their own, or as if they were common knowledge.iie In a 
1922 article, Bonifacy congratulated Pasquier as Resident 
Superior for setting up a college intended to impart a 
practical education in the customs and traditions of the 
iie An interesting variation appears in a 1930 article 
that deals almost exclusively (and unconsciously) with 
contemporary projeetions of French Self and Annamite Other, 
'L'evolution intellectuelle et sociale des Annamites sous 
!'influence fran~aise', BSEI (ns), V, 3 (1930), pp.165-86. 
Its author, E. Mathieu, gives the characteristics of a rac-
ial soul (a people's 'mentality, its atavism, its intrinsic 
qualities, its beliefs, and its ancestral traditions') but 
instead attributes them to 'le genie d'une race' [p.177]. 
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pays to probationary Annam mandarins. The new Ecole des 
Hautes Etudes existed to fill a role at which the Ha-noi 
University Ecole du Droit had conspicuously failed: to pro-
vide young mandarins with practical instruction, in Pas-
quier's words, in the "choses des usages, the folk-lore, 
the traditions [and] the rites' of Annam, the lack of which 
left them 'strangers among their brothers, incapable of 
understanding their thoughts and feelings, ignorant of the 
motive forces that guide their actions•.iio In practice, 
however, this meant teaching them about Annam's Chinese 
heritage, which Bonifacy found both wise and admirable.ii 7 
Previously Annamites only learnt matters taught 
in China: this could be criticised, but we might 
respond that Annamite legislation was copied from 
the Chinese, that their language draws all its 
abstract words from the Chinese, that in Annamite 
the names of countries, towns, provinces, and in-
dividuals are Chinese, that their religion, arts 
[and] the rites derive from Chinese rites, reli-
gions [and] arts, in a word that Annamite culture 
is none other than Chinese culture (la culture 
annamite n'est autre que la culture chinoise). 
From this spring-board, Bonifacy Jumped (as did many 
others) to argue for the retention of Chinese characters in 
colonial public schools as the only sure way to avoid cut-
ting Vietnamese civilisation off from its roots, and from 
its past achievements. Without Chinese education, in other 
words, the health of the Annamite soul would suffer. In a 
iio Speech at the opening, 24 Nov 1922. AEP GGIC 51080 
The School, closed in 1925, replaced the former Hau-Bo, 
whose far more theoretical orientation had equally failed. 
For a scathing critique, see Ho Bae Khai, 'L'Ecole des Hau-
bo. Pepiniere des mandarins', 81.. (ns), XXV, 5-6 (1917), 
pp.393-405. An unsigned version of the article is held at 
AEP GGIC 48045 
ii 7 'Opinion. Ecole des Hautes Etudes du Gouvernement 
Annamite'. ATK, 1 Dec, 1922. (my emphasis) 
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delightfully unselfconscious example of projected identity, 
he went on to warn that, without a Chinese education, Viet-
namese children risked no longer being able to access their 
own literary heritage. The great number of homonyms in quoc 
ngu, he asserted, would make poetry written in their own 
language unintelligible to children without Chinese ideo-
graphs to help them differentiate the meanings. But even 
worse, without a knowledge of Chinese, Vietnamese would 
find themselves unable to converse with their own families: 
'without it, it would no longer be possible for Annamites 
to express themselves, as the names of family relations, 
except for mother and younger brother (or sister), are 
Chinese'. 11 e 
By proving that the past was ~also the present', Le 
Ban's ideas also validated the post-1908 Protectorate pol-
icy of mining the traditional past for 'elements of deci-
sion and knowledge for the future', as Regismanset put it 
in 1921. 11~ Again, examples proliferate. The missionary-
columnist AGAT, for instance, wrote in 1924 that it was not 
external features like skin colour, or the shape of eyes 
and nose, that separated peoples. Rather, they were diffe-
rentiated120 
above all by the more or less common fund of 
ideas, customs, and mores that we call ••• their 
soul. This soul, composed of diverse elements, is 
11e. Sans lui, il ne serait plus possible aux Annamites de 
s'exprimer, les noms de parente m~me, sauf mere et frere 
(ou soeur) cadet, sont chinois.· 
119 • Both quotes, Regismanset. Miracle fran~aise, p.147. 
120 All quotes, AGAT, 'Les Enseignements de l'histoire 
d'Annam. IX'. ATK, 22 Mar 1924. 
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translated in two ways which, at heart, are only 
one, religion and philosophy. 
The Ann~mites posed no exception to 'this law'. To compre-
hend their soul, he insisted, the French needed to examine 
the •sediments left by the great current of ideas from 
China, notably the ancestral cult, Taoism, Buddhism, and 
Confucianism~. But they must advance courageously to the 
heart of Vietnamese difference in order to make an exact 
assessment of ~the philosophical and religious ideas upon 
which the Annamite soul [was] based'. Thus empowered with 
deep knowledge, the French would be able 'to judge with 
complete discernment whether there [existed] elements cap-
able of raising ~he Annamite nation once more, and of re-
habilitating it before history·. 
But for the French to be able to 'judge with complete 
discernment• the depths of the Annamite soul implied two 
things: that they disposed of extraordinary cultural and 
intellectual powers; and that, Le Bon to the contrary, 
races could understand each other. In the metropole, Le Bon 
(and his biological determinist colleagues) enjoyed the 
luxury of distance from the Other. Despite his expressed 
fears, Le Bon could have experienced few direct and per-
sonal challenges to his conviction of superiority. Colo-
nials, on the other hand, who had to dwell in the midst of 
Otherness, needed to guard their defences and constantly 
shore up the personal sense of mastery and superiority that 
enabled them to function effectively. In Vietnam, experien-
ce taught that the local people might, at any time and for 
no apparent reason, act in unexpected and even dangerous 
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ways. Such behaviour confronted colonial society with the 
disturbing reflection of its actual ignorance and potential 
insecurity~ So while colonial state power was never seri-
ously endangered before its collapse in the aftermath of 
World War Two, currents of insecurity stirred with dark 
unease below the surface of many individuals' lives, esp-
ecially those outside the towns. When not expressed in bru-
talities,i 2 i the repressed fears and anxieties manifested 
in the colonial arena as inflated, and obviously compensa-
tory, assertions that the French Self enjoyed absolute sup-
remacy over, or total knowledge of, the Vietnamese Other. 
As we saw with the wide acceptance of the myth of Vietnam 
as ancient Rome, and of the comforting projection of ident-
ity at its core, whatever met the deepest needs of the col-
lective Self, however preposterous, illogical or contra-
dietary they might seem to outsiders, could be adopted, 
adapted, and mythologised to satisfy the needs of the time. 
And once mythologised, they moved in the realm of mentali-
ties, where the rules of the material universe did not hold 
paramount sway. 
This is what happened in twentieth century colonial 
Vietnam to the long-standing metropolitan concept of le 
genie fran~ais. In its usual meaning, the term denoted the 
French image of their own national character, which is how 
genie is usually translated in English. In colonial Viet-
i 2 i Periods of political unease might focus such fears: on 
two occasions in the mid-1920s, the mere sight of Vietnam-
ese youths joking among themselves provoked physical at-
tacks by enraged Frenchmen, each convinced the Vietnamese 
had been laughing at him personally. Reports in EA, 24 Ap 
1925 and Annam, 31 May 1926. 
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nam, however, le genie fran~ais came to signify something 
far more important - the god-like power and perception of 
the Fren~h Self as an actor in the colonial political 
arena. With only rare exceptions,i22 by the 1920s we find 
le genie fran~ais commonly used to summarise the attributes 
of the colonial collective projection of French Self. To 
convey something of that grandiose sense we have rendered 
it here as 'the French genius'. 
In France, the notion of le genie applied equally to 
peoples and individuals. On the personal level, it paral-
leled the English concept of •genius", denoting writers, 
artists, or scientists of brilliance, or statesmen and 
generals of renown. It was, for instance, in this sense 
that Le Bon used it to refer to the 'beaux genie~ of elite 
European males. On a collective level, it was used to sum 
up aspects of national (or racial) character that were 
often presented as essentially active in nature. As we saw, 
Luro attributed a genie for expansion to the Vietnamese. In 
1901, Marcel Dubois of the Comite de l'A~ie fran;aise,i2~ 
praised the English genie for commerce that allowed the 
British to create a trading relationship with their great 
i 22 Pasquier was one, though it may have been a personal 
vanity. Despite L'Annam's debt to Le Bon, Pasquier avoided 
"l'~me" and applied "le genie" to French and Vietnamese 
alike. Then in the 1920s, when most others differentiated 
between le genie fran~ais and J'~me annamite, Pasquier oft-· 
en chose l'~me for both as, for example, when describing 
his vision of 'Annam, age-old but being reborn' through the 
'union of the Annamite soul and the French soul'. 'La Mis-
sion des etudiantes fran;aises', ATK, 25 Dec 1924. 
i 2~ Later, as a professor at the Sorbonne, he wrote in 
Systemes coloniaux et peuples colonisateurs that France 
possessed 'un genie colonial'. Quoted in Regismanset, 
Miracle fran~aise, p.21. 
Indian colony that enriched themselves h~ndsomely. (This he 
comp~red:to the French empire at the time which, in Asia 
especially, attracted little investment and paid few divi-
dends. 124 ) But while Dubois might encourage France to bor-
row some successful colonial techniques from the Anglo-
Saxons, he warned in the process that she must always take 
care 'to guard [her] originality [and her] personality' • 12 ~ 
We must slightly modify our character without 
thereby suffocating the genius of our race (le 
genie de notre race), without suppressing all 
idealism and indeed all enthusiasm. Let us know, 
above all, how to preserve our native generosity 
towards the peoples that Destiny has placed under 
out domination. 
Notions of ~rench idealism and generosity surface re-
peatedly in the metropolitan image of le genie 7ran•ais. 
French conviction in the superiority of their civilisation, 
however defined, was not new. It had existed long·before 
the Revolution infused it with a sense of mission civilisa-
trice, and Napoleon's armies carried it throughout Europe 
at bayonet-point. Unlike the later image of "the White 
Man's Burden", it had formed a fundamental part of French 
self-definition long before the imperial expansion of the 
later nineteenth century. Nevertheless, colonialism provid-
ed the French civilising mission with a vaster, and more 
challenging, field of endeavour than ever before, as men 
from Francis Garnier onwards recognised. His 1864 view of 
1 24 Henri Brunschwig, Mythes et realites de l'imperial-
isme colonial fran;ais, 1871-1914 (Paris: A. Colin, 1960), 
Chapter 6; and Stuart M. Persell, The French Colonial Lob-
by, 1889-1938 (Stanford University Press, 1983), explore 
the economics of French colonialism at the time. 
Courtellemont, L'Empire coloniale, p.15. 
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le genie fran~ais, and of the colonial duty it imposed on a 
France who was true to herself, well summarises a later 
widespread current of French opinion vis-a-vis the colo-
nies, first in colonial circles, and later generally. 126 
'This generous nation~, wrote Garnier, 'whose opinion rules 
civilised Europe and whose ideas have conquered the world, 
has received from Providence a higher mission, that of 
emancipation, of calling to light and liberty, races and 
peoples still enslaved by ignorance and despotism'. 127 
But in Vietnam, to penetrate the Annamite soul, disarm 
its atavistic tendencies, and enlist its positive qualities 
in support of the Protectorate, required powers more god-
like than the idealism, generosity, humanity, and intellec-
tual gifts with which France was so well endowed. And so, 
from necessity, it acquired them - or at least, the projec-
tion of the colonial French Self as le genie fran~ais did. 
Let us consider some brief examples. 
In our earlier discussion of the myth of old, tradi-
tional Annam, we saw how, as part of Le Miracle fran~ais en 
Asie, Charles Regismanset described the nineteenth century 
French as 'saviour-gods' bringing the boon of peace to the 
long-suffering Indochinese multitudes. 12e A few years later 
Pierre Pasquier conveyed the same sentiment to his Vietnam-
ese friends in the AVH when he told them, in 1924, that 
12° For a longer discussion, see Girardet, L'Idee colo-
niale, pp.81-93 and 117-35. 
127 From La Cochinchine francaise en 1864, cited in Ibid~ 
p.23 (my translation). 
Regismanset, Miracle fran;aise, p.147. 
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France had not only given them: 129 
peace, security, your goods and your persons, the 
economic development of your soil, [and] the aug-
--mentation of your riches. She also brings you the 
wonderful secret which is going to quicken and 
bring into bloom your own qualities, the nourish-
ing ideas of your [own] thought. Through "the 
French miracle" your souls will be augmented, the 
field of your conceptions widened, not because of 
any renunciation or tabula rasa, but rather by 
moving beyond the level of your culture and, by 
means of your renewed faculties, [to beyond] 
where you have been at standstill for centuries. 
An even more blatant example of the quasi-divine nat-
ure attributed to the colonial French Self comes from Al-
bert Sarraut, the man who, as Colonial Minister in 1923, 
would describe the French colonial doctrine as 'the Decla-
ration of the Rights of Man as interpreted by St Vincent de 
Paul'. 130 A few years earlier, in 1917, a reform of the 
Tonkin Law Code had extended some basic legal guarantees to 
the people in the North. In Annam, it should be noted, the 
scarcely modified Gia-Long Code still regulated the lives 
of five million Vietnamese. But Governor-General Sarraut 
seized on the Tonkin reform as the pretext for an extra-
ordinary example of colonial mythologising. A slightly 
condensed version follows. 131 
Before our arrival in Indochina one could say 
that, despite the benevolent laws conceived for 
them by sage monarchs, the Annamite people were 
like a sort of amorphous, obscure, confused mass, 
where the individual disappeared into the group, 
was drowned in the community ••. Man, weak and 
powerless before the all-powerful State, was only 
129 Speech to a visiting delegation of French schoolgirls 
at the AVH. 'La Mission des etudiantes', ATK, 25 Dec 1924. 
13 '~ At a meeting of the Academy of Colonial Sciences, re-
ported in BAVH, X, 4 (1923), p.498. 
Ajalbert, L'Indochine, pp.225-26. 
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one grain in a pile of sand. This pile of beings 
obeyed passively through the centuries whatever 
it was ordered to do by an absolute authority 
which disposed of the masses according to its 
__ wi 11, without having to answer for abuses of pow-
er before a superior law limiting the right of 
the sovereign himself •.• The laws protecting the 
individual meant what"the mandarin wh6 applied 
them [said they] meant, or the monarch who super-
vised their application. No legal recourse was 
possible against the supreme power. 
Well, what has been admirable in the action of 
France .•. is precisely that, thanks to her ••• 
the rights of the individual have finally taken a 
precise outline. [T]he patient and maternal 
hand of France has drawn upon the immense clay of 
the native community to_make models and create 
ther.e "individualities", having rights for them-
selves, accompanied by guarantees whose existence 
is henceforth recognised and consecrated by supe-
rior, tutelary law. From the previous human dust, 
the action of France has made men! 
In some respects, all additional commentary seems 
superfluous before such a breathtaking example of colonial 
mythgology. Nevertheless, some aspects should be high-
lighted. It is interesting to note, for example, how at the 
start Sarraut separated the ·sage monarchs', who had con-
ceived the 'benevolent laws', from the 'absolute authority• 
that disposed of the cowed and passive multitudes, for it 
hints at the pro-monarchical politique indigene which he 
would toy with, and which Pasquier later fully embraced. 
But for our present purpose, the conclusion is more rele-
vant: 'from human dust' France had made 'men'. We are not 
simply confronted here with a grotesquely over-blown meta-
phor, though Sarraut certainly delighted in them. Rather, 
we see in this a re-assuring signal from the leading 
Frenchman in the colony to all his local compatriots in the 
form of a stylised representation of the roles of Self and 
Other in the colonial arena. Like Pasquier's speech that we 
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excerpted above, it re-confirmed the convictions of colo-
nial French about their "true" identity and the "real" nat-
ure of t~~ Vietnamese, at the same time that it traced the 
appropriate relationship between the two. And in this 
endeavour it proved successful enough to feature as one of 
only two examples of Sarraut's voluminous output selected 
by Jean Ajalbert for his 1930 collection, designed to show-
case French insight into Indochina, L'Indochine par les 
franc;:ais. 
The second significant element in Sarraut's story is 
the extraordinary degree of inferiority projected onto the 
Vietnamese of the traditional past - neither animal nor 
vegetable, they appear here in the metaphor of grains of 
sand, or human dust. At the turn of the century, when Dou-
mer projected inferiority onto the Vietnamese past and its 
contemporary representative~ he disparaged the traditional 
elite for its failures but never metaphorically portrayed 
its members - and certainly not the stout peasants - as 
anything less than human. Rather, for Doumer, (French) Self 
and (Vietnamese) Other had been identical two thousand 
years before; and would be so again in the future he was 
working to bring about. But far from being ''ourselves in 
the past", for Sarraut in 1917 the pre-colonial Vietnamese 
appeared as only potentially human, requiring the interven-
tion of a French demiurge to transform them into real men 
(like the European Self). The comparison reveals the grow-
ing inflation of the projected French Self since Doumer; 
just as it suggests why the fusion of inferiority and iden-
tity that increasingly occurred after 1908 made the rework-
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ed myths of Self and Other so attractive and tenacious in 
later colonial circles. Integrating both aspects of projec-
ted Otherness made it possible for a supposed 'indigeno-
phile'i~2 like Sarraut to project, with a clear liberal 
conscience, literally dehumanising inferiority onto the 
Vietnamese, while simultaneously applauding their transfer-
mation into real men, thanks to the intervention of the 
French Self. 
In this example, Sarraut projectetj inferiority onto a 
(mythologised) Vietnames• past, and identity onto a (mytho-
logised) colonial present. Others, among them at times the 
Friends of Old Hue, switched the focus and preferred to 
project inferiority onto contemporary Annamites and iden-
tity onto the distant future, when the union of French 
~~ 
genius and AnnamiteAwould give birth to a fine, new civili-
sation in the Pacific. We will conclude with this myth and 
projection. 
The Union of French Genius and Annamite Soul 
As we discussed in Chapter Four, Leopold Cadiere and 
some French and Vietnamese friends had formed a small, 
learned society in 1913 to research and conserve historical 
memorabilia, information, and artefacts relating to old 
Hue. Very soon, however, the needs of the time had turned 
the AVH it into a work-shop where, equipped with modern new 
132 Sarraut claimed he had been accused of this by some, 
in a 1920 speech. Cited in Regismanset, Miracle fran-aise, 
p.346. 
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tools supplied by Le Bon's myth of the racial soul, its 
members crafted and burnished colonial myths and projec-
tions of Self and Other to perfection. 
Le Bon, as we saw, had insisted that conserving a peo-
ple's heritage of philosophy, literature, art, and religion 
uncontaminated by foreign influences played a vital role in 
preserving the health of its racial soul. Armed with this 
knowledge, and alarmed that cross-cultural experiments were 
attracting certain Vietnamese artists and craft workers, 
the AVH determined early in its existence to stem the cor-
rosive influx of western artistic notions, so detrimental 
to the native soul - and, of course, so liable to muddy the 
crisp divisions they strove so hard to preserve between 
Same/Self and Different/Other in the complex situation of 
the 1910s. 
The AVH's perceptions and responses to this double 
danger typif ie_d t.he pattern that underlay all versions of 
the myth of the union of Fren~h Self and Vietnamese Other, 
even Sarraut's extreme account above. On an analytical 
level, its emphasis on Annamite failure redeemed by French 
intervention manifestly recalled the myth of old, traditio-
nal Annam. The principal difference was that this time the 
myth concerned itself more with natural flaws in the Viet-
namese Other, the innate characteristics which the exigen-
cies of history might influence for good or ill. In this 
myth, French intervention acted to rescue the Vietnamese 
from themselves, and to re-make them in conformity to a 
better (higher, culturally purer} standard. 
As with almost everything else in its first decade of 
4.27 
existence, the AVH's desire to stimulate an indigenous ar-
tistic renaissance in Annam neatly fitted this template. 
Local art~- AVH members agreed, had fallen into 'a profound 
and regrettable decline' for three basic reasons. First 
they blamed the former government, for by refusing artists 
and artisans their liberty, it had caused the most talented 
to practice their skills only inside their families. Next, 
earlier prosperity had given way to poverty; and, in that 
situation, the 'th~ apathy inherent in the race' had done 
the rest.i33 Happily, colonialism had solved the first two 
problems - and it could overcome the third as well, but 
only if the French respected certain crucial principles, as 
Edmond Gras reminded the Association in 1915.i34 
It was essential to carefully avoid wishing to 
impose on these future artists our conceptions of 
art, our western vision, our decorative motifs. 
[ .•• All their models] must remain Annamite, for 
it is a Renaissance that we want to guide, not a 
dangerous and useless Revolution that we seek to 
foment. If a transformation of Annamite art is to 
come about, it must logically ••• be born from 
the genie of the race alone. And this will occur 
because we will have been anonymous and wise 
educators, and not pretentious trouble-makers • 
••• The great vital principle of art, the es-
sential condition of all creation, the source of 
all artistic progress, from the artisan to the 
master, is respect for the individuality of each, 
for the temperament of the individual as of the 
race. It is only at this price that servile imi-
tation can be avoided, and even worse plagiarism, 
decadence, [and finally] death 
i 33 Edmond Gras, 'Quelques r~flexions sur un enseignement 
d'art en Annam', BAVH, IV, 4 (1917), p.457. The article was 
read at the meeting of 27 Oct 1915, shortly after Orband 
had given a very similar lecture at the Alliance fran~aise, 
according to fn.2. Cadiere, 'L'Oeuvre', pp.37-40 also deals 
with these efforts between 1915 and 1921. At the time Gras 
was Head of the Annam Treasury. 
Both quotes, Gras, 'Un enseignement d'art', p.458 
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Though evident to the French, unfortunately these fundamen-
tal truths tended to escape most local Vietnamese artists, 
-sculptors~- painters, and architects. They failed to 
open their eyes to the admirable things of a past 
full of teaching that they no longer [knew] how 
to see or that they [saw] without understanding. 
What [was] needed [was] to utilise the remarkable 
gifts of imitation of their race ••• by [allowing 
them] to make comparisons with the past ••• [and 
with works of] the Chinese and Japanese, their 
[former] great teachers of art 
'Make no mistake•, Gras concluded, 'Art is necessary to the 
life of a people. It is more than a manifestation of its 
well-being. Art is the corner-stone of a civilisation~.i~e 
Thanks to its superior ability to analyse and compre~ 
hend the nature of the Vietnamese Other (imitators, not in-
novators; apathetic and thus liable, if left to themselves, 
to neglect to the point of amnesia the corner-stone of 
their civilisation)i30 , the French Self knew how to act to 
effect the changes necessary to save Vietnamese culture 
from the passivity of the Annamite soul. Gras' exposition 
illustrates perfectly the relationship between le genie 
fran~ais and J'§me annamite in this myth and projection. 
The active French Self initiates and effects, while the 
passive Annamite Other is acted upon. 
One wonders whether Protectorate officials in the 
Ibid, p.460. 
i 3 ° Cf. RS Pasquier's 1921 description of Annam as 'this 
country, where forgetfulness seems to have been borrowed 
from nature'. BAVH, VIII, 4 (1921), p.304. Or Guibier's 
comment that AVH members charged themselves 'to conserve 
that which resists time and all its attacks, but will not 
survive the forgetfulness of men: the very essence of 
things, their spirit, their soul ••• · 'Le Gouverneur-
general au "Vieux Hue"', BAVH, VII, 4 (1920), p.480. 
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1910s would have been quite so interested in fostering an 
Annamite artistic renaissance if more of their energies had 
been engaged in projects of genuine colonial change. Cer-
tainly as the 1920s advan~ed, the whole issue seems to have 
narrowed to the activi tie.s of the Khai-EHnh Museum. In the 
1910s, however, the Friends of Old Hue threw themselves 
into the task. Leading members met to draw up plans for an 
Artistic Commission based on ideas Gras (and Orband else-
where) had advanced. 137 It bore fruit the next year. An 
Exposition of items, mainly borrowed from Vietnamese mem-
bers and their.friends, "amaied' Governor-General Sarraut 
and other important 'personages" visiting Hue for the Nam-
Giao sacrifice of 1918 with its richness and elegancei13e 
But as with the later Khai-Binh Museum, also run under the 
Association's auspices, this Exposition never aimed simply 
to display, but to educate local artists and artisans in 
their own culture by providing them with models for 
imitation. 13• The crusading desire to extirpate the •mi-
europeen mi-annamite•, 140 wherever encountered, even led 
members in 1915 to consider holding a contest to discover 
the most beautiful examples of purely Annamite portals in 
137 L. Cadiere, 'Projet pour !'organisation et le deve-
loppement de la Commission artistique des A.V.H.', BAVH, 
IV, 4 (1917), pp.461-66. 
138 Cadi~re, 'L'Oeuvre·, pp.39-40. Its success led to a 
plan for an annual artistic Salon, which seems not to have 
eventuated. 
139 • P. Jabouille, 'Musee Khai-Binh: Historique du Musee', 
.§.e.Y.tl, XVI, 2(1929), pp.92-93. 
l.40 Cadiere, 'L'Oeuvre', p.39. 
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Hue, and to reward the owners.i 4 i This vigilance also ex-
tended to certain musical performances arranged by some 
members of--the Association, which 'confine[d] themselves to 
traditional music', with no attempts at 'musique metisse' 
al lowed. i 42 
AVH perceived this project not as an attempt to censor 
Vietnamese artistic expression but as a generous and disin-
terested endeavour to preserve Vietnamese (racial-cultural) 
originality and stimulate a (controlled) renaissance by 
res~uing its arts from oblivion. Unconscious self-interest 
played a large part, however, especially the need to define 
and control cross-cultural contacts between French and An-
namite. Like the officials in 1908 who saw reformist scho-
lars acting outside administrative control as traditional-
ist malcontents rather than unauthorised experimenters in 
~ 
social change, so AVH members a decade~also rejected and 
disparaged the novel, unconventional, experimental, cross-
cultural, and evolving elements in Vietnamese arts and 
crafts. Whereas Levecque believed he championed modernity, 
the AVH strove to restore the traditional artistic heritage 
of the past. Yet like Levecque's discovery of a new criti-
cal faculty spreading among the people in 1908, the AVH's 
vision risked equally being blinkered by their owM uncon-
scious projections, in this case by their vision of Sino-
Vietnamese elite culture pushed uniformly backwards in 
time. And although they were advised by their Vietnamese 
i 4 i Ibid. 
~42 Ibid, p.44. Though the traditional music turned out 
to be rather hard to appreciate for many. 
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friends, it nevertheless remained French views of what con-
stituted good taste in Annamite art that basically dictated 
what was .collected, preserved, and made available for cur-
rent and future generations of artists to copy. 
Their keenest collaborators, men from the royal clan 
and the Hue-based elite, products themselves of families 
with only a few generations of intesive sinicisation, will-
ingly co-operated in this task. Amassing orthodox Sino-
V{etnamese ~r~de~tials enhanced their own self-image, as 
well as their links with French officials. But beyond that, 
a supporting role in the AVH as the mute, stylised chorus 
of the 'lettered aristocracy of the Annamite people' suffi-
ced for most of them. 143 They left to French members the 
heroic role of knights-errant, drawn by the romantic desire 
to defend old Hue and its traditional Sinic civilisation, 
as Cadiere poetically portrayed the Association in a 1917 
address. Inspired perhaps by the presence of Sarraut, 
Cadiere let his fancy roam free. In a rather surprising 
metaphor from a missionary, he enthused at length about Hue 
as a beautiful woman whom a 'foreign knight' had loved from 
afar for centuries; and who, though 'defend[ing] herself 
shyly' from his first passionate advances, had soon 'given 
herself totally' to his embrace. 144 
143 As Cadiere described them in 'Annex B. Notice sur la 
"Burma Research Society"', BAVH, IX, 4 (1922), p.375. Al-
though Vietnamese did author articles, the minutes show 
they rarely spoke at meetings, probably because of poor 
French. 
144 • 'Allocution du Redacteur du Bulletin', BAVH, IV, 1 
(1917), pp.6-7. A rather more conventional sexual metaphor 
was of ~a marriage of convenience at the start 
progressively becoming a marriage of inclination', as AVH 
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In 1914, Cadiere had dreamt of a learned society whose 
studies rested on intellectual and scientific rigour 1~5 
and, looking back over its first decade of existence, he 
insisted on the scientific nature of the work they had 
achieved. 146 To its editor, the Bulletin· served the Annam-
ite cultural world like a herbarium •that serve[d] the 
scientist to bring order into vast nature'. 147 Yet from 
quite early on, numbers of published articles and the 
atmosphere of the meetings that seeps through the minutes, 
seem far more romantic and antiquarian than rigorous or 
scientific. It was probably for this reason, rather than 
the ~lack of scientific spirit or love of science' 148 which 
Cadiere charged them with, that kept most young French edu-
cated Vietnamese, outside the inner circle of collaborating 
families, from involving themselves with the Friends of Old 
Hue. But.neither Cadiere's disappointment at this aloof-
ness, nor his uncharitable asses.sment of western-educated 
youth, sprang f~o~ person~l- caus~~ alone. Modern science 
President 6aide put it at a reception for 66 Merlin in 
1923. Projected identity made him see this result as nat-
ural and 'inevitable, [for were] not the versatility, in-
telligence, finesse and irony of the Annamite race essenti-
ally French qualities?' 'Allocution de ~.le Dr 6aide', 
BAVH, X, 4 (1923), p.503. 
145 He sought descriptions that were 'exact, precise, de-
tailed, minute, in a word, scientific'. L. Cadiere, 'Plan 
des recherches pour "Les Amis du Vieux Hue"', BAVH, I, 1 
(1914)' p.6. 
146 Cadiere, 'L'Oeuvre·, p.7. 
147 From Cadiere's speech to a visiting Parliamentary 
delegation. BAVH, X, 4 (1923), p.483 
148 • Cadiere, '"Burma Research Society"', p.378. To his 
chagrin, the British group attracted many western-educated 
natives into its ranks, unlike the AVH. 
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played a talismanic role in colonial mythology: the posses-
sion of science formed the essential characteristic that 
-invariably. distinguished advanced from backward races. It 
was to superior European science, for example, that the 
French Self usually attributed the ability of the genie 
fran~ais to penetrate and comprehend the Annamite soul. 
But "science" enjoyed another role in colonial myth in 
Vietnam, one which required a certain degree of Vietnamese 
co-operation to carry out. Science provided the fructifying 
force by which the union of French genius and Annamite soul 
would bring forth 'a new civilisation, original and charm-
ing', on the Pacific shores. Pasquier explained it all to a 
group of visiting French school-girls in 1924. France, he 
revealed, had brought to the Annamites \what Asia 
(had] always lacked: a method of thought to germinate and 
make fruitful (its] conceptions'. Despite being the birth-
plac_e of all great religions, and still teeming with 'pro-
phets, magi, thaumaturges [and] even sages', Asia until now 
had never spawned a single 'thinker, in the philosophical 
sense of the wordJ. But at last, thanks to France, its op-
portunity had arrived. And despite the difficulties posed 
by the forces of ~blind resistance', by the •obstinant ig-
norance of those who, contemptuous of the present day would 
call down anathema in the name of archaic and outworn trad-
itions', the chance to create this new (hybrid) civilisa-
tion some time in the future represented 'a fine undertak-. 
ing for a people' and an •admirable ideal to propose to 
them' • .1. 49 
But what if the people to whom it was offered had 
other ideas? Basically, the myth rejected this possibility, 
for it defined the ability to think clearly as a European 
attribute. Further, the Annamite role in its grand schema 
was passive. Like Sophia by Logos, the (feminine) l'~me 
annamite would be penetrated, quickened, and fructified 
with new life by the decisive intelligence of the (mascul-
ine) genie fran~ais. No place existed here for the Annamite 
Other to presume to initiate, or to act for itself. It was 
rtot up to young Vietnamese, for instance, to pretend to 
judge for themselves the value of French colonialism - not 
even implicitly, as in ignoring the benefits offered by 
joining a scientific society like the AVH. Such puzzling 
refusals to grasp opportunities reinforced negative racial 
stereotypes, drawing an uncharacteristically stinging 
comment even from a well-wisher like Cadiere. 
But as the 1920s proceded, young western-educated 
Vietnamese increasingly irritated French colonial myth-
ologists. Numbers of them insisted on stepping outside the 
limits of projected Otherness (and therefore of behaviour 
acceptable to the French Self) to act on and test out their 
own evolving sense of identity. But as we mentioned in the 
Introduction, in colonial society this became a perilous 
path for those who trade it: rejecting the projection by 
being oneself in public automatically challenged both the 
power structure it supported and the collective sense of 
Self that controlled and defined Otherness. We often get 
~ 49 All quotes from 'La Mission des etudiantes fran~ai­
ses', ATK, 25 Dec 1924. The whole speech forms an almost 
complete statement of Pasquier's version of this myth. 
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the impression from the sources that such people tended to 
focus French disquiet, distrust, and anger well before they 
had act~ally committed themselves to any genuinely anti-
colonial course. Their public refusal, wittingly or not, to 
conform to the perceptions of Otherness projected by the 
colonial Self seems to have been offence enough. The offi-
cial attitude towards Phan Chu Trinh .in Annam immediately 
comes to mind in this context; 1 eo but too so does the 
treatment of many among the 1920s generation. To colonial 
mythologists, their behaviour made them seem neither fish 
nor fowl, having willfully rejected their own culture with-
out, however, being capable of understanding (rather than 
simply imitating) that of France. 
AVH stalwart and Annam SQrete Chief, Leon Sogny, for 
example, sneered in 1926-27 at this new generation with its 
'superficial western studies' and its 'illusions about the 
extent of its knowledge'. One could not reason with such 
~semi-educated, semi-evolved malcontents·, 1 e 1 Sogny repor-
ted, for he had tried to show them the error of their ways 
and failed. 1 e 2 Fortunately, their foolish disdain for their 
ieo But ironically projected identity helped save him. 
Phan's attacks on the traditional regime had found favour 
in some French circles at the time, and predisposed GG Klo~ 
bukowski to favourable treatment. Ultimately he was allowed 
to go into exile in France. •Note on the Phan Chu Trinh af-
fair', 13 March 1909. AOM Indochine A30(116) Carton 22. 
1 e 1 All quotes, Annam SQrete report, 1926-27, pp.1-3. AEP 
GGIC 7-F 18 
1 e 2 Others experienced it, too, including the French 
judge who found himself arguing the benefits of colonialism 
with Nguyen The Nghiep in the dock, before imprisoning him 
for trying to leave the country illegally. 'Le Proces de 
Vinh', ATK, 13 Ap 1927. 
436 
own traditions would ensure they enjoyed no political in-
fluence over the peasants. 
Othe~ colonial French tried paternally to direct this 
misguided youth back to its own cultural roots. The journa-
list, Peyrot, for instance, urged in 1929 that Pierre Pas-
quier's L'Annam d'autrefois, reprinted and newly fashion-
able during his Governor-Generalship, 'should be in the 
hands of all the students of Cochinchina and Tonkin'. Pas-
quier's untimely death in 1~34 would eulogise him as the 
French magician of the Annamite soul~ something he was said 
to •comprehend, in the true sense of the word, that is to 
say with all his sensibility tending towards the gift of 
divination•.ie~ But even before this apotheosis, the in-
fluence of colonial myths of Self and Other. caused French-
men like Peyrot to believe that Pasquier understood the 
Vietnamese better than they understood themselves. And by 
studying L'Annam d'autrefois, therefore young Vietnamese 
would discover the truth about the French (Self) as well 
learning,ie4 
from a Frenchman of the elite, respect for the 
traditions that they stupidly pride themselves on 
despising. They would be instructed on the real 
sentiments that decide our conduct in this land, 
where we have not come to destroy but to add to 
what already exists. They would draw from it a 
lesson in good taste and moderation that would 
[also] not be superfluous. Listening to M. Pas-
ie3 'Pierre Pasquier~, ATK, 21 Jan 1934. Cf. RS Thibau-
deau's eulogy to the Council: 'Governor-General Pasquier 
was an Annamite in his thinking and in his heart. We all 
considered him as the guide who was surest, clearest, and 
most to be listened to and respected'. CM, 18 Jan 1934. 
!CNF 291/2508 
ie4 G. Peyrot, 'Monsieur Pasquier et les annamites', ATK, 
7 Jan 1929. 
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quier proclaim the excellence of certain of their 
institutions, they would be persuaded that we do 
not despise them as they make out. 
Peyrot's plea to young French-educated Vietnamese to 
let the French (Self) redeem their flaws, and remake them 
closer to the real nature of the Vietnamese (Other) showed 
the influence of the AVH's mythologising from the previous 
decade. By then, however, this refractory and turbulent 
youth, whose behaviour flouted both their own people's fine 
traditions and French expectations, had driven some long-
standing AVH members virtually to disown them entirely. In 
1933, for example, Hippolyte Le Breton rejected many of his 
own former students as 'much more French than Annamite·. It 
was no compliment, however, to be branded as 'impatient to 
command before having learned to obey, impatient to arrive 
per fas et nefas, seeking only to satisfy [their] gross 
pleasures'.iee 
But also by then, Le Breton's twenty-five years in An-
nam had brought him full circle, to an emotional identifi-
cation with the (idealised) Annamite past. He mourned the 
loss of the former Rites, which by comparison with current 
times now seemed to present ~certain admirable aspects', as 
did the example of the disappearing society that had produ-
ced them. Consonant with this came a personal identifica-
tion with the traditional literati whom, thirty years be-
fore, Doumer and his ilk had happily consigned to the gar-
bage bin of history.iee 
iee. H. Le Breton, 'La Vie de S.E. Hong Khang', BAVH, XX, 
3 (1933), p.202. 
Ibid, p.204. He even dated the article, 'Hue, 1 
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Let us study, through the example that "the Life 
of the Illustrious Men of Annam" gives us, the 
beauties of the wisdom of the Far-East, in order 
-to learn to safeguard them. 
And myself too, like the fine lettre of Annam, 
... am turning towards the past, regretting to 
see extinguished, little by little, what used to 
be true, good, great, and fine in "le lettre". 
This example underlines the increased flexibility and soph-
istication available in colonial myths and projections of 
Self and Other by the 1930s. In this instance we see how 
identifying with a nostalgic, idealised Vietnamese repre-
sentation (like the honest hard-working son of the soi1,i~7 
or the old scholar steeped in Chinese learning) could let a 
colonial Frenchmen dismiss or question the authenticity of 
living, contemporary Vietnamese whose lives had been chang-
ed or distorted by colonialism. Reacting against the disap-
pointments of the present, he could still imagine, and in-
dulge himself in, a sympathetic sense of connectedness with 
the "real" or "essential" qualities of Vietnam or the Viet-
namese Other. 
This degree of sophistication in perceptions of Self 
and Other reflected the extent to which the colonial poli-
tical myths that validated the projections had, by the end 
of the 1920s, been naturalised and locally-adapted. To all 
French (and many Vietnamese eyes), they appeared historic-
ally grounded in Vietnamese sources, based on objectively-
verifiable facts rather than French projections and import-
ed metropolitan perceptions. Their foreign roots had long 
March, 1933 (6th day of the 2nd lunar month, of the 
cyclical year qui-dau, 8th of the Bao-Bai era)~' 
i~7 For an example, see Paul Monet, Les Jauniers. His-. 
toire vraie (Paris: Gallimard, 1930), pp.168-69. 
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been forgotten in a maturing proces~ that merged and inter-
layered all the qualities of projected inferiority and 
identity~·-It resulted in a composite, all-purpose image of 
Vietnamese identity, unconsciously organised to satisfy the 
vital colonial needs of security and superiority vis-~-vis 
the colonised Vietnamese. For this reason, it should be 
stressed that no matter how anchored in native history, 
culture and society colonial understanding of the Vietnam-
ese might have appeared, nor how much individual Frenchmen 
like Pasquier might have admired aspects of the Vietnamese 
tradition, the colonial myths and projections of Self and 
Other upon which the colonial understanding of Vietnamese 
cultural identity rested never transcended their racist 
origins in nineteenth century European imperialist myths 
and projections. Images of Vietnamese cultural identity 
contamindted by these sources, even at second hand, should 
therefore no longer be accepted by scholars without a prior 
critical reassessment or much more corroborative research. 
But the great, enduring success of these myths of Self 
and Other in colonial Vietnam, and of the little China fal-
lacy that they championed and mythologised in turn, derived 
less from their apparent naturalisation or the support they 
leant to dreams of racial superiority. Rather it arose from 
their ability to unify the paired opposites of Same and In-
ferior in the projection of Vietnamese Otherness. Where 
1908 had unconsciously challenged the easy French sense of 
mastery over their alien environment, by 1928 the problem 
was resolved. The French Self now owned the Vietnamese 
Other: from then on, nothing the Other did could ever again 
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threaten to take the Self so completely by surprise. Viet-
namese actions might still anger or disappoint Frenchmen, 
of course_;_ but even examples of that frustrating • mentalite 
incomprehensible',iee always lurking in the dark recesses 
of the native mind, could be adequately accounted for. All 
exits were covered, all entries guarded, and all borders 
patrolled, for the past, the present, and the fut~re. 
The myths also provided for all expected politic~! 
eventualities, as Pasquier illustrates in our concluding 
example. Pasquier's knowledge of the Annamite soul assured 
him that blind, atavistic forces persisted deep within it. 
They might take the form of reactionary traditionalism or, 
among the peasants especially, of fatalism, credulity, and 
sudden violence. To the Governor-General in 1928, the anti-
tax movement took the form of a sort of sickness, a mass 
contagion welling up from that deep region of sentiments, 
beyond the sway of reason, that Le Bon had shown most 
motivated the common people. As Pasquier informed a 
Parisian audience:ie9 
The amorphous masses ••• who forget benefits re-
ceived, who let themselves be lulled by words and 
chimeras, and who abandon themselves to the great 
fatalism which weighs on all Asiatic destinies 
iee The title of an ATK article concerning peasant deaths 
consequent on sleeping with their heads on railway lines. 
The practice irritated the author: railways were meant to 
symbolised colonial progress; but by 'tak[ing] the railway 
for a bedroom', peasants implicitly domesticated the French 
achievement to their own uses. And despite the title, the 
author could explain the practice on the basis of natural 
Vietnamese Inferiority: the peasants hoped the noise of the 
train would wake them, but 'forgot the depths of the Annam-
ite slumber' and died instead. ATK, 15 Sept 1928 
Pasquier, 'La Politique', NP, No. 135, Nov-Dec 1928, 
p.46. 
[would] for an hour of intoxication follow 
all those willing to speak of their chimera. 
It is in this psychology of the native masses, 
the Annamites especially, that we must find the 
--explanation of our marvellous conquest, made with 
four men and a corporal [It also explained 
1908] when the bewitched people, following lead-
ers [and] without understanding anything of the 
import of what they were doing, suffered a sort 
of vertigo, a real epidemic contagion which push-
ed them into the wildest adventures. 
And it is this understanding of the instabil-
ity of the masses, whom education has not yet 
been able to modify, that could cause some fear 
of spontaneous infatuations against which the 
suggestions of reason would be in vain. 
When the Nghe-Tinh rebellion broke out two years lat-
er, its explanation lay ready at hand, indeed, anticipated 
by the myth. Not only did Pasquier admonish the people of 
the two rebellious provinces in its terms,i 0 o but the offi-
cial enquiry into the revolt, the Morche Commission, listed 
its argument as a direct cause of the rebellion:i 0 i 
The Annamite peasant, whose credulity is extreme, 
accept[ed] all [the communists promises of land 
and tax reform] without troubling themselves 
about whether they [could be] realised. But [the 
peasant] only asks to be deceived, for between 
reality and the supernaturalr his simple, naive 
soul, in whose depths is imprinted a certain 
··orien~al poetry, will always go towards the 
latter. 
Not only did the myth explain the forces of blind pea-
sant atavism, it equally accounted for potential political 
difficulties with all other Vietnamese, moderates included. 
The problem would be solved with the appearance, some time 
in the future, of the first Vietnamese generation of logic-
io•::> 'Pree lamation du Gouverneur-general' , ATK, 8 Oct 
1930. He also demanded they 'listen to those who speak to 
you in the name of a powerful nation which wants to protect 
you against your own weakness~. 
iai Rapport de la Commission d'Enqu~te sur les Evenements 
du Nord-Annam, pp.27-28. ADM !CNF 212/1597 
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al thinkers. Until then, however, the local people would 
manifestly require French guidance; but France might find 
it difficu1t to understanding all their demands, since they 
themselves were not yet capable of thinking them out and 
expressing them clearly. Once more, Pasquier explained the 
problem in 1928. 
Between the two extremes of the old, lettre opposi-
tion, \the enemy of government whatever its form •.. vio-
lently aristocratic and oligarchic', on the one hand, and 
the revolutionary nationalists who (as Annamites) were 'in-
capable of founding a doctrine [and] seek among foreigners 
[for] a program, a formula', on the other, stood an 'in-
telligent patriotic elite'. When this group properly evolv-
ed, they would join France in founding a new civilisation 
in Asia. Pasquier had spoken at length with representatives 
of these men, and had found them ~remarkably intelligent, 
with great finesse of mind, fine penetration of thought, 
[and] much wisdom'. Unfortunately, however, they could not 
'define their demands clearly and exactly'. Their problem 
stemmed from moral rather than material (or political) 
causes: it was a matter of 'susceptibility, of self-res-
pect'. And, he might have added, they needed to serve an 
apprenticeship in logic for, while they 'confusedly sought 
social equality, ••• often through incomprehension they 
[were] incapable of practising and utilising the freedom 
already accord[edJ them'.iQ 2 
By 1928, then, the myths of Self and Other covered all 
All quotes, Pasquier, 'La Politique', pp.45-46. 
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contemporary political possibilities, and met all medium 
term eventualities, with the promise of a glorious result 
in the long term. But it could all only come to fruition, 
as Pasquier urged~ French Government in 1931, if France 
held fast to her 'apostolic ideal' in Indochina. 163 Ele-
ments in the metropole were beginning to acquire some 
doubts by then; but in the· colony he need not have worried. 
By the 1930s, the political myths he had helped shape had 
become integral to the thoughts and perceptions of the 
entire French community. Few might have believed every 
feature or image, but none at the time disputed the power-
ful colonial discourse on identity they had helped create 
and sustain. 
And so well adapted to Vietnam did its images and 
arguments appear, so apparently historical, so seemingly 
locally derived, that these representations of Vietnamese 
cultural identity~ past and present, developed a life of 
their own in western scholarship_ that ~nabled them to 
outlive the society of their birth by several decades. 
163 Resume of GG Psquier's speech to the Superior 
Colonial Council, 30 Ap 1931. AOM !CNF 331/2675 
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ANNEX ONE 
A Note o~·Popular Rebellions in Early Nguyen Vietnam 
In the late 1950s and 1960s, Marxist Vietnamese his-
toriography of the pre-colonial Nguyen period repeatedly 
claimed that the dynasty had been widely rejected right 
from the start, and that this popular revulsion had been 
expressed in continuous outbreaks of anti-dynastic peasant 
revolt. In the words of Tran Van Giau, it seemed like ·any-
one who wanted to raise a rebellion against the court could 
influence large numbers of the peasant masses to support 
him, whether he was a civilian or a soldier, of high or 
common status, literate or illiterate, from the coastal 
plains or the Highlands.'L In 1959, using published Nguyen 
court, records Chu Thien counted about five hundred such 
uprisings in eighty years, excluding banditry and 101 
foreign incursions. 2 In 1964 Nguyen Phan Quang sharpened 
Chu Thien's rounded figures into the following table of 
popular uprisings per reign: 3 
Gia-Long (1802-1820) 73 
Minh-Mang (1820-1841) 234 
Thieu-Tri (1841-1847) 56 
Tu-Due (1847-1883) 103 
total - 466 
L The words appear uncited in Chu Thien, 'Nay nhan xet 
nho ve nhung cuoc nong dan khoi nghia trieu Nguyen', NCLS, 
19 (1960), p.19. Nguyen Phan Quang later attributed an 
identical passage to Tran Van Giau but without further 
citation, in 'Vai y kien danh gia phong trao nong dan khoi 
nghia trong nua dau the ky XIX', NCLS, 61 (1964), p. 46. 
2 Chu Thien, 'Cuoc nong dan', p.12. His rounded figures 
only totalled about 470, however. 
3 Nguyen Phan Quang, 'Phong trao nong dan', p.44. 
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By the 1970s, the image of 'peasant rebellions (khoi 
nghia cua nong dan) [breaking] out continuously and every-
where~ 4 1n Nguyen Vietnam had assumed the status of an his-
torical datum for Ha-noi historians.= From there it moved 
into western historiography, with both Alexander Woodside 
and Le Thanh Khoi incorporating versions of it in their 
writings on the era.• But a closer examination of the meth-
odology underlying the analysis, and of the figures upon 
which the interpretation rests, reveal such basic flaws 
that the Ha-noi claim must be set aside, for the Gia-Long 
reign at least. 
First, unexplained discrepancies exist between diffe-
rent researchers' results. In 1959, Chu Thien reported that 
his figures derived from an analysis of the eai-Nam Thuc 
Luc Chinh Bien (the court Historiographies). 7 When Nguyen 
Phan Quang and Sang Huy Van examined the Gia-Long era in 
detail in 1965, they too consulted the Thuc Luc, among 
other sources including French historical studies. Yet des-
pite making a wider search, the second authors only report-
ed 'over 50' revolts, or almost one-third fewer than Chu 
Chu Thien, 'Cuoc nong dan·, p.11. 
= Cf. So Bang's comment: 'hundreds of peasant uprisings 
broke out continuously from North to South', in · Tinh hinh 
trieu dinh Hue truoc vu bien nam 1885', NCLS, 224 (1985), 
p.74. 
• Le Thanh Khoi, Histoire du Vietnam des oriqines a 1858 
(Paris: Sudestasie, 1981), p.382. Alexander Woodside in 
Vietnam and the Chinese Model (Harvard University Press, 
1971), p.135 and fn 65; and his chapter, "Vietnam, 1802-
1867", in David Joel Steinberg (ed), In Search of Southeast 
Asia. A Modern History (Sydney and Wellington: Allen an~ 
Unwin, 1987, revised ed), p.129. 
7 Chu Thien. 'Cuoc nong dan·, p.11. 
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Thien. 6 They made no attempt to reconcile the discrepancy 
with the earlier total, nor even to note it, notwithstand-
ing Nguyen Phan Quang's own published endorsement of Chu 
Thien's higher figure the previous year. 9 What became of 
twenty missing rebellions? 
Errors in calculation alone seem unlikely to account 
for such a large disparity in results. Rather, it suggests 
conflicting definitions over what constituted a •peasant 
uprising't which is what both sources supposedly counted. 
But nothing in either text indicates if this was in fact 
the cause of the discrepancy. We therefore have no way of 
assessing which figure is more acceptable - or, indeed, 
whether either should be regarded as accurate. After all, 
Kieu Danh Mau, the Confucian chronicler of nineteenth 
century anti-dynastic rebellions, only recorded eleven 
internal revolts for the Gia-Long era in his 1901 volume 
based on much the same sources.io Yet Chu Thien's figures 
form the main statistical plank sustaining the interpret-
ation of general and unprecedented peasant unrest from the 
start of the Nguyen era. The failure (or inability) of sub-
sequent researchers to verify his total for the Gia-Long 
period must call all his figures into question. Until the 
basic data are re-examined, then, Ha-noi historians" claims 
about the scope of nineteenth century peasant revolt must 
e Nguyen Phan Quang and Bang Huy Van. 'Tinh hinh dau 
tranh giai capo thoi Gia-Long·, NCLS, 78 (1965), p.11. 
Nguyen Phan Quang, 'Phong trao nong dan', p.44. 
i•::> Kieu Danh Mau, Ban trieu ban nqhich liet truyen, trans 
Tran Khai Van (Sai-gon, 1963), pp.6-28 
be treated far more cautiously than they have been, especi-
ally for the Gia-Long period. 
Secpnd, a consideration of the evidence adduced to 
support the 1960s thesis of immediate, generalised and on-
going peasant rejection of the dynasty raises serious 
doubts about how many of these so-called ~peasant rebel-
lions" were any such thing. For the Gia-Long reign, the 
main question revolves around the appropriate classifica-
tion of the armed raids of Highland tribes against settled 
Vietnamese lowland communities in Quang-ngai. In cases like 
the later Nong Van Van revolt in Bac-ky, for example, such 
movements clearly represented anti-government rebellions, 
though hardly qualifying for the ~peasanth tag that Chu 
Thien and others have awarded them. But where the Thuong of 
9a-vach are concerned, the situation is far less obvious. 
The ea-vach tribes (Cua, Hre, Sedang, Bhanar and Die) 
bulked large among the mountain peoples characterised as 
~high savages' (Noi cao), 'wild savages• (Noi hoang) or 
•barbarian devils' (ac man) by south-central Trung-ky 
Vietnamese.ii Their tribal lands lay beyond the Ba-vach 
pass, historically at or past the fringe of Vietnamese 
political influence and control. Tribes from this region 
had first clashed with Vietnamese troops in 1540; but 
afterwards both sides settled into a pattern of co-exist-
ence for two centuries. 
From the mid-eighteenth century on, however, the Ba-
vach Thuong earned their lowland reputation as the cruel-
ii I am grateful to Li Ta Na for this linguistic data. 
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lest, least predictable, most uncontrollable, and terrify-
ing of the Highland peoples. In the reign of chua Vo-vuong 
( 1738-6-5 )_ ,_ bad harvests in the mountains coincided with a 
Vietnamese push to subject these distant tribes to regular 
control and taxation by the Bang-trong authorities. Food 
shortages and official harrassment sparked large-scale 
raiding into Quang-ngai by the Da-vach Thuong in 1750. 
Chased back into the mountains in 1751, the Thuong were 
tricked· in~o submission by Nguyen Cu Trinh, who also tried 
.. 
to redress their justifiable grievances against corrupt 
local officials. An uneasy peace followed until 1770, when 
similar circumstances triggered a second major assault on 
the coastal plains that only ended with the Tay-son rebel-
lion a couple of years later.i 2 Thirty years of civil 
strife followed. In the nineteenth century, Nguyen court 
documents recorded repeated raids on Vietnamese communities 
in Quang-ngai by the marauding Thuong of Ba-vach. On seve-
ral occasions in the first reign, Gia-Long's great general, 
Le Van Duyet, marched his army from the South to repress 
them, but always without lasting success. Finally, late in 
the reign, the throne accept Duyet's advice and ordered the 
construction of a "Great Barbarian Quelling Wall" (Trinh 
Han Truong Luy), with 115 ten-man watch towers strung along 
i 2 Cuu Long Giang & Toan Anh, Viet Nam Chi Luoc. Hien 
Thuonq Cao Nquyen, I (Sai-gon,, 1974), pp.91-95 and Phan 
Khoang, Viet Su: Xu Banq-Tronq 1558-1777 (Sai-Gon: Nha Sach 
Khai Tri, 196?), pp.513-17. 
450 
its 150 kilometres.i~ Even so, it failed to stop the raids, 
which continued for many years after. 
In ~~e light of this background, then, how should 
these attacks be classified for the Gia-Long reign? Is it 
appropriate to regard them as 'peasant rebellions' against 
the Nguyen dynasty, as Chu Thien and others have done; or 
as 'class struggles'(dau tranh giai cap) as Nguyen Phan 
Quang and Bang Huy Van have termed them? And should we 
accept the Thuong of Ba-vach, as Ngµyen Phan Quang and Bang 
Huy Van have doAe, as nghia quan (partisans of the just 
cause) engaged in a khoi nghia (righteous revolt) against 
Gia-Long?i 4 
The first issue is easily dismissed. The anachronistic 
pseudo-Marxist terminology of class struggle has no place 
in the analysis of this phenomenon in late traditional 
Vietnam. Nor should the fantastic assumption that ethnic-
ally-distinct mountain tribes can be subsumed analytically 
within the category of "Vietnamese peasantry" be accepted. 
Clearly, raiding Highland warriors should not be confused 
with \peasant rebels', nor can their incursions be regarded 
as ~class struggles# in any meaningful sense of the term. 
The second matter holds more interest. Up to a point, 
the Thuong raids were politically motivated, and anti-
Nguyen. Tribal peoples had fought in the Tay-son army, and 
some may have continued to begrudge the Nguyen their vie-
tory, during the Gia-Long reign especially. But for most, 
i~ Nguyen Phan Quang and Bang Huy Van, 'Bau tranh giai 
cap', p.19. 
i4 Ibid, p.18. 
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raids on the coastal settlements reacted less against the 
ruling family than against royal attempts to push effective 
Vietnamese control deeper into the mountains. Thuong incur-
sions dramatised tribal peoples' unwillingness to surrender 
their autonomy to lowland political control, at the same 
time, it should not be forgotten, that they provided real 
economic benefits to those involved. From a Vietnamese per-
spective, therefore, it seems ironic to say the least to 
designate as "partisans of the just cause" nineteenth cen-
tury tribal warriors who routinely preyed on Vietnamese 
villages in order to rob or enslave the occupants, and who 
almost always retreated to their mountain redoubts rather 
than fight the royal forces sent to defend the peasants. 
That the Thuong rejected outside control, rather than simp-
ly the Nguyen dynasty, was also underlined at the end of 
the century. When the French began to extend colonial power 
to the Highlands in the late 1890s, they met the same stub-
born resistance as the Vietnamese had earlier done. It re-
quired six suppression campaigns, plus numerous patrols by 
French-officered Garde indigene equipped with modern wea-
pons, before most of the moutain peoples from Quang-nam to 
Phu-yen submitted to colonial authority. Even then, as late 
as 1905, only the appearance of a strong French force serv-
ed to deter the Sedang of Binh-dinh from their 'usual Janu-
ary incursions' against Vietnamese villages.ie In histori-
cal context, then, it is surely more appropriate to classi-
ie E. Daufes, La Garde indiqene de l'Indochine de sa 
creation a nos jours, II (Avignon, 1934), pp.121-145, quote 
p.145. 
fy these disturbances among the incidents of banditry and 
foreign incursions that Chu Thien, Nguyen Phan Quang and 
Bang Huy Van classed separately from internal revolts and 
peasant rebellions. 
If we exclude the Thuong raids as cross-border, inter-
ethnic conflicts, quit~ a different picture of Vietnamese 
popular unrest during the first reign emerges from that 
presented by Nguyen Phan Quang and Bang Huy Van. Although 
the authors accepted that, south of Nghe-an, the struggle 
movement against Gia-Long lacked the scope and cohesion 
seen further north, they nevertheless insisted that &the 
central and southern Trung-bo regions, just like the Gia-
dinh area, were not peaceful places during the eighteen 
year Gia-Long reign', and that ~khoi nghia worth recording 
broke out' in the Centre during these years.i= They backed 
these contentions with a chart (reproduced below) that tab-
ulated the years of armed disturbances, province by provin-
ce, between 1802 and 1819. Quang-ngai featured on it each 
year of the reign, outstripping every other province as a 
hot-bed of revolt - but only, according to the text, on 
account of the Ba-vach Thuong. It was to this chart - and 
the Quang-ngai example in particular~ 7 - that Alexander 
Woodside sourced his claim that rebellions in the Gia-Long 
Ibid, p.17. 
i 7 Woodside, Model, p.311, fn 65. A later essay stressed 
the point: 'some 105 discernible peasant uprisings have 
been counted for the brief eighteen years of Gia-Long's 
reign, including eighteen, or one per year, in just one 
province (Quang Ngai). • 'The Historical Background·, in 
Nguyen Du (ed. and trans. Huynh Sanh Thong), The Tale of 
Kieu (New York: Vintage Books), 1973, p.xiv. 
45: 
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period were 'well distributed regionally'.ie (It is also 
apparently due to a misreading of the chart that he has 
consistently misreported its authors' findings as 105 up-
risings under Gia-Long instead of the 'over 50' mentioned 
in the text.i 9 ) 
But deleting the Thuong raids changes the pattern of 
internal revolt under Gia-Long dramatically. Popular unrest 
emerges as an almost exclusively Northern phenomenon, as 
the authors' own table confirms when divided into former 
Bang-ngoai and former Bang-trong, as we have done. Even as 
it stands, without any amendment, the table shows distur-
bances running at almost four to one in favour of the North 
(81 to 24). Subtracting the Thuong raids from the southern 
total sends the years of disturbances there plummetting to 
a mere six. And, once more excluding Quang-ngai, we find 
that only four out of fifteen provinces were involved, none 
of them south of Binh-dinh, compared to one at least in 
every former Bang-ngoai province. 20 
Thus, rather than prove the thesis that the whole 
country rejected the Nguyen right from the start, the only 
detailed statistical evidence presented in Nqhien Cuu Lich 
Woodside, Model, p.135. 
i 9 While 105 entries appear on the chart, it does not re-
cord separate incidents but only marks the years in which 
disturbances occurred in individual provinces. It does not 
indicate whether multiple outbreaks may have happened in 
the same province in any one year, nor whether consecutive 
entries for particular provinces represented the same or 
different uprisings. Its value is limited accordingly. 
20 The authors claimed that, despite the failure of court 
records to report khoi nghia in Nam-ky during the period, 
'regular disorders' still occurred there ['Bau tranh giai 
cap', p.19). They never marked any on the chart, however. 
Su in the 1960s indicated the opposite. For the Gia-Long 
reign, the basic Northern provenance of anti-dynastic up-
risings is_.incontrovertible, and suggests that, like Mac 
Bang Dung in the sixteenth century and Quang-Trung in the 
late eighteenth century, Gia-Long proclaimed his dynasty 
before conquering his kingdom. 
TABLE: ARMED DISTURBANGES IN THE GIA-LONG REIGN 
year 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
location 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Lang-son + + 
Cao-bang + 
Tuyen-quang + + + + + + + 
Thai-nguyen + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Quang-yen + 
Hung-hoa + + + 
Kinh-bac: + + + + + + 
Hai-duong + + + + + 
Son-nam-thuong + + + + + + + + + + + 
Son-nam-ha + + + + + + 
Son-tay + + + + + + + + 
Thanh-hoa + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Nghe-an + + + + + 
================================================== 
Quang-binh 
Quang-tri 
Quang-due 
Quang-nam 
Quang-ngai 
Binh-dinh 
Phu-yen 
Binh-hoa 
Binh-thuan 
Gia-dinh 
+ 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
+ 
Every year marked + there was an armed disturbance in 
the area 
Source: Nguyen Phan Quang and Bang Huy Van. NCLS, 78 
(1965), between pp.12-13. 
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TABLE 1: DOCTORAL GRADUATES (TIEN SJ/PHO BANG) BY PROVINCE 
area 
HFn6i 
H.t"i -du'dng 
e.ic:-n1nh 
Soh-t~y 
Hu'ng-y~n 
Nam-dinh 
Ninh-blnh 
8 
2 
2 
l 
tl 
2 
6 
1 
El 
2 
9 
3 2 l 
1 1 
3 
1 3 
1 
3 
1 1 1 
tl 8 8 
3 3 3 
2 ::, l:l 
1 1 1 
8 8 8 
4 4 4 
2 3 
l 1 l 
8 8 8 
4 4 4 
4 7 El 
1 
8 
4 
9 
l 
8 
5 
l 
3 2 5 4 1 l 2 2 4 3 
1 1 3 1 3 
2 1 :s l 4 1 2 1 
1 
8 
5 
3 
~ 2 2 
1 2 
1 2 2 2 3 3 2 
2 2 
l l l l 
8 8 8 6 
5 6 6 6 
6 2 5 8 
l 
1 
1 
1 6 4 
l 1 
1 2 1 
2 1 1 
2 
l 1 
a a 
6 7 
9 l 
1 2 
l 
l 
1 
8 
7 
5 
1 
l 
l 
B.fc: -k v 4 I 9 9 3 7 8 7 3 7 4 9 13 8 2 3 6 13 6 5 3 3 
thanh::;hoa t 
Nghe-an 2 
Ha-ti'nh 
oulng-bJ.nh 
oulng-trl. 
Thu'a-thi~n 
Qu.\ng-nam 
ouJng-nga"i 
Bi"nh-ct'i,nh 
l l 
-.s 
1 
1 1 
1 l 2 
l l 
3 2 
2' l 2 
-, 
~ 
;! 
1 1 
1 
2 
.. , 
L 
3 
2 
2 
l 
1 
1 
l 
4 
l 
1 
6 
3 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
2 
4 
2 
1 
l 
3 
2 
2 
3 
1 
l 
5 
1 
3 
3 
5 
l 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1 
l 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
7 
J 
l 
1 
1 
, 
... 
2 
2 
2 
1 3 
l 
1 
2 
2 
5 
2 
3 
:z 
1 
8 
7 
7 
1 
1 
2 
l 
1 
l 
l 
8 
7 
9 
l 
8 
8 
0 
2 1 
2 
3 
2 l 
1 
8 
8 
4 
1 
4 7 1 
l 
3 
2 
1 
J. 
1 
l 
l 
1 
2 
1 
Trung-ky 4 2 5 2 7 13 7 12 6 18 8 13 11 19 11 3 4 7 11 4 5 14 7 9 3 5 
Nam-k~ 1 1 1 
total 
51 
15 
26 
20 
4 
30 
5 
151 
15 
49 
28 
29 
H:l 
35 
22 
9 
6 
211 
4 
Total a 10 14 .11 11 20 15 19 ~ 26 12 22 24 27 13 7 11 20 t7 9 a 11 7 13 10 6 3S6 
TABLE 2. GRADUATE NUMBERS PER DECADE, 1822-1879. 
A. By r~9_ion 
B. By selected areas 
Table 2A 
1820s 1830s 1840s 1850s 1860s 1870s total 
.J ' Bac-ky 
Trung-ky 
Nam-ky 
Total 
ct ' 
'%. Bac-ky 
'%. Trung.:.k~ 
I. Nam-k~ 
Table 28 
' " Ha-noi 
Nam-chnh 
• totai 
Nghe-an 
Ha-t.l'.nh 
• total 
"Z Quang-blnn 
Quclng-tr i 
ThUa-thi•n 
• total 
20 
11 
l 
32 
62'%. 
34'%. 
4'%. 
6 
3 
9 
4 
5 
9 
1 
l 
19 
22 
l 
42 
4~'%. 
53% 
2'%. 
10 
3 
13 
3 
2 
5 
3 
3 
3 
9 
51 
75 
126 
41'%. 
59'%. 
14 
12 
26 
12 
8 
20 
10 
6 
13 
29 
13 
33 
l 
47 
28'%. 
70(. 
2%" 
3 
3 
6 
9 
5 
14 
5 
3 
8 
16 
30 
26 
1 
57 
53'%. 
45'%. 
2'%. 
12 
4 
16 
5 
4 
9 
7 
2 
5 
14 
17 150 
38 205 
4 
55 359 
31'%. 41. 7'%. 
69'%. 57.iY. 
1.1'%. 
6 
4 
10 
12 
3 
15 
4 
4 
6 
14 
51 
29 
80 
45 
27 
72 
29 
18 
36 
83 
These three areas produced 65'%. of all doctoral graduates in 
the period, in roughly comparable proportions: 
Ha-ndi/Nam-clinh = 22'%. of 
... r" Ngh~- inh = 20'%. of 
Binh-Tri-Thi~n = 23'%. of 
all graduates (or 53'%. of all 
;s Bac-ky graduates) 
all graduates (or 36'%. of all 
Trung-ky graduates) 
all graduates (or 40'%. of all 
Trung-ky graduates> 
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TABLE 3: ANALYSIS OF COMPARATIVE CAREER SUCCESS OF 
METRO~OLITAN GRADUATES, BY SELECTED AREA (1822-1862) 
Introductory notes 
457 
- The period chosen gives the biggest sample while largely 
avoiding colonial distortions. 
- The years represent successive examinations. 
Administrative grades (1-5) include both classes, thus: 
1 includes the 8 daf h9c si; ~ 
2 in$ludes both levels of provincial governor (tang 
a8c and tuan phJ) and heads of ministries ( thuqhg-
tha? plus their deputies (tham-tri). 
( 
-·In education, 4 refers mainly to tE?achers at the Qudc TU"' 
Gilm and 5 to provincial professors tdoc h~c). 
-•Phu/h' refers to those whose highest recorded grade was 
district magistrate [tri phJ (5-2) or tri huy'n (6-2)], 
•other' refers to any other position in grades b and 7. 
UNKNOWN includes those with insufficient details, those 
who did not become mandarins, and those who were awarded 
honorary grades without holding office. 
- Bold numbers show the highest career grades achieved 
(ignoring later fluctuations or posthumous promotions). 
- Information in brackets summarises individual career 
fluctuations noted in the text, thus: 
(B): dismissed 
(Bx): dismissed; reint~grated and reached numbered 
level 
(BX-]: dismissed; ~ejoined education at numbered level 
[BM]: dismissed, redeemed h~mself in the military 
(DR]: demoted, and allowed to retire 
(Ox]: demoted, but finished career at indicated level 
(OJ: demoted; no further information 
(DX-]: demoted to indicated level in education 
(XX-J: 'transferred' to indicated level in education 
(E]: text say •caught in error', but without details. 
where x is the number of the new mandarinal grade. 
CD 
If) 
<::t 
3A. H~-ndi/Nam-dinh 
. 
GRADE 1822 1826 1829 1832. 
ADM IN 
l 
( l 
2 2 2 
( l (95][9] 
3 2 2 
( ] (DR](9] [D] 
4 2 1 
( ] (E](9] (DR] 
5 
(] 
phu/h. 
(] 
other 1 
(] 
EDUC 
4 1 
5 
UNKNOWN 
TOTAL 
1835 1838 1841 
1 
2 3 
(05] 
1 
1 3 
CE] 
1 
(E] 
2 
1 
1842 1843 1844 1847 1848 1849 1851 1853 1856 1862 TOTAL 
1 1 1 1 1 9 
(B2J (B5•] 
1 2 1 1 10 
(9M] [94] 
1 1 3 1 1 15 (XS•] (05•] 
1 
1 1 1 2 2 11 
2 
[48] 
1 4 
1 1 3 
[7] 
1 1 
56 
0-
If) 
¢ 
1 ... 38. Ngh7-Tinh 
GRADE 1822 1826 1829 1832 183S 1838 1841 1842 1843 1844 1847 1848 1849 1851 1853 18S6 1862 total 
ADM IN 
1 0 
( ] 
2 l l l l l l 1 3 1 11 
(] (DS] (04) [B3] [B4] (04) 
3 l 2 1 l 5 
[ ] (96] 
4 1 l l l 2 l 4 2 13 
(] [ 9] [XS•] (BS•] 
s 1 1 1 2 1 6 
( ] 
phu/h. 1 1 1 2 1 6 
( ] (E] 
other l 1 1 1 l 5 
(] (07) (98] 
(46] 
EDUC 
4 1 
s 1 
[l] 
UNKNOWN 1 l 1 3 
TOTAL 50 
0 
...(I 
o:::t· 
3C. B!nh-Tr~-Thi~n 
GRADE 1822 1826 
ADM IN 
1 
[ ] 
2 
(] 
3 
[] 
4 
[] 
5 
[) 
phu/h. 
(] 
other 
[) 
EDUC 
4 
5 
UNKNOWN 
TOTAL 
1829 1832 
1 
1835 1838 1841 1842 1843 
1 
2 1 1 1 2 
[9] (94] 
2 1 
(9) 
1 2 1 2 
(EJ (BJ 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1844 1847 1848 1849 1851 1853 1856 1862 total 
1 2 1 5 
(Dl] (81] 
l 1 2 l 13 
[D3] 
l 1 1 6 
(D5) 
3 4 1 14 
2 l 1 4 
2 1 1 5 
1 1 1 4 
(51] 
1 2 
1 1 
[3] 
1 2 
56 
..... 
...(I 
o::t 
3D. Thifa-thi~n province 
GRADE 1822 1826 1829 
ADM IN 
1 
(] 
2 1 
[] 
3 
(] 
4 
(J 
5 
(] 
phu/h. 
(] 
other 
(] 
EDUC 
4 
5 
UNKNOWN 
TOTAL 
1832 1835 1838 1841 1842 1843 
1 
1 1 1 
(94] 
1 
1 1 
1844 1847 1848 1849 1851 1853 1856 1862 TOTAL 
1 2 1 5 
(Dl] (01) 
1 1 2 8 
(D3] 
1 2 
(D5] 
1 1 4 
1 1 2 
2 2 
1 1 
(24] 
0 
1 1 
[1] 
0 
25 
462 
TABLE 4. NUMERICAL COMPARISON BETWEEN THE FOUR AREAS 
I. H~-noi/Nam-~inh 
I I. Nghs--T.t'nh . 
III.B.i:rih-:-_Tr~-Thien 
IV. Th~a-thien province 
I I I I I I IV 
Grades 
ADM IN 
1 5 5 
2 9 11 13 7 
3 10 5 6 2 
4 15 13 14 4 
5 1 6 4 2 
phu/h. 11 6 5 2 
other 2 5 4 1 
EDUC 
4 4 2 
5 3 l 1 l 
UNKNOWN 1 3 2 0 
TOTAL 56 50 56 24 
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TABLE 5. PROVINCIAL BACKGROUND OF TIEN SJ/PHO BANG WHO REACHED 
THE POWER ELITE (l-1 TO 2-lJ BEFORE 1884 (examinations of 1822 
to 1856) 
A. Data 
~ 
Those who were 
dismissed or demoted and failed to regain their original 
rank are indicated by an asterisk; 
from B~c-k~ provinces appear in bold type; 
• pho bang are underlined. 
Posthumous promotions are not included 
Abbreviations 
Highest ranks: 
1-1 One of the di~n rank of cliii. hoc si, or an 'imperial tutor' 
1-2 One of the four hi~p bi~n 'rank. of clai hqc sr' 
2-la. Board President - thuong tho 
2-lb Provincial Governor-General - tong doc 
Provtf1ces: 
Ha,;t.inh BN Ba.c-ninh l-1T 
HD H.ii-ou'dng QN Quang-nam 
HN H~-ndi QNg Qu.Ing-ngai 
HY Hu'ng....:yQn TT Thu•a-thien 
NB Nam-c:finn 
ST Sdn-tjy VL vinh-long 
1822 1826 1829 1832 183:i 1838 1841 
2-lo* 1-2 z-1a z.-10 2-lb• 1-1 2-lb 
(Hi] [vL] [HTJ [QNgj [hD] [TT] [HNJ 
2-la 2-lb 
[HT] (HY] 
2-lb* 
[Nf) J 
2-lb* 
[NBJ 
2-lb 
[SN] 
1842 1843 1844 1848 1849 1851 1853 1856 
2-la. 2-la* 2-la* 2-la* ~ 2-la* 2-la* 2-la (QNgJ [QN] [SN] (HT] (Ne] [TT] [HTJ (HT] 
2-lb* ~ 1-1 2-la (HT] [TTJ [TT] [TT] 
1-2 
(TT] 
2-lb 
CSTJ 
8. Analysis 
Total = 26 
2 at 1-1 
3 at 1-2 
- 11 at 2-la 
- 10 at 2-lb 
. ;. > ' Thuc:ng-tho 
Th.Ya thi~n 
- 2 at 
2 at 
2 at 
- 0 at 
= 6 (or 23%) 
1-1 (or 100%) 
1-2 (or 66%) 
2-la (or 18%) 
2-lb 
Th ') • e men in the top two grades were thuong-tho, giving a total 
of lo Board Presidents. 
Their provincial backgrounds were: 
T-rung-ky 
o - Th~~-thien 
5 - Ha-ti'nh 
1 Q "Z .J. uang-ngai 
1 - Qu.\ng-nam 
.J .... 
Bac-ky 
1 - stc-ninh [ *] 
1 - Nam-dinh 
• ie Trung-ky totalled 13 (or 811.) • 
Nam-kV 
"' l - Vinh-long 
• Of those 16, 4 were dismissed or de~ted [*] and never 
regained thuohg tho•status (although the Bac-ninh thu't;lng-tho: 
,:/. ~ a• .-..-r ---"'""'' Nguyen Tu' Gian, rose again to tong aoc). 
,.z ~,,., 
Tong aoc 
"B I 
There were 9 Provincial Governors (tong i/Oc) listed. 
Their provincial backgrounds were: 
Trung-ky 
2 - Ha-tinh 
l Q "t t<J. 
- uang-ngai 
ti ' Bac-ky 
2 - Nam-dinh 
1 - Hung-yen 
1 - sic-ninh 
l H1i-du'dng 
l - Ha-no'i 
I '"' l Son-tay 
• ie ..t .... Bac-ky totalled 7 (or 77%). 
PhcJ ba},g 
The sample contained 5 pho bang (or 191.) 
Their backgrounds were: 
' Trung-ky 
3 - ThUla-thi~n 
1 Q "'- ~ 
- uang-ngai 
.t ' Bac-ky 
l - Nam-J:f.nh 
• all three from Tnua-thi~n reached 1-1 to 1-2. 
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TABLE 6. FAMILY EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF TIEN SJ/PHO BANG, 
BY SELECTED AREAS (1822-1884) 
Notes 
A. Central Trung-ky CBtnh-Tri-Thiin and Qu.ing-nam) 
B. Thanh-Nghe-Tfnh 
C B ok k' CH' ,. N .:J. B" . • ac- y a-no1, am-cfnh, ac-n1nh) 
NB: GTBKL does not record relatives with t6 t~i titles. 
The 10 provinces provide an 80/. sample of all graduates (inclu-
ding all families over two generations>, and subdivide into 
areas with roughly equal cohorts. 
Table 6A. Generations of graduates per area 
A B c 
total 104 93 107 
- sole grad• 70 (67/.) 47 ( 50/.) 65 (61/.) 
- others: 34 ·46 42 
1S" gen ~ 16 ( 15/.) 18 ( l 9'l.) 13 ( 12'%.) 
2'"'d gen °'- 7 ( 8'l.) 24 ( 26'l.) 18 ( l 7/.) 
same gen only 11 ( 10'%.) 4 ( 4'l.) 11 ( 10/.) 
~ graduates who became fathers, uncles, or grandfathers of cu 
nhan or higher graduates {into the twentieth century) 
.!'> graduates whose fathers, grandfathers, or uncles already had 
high academic titles. Where graduates fitted both categories, 
they appear here. 
Table 68. Nineteenth Century •Great 5cholar Families' 
The table examines family success rates over generations 
. Families counted once only • 
• QT.f>KL includes details or close patrilineal relatives, as 
well as matrilinea1 uncles and (unspecified> nepnews and 
cousins. 
Four Northern families included one generation under the Le. 
A 8 c 
total families 100 85 98 
- with multiple grad• 30 ( 30/.) 36 ( 42/.) 31 ( 31 'l.) 
[multiple ts/pb 4 8· 9] 
Of those families -
1 gen only 6 { 20/.) 7 ( 22/.) 
2 gen .. 23 ( 76/.) 32 ( 89/.) 20 ( 641.) 
3 gen l ( 3/.) 4 ( 11 'l.) 3<=(10/.) 
4 gen l ( 31.) 
• two Ha-tinh families produced 3 ts/pb graduates each 
.. including non-consecutive generations 
= including Ho~ng Te' MT who moved from Soh-tay to Ha-noi 
z Bao-Bai 
Bui An Ni@n 
' Bui Ng9c Qut' 
? ±I\) Bu'u-oao 
z 
Bu'u-li@m 
l z.. 
Bu'u-thao 
i 
Bu'u-trung 
'2 
Canh 
Cao B~ Qu~t 
Cao Xuan Due 
""' t Doan Uan 
I 
Duc-Bu'c 
Duy-T~n 
B~m-Phu'o'ng 
B~ng I Ng9c Danh 
B~ng Nhu' Mai 
GLOSSARY OF VIETNAMESE WORDS 
Personal Names or Titles 
Gia-Long 
H~ Huy T~p 
Ham-Ng hi 
'· Hi~p-Hoa 
I A H6 Ba On 
Hd' Ch{ Minh 
Hd 
J, 
Bae An 
I 
Hd B.i'c Di 
H6 
.} 
Bae Si@°m 
J, i 
Hd Bae Khai 
J, 
Hff Sac Li@n 
( 
He' Ba'c Trung 
Hff Tung Mau 
Hff si' Tu~h 
HIS Van BOi 
2. Hoang Cao Khai 
I 
Hoang K~ Vi~m 
Hoang Kim X~n 
B~ng Tra'n Thu'o'ng 
Hoang Quang 
Hoang T~ Mi' 
Bao Duy Tb' 
Bao I Thai Hanh 
Binh Ti~n Hoang 
"' B6 Thanh Nho'n 
Boan EHnh Nh~n 
Boan Tru'ng 
\. I Sdng-Khanh 
Hoang Trc;mg Mau 
? HO'ng-bao 
IV 
H~ng-kh~ng 
HO'ng-t~p 
Hu~-vu'o'ng 
' Hu'o'ng-sam 
" Huynh Cen 
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Ki~n-dU'ng nam 
I I 
Ki,n-Phu'o'c 
I Ki@n-thai vu'o'ng 
z. . Khai-Binh 
• 
L@ Duy sci 
' L@ Duy Hoan 
L@ Duy Lu'o'ng 
L@ Duy Minh 
L@ HO'ng Phong 
L@ HOng So' n 
L@ Lo'i 
• 
' L@ Phat An 
L@ Quang B~nh 
L@ si' 
I L@ Thanh-tOng 
L@ van Duy~t 
L@ V~n KhOi 
Lu'u V~n B.lnh 
Ly 
Mac 
Minh-Mf!ng 
Minh-vu'o'ng 
Myc-vu'o'ng 
"' My-Du'o'ng 
Nam-Phu'o'ng 
NOng Van van 
Ngo i>!nh Di@m 
.. 
2 NgO Bl.nh Kha 
.f, 
NgttY Khac Tua'n 
., I f 
Nguy@!n Ai QuOc 
Nguyln Anh 
,,, ' Nguy@n Ba Nghi 
,J / Nguy@n ceng Tru 1 
"' z Nguy@n Cu'u Ki@u 
" z Nguy@n Cu'u Tru'o'ng 
II 
Nguy@n Du 
"' v Nguy@n Bang Giai 
# v Nguy@n Bang Hanh 
.., ,,,, 
Nguy@n Bang Tuan 
¥ ~. Nguyen B.lnh Chi@IJ 
"' Nguy@n B.lnh Hoe 
.I 
Nguy@n Ho~ng 
"" Nguy@n Hu~ 
.., "' Nguy@n Hu'u B~i 
N it# ·J Nguy@n Hu'u Chinh 
.. J 
Nguy@n Hu'u D~t 
.., "' Nguy@n Hu'u Lu~n 
IV tV Z Nguy@n Hu'u Thuy 
., ~ 
Nguy@n Huy Dy 
N ' f Nguy@n Huynh Bu'c 
.., 
Nguy@n Hy 
N 
Nguy@n Khoa H~o 
.. 
Nguy@n Khoa Ky 
"' Nguy@n Khoa Minh 
I# Nguy@n Khoa Tan 
Nguy@n Kim 
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,.., I Nguy@n Phuc Chu 
"' 
I I Nguy@n Phuc Khoat 
"' Nguy@n Than 
"' 
I 
Nguy@n Thanh y 
'3 B{ch Nguy@n Thi 
• 
,v 
Nguy@n Thi Minh Khai 
. 
.V ..; 
Nguy@n Tri Ki@m 
.., 
Nguy@n Tri Phu'o'ng 
"' Nguy@n Tr9ng Hi~p 
N 
Nguy@n Tr9ng Thao 
N 
Tru'b'ng Nguy@n TO 
. 
"" 
-i Nguy@n Tu' Gian 
,.., 
van Nguy@n NM~n 
"' van Nguy@n Nhi 
. 
,., .,, 
Phu Nguy@n Van 
., 
van Nguy@n Thanh 
~ .., ~ Nguy@n Van Tuy@n 
"' van Tu'o'ng Nguy@n 
,.,. 
Nguy@n van 
,., 
Nguy@n Xuan 
"' "' Nguy@n Xuc1tn On 
Ph9m 
.., 
Bang Hu'ng 
Phan scI V~nh 
Phan B¢i Chelu 
Phan Chu Trinh 
Phan Bl:nh Phung 
Phan Huein 
I 
Phan Huy Ich 
Phan Huy Thu c 
• 
Phan Nhu' T{nh 
Phan Thanh Gian 
Phan Thanh Li@m 
Phan X{ch Long 
Quang-Trung 
,J 
Sai-vu'o'ng 
I 
TOng van Kh6i 
, 
TOn ThAt H~n 
' TOn Th~t Lu'o'ng 
I I 
TOn That Thuy~t 
I 
TOn Th~t Tram 
• 
T(i' Du 
I 
Tl/-Bu' c 
Tung-thi~n Qu~n-vu'o'ng 
Tuy-ly Qu~n-vu'o'ng 
I "" Z . Thai Van Toan 
Th.\nh-Th~i 
Theln Trqng Hu~' 
J.-M. Th{ch 
Thi~u-Tri 
, " 
Th9-xuan Qu~n-vu'o'ng 
Trc:ln Bich San 
Tr~n COng Lai 
Tr~n B1nh B~ch 
Tra'n B1nh Ph~t 
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Trh.'n Bl.nh 
,, 
Tue 
Trd'n Hy 
..., 
Tang 
Trfl'n Phu 
Tr£n T~n 
Trfl'n 
t. I 
Ti~n Hei 
Tr£n t ThAnh Ti~n 
Trfin Tr'ilm 
Trinh Giang 
• 
I Trinh HoAi Bu'c 
• 
a 
Trinh Ki~m 
' 
Trinh T~c I 
Trinh ' , Tung 
Tru'o'ng COng Binh 
• 
... 
, 
Tru'o'ng Bang B~ 
Tru'o'ng ... Bang 
, 
Qu~ 
Tru'o'ng Nhu' Cu'o'ng 
Tru'o'ng Ph8c Loan 
Tru'o'ng Quang Ban~ 
Place Names 
An-c'to'ng 
Anh-so'n 
An-ninh 
~ ~ Bac-ky 
J, . Bac-n1nh 
./. Bac-th~nh 
Bi~n-h6a 
Blnh-dinh 
. 
Tru'o'ng Quang Tr~ 
/ 
Tru'o'ng QuOc D~ng 
' ! Tru'o'ng Ti~n Bu'u 
,., , 
Tru'o'ng Van Ch~t 
... I Vo Tanh 
,.; 
Blnh Vo Tn;ing 
.. Vo-vu'o'ng 
,. 
N Vo Xu~n C~n 
"" 
'I. 
Vu Pham Khai 
• 
Vu'o'ng Tu' 
U'ng-bang 
U'ng-bl:nh 
U'ng-d';1 I 
, 
U'ng-hoat 
z. U'ng-qua 
U'ng-thOng 
' U'ng-uy 
B.l:nh-hda 
Blnh-thut!n 
c~'n-giu~c 
i. Cao-bang 
• Cao-xa 
B~i-Nam 
Ba-lat 
• 
Bai 
• 
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eang-ngoai Nha-trang 
eang-trong 
e~-vc!ch. Phan-rang 
e!nh-tu'o'ng 
I 
Phu-xu~n 
ea h"'. I ng- o i Phu-y~n 
eo·ng-so' n 
~ , Quang-binh 
Gia-cJ~nh s. di, Quang- u'c 
Giao-chl i: Quang-nam 
Q a. ,.;. 
uang-ngai 
z.. Hai-An z. Quang-y~n 
I Hai-du'o'ng Qu'i-nho' n 
Ha-nth 
• 
Quynh-c:fth 
Ha-t~nh 
f Hu~ SAi-gon 
Hu'ng-h6a So'n-nam-ha ,. 
Hu'ng-y@n So'n-nam-thu'q'ng 
So'n-t~y 
/ ' Kha·nh-hoa 
.{, 
Kinh-bac T~y-so'n 
I TOng-so'n 
L<Jng..,..so' n Tuy@n-quang 
z Lao-bao Thang-long 
Thanh-hba 
Nam-dinh Thanh-Ngh~ 
• 
Nam-h~ Thu~n-an 
. 
' Nam-ky Thu'a-thi~n 
"' Ninh-blnh Tri-1~
Ngh~-an 
... Trung-ky 
Vi~t-Nam vtnh-long 
Vinh Vo-li@t 
Institutional, Political and Other Terms 
( 
am sinh 
~m ' a thu 
I I 
an-sat 
bach di~n thu'sinh 
. ~ 
r I bO-chanh 
C~n-ch~nh-di@n Bai-hoc-st 
c)tn vu'o'ng 
0'1 cha 
I 
chua 
~ 
chu' nd'm 
Co'-mat-vi~n 
.. . 
d~ng c/i~n 
, 
ceng sinh 
t 
cu' nhan 
d'ai-th~n 
• % -giai nguy~n 
. . 
Han-lcim-vi~n 
Hi~n-lu'o'ng 
I' 
hi~p tran 
ho~ng-d@ 
hoang-'-h~u 
Hoang Tri@u H~i Bi~n 
ho dai khoa 
. . 
:-. +I HOng-ou'c 
H~ng 10 tu' khanh 
-( 
hu'o'ng ti~n 
huy~t a~' vu'o'ng 
"" I hu'u ton chanh 
2 kinh-lu'9'c-su' 
kim-ti~n 
f I lai co quy quan 
# lang binh 
lang trung 
I, 
me 01 
• 
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, 
Mi@u Tru ng-hu'ng COng Thfin 
Minh-hu'o'ng 
Nam Giao 
( 
nam ti@n 
I NOi-cac 
"' Nu' COng Hoc HOi 
. 
nghfa sf d'oan 
nh3n v~t 
eng l~' n 
eng quan 
ong tro'i 
Phat s~ng 
• 
phe tu' van 
I Z pho bang 
... ,., 
pho ma 
phJc cJJ·c 
quan 
qu<'1c I chua 
I Qudc Hoc 
. 
I J qu1~k ngu' 
{ QuOc TCt' Gi~m 
t~ ten c h.;n h 
z. , 
t@ tu'o'ng 
I .,, 
ti@n SJ. 
'\ ( 
teng ode 
~ f 
teng tran 
'&. 
Ton Nho'n Phu 
ten sinh 
' ten that 
' z tu~n phu 
t t" t" -u ai 
I I 
Thai-mi@u 
Th~i-t~· Thi~~-b:o 
Tham t~n ~ai th~n 
tham tri 
I 
thi@n tang 
~ Thi@n-tu' 
Thi~u b~o 
I I Thi@u pho 
, 
Thi@u su' 
th~ lang 
I I 
theng ch~ 
. 
thu'9'ng-tho' 
• 't 
tr~n thu 
tri huy~n 
i 
tri phu 
' I, tro'i 01 
trung-hu'ng 
trung-ngh.i'a 
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V~n chdc 
V~n-minh-oi@n Bai-hoc-s! 
- . 
., 
van 
' ve 
Vi@t-Minh 
. 
i 
Vinh 
vua 
vua b~p 
vu'o'ng 
t 
vu'o'ng thO 
Phrases 
An-nam Nhu'-tay Du-ho.c-bao tro'-hOi 
. . 
J ' -1! Bao oan gia ti@n nhap! 
I . " I • Bao i · an gia thu' nh,p! 
Si tu' gi~ thG· nh~p! 
d£y vua kh~ng KhA, d!o m~ khOng B!i 
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